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  1. added 2019-05-13
    The Philosophy of Animal Minds: An Introduction.W. Rohert - 2009 - In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. pp. 1.
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  2. added 2019-05-06
    Book Review of Animal Thought. [REVIEW]S. F. Sapontzis - unknown
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  3. added 2019-05-06
    Animal Agency.Hans Johann Glock - 2010 - In .
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  4. added 2019-04-29
    The Philosophy of Animal Minds.Robert W. Lurz (ed.) - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
    This volume is a collection of fourteen essays by leading philosophers on issues concerning the nature, existence, and our knowledge of animal minds. The nature of animal minds has been a topic of interest to philosophers since the origins of philosophy, and recent years have seen significant philosophical engagement with the subject. However, there is no volume that represents the current state of play in this important and growing field. The purpose of this volume is to highlight the state of (...)
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  5. added 2019-04-16
    Companion to the Philosophy of Animal Minds.Sean Allen-Hermanson - forthcoming - Routledge.
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  6. added 2019-04-01
    Animal Minds in Time: The Question of Episodic Memory.Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack - 2017 - In Kristin Andrews & Jacob Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. London: Routledge. pp. 56-64.
    One particularly vibrant area of debate, in recent times, concerning potential cognitive differences between humans and other animals (and also one wth a veritable history) is centred on the claim that non-human animals are, in some sense, 'stuck in time', whereas humans are able to cognitively transcend the present moment in time by turning their minds back to particular past events. This chapter seeks to clarify what is at issue in these debates.
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  7. added 2019-04-01
    Kristin Andrews: The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition.Michele Merritt - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):475-481.
  8. added 2019-04-01
    3. More on Animal Minds: Dogs and Concepts.Alice Crary - 2016 - In Inside Ethics: On the Demands of Moral Thought. Harvard University Press. pp. 92-120.
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  9. added 2019-04-01
    From Cognition to Consciousness: A Discussion About Learning, Reality Representation, and Decision Making.David Guez - 2010 - Biological Theory 5 (2):136-141.
    The scientific understanding of cognition and consciousness is currently hampered by the lack of rigorous and universally accepted definitions that permit comparative studies. This article proposes new functional and unambiguous definitions for cognition and consciousness in order to provide clearly defined boundaries within which general theories of cognition and consciousness may be developed. The proposed definitions are built upon the construction and manipulation of reality representation, decision making, and learning and are scoped in terms of an underlyinglogical structure. It is (...)
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  10. added 2019-04-01
    Knowledge in Humans and Other Animals.Hilary Kornblith - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):327-346.
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  11. added 2019-04-01
    'Superstitious' Behavior in Animals.W. N. Kellogg - 1949 - Psychological Review 56 (3):172-175.
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  12. added 2019-04-01
    The Animal Mind.Margaret Floy Washburn - 1908 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (17):467-469.
  13. added 2019-04-01
    C. Lloyd Morgan, Animal Behaviour. [REVIEW]J. L. Mcintyre - 1901 - Mind 10:394.
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  14. added 2019-03-26
    Normative Practices of Other Animals.Sarah Vincent, Rebecca Ring & Kristin Andrews - 2019 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology. New York: pp. 57-83.
    Traditionally, discussions of moral participation – and in particular moral agency – have focused on fully formed human actors. There has been some interest in the development of morality in humans, as well as interest in cultural differences when it comes to moral practices, commitments, and actions. However, until relatively recently, there has been little focus on the possibility that nonhuman animals have any role to play in morality, save being the objects of moral concern. Moreover, when nonhuman cases are (...)
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  15. added 2019-03-26
    Do Apes Attribute Beliefs to Predict Behavior?Kristin Andrews - 2018 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 25:89-110.
    I defend a Mengzian version of the Social Intelligence Hypothesis, according to which humans think about one another’s beliefs and desires—and reasons for action—in order to solve our social living problems through cooperation, rather than through competition and deception, as the more familiar Machiavellian version has it. Given this framework, and a corresponding view about the function of belief attribution, I argue that while apes need not attribute propositional attitudes to pass the “false belief task,” we should not conclude that (...)
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  16. added 2019-03-26
    Life in a Cage.Kristin Andrews - 2017 - The Philosophers' Magazine 76:72-77.
    Personhood is not a redundant category, but a social cluster kind. On this view, chimpanzees have their own kind of personhood profile. Seeing that chimpanzees have a personhood profile allows us to argue that chimpanzees like Tommy are individuals who deserve rights under the law. If chimpanzee personhood is a matter of public policy that needs to be decided by society, then learning more about the person profiles of chimpanzees will be essential in making this case. As the public learns (...)
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  17. added 2019-03-26
    Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places?Kristin Andrews - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (5):521-536.
    : I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's theoretical commitments should lead them to (...)
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  18. added 2019-03-26
    The First Step in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for Other Minds.Kristin Andrews - 1996 - Etica and Animali: The Great Ape Project:131-141.
    A defense of equality for great apes must begin with an understanding of the opposition and an acknowledgement of the most basic point of disagreement. For great apes to gain status as persons in our community, we must begin by determining what the multitude of different definitions of "person" have in common. Finding that great apes fulfill the requirements of any one specific theory of personhood is insufficient, for these theories are highly controversial, and a critique of the theory will (...)
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  19. added 2019-03-18
    Thinking in and About Time: A Dual Systems Perspective on Temporal Cognition.Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences:1-77.
    We outline a dual systems approach to temporal cognition, which distinguishes between two cognitive systems for dealing with how things unfold over time – a temporal updating system and a temporal reasoning system – of which the former is both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more primitive than the latter, and which are at work alongside each other in adult human cognition. We describe the main features of each of the two systems, the types of behavior the more primitive temporal updating system (...)
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  20. added 2019-03-18
    What Frege Asked Alex the Parrot: Inferentialism, Number Concepts, and Animal Cognition.Erik Nelson - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    While there has been significant philosophical debate on whether nonlinguistic animals can possess conceptual capabilities, less time has been devoted to considering 'talking' animals, such as parrots. When they are discussed, their capabilities are often downplayed as mere mimicry. The most explicit philosophical example of this can be seen in Brandom's frequent comparisons of parrots and thermostats. Brandom argues that because parrots (like thermostats) cannot grasp the implicit inferential connections between concepts, their vocal articulations do not actually have any conceptual (...)
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  21. added 2019-03-18
    Neo-Pragmatism, Primitive Intentionality and Animal Minds.Laura Danón - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):39-58.
    According to Hutto and Satne, 521–536, 2015), an “essential tension” plagues contemporary neo-Pragmatist accounts of mental contents: their explanation of the emergence and constitution of intentional mental contents is circular. After identifying the problem, they also propose a solution: what neo-Pragmatists need to do, to overcome circularity, is to appeal to a primitive content-free variety of intentionality, different from the full-blown intentionality of propositional attitudes. In this paper, I will argue that, in addition to the problem of circularity, there is (...)
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  22. added 2019-03-18
    Animal Agency.Dale Jamieson - 2018 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 25:111-126.
    The rise of physicalism and naturalism, the development of cognitive science, and the explosion and popularization of knowledge about animal behavior has brought us to see that most of the properties that were once thought to distinguish humans from other animals are shared with other animals. Many people now see properties that are morally relevant to how it is permissible to treat animals, such as sentience, as widely distributed. Agency, however, is one area in which the retreat from human uniqueness (...)
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  23. added 2019-03-18
    Comparative Psychometrics: Establishing What Differs is Central to Understanding What Evolves.Christoph J. Völter, Brandon Tinklenberg, Amanda Seed & Josep Call - 2018 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373 (20170283).
    Cognitive abilities cannot be measured directly. What we can measure is individual variation in task performance. In this paper, we first make the case for why we should be interested in mapping individual differences in task performance on to particular cognitive abilities: we suggest that it is crucial for examining the causes and consequences of variation both within and between species. As a case study, we examine whether multiple measures of inhibitory control for non-human animals do indeed produce correlated task (...)
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  24. added 2019-03-18
    Where the Standard Approach in Comparative Neuroscience Fails and Where It Works: General Intelligence and Brain Asymmetries.Davide Serpico & Elisa Frasnelli - 2018 - Comparative Cognition and Behavior Reviews 13:95-98.
    Although brain size and the concept of intelligence have been extensively used in comparative neuroscience to study cognition and its evolution, such coarse-grained traits may not be informative enough about important aspects of neurocognitive systems. By taking into account the different evolutionary trajectories and the selection pressures on neurophysiology across species, Logan and colleagues suggest that the cognitive abilities of an organism should be investigated by considering the fine-grained and species-specific phenotypic traits that characterize it. In such a way, we (...)
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  25. added 2019-03-18
    Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-28.
    A surge of empirical research demonstrating flexible cognition in animals and young infants has raised interest in the possibility of rational decision-making in the absence of language. A venerable position, which I here call “Classical Inferentialism”, holds that nonlinguistic agents are incapable of rational inferences. Against this position, I defend a model of nonlinguistic inferences that shows how they could be practically rational. This model vindicates the Lockean idea that we can intuitively grasp rational connections between thoughts by developing the (...)
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  26. added 2019-03-18
    Visual Imagery in the Thought of Monkeys and Apes.Christopher Gauker - 2017 - In Kristin Andrews & Jacob Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 25-33.
    Explanations of animal problem-solving often represent our choices as limited to two: first, we can explain the observed behavior as a product of trained responses to sensory stimuli, or second, we can explain it as due to the animal’s possession of general rules utilizing general concepts. My objective in this essay is to bring to life a third alternative, namely, an explanation in terms of imagistic cognition.The theory of imagistic cognition posits representations that locate objects in a multidimensional similarity space. (...)
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  27. added 2019-03-18
    Theory of Mind and Non-Human Intelligence.Brandon Tinklenberg - 2016 - Shakelford, T.K. And V.A.Weekes-Shakelford (Eds.) Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science. Springer.
    Comparative cognition researchers have long been interested in the nature of nonhuman animal social capacities. One capacity has received prolonged attention: mindreading, or “theory of mind” as it’s also called, is often seen to be the ability to attribute mental states to others in the service of predicting and explaining behavior. This attention is garnered in no small measure from interest into what accounts for the distinctive features of human social cognition and what are the evolutionary origins of those features. (...)
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  28. added 2019-03-18
    Pojem animální mysli.Tomas Hribek - 2016 - In Hana Müllerová, David Cerny & Adam Doležal (eds.), Kapitoly o právech zvířat. Praha, Česko: pp. 235-306.
    [The Concept of Animal Mind] A critical analysis and assessment of the current philosophical theories of animal cognition and consciousness. The contents: 1. The concept of mind; 2. Other minds; 3. Can animals think?; 4. Do animals have concsiousness?; 5. Conclusion.
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  29. added 2019-03-18
    The Principle of Conservatism in Cognitive Ethology.Elliott Sober - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:225-238.
    Philosophy of mind is, and for a long while has been, 99% metaphysics and 1% epistemology. Attention is lavished on the question of the nature of mind, but questions concerning how we know about minds are discussed much less thoroughly. University courses in philosophy of mind routinely devote a lot of time to dualism, logical behaviourism, the mind/brain identity theory, and functionalism. But what gets said about the kinds of evidence that help one determine what mental states, if any, an (...)
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  30. added 2018-09-08
    Great Apes Search for Longer Following Humans’ Ostensive Signals, but Do Not Then Follow Their Gaze.Fumihiro Kano, Richard Moore, Chris Krupenye, Satoshi Hirata, Masaki Tomongaga & Josep Call - 2018 - Animal Cognition 21 (5):715-728.
    The previous studies have shown that human infants and domestic dogs follow the gaze of a human agent only when the agent has addressed them ostensively—e.g., by making eye contact, or calling their name. This evidence is interpreted as showing that they expect ostensive signals to precede referential information. The present study tested chimpanzees, one of the closest relatives to humans, in a series of eye-tracking experiments using an experimental design adapted from these previous studies. In the ostension conditions, a (...)
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  31. added 2018-07-24
    Collective Intentionality in Non-Human Animals.Robert A. Wilson - 2017 - In Marija Jankovic and Kirk Ludwig (ed.), Routledge Handbook on Collective Intentionality. New York, NY, USA: pp. 420-432.
    I think there is something to be said in a positive and constructive vein about collective intentionality in non-human animals. Doing so involves probing at the concept of collective intentionality fairly directly (Section 2), considering the various forms that collective intentionality might take (Section 3), showing some sensitivity to the history of appeals to that concept and its close relatives (Section 4), and raising some broader questions about the relationships between sociality, cognition, and institutions by discussing two different possible cases (...)
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  32. added 2018-07-24
    Thoughtful Brutes.Tomas Hribek - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19:70-82.
    Donald Davidson and John Searle famously differ, among other things, on the issue of animal thoughts. Davidson seems to be a latter-day Cartesian, denying any propositional thought to subhuman animals, while Searle seems to follow Hume in claiming that if we have thoughts, then animals do, too. Davidson’s argument centers on the idea that language is necessary for thought, which Searle rejects. The paper argues two things. Firstly, Searle eventually argues that much of a more complex thought does depend on (...)
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  33. added 2018-03-11
    Perception and the Vis Cogitativa: A Thomistic Analysis of Aspectual, Actional, and Affectional Percepts.Daniel D. De Haan - 2014 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):397-437.
    This paper aims to establish some of the taxonomical groundwork required for developing a robust philosophy of perception on the basis of the Thomistic doctrine of the cogitative power . The formal object of the cogitative power will be divided into aspectual, actional, and affectional percepts. Accordingly, the paper contends that there is an internal sense power capable of a non-conceptual and pre-linguistic perceptual estimation of what some particular is, what could be done with respect to it, and what is (...)
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  34. added 2018-02-17
    The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds.Kristin Andrews & Jacob Beck (eds.) - 2017 - Routledge.
    While philosophers have been interested in animals since ancient times, in the last few decades the subject of animal minds has emerged as a major topic in philosophy. _The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds_ is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising nearly fifty chapters by a team of international contributors, the _Handbook_ is divided into eight parts: Mental representation Reasoning and (...)
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  35. added 2018-02-17
    Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals.Kristin Andrews - 2011 - In Tom L. Beauchamp R. G. Frey (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 469--494.
    In the context of animal cognitive research, anthropomorphism is defined as the attribution of uniquely human mental characteristics to animals. Those who worry about anthropomorphism in research, however, are immediately confronted with the question of which properties are uniquely human. One might think that researchers must first hypothesize the existence of a feature in an animal before they can, with warrant, claim that the property is uniquely human. But all too often, this isn't the approach. Rather, there is an a (...)
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  36. added 2018-02-16
    Umwelt or Umwelten? How Should Shared Representation Be Understood Given Such Diversity?Colin Allen - 2014 - Semiotica 2014 (198):137-158.
    It is a truism among ethologists that one must not forget that animals perceive and represent the world differently from humans. Sometimes this caution is phrased in terms of von Uexküll’s Umwelt concept. Yet it seems possible (perhaps even unavoidable) to adopt a common ontological framework when comparing different species of mind. For some purposes it seems sufficient to ­anchor comparative cognition in common-sense categories; bats echolocate insects (or a subset of them) after all. But for other purposes it seems (...)
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  37. added 2018-01-19
    Symbols Are Not Uniquely Human.Sidarta Ribeiro, Angelo Loula, Ivan Araújo, Ricardo Gudwin & Joao Queiroz - 2006 - Biosystems 90 (1):263-272.
    Modern semiotics is a branch of logics that formally defines symbol-based communication. In recent years, the semiotic classification of signs has been invoked to support the notion that symbols are uniquely human. Here we show that alarm-calls such as those used by African vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops), logically satisfy the semiotic definition of symbol. We also show that the acquisition of vocal symbols in vervet monkeys can be successfully simulated by a computer program based on minimal semiotic and neurobiological constraints. (...)
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  38. added 2018-01-17
    Razonamiento Animal: Negación y Representaciones de Ausencia.Jorge Morales - 2011 - Revista Argentina de Ciencias Del Comportamiento 3 (1):20-33.
    In this paper, I reject that animal reasoning, negation in particular, necessarily involves the representation of absences, as suggested by Bermúdez (2003, 2006, 2007), since this would still work as a logical negation (unavailable for non-linguistic creatures). False belief, pretense, and communication experiments show that non-human animals (at least some primates) have difficulties representing absent entities or properties. I offer an alternative account resorting to the sub-symbolic similarity judgments proposed by Vigo & Allen (2009) and expectations: animal proto-negation takes place (...)
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  39. added 2017-10-26
    Animal Cognition and Human Values.Jonathan Birch - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (5):1026-1037.
    Animal welfare scientists face an acute version of the problem of inductive risk, since they must choose whether to affirm attributions of mental states to animals in advisory contexts, knowing their decisions hold consequences for animal welfare. In such contexts, the burden of proof should be sensitive to the consequences of error, but a framework for setting appropriate burdens of proof is lacking. Through reflection on two cases—pain and cognitive enrichment—I arrive at a tentative framework based on the principle of (...)
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  40. added 2017-10-09
    Animal Morality: What is the Debate About?Simon Fitzpatrick - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy 32 (6):1151-1183.
    Empirical studies of the social lives of non-human primates, cetaceans, and other social animals have prompted scientists and philosophers to debate the question of whether morality and moral cognition exists in non-human animals. Some researchers have argued that morality does exist in several animal species, others that these species may possess various evolutionary building blocks or precursors to morality, but not quite the genuine article, while some have argued that nothing remotely resembling morality can be found in any non-human species. (...)
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  41. added 2017-07-25
    The Logical Problem and the Theoretician's Dilemma.Hayley Clatterbuck - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):322-350.
    The theory-theory of human uniqueness posits that the capacity to theorize, in a way strongly analogous to theorizing in scientific practice, was a key innovation in the hominid lineage and was responsible for many of our unique cognitive traits. One of the central arguments that its proponents have used to support the claim that animals are not theorists, the logical problem, bears strong similarities to Hempel's theoretician's dilemma, which purports to show that theories are unnecessary. This similarity threatens to undermine (...)
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  42. added 2017-07-24
    The Discourse of the Birds.David Abram - 2010 - Biosemiotics 3 (3):263-275.
    Modern humans spend much of their time deploying a very rarefied form of intelligence, manipulating abstract symbols while their muscled body is mostly inert. Other animals, in a constant and largely unmediated relation with their earthly surroundings, think with the whole of their bodies. This kind of distributed sentience, this intelligence in the limbs, is especially keen in the case of birds of flight. Unlike most creatures of the ground, who must traverse an opaque surface of only two-plus dimensions as (...)
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  43. added 2017-07-24
    `The Complete Biography of Every Animal': Ants, Bees, and Humanity in Nineteenth-Century England.J. F. M. Clark - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 29 (2):249-267.
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  44. added 2017-07-24
    Living Together: People, Animals, Environment--A Personal Historical Perspective.L. K. Bustad - 1988 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 31 (2):171.
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  45. added 2017-07-24
    Vacancy Chains: A Process of Mobility to New Resources in Humans and Other Animals.I. D. Chase & T. H. DeWitt - 1988 - Social Science Information 27 (1):83-98.
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  46. added 2017-07-24
    Assessment of Covariation by Humans and Animals: The Joint Influence of Prior Expectations and Current Situational Information.Lauren B. Alloy & Naomi Tabachnik - 1984 - Psychological Review 91 (1):112-149.
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  47. added 2017-07-20
    Battlefish Contention.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2017 - Animal Sentience 2 (13):3.
  48. added 2017-05-14
    Is Behavioural Flexibility Evidence of Cognitive Complexity? How Evolution Can Inform Comparative Cognition.Irina Mikhalevich, Russell Powell & Corina Logan - 2017 - Interface Focus 7.
    Behavioural flexibility is often treated as the gold standard of evidence for more sophisticated or complex forms of animal cognition, such as planning, metacognition and mindreading. However, the evidential link between behavioural flexibility and complex cognition has not been explicitly or systematically defended. Such a defence is particularly pressing because observed flexible behaviours can frequently be explained by putatively simpler cognitive mechanisms. This leaves complex cognition hypotheses open to ‘deflationary’ challenges that are accorded greater evidential weight precisely because they offer (...)
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  49. added 2017-03-09
    Pensamientos de primer orden.Mariela Aguilera - 2013 - Critica 45 (133):55-81.
    Uno de los argumentos en favor de la dependencia entre lenguaje y conceptos descansa en la premisa de que la posesión de conceptos involucra pensamientos de segundo orden y éstos, a su vez, requieren lenguaje. Este trabajo se centra en una variante de este argumento formulada por José Luis Bermúdez. Sostendré que aun cuando el pensamiento de segundo orden suponga competencia lingüística, no es necesario aceptar esa premisa. Propondré, en cambio, dos condiciones alternativas para la posesión de conceptos, la identificación (...)
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  50. added 2017-03-01
    Chimpanzee Mind Reading: Don't Stop Believing.Kristin Andrews - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (1):e12394.
    Since the question “Do chimpanzees have a theory of mind?” was raised in 1978, scientists have attempted to answer it, and philosophers have attempted to clarify what the question means and whether it has been, or could be, answered. Mindreading or theory of mind refers to the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. Some versions of the question focus on whether chimpanzees engage in belief reasoning or can think about false belief, and chimpanzees have been given nonverbal versions (...)
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1 — 50 / 121