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  1. added 2020-02-18
    The Feeling Animal.Andrew M. Bailey & Allison Krile Thornton - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    For good or for ill, we have animal bodies. Through them, we move around, eat and drink, and do many other things besides. We owe much – perhaps our very lives – to these ever-present animals. But how exactly do we relate to our animals? Are we parts of them, or they of us? Do we and these living animals co-inhere or constitute or coincide? Or what? Animalism answers that we are identical to them. There are many objections to animalism, (...)
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  2. added 2019-10-28
    A Case for Conservatism About Animal Consciousness.Samuel Murray - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    *Please email me for a copy of the paper if you are interested! -/- Liberal theories of animal consciousness maintain that we should attribute consciousness widely across various species. Conservative theories of animal consciousness maintain that we should not attribute consciousness widely. This paper makes a case for a conservative theory of animal consciousness. The case depends on two defensive moves and one offensive move. The defensive moves indicate that the indistinguishable causal profiles of conscious and non-conscious mental states are (...)
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  3. added 2019-07-15
    Animal Moral Psychologies.Susana Monsó & Kristin Andrews - forthcoming - In John M. Doris & Manuel Vargas (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Observations of animals engaging in apparently moral behavior have led academics and the public alike to ask whether morality is shared between humans and other animals. Some philosophers explicitly argue that morality is unique to humans, because moral agency requires capacities that are only demonstrated in our species. Other philosophers argue that some animals can participate in morality because they possess these capacities in a rudimentary form. Scientists have also joined the discussion, and their views are just as varied as (...)
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  4. added 2019-06-05
    The Evolution of Animal Play, Emotions, and Social Morality: On Science, Theology, Spirituality, Per.Marc Bekoff - 2001 - Zygon 36 (4):615-655.
  5. added 2019-06-05
    Emotion as an Explanatory Principle in Early Evolutionary Theory.Sue Campbell - 1997 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (3):453-473.
  6. added 2019-05-17
    The Case for Animal Emotions: Modeling Neuropsychiatric Disorders.K. J. Sufka, M. Weldon & C. Allen - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. pp. 522--536.
  7. added 2019-05-16
    Payback Without Bookkeeping: The Origins of Revenge and Retaliation.Isaac Wiegman - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (7):1100-1128.
    ABSTRACTCurrent evolutionary models of revenge focus on its complex deterrent functions. Nevertheless, there are some retaliatory behaviors in nonhuman animals that do not appear to have a deterren...
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  8. added 2019-05-16
    Anger and Punishment: Natural History and Normative Significance.Isaac Wiegman - 2014 - Dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis
    I argue that the evolutionary history of anger has substantive implications for normative ethics. In the process, I develop an evolutionary account of anger and its influence on action. First, I consider a prominent argument by Peter Singer and Joshua Greene. They conclude that evolutionary explanations of human cooperation debunk – or undercut the evidential value of – the moral intuitions supporting duty ethics (as opposed to utilitarian or consequentialist ethics). With this argument they aim to defend consequentialist theories. However, (...)
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  9. added 2019-04-01
    Witnessing Animal Others: Bearing Witness, Grief, and the Political Function of Emotion.Kathryn Gillespie - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (3):572-588.
    This article theorizes the politics of witnessing and grief in the context of the embodied experience of cows raised for dairy in the Pacific Northwestern United States. Bearing witness to the mundane features of dairy production and their impact on cows' physical and emotional worlds enables us to understand the violence of commodification and the political dimensions of witnessing the suffering of an Other. I argue that greater attention should be paid to the uneven hierarchies of power in the act (...)
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  10. added 2019-04-01
    Kristin Andrews: The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition: Routledge, 2014, 185 Pages. ISBN: 0415809606 $37.95.Michele Merritt - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):475-481.
  11. added 2019-03-25
    Primates Are Touched by Your Concern: Touch, Emotion, and Social Cognition in Chimpanzees.Maria Botero - 2018 - In Kristin Andrews & Jacob Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. London: Routledge. pp. p. 372-380.
    There is something important about the way human primates use touch in social encounters; for example, consider greetings in airports (hugs vs. handshakes) and the way children push each other in a playground (a quick push to warn, a really hard one when it is serious!). Human primates use touch as a way of conveying a wide range of social information. In this chapter I will argue that one of the best ways of understanding social cognition in non-human primates is (...)
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  12. added 2019-03-25
    Bringing Touch Back to the Study of Emotions in Human and Non-Human Primates: A Theoretical Exploration.Maria Botero - 2018 - International Journal of Comparative Psychology 30 (10):1-17.
    This paper provides a theoretical exploration of how comparative research on the expression of emotions has traditionally focused on the visual mode and argues that, given the neurophysiological, developmental, and behavioral evidence that links touch with social interactions, focusing on touch can become an ideal mode to understand the communication of emotions in human and nonhuman primates. This evidence shows that touch is intrinsically linked with social cognition because it motivates human and nonhuman animals from birth to form social bonds. (...)
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  13. added 2019-03-25
    Death in the Family. [REVIEW]Maria Botero - 2016 - Animal Sentience 1:1-3.
    Barbara King presents grief as the result of the capacity of human and non-human animals for social and affectionate bonds. This is a novel approach that provides a context for interpreting behavioral evidence of grief. The book also offers thought-provoking insights into the relationship between emotion and the expression of emotion. The most surprising element of King’s approach is that, throughout the book, her account of non-human animal grief forces us to reassess the way we treat them.
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  14. added 2019-03-05
    Animal Consciousness.Pierre Le Neindre, Emilie Bernard, Alain Boissy, Xavier Boivin, Ludovic Calandreau, Nicolas Delon, Bertrand Deputte, Sonia Desmoulin-Canselier, Muriel Dunier, Nathan Faivre, Martin Giurfa, Jean-Luc Guichet, Léa Lansade, Raphaël Larrère, Pierre Mormède, Patrick Prunet, Benoist Schaal, Jacques Servière & Claudia Terlouw - 2017 - EFSA Supporting Publication 14 (4).
    After reviewing the literature on current knowledge about consciousness in humans, we present a state-of-the art discussion on consciousness and related key concepts in animals. Obviously much fewer publications are available on non-human species than on humans, most of them relating to laboratory or wild animal species, and only few to livestock species. Human consciousness is by definition subjective and private. Animal consciousness is usually assessed through behavioural performance. Behaviour involves a wide array of cognitive processes that have to be (...)
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  15. added 2018-09-28
    Animal Morality: What It Means and Why It Matters.Susana Monsó, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg & Annika Bremhorst - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (3-4):283-310.
    It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations. In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it. Using the capabilities approach, we argue that beings who are moral subjects are entitled to enjoy positive opportunities for the flourishing of their moral capabilities, and that the thwarting of these capabilities entails (...)
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  16. added 2018-09-07
    Consciousness as an Adaptation. What Animals Feel and Why.Pouwel Slurink - 2016 - In Andreas Blank (ed.), Animals. New Essays. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. pp. 303-332.
    Evolutionary epistemology (Lorenz, Vollmer) and value-driven decision theory (Pugh) are used to explain the fundamental properties of consciousness. It is shown that this approach is compatible with global workspace theory (Baars) and global neuronal workspace theory (De Haene). The emotions are, however, that what drives consciousness. A hypothetical evolutionary tree of the emotions is given – intended to show that consciousness evolves and is probably qualitatively different in different groups of animals.
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  17. added 2018-08-31
    What Basic Emotions Really Are: Encapsulated or Integrated?Isaac Wiegman - manuscript
    While there is ongoing debate about the existence of basic emotions and about their status as natural kinds, these debates usually carry on under the assumption that BEs are encapsulated from cognition and that this is one of the criteria that separates the products of evolution from the products of culture and experience. I aim to show that this assumption is entirely unwarranted, that there is empirical evidence against it, and that evolutionary theory itself should not lead us to expect (...)
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  18. added 2017-03-01
    The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds.Kristin Andrews & Jacob Beck (eds.) - 2017 - Routledge.
    While philosophers have been interested in animals since ancient times, in the last few decades the subject of animal minds has emerged as a major topic in philosophy. _The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds_ is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising nearly fifty chapters by a team of international contributors, the _Handbook_ is divided into eight parts: Mental representation Reasoning and (...)
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  19. added 2017-03-01
    The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition.Kristin Andrews - 2014 - Routledge.
    The study of animal cognition raises profound questions about the minds of animals and philosophy of mind itself. Aristotle argued that humans are the only animal to laugh, but in recent experiments rats have also been shown to laugh. In other experiments, dogs have been shown to respond appropriately to over two hundred words in human language. In this introduction to the philosophy of animal minds Kristin Andrews introduces and assesses the essential topics, problems and debates as they cut across (...)
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  20. added 2016-10-14
    Angry Rats and Scaredy Cats: Lessons From Competing Cognitive Homologies.Isaac Wiegman - 2016 - Biological Theory 11 (4):224-240.
    There have been several recent attempts to think about psychological kinds as homologies. Nevertheless, there are serious epistemic challenges for individuating homologous psychological kinds, or cognitive homologies. Some of these challenges are revealed when we look at competing claims of cognitive homology. This paper considers two competing homology claims that compare human anger with putative aggression systems of nonhuman animals. The competition between these hypotheses has been difficult to resolve in part because of what I call the boundary problem: boundaries (...)
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  21. added 2016-04-21
    An Evolutionary Ockham's Razor to Reciprocity.Irene Berra - 2014 - Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 5:01258.
    Reciprocal altruism implies delayed payoffs by definition. It might therefore seem logical to assume that limited memory, calculation, and planning capacities have constrained the evolution of reciprocity in non-human animals. Here I will argue that this is not the case. First, I will show that the emotional track of past interactions is enough to motivate and maintain reciprocity over longer timespans. Second, I will propose a developmental pathway of this system of emotional bookkeeping. In particular, the neuropeptide modulation underlying mother-infant (...)
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  22. added 2016-03-09
    Morality Without Mindreading.Susana Monsó - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):338-357.
    Could animals behave morally if they can’t mindread? Does morality require mindreading capacities? Moral psychologists believe mindreading is contingently involved in moral judgements. Moral philosophers argue that moral behaviour necessarily requires the possession of mindreading capacities. In this paper, I argue that, while the former may be right, the latter are mistaken. Using the example of empathy, I show that animals with no mindreading capacities could behave on the basis of emotions that possess an identifiable moral content. Therefore, at least (...)
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  23. added 2016-02-09
    Animals as Reflexive Thinkers: The Aponoian Paradigm.Mark Rowlands & Susana Monsó - forthcoming - In Linda Kalof (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies. Oxford University Press.
    The ability to engage in reflexive thought—in thought about thought or about other mental states more generally—is regarded as a complex intellectual achievement that is beyond the capacities of most nonhuman animals. To the extent that reflexive thought capacities are believed necessary for the possession of many other psychological states or capacities, including consciousness, belief, emotion, and empathy, the inability of animals to engage in reflexive thought calls into question their other psychological abilities. This chapter attacks the idea that reflexive (...)
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  24. added 2015-09-11
    Empathy and Morality in Behaviour Readers.Susana Monsó - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (5):671-690.
    It is tempting to assume that being a moral creature requires the capacity to attribute mental states to others, because a creature cannot be moral unless she is capable of comprehending how her actions can have an impact on the well-being of those around her. If this assumption were true, then mere behaviour readers could never qualify as moral, for they are incapable of conceptualising mental states and attributing them to others. In this paper, I argue against such an assumption (...)
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  25. added 2015-09-10
    Evidential Criteria of Homology for Comparative Psychology.Isaac Wiegman - manuscript
    While the homology concept has taken on importance in thinking about the nature of psychological kinds, no one has shown how comparative psychological and behavioral evidence can distinguish between competing homology claims. I adapt the operational criteria of homology to accomplish this. I consider two competing homology claims that compare human anger with putative aggression systems of nonhuman animals, and demonstrate the effectiveness of these criteria in adjudicating between these claims.
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  26. added 2015-06-23
    Emotions: The Shared Heritage of Animals and Humans.Hans J. Markowitsch - 2009 - In Birgitt Röttger-Rössler & Hans Markowitsch (eds.), Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes. Springer. pp. 95--109.
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  27. added 2015-06-22
    Review of Mark Rowlands, Can Animals Be Moral? [REVIEW]Tom McClelland - 2013 - Metapsychology Online 17 (29).
    In this vivid and engaging book Mark Rowlands asks whether animals are capable of being moral. His answer is a mitigated 'yes', supported by an ambitious and convincing philosophical argument. A great deal of attention has been given to the question of whether animals deserve our moral consideration. Much less has been given to the question of whether animals themselves are moral beings. The dominant view among both philosophers and scientists has been that they are not. The standard position is (...)
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  28. added 2014-04-11
    Animal Experience: Consciousness and Emotions in the Natural World.Leon Niemoczynski & Stephanie Theodorou (eds.) - 2014 - Open Humanities Press.
    Open Humanities Press, Living Books About Life Series.
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  29. added 2014-03-28
    Human Beings and Giant Squids (on Ascribing Human Sensations and Emotions to Non-Human Creatures).David Cockburn - 1994 - Philosophy 69 (268):135-50.
    A television nature programme a year or two ago contained a striking sequence in which a giant squid was under threat from some other creature . The squid responded in a way which struck me immediately and powerfully as one of fear. Part of what was striking in this sequence was the way in which it was possible to see in the behaviour of a creature physically so very different from human beings an emotion which was so unambiguously and specifically (...)
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  30. added 2014-03-20
    Affective Consciousness: Core Emotional Feelings in Animals and Humans.Jaak Panksepp - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):30-80.
    The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain–mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill (...)
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  31. added 2014-03-19
    Animal Passions and Beastly Virtues: Cognitive Ethology as the Unifying Science for Understanding the Subjective, Emotional, Empathic, and Moral Lives of Animals.Marc Bekoff - 2006 - Zygon 41 (1):71-104.
  32. added 2014-02-19
    La vie végétative des animaux : la destruction heideggérienne de l’animalité.Christiane Bailey - 2007 - PhaenEx 2 (2):81-123.
    La déconstruction heideggérienne de l’animalité qui a lieu dans les Concepts fondamentaux de la métaphysique va jusqu’à faire disparaître l’idée même d’une vie animale , d’une vie propre aux animaux. La vie, comme le disait déjà Heidegger dans Être et temps , est « un mode d’être propre », ce qui veut dire, comme le confirmera le cours de 1929-1930, que la vie est « le mode d’être de l’animal et de la plante ». D’emblée conçus comme « organismes », (...)
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  33. added 2013-10-12
    Review of Victoria Braithwaite's „Do Fish Feel Pain?“. [REVIEW]S. Benjamin Fink - 2010 - Metapsychology 14 (34).
  34. added 2013-09-24
    Variation in Emotion and Cognition Among Fishes.Victoria A. Braithwaite, Felicity Huntingford & Ruud den Bos - 2013 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 26 (1):7-23.
    Increasing public concern for the welfare of fish species that human beings use and exploit has highlighted the need for better understanding of the cognitive status of fish and of their ability to experience negative emotions such as pain and fear. Moreover, studying emotion and cognition in fish species broadens our scientific understanding of how emotion and cognition are represented in the central nervous system and what kind of role they play in the organization of behavior. For instance, on a (...)
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  35. added 2012-09-12
    4 Darwin on Mind, Morals and Emotions.Robert J. Richards - 2003 - In J. Hodges & Gregory Radick (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Darwin. Cambridge University Press. pp. 92.
  36. added 2012-01-21
    Consciousness, Emotion and Animal Welfare: Insights From Cognitive Science.M. Mendl & E. S. Paul - 2004 - Animal Welfare 13:17- 25.
  37. added 2011-11-09
    Reinforcement and Punishment: Dissociable Systems for Action and Emotion?Simon Killcross - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):205-205.
    Rolls presents a theory of emotion based on the premise that emotions are evoked by events that are capable of being instrumental reinforcers and punishers. As support for this theory is drawn almost entirely from experiments in non-human primates, valuable insights into the relationship between punishment and reinforcement systems, and the nature of instrumentality, may have been overlooked.
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  38. added 2010-10-05
    The Description and Evaluation of Animal Emotion.Stephen R. L. Clark - 1987 - In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.
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  39. added 2009-12-17
    Propositions and Animal Emotion.Robert C. Roberts - 1996 - Philosophy 71 (275):147-56.
  40. added 2009-12-03
    Animal Emotion.Beth Dixon - 2001 - Ethics and the Environment 6 (2):22-30.
    : Recent work in the area of ethics and animals suggests that it is philosophically legitimate to ascribe emotions to nonhuman animals. Furthermore, it is sometimes argued that emotionality is a morally relevant psychological state shared by humans and nonhumans. What is missing from the philosophical literature that makes reference to emotions in nonhuman animals is an attempt to clarify and defend some particular account of the nature of emotion, and the role that emotions play in a characterization of human (...)
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  41. added 2009-12-03
    Emotions or Emotional Feelings? (Commentary on Rolls' The Brain and Emotion).Murat Aydede - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):192-194.
    It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, "What is it like to be a bat?" is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a bat . . . provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured internal representational system that enables them to think about their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured. For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1998, p. 262). By this criterion, not only (...)
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  42. added 2009-12-03
    Significance, Emotions, and Objectivity: Some Limits of Animal Thought.Bennett W. Helm - 1994 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Rationality is the constitutive ideal of the mental. Therefore it is important to understand the sort of rationality at issue here. It is often assumed that rationality just is instrumental rationality, but this leaves us with too thin a notion of desire: Desires centrally involve the notion of things mattering or being significant, for their objects must normally be worth pursuing to the subject. Such significance is simply unintelligible in terms of instrumental rationality. Consequently, understanding significance and its rational connections (...)
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