Anton Marty

In this study, I propose to examine Marty's reconstruction of the general framework in which Brentano develops his theory of consciousness. My starting point is the formulation, at the very beginning of the second chapter of the second book of Brentano's Psychology, of two theses on mental phenomena, which constitute the basis of Brentano's theory of primary and secondary objects. In the second part, I examine the objection of infinite regress raised against Brentano's theory of primary and secondary objects and (...) Marty's interpretation of Brentano's theory of the unity of consciousness. The third part bears on the important distinction between implicit and explicit consciousness, which Brentano introduces in his lectures on descriptive psychology. Here, I analyse Marty's principle of individuation in light of the modifications which Brentano made to his theory of consciousness after the publication of his Psychology in 1874. The last section is an examination of Marty's conception of consciousness as self-consciousness with respect to his principle of individuation. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 2, pp 245 - 264 In the last few decades, the interest in Brentano’s philosophical psychology, especially in his theory of judgment, has been steadily growing. What, however, has remained relatively unexplored are the modifications that have been introduced over the years into this theory by Brentano himself and by his student Anton Marty. These amendments constitute the focus of the present paper. As will be argued, only by making such changes can the weaknesses of (...) the first formulation of the theory be overcome. Moreover, as the final section of the paper attempts to show, these modifications may even trigger further steps towards what we might label a new Brentanian theory of judgment. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse and compare Anton Marty’s and Alexius Meinong’s theories of judgement. There are at least two reasons speaking in favour of such a comparison. First, both philosophers were influenced by Franz Brentano’s approach to consciousness, in general, and by his theory of judgement, in particular: in differing degrees, Marty and Meinong may be considered pupils of Brentano. Second, the two philosophers introduced similar amendments to Brentano’s approach. According to Brentanian orthodoxy, we do not have access to (...) any entity that objectively grounds the truth of our judgements, whilst Marty and Meinong both commit themselves to the view that we do. This paper reconstructs the specific ontological characteristics of these entities and the kind of epistemological access we have to them. Finally, a crucial but problematic component of Marty’s and Meinong’s theories is addressed, i.e., the introduction of negative entities to ground the truth of negative judgements. (shrink)

In this study, I propose to examine Marty's reconstruction of the general framework in which Brentano develops his theory of consciousness. My starting point is the formulation, at the very beginning of the second chapter of the second book of Brentano's Psychology, of two theses on mental phenomena, which constitute the basis of Brentano's theory of primary and secondary objects. In the second part, I examine the objection of infinite regress raised against Brentano's theory of primary and secondary objects and (...) Marty's interpretation of Brentano's theory of the unity of consciousness. The third part bears on the important distinction between implicit and explicit consciousness, which Brentano introduces in his lectures on descriptive psychology. Here, I analyse Marty's principle of individuation in light of the modifications which Brentano made to his theory of consciousness after the publication of his Psychology in 1874. The last section is an examination of Marty's conception of consciousness as self-consciousness with respect to his principle of individuation. (shrink)

Abstract: In this study, I propose to examine Marty’s reconstruction of the general framework in which Brentano develops his theory of consciousness. My starting point is the formulation, at the very beginning of the second chapter of the second book of Brentano’s Psychology, of two theses on mental phenomena, which constitute the basis of Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects. In the second part, I examine the objection of infinite regress raised against Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects (...) and Marty’s interpretation of Brentano’s theory of the unity of consciousness. The third part bears on the important distinction between implicit and explicit consciousness, which Brentano introduces in his lectures on descriptive psychology. Here, I analyse Marty’s principle of individuation in light of the modifications which Brentano made to his theory of consciousness after the publication of his Psychology in 1874. The last section is an examination of Marty’s conception of consciousness as self-consciousness with respect to his principle of individuation. (shrink)

This paper aims to discuss some aspects of the Marty–Husserl debate about grammar. My suggestion is that the debate is first of all an epistemological debate, that is, a debate about what a priori knowledge is and how it is acquired. The key opposition is between Marty’s Brentanian notion of ‘analytic intuition’ and Husserl’s Bolzanian notion of ideation. As I will argue, the underlying issue is the possibility of a psychological a priori. On the one hand, analytic intuition provides the (...) psychologist with a priori knowledge about empirical facts. On the other hand, ideation provides the logician with entities that are disconnected from empirical facts—entities which are ‘purely logical’. I conclude with some brief remarks on the Brentanian background of both conceptions. (shrink)

Résumé — Les analyses minutieuses consacrées aux concepts clés de forme et de matière jouent, dans la philosophie de Marty, un rôle de premier plan. Ce texte vise à tirer au clair la relation établie dans l’œuvre martyenne entre le sens ontologique et le sens grammatical de ces concepts. Sur la base d’une vaste reconstruction historique, les Untersuchungen introduisent, contre l’interprétation wundtienne et en accord avec celle de Husserl, un concept de forme émancipé de toute emprise ontologique. Ce concept, de (...) nature structurale, est à l’abri des deux métaphores de la forme qui ont toujours conditionné les grammaires spéculatives.— A main role in the philosophy of Anton Marty is played by his insightful analysis of the key-concepts of form and matter. This text aims to shed light on the relationship between the ontological character of those concepts and their grammatical function in Marty’s works. After a thorough historical reconstruction, Marty defends, as well as Husserl and against Wundt’s interpretation, a concept of form free of any ontological influence. This structural concept is apart from the two metaphors of the form which have always conditioned the speculative grammars. (shrink)

"La Lógica pura, la idea de la Gramática pura y el problema de una filosofí­a del lenguaje en las Investigaciones Lógicas" Una de las cuestiones centrales que hasta hoy en dí­a se siguen debatiendo en torno a la recepción de las Investigaciones Lógicas, se refiere a la relación entre pensamiento y lenguaje, entre significado y expresión lingí¼í­stica, entre percepción y juicio, entre Lógica y Gramática que estableció en el debate con G. Frege y A. Marty, entre otros. El autor se (...) ocupa de las influencias -en parte directas o indirectas- que ha dejado la obra de Husserl sobre la lingí¼í­stica moderna, la filosofí­a del lenguaje del siglo XX y la filosofí­a analí­tica del lenguaje. "The pure Logic, the pure Grammar's idea and the problem of a philosophy of the language in the Logical Investigations". One of the central questions that until today is continued debating around the reception of the Logical Investigations, it refers to the relationship between thought and language. between meaning and linguistic expression, between perception and judgement, between Logic and Grammar that Husserl settled down in the debate with G. Frege and A. Marty, among others. The author is in charge of the influences -direct or indirectly- that has left the work of Husserl on the modern linguistics, the philosophy of the language of the XX century and the analytic philosophy of the language. (shrink)

The point of departure for Anton Marty's theory of intentionality is Franz Brentano's ontology of intentionality as outlined in the unpublished manuscript of his logic-lectures from the second half of the 1880's. This rich ontology comprises immanent objects, immanent propositional contents and states of affairs. The late Marty rejects all immanent entities in Brentano's sense and explains intentionality in terms of counterfactualconditionals.However,contraryto the late Brentano,he insists on the indispensability of the category of states of affairs. Consequently Marty can formulate a (...) realistic theory of truth, while Brentano holds an epistemic theory of truth. (shrink)

The Swiss philosopher Anton Marty (Schwyz, 1847 - Prague, 1914) belongs, with Carl Stumpf, to the first circle of Brentano’s pupils. Within Brentano’s school (and, to some extent, in the secondary literature), Marty has often been considered (in particular by Meinong) a kind of would-be epigone of his master (Fisette & Fréchette 2007: 61-2). There is no doubt that Brentano’s doctrine often provides Marty with his philosophical starting points. But Marty often arrives at original conclusions which are diametrically opposed to (...) Brentano’s views. This is true of his views about space and time and about judgment, emotions and intentionality. In the latter case, for example, Marty develops Brentano’s view and its implications in great detail (Mulligan 1989; Rollinger 2004), but uses them to formulate a very unBrentanian account of intentionality as a relation of ideal assimilation (Chrudzimski 1999; Cesalli & Taieb 2013). Marty’s philosophy of language, on the other hand, is one of the first philosophies worthy of the name. In what follows, we contrast briefly their accounts of (i) judgment and states of affairs and of (ii) emotings and value (two topics of foremost significance, for Brentano and Marty’s theoretical and practical philosophies respectively) (§1), and their philosophies of language (§2). Brentano’s view of language is based on his philosophy of mind. Marty takes over the latter and turns a couple of claims by Brentano about language into a sophisticated philosophy of language of a kind made familiar much later by Grice. Marty’s philosophy of states of affairs and value and of the mind’s relations to these also takes off from views sketched by the early Brentano, views forcefully rejected by the later Brentano. (shrink)

Anton Marty (1847-1914) is known to be the most faithful pupil of Franz Brentano. As a matter of fact, most of his philosophical ideas find their source in the works of his master. Yet, the faithfulness of Marty is not constant. As the rich correspondence between the two thinkers shows, Marty elaborates an original theory of intentionality from ca. 1904 onward. This theory is based on the idea that intentionality is a process of mental assimilation (ideelle Verähnlichung), a process at (...) the core of which lies a sui generis relation of “ideal similitude” holding between a thinking subject and its object. This study spells out the Martyian notion of mental assimilation and traces back Marty’s evolution from his earlier position (prominently described in the recently published Deskriptive Psychologie of 1893-1894) to his final view as it is found in the Untersuchungen of 1908. It turns out that besides Brentano, Husserl is a key figure in that evolution. Such a “genetic”elucidation of Marty’s last theory is required in order to reach the main goal of this paper, namely: the clarification of Marty’s degree of dependence upon Brentano with respect to the theory of intentionality. That being said, we do not merely intend to compare the mature Marty with Brentano: our “genetic” considerations will also allow us to describe the interaction between the two thinkers before 1904. Accordingly, we begin by presenting Brentano’s own position on intentionality in discussing its two currently competing readings, namely the “discontinuist” and the “continuist” one. Against a recent interpretation, we argue that Marty’s endorsement of a “discontinuist” reading is not based on a misunderstanding of Brentano’s position. (shrink)

The paper focuses on a specific point addressed in the previous article of L. Cesalli and H. Taieb The road to “ideelle Verähnlichung”, namely, the correctness of Marty’s interpretation of the early (pre-reistic) Brentanian conception of intentionality. Moving from the distinction between immanent (or intentional) object and intentional correlate, as developed by Brentano in his lectures on Descriptive Psychology, and referring to Aristotelian theory of relativa, which Brentano always remained faithful to, I show that Marty interpreted Brentano’s early conception of (...) intentionality in an immanentistic sense. Thus, the foundations for the so-called ‘ontological’ or ‘discontinuist view’ of Brentano’s intentionality thesis were put down, and through the exegesis of his pupils and Brentano’s Enkelschüler Kastil and Kraus it was then passed on, from generation to generation, until the present day. (shrink)