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  1. added 2020-07-01
    Tactful Animals: How the Study of Touch Can Inform the Animal Morality Debate.Susana Monsó & Birte Wrage - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    In this paper, we argue that scientists working on the animal morality debate have been operating with a narrow view of morality that prematurely limits the variety of moral practices that animals may be capable of. We show how this bias can be partially corrected by paying more attention to the touch behaviours of animals. We argue that a careful examination of the ways in which animals engage in and navigate touch interactions can shed new light on current debates on (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-28
    Primate Social Cognition and the Core Human Knowledge Concept.John Turri - 2018 - In Masaharu Mizumoto, Stephen Stich & Eric McCready (eds.), Epistemology for the rest of the world: linguistic and cultural diversity and epistemology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 279-290.
    I review recent work from armchair and cross-cultural epistemology on whether humans possess a knowledge concept as part of a universal “folk epistemology.” The work from armchair epistemology fails because it mischaracterizes ordinary knowledge judgments. The work from cross-cultural epistemology provides some defeasible evidence for a universal folk epistemology. I argue that recent findings from comparative psychology establish that humans possess a species-typical knowledge concept. More specifically, recent work shows that knowledge attributions are a central part of primate social cognition, (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-27
    Belief and Representation in Nonhuman Animals.Sarah Beth Lesson, Brandon Tinklenberg & Kristin Andrews - 2020 - In 2nd ed (ed.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. pp. 370-383.
    It’s common to think that animals think. The cat thinks it is time to be fed, the monkey thinks the dominant is a threat. In order to make sense of what the other animals around us do, we ascribe mental states to them. The cat meows at the door because she wants to be let in. The monkey the monkey fails the test because he doesn’t remember the answer. -/- We explain animal actions in terms of their mental states, just (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-23
    What Does It Mean to Be Human, and Not Animal? Examining Montaigne’s Literary Persuasiveness in “Man is No Better Than the Animals”.Rory Collins - 2018 - Sloth: A Journal of Emerging Voices in Human-Animal Studies 4 (1).
    Michel de Montaigne famously argued in “Man is No Better Than the Animals” that humans and non-human animals cannot be dichotomized based on language or reasoning abilities, among other characteristics. This article examines a selection of writing features at play in the text and discusses how successfully they convey Montaigne’s claims. Throughout, I argue that Montaigne presents a superficially convincing case for doubting a categorical distinction between humans and animals on linguistic and rational grounds through the use of rhetorical questions, (...)
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  5. added 2019-09-10
    Form and Function in the Imitative Learning of Language: Comment on “Replication and Emergence in Cultural Transmission” by Monica Tamariz.Richard Moore - forthcoming - Physics of Life Reviews.
  6. added 2019-05-20
    Do Apes Attribute Beliefs to Predict Behavior?Kristin Andrews - 2018 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 25:89-110.
    I defend a Mengzian version of the Social Intelligence Hypothesis, according to which humans think about one another’s beliefs and desires—and reasons for action—in order to solve our social living problems through cooperation, rather than through competition and deception, as the more familiar Machiavellian version has it. Given this framework, and a corresponding view about the function of belief attribution, I argue that while apes need not attribute propositional attitudes to pass the “false belief task,” we should not conclude that (...)
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  7. added 2019-05-20
    Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places?Kristin Andrews - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (5):521-536.
    : I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's theoretical commitments should lead them to (...)
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  8. added 2019-05-20
    Dogs That Don't Bark in the Night: How to Investigate the Lack of a Domain of Expertise?Dorothy L. Cheney & Robert M. Seyfarth - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:92 - 109.
    Despite being excellent observers' of each others' behavior, vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops) appear to be surprisingly ignorant about the behavior of the species that prey upon them. In particular, they fail to attend to many of the visual cues created by their predators. One explanation for this lack of attentiveness is that natural selection has favored skills in the social domain that cannot be extended to non-social contexts. In this paper, we review the ways that the term "domain" has been (...)
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  9. added 2019-05-13
    The Semantic Problem(s) with Research on Animal Mind‐Reading.Cameron Buckner - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):566-589.
    Philosophers and cognitive scientists have worried that research on animal mind-reading faces a ‘logical problem’: the difficulty of experimentally determining whether animals represent mental states (e.g. seeing) or merely the observable evidence (e.g. line-of-gaze) for those mental states. The most impressive attempt to confront this problem has been mounted recently by Robert Lurz. However, Lurz' approach faces its own logical problem, revealing this challenge to be a special case of the more general problem of distal content. Moreover, participants in this (...)
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  10. added 2019-05-13
    Mindreading Animals: The Debate Over What Animals Know About Other Minds.Robert W. Lurz - 2011 - Bradford.
    But do animals know that other creatures have minds? And how would we know if they do? In "Mindreading Animals," Robert Lurz offers a fresh approach to the hotly debated question of mental-state attribution in nonhuman animals.
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  11. added 2019-05-13
    Social Animal Cognition.Tetsuro Matsuzawa - 2009 - Interaction Studies: Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 10 (2):107-113.
  12. added 2019-05-13
    Collective Cognition in Animal Groups.Iain D. Couzin - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):36-43.
  13. added 2019-05-13
    Chimpanzees Know What Others Know, but Not What They Believe.Juliane Kaminski, Josep Call & Michael Tomasello - 2008 - Cognition 109 (2):224-234.
  14. added 2019-05-13
    Dolphin Social Intelligence: Complex Alliance Relationships in Bottlenose Dolphins and a Consideration of Selective Environments for Extreme Brain Size Evolution in Mammals.Richard C. Connor - 2007 - In Nathan Emery, Nicola Clayton & Chris Frith (eds.), Social Intelligence: From Brain to Culture. Oxford University Press.
  15. added 2019-05-13
    Do Chimpanzees Know What Others See - or Only What They Are Looking At?Michael Tomasello & Josep Call - 2006 - In Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press. pp. 371-384.
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  16. added 2019-05-13
    Belief Attribution Tasks with Dolphins: What Social Minds Can Reveal About Animal Rationality.Alain J.-P. C. Tschudin - 2006 - In Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
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  17. added 2019-05-13
    Social Narratives Surrounding Dolphins: Q Method Study.Paul Boyle, Sarah Gruber, Thomas Webler, Heidi Lyn, Jessica Sickler, Diana Reiss, John Fraser & Katherine Lemcke - 2006 - Society and Animals 14 (4):351-382.
    In preparation for development of an exhibit on the cognitive abilities of dolphins, the Wildlife Conservation Society sought to determine potential visitor's social perspectives about dolphin intelligence, and how these beliefs might influence acceptance of scientific information. The study reported here used Q methodology to identify these underlying social perspectives. The study of adults and the study of children each revealed three distinct perspectives. While consensus emerged among adults on points about dolphins' high intelligence and communication abilities, the three perspectives (...)
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  18. added 2019-05-13
    Chimpanzees Are Sensitive to Some of the Psychological States of Others.Josep Call - 2005 - Interaction Studies: Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 6 (3):413-427.
  19. added 2019-05-13
    A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Animal Cooperation.Lee Alan Dugatkin & Michael S. Alfieri - 2002 - In Marc Bekoff, Colin Allen & Gordon M. Burghardt (eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition. MIT Press.
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  20. added 2019-05-06
    Animal Groups and Social Ontology: An Argument From the Phenomenology of Behavior.Alejandro Arango - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):403-422.
    Through a critical engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the concepts of nature, life, and behavior, and with contemporary accounts of animal groups, this article argues that animal groups exhibit sociality and that sociality is a fundamental ontological condition. I situate my account in relation to the superorganism and selfish individual accounts of animal groups in recent biology and zoology. I argue that both accounts are inadequate. I propose an alternative account of animal groups and animal sociality through a Merleau-Pontian inspired (...)
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  21. added 2019-04-29
    Do Apes Read Minds? By Kristin Andrews.Marco Fenici - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):550-552.
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