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  1. A Puzzle About Inferential Strength and Probability.Alexander Hughes - manuscript
    Inductive logic would be the logic of arguments that are not valid, but nevertheless justify belief in something like the way in which valid arguments would. Maybe we could describe it as the logic of “almost valid” arguments. There is a sort of transitivity to valid arguments. Valid arguments can be chained together to form arguments and such arguments are themselves valid. One wants to distinguish the “almost valid” arguments by noting that chains of “almost valid” arguments are weaker than (...)
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  2. Disjunction and Distality: The Hard Problem for Purely Probabilistic Causal Theories of Mental Content.William Roche - forthcoming - Synthese:1-34.
    The disjunction problem and the distality problem each presents a challenge that any theory of mental content must address. Here we consider their bearing on purely probabilistic causal (ppc) theories. In addition to considering these problems separately, we consider a third challenge – that a theory must solve both. We call this “the hard problem.” We consider 8 basic ppc theories along with 240 hybrids of them, and show that some can handle the disjunction problem and some can handle the (...)
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  3. Does Luck Exclude Knowledge or Certainty?Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2387-2397.
    A popular account of luck, with a firm basis in common sense, holds that a necessary condition for an event to be lucky, is that it was suitably improbable. It has recently been proposed that this improbability condition is best understood in epistemic terms. Two different versions of this proposal have been advanced. According to my own proposal :361–377, 2010), whether an event is lucky for some agent depends on whether the agent was in a position to know that the (...)
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  4. Rebooting the New Evidence Scholarship.John R. Welch - 2020 - International Journal of Evidence and Proof 24 (4):351-373.
    The new evidence scholarship addresses three distinct approaches: legal probabilism, Bayesian decision theory and relative plausibility theory. Each has major insights to offer, but none seems satisfactory as it stands. This paper proposes that relative plausibility theory be modified in two substantial ways. The first is by defining its key concept of plausibility, hitherto treated as primitive, by generalising the standard axioms of probability. The second is by complementing the descriptive component of the theory with a normative decision theory adapted (...)
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  5. Simulation Validation From a Bayesian Perspective.Claus Beisbart - 2019 - In Claus Beisbart & Nicole J. Saam (eds.), Computer Simulation Validation - Fundamental Concepts, Methodological Frameworks, and Philosophical Perspectives. Springer. pp. 173-201.
    Bayesian epistemologyEpistemology offers a powerful framework for characterizing scientific inference. Its basic idea is that rational belief comes in degrees that can be measured in terms of probabilities. The axioms of the probability calculus and a rule for updatingUpdating emerge as constraints on the formation of rational belief. Bayesian epistemologyEpistemology has led to useful explications of notions such asConfirmation confirmation. It thus is natural to ask whether Bayesian epistemologyEpistemology offers a useful framework for thinking about the inferences implicit in the (...)
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  6. Connecting Applied and Theoretical Bayesian Epistemology: Data Relevance, Pragmatics, and the Legal Case of Sally Clark.Matthew J. Barker - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (3).
    In this article applied and theoretical epistemologies benefit each other in a study of the British legal case of R. vs. Clark. Clark's first infant died at 11 weeks of age, in December 1996. About a year later, Clark had a second child. After that child died at eight weeks of age, Clark was tried for murdering both infants. Statisticians and philosophers have disputed how to apply Bayesian analyses to this case, and thereby arrived at different judgments about it. By (...)
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  7. Transforming the Self Amidst the Challenges of Chance: William James on "Our Undisciplinables".Colin Koopman - 2016 - Diacritics 44 (4):40-65.
    William James’s moral and political thought was remarkably well adapted to its historical context, in particular to the emergence in the late nineteenth century of a generalized culture of uncertainty, contingency, and probability that called into question traditional conceptions of sovereign selfhood and autonomous freedom. Facing the solidification of numerous apparatus of chance, James developed a strenuous ethics rooted in a conception of freedom as self-transformation. That this ethics was attuned to the pressing problematics of his day is shown by (...)
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  8. Conclusions as Hedged Hypotheses.John R. Welch - 2016 - In Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias. Windsor, CA: Windsor University Press.
    How can the objectivity of an argument’s conclusion be determined? To propose an answer, this paper builds on Betz’s view of premises as hedged hypotheses. If an argument’s premises are hedged, its conclusion must be hedged as well. But how? The paper first introduces a two-dimensional critical grid. The grid’s vertical dimension is inductive, reflecting the argument’s downward flow from premises to conclusion. It specifies the inductive probability of the conclusion given the premises. The grid’s horizontal dimension is epistemic, focusing (...)
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  9. Heaven Can't Wait: A Critique of Current Planetary Defence Policy.Joel Marks - 2015 - In Jai Galliott (ed.), Commercial Space Exploration: Ethics, Policy and Governance. pp. 71-90.
    It is now generally recognized that Earth is at risk of a devastating collision with an asteroid or a comet. Impressive strides in our understanding of this threat have been made in recent decades, and various efforts to deal with it have been undertaken. However, the pace of government action hasn’t kept up with the advance of our knowledge. Despite the daunting dimensions of planetary defense, one intrepid NGO has stepped up to the plate: The B612 Foundation has embarked on (...)
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  10. A Merton Model of Credit Risk with Jumps.Hoang Thi Phuong Thao & Quan-Hoang Vuong - 2015 - Journal of Statistics Applications and Probability Letters 2 (2):97-103.
    In this note, we consider a Merton model for default risk, where the firm’s value is driven by a Brownian motion and a compound Poisson process.
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  11. Parsimony and the Argument From Queerness.Justin Morton & Eric Sampson - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):609-627.
    In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the argument from queerness originally made famous by J.L. Mackie. In this paper, we do three things. First, we eliminate four untenable formulations of the argument. Second, we argue that the most plausible formulation is one that depends crucially upon considerations of parsimony. Finally, we evaluate this formulation of the argument. We conclude that it is unproblematic for proponents of moral non-naturalism—the target of the argument from (...)
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  12. Moral Strata: Another Approach to Reflective Equilibrium.John R. Welch - 2014 - Springer.
    This volume recreates the received notion of reflective equilibrium. It reconfigures reflective equilibrium as both a cognitive ideal and a method for approximating this ideal. The ideal of reflective equilibrium is restructured using the concept of discursive strata, which are formed by sentences and differentiated by function. Sentences that perform the same kind of linguistic function constitute a stratum. The book shows how moral discourse can be analyzed into phenomenal, instrumental, and teleological strata, and the ideal of reflective equilibrium reworked (...)
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  13. Probability as a Measure of Information Added.Peter Milne - 2012 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):163-188.
    Some propositions add more information to bodies of propositions than do others. We start with intuitive considerations on qualitative comparisons of information added . Central to these are considerations bearing on conjunctions and on negations. We find that we can discern two distinct, incompatible, notions of information added. From the comparative notions we pass to quantitative measurement of information added. In this we borrow heavily from the literature on quantitative representations of qualitative, comparative conditional probability. We look at two ways (...)
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  14. Dangerous “Spin”: The Probability Myth of Evidence-Based Prescribing - a Merleau-Pontyian Approach.Ron Morstyn - 2011 - Australasian Psychiatry 19 (4):295-300.
    Objective: The aim of this study was to examine logical positivist statistical probability statements used to support and justify “evidence-based” prescribing rules in psychiatry when viewed from the major philosophical theories of probability, and to propose “phenomenological probability” based on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of “phenomenological positivism” as a better clinical and ethical basis for psychiatric prescribing. -/- Conclusions: The logical positivist statistical probability statements which are currently used to support “evidence-based” prescribing rules in psychiatry have little clinical or ethical justification (...)
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  15. The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006).Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.) - 2010 - Springer.
    To clarify and illuminate the place of probability in science Ellery Eells and James H. Fetzer have brought together some of the most distinguished philosophers ...
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  16. Probing the Improbable: Methodological Challenges for Risks with Low Probabilities and High Stakes.Toby Ord, Rafaela Hillerbrand & Anders Sandberg - 2010 - Journal of Risk Research 13:191-205.
    Some risks have extremely high stakes. For example, a worldwide pandemic or asteroid impact could potentially kill more than a billion people. Comfortingly, scientific calculations often put very low probabilities on the occurrence of such catastrophes. In this paper, we argue that there are important new methodological problems which arise when assessing global catastrophic risks and we focus on a problem regarding probability estimation. When an expert provides a calculation of the probability of an outcome, they are really providing the (...)
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  17. Response to Shaffer, Thagard, Strevens and Hanson.Gilbert Harman & Sanjeev Kulkarni - 2009 - Abstracta 5 (S3):47-56.
    Like Glenn Shafer, we are nostalgic for the time when “philosophers, mathematicians, and scientists interested in probability, induction, and scientific methodology talked with each other more than they do now”, [p.10]. 1 Shafer goes on to mention other relevant contemporary communities. He himself has been at the interface of many of these communities while at the same time making major contributions to them and this very symposium represents something of that desired discussion. We begin with a couple of general points (...)
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  18. The Prior Probabilities of Phylogenetic Trees.Joel D. Velasco - 2008 - Biology and Philosophy 23 (4):455-473.
    Bayesian methods have become among the most popular methods in phylogenetics, but theoretical opposition to this methodology remains. After providing an introduction to Bayesian theory in this context, I attempt to tackle the problem mentioned most often in the literature: the “problem of the priors”—how to assign prior probabilities to tree hypotheses. I first argue that a recent objection—that an appropriate assignment of priors is impossible—is based on a misunderstanding of what ignorance and bias are. I then consider different methods (...)
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  19. Probability and Evolution. Why the Probability Argument of Creationists is Wrong.Josef Schurz - 2007 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (1):163-165.
    Evolution is a time process. It proceeds in steps of definite length. The probability of each step is relatively high, so self organization of complex systems will be possible in finite time. Prerequisite for such a process is a selection rule, which certainly exists in evolution. Therefore, it would be wrong to calculate the probability of the formation of a complex system solely on the basis of the number of its components and as a momentary event.
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  20. Sudden Infant Death or Murder? A Royal Confusion About Probabilities.Neven Sesardic - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):299-329.
    In this article I criticize the recommendations of some prominent statisticians about how to estimate and compare probabilities of the repeated sudden infant death and repeated murder. The issue has drawn considerable public attention in connection with several recent court cases in the UK. I try to show that when the three components of the Bayesian inference are carefully analyzed in this context, the advice of the statisticians turns out to be problematic in each of the steps.
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  21. Vagueness and Inductive Molding.J. R. Welch - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):147-172.
    Vagueness is epistemic, according to some. Vagueness is ontological, according to others. This article deploys what I take to be a compromise position. Predicates are coined in specific contexts for specific purposes, but these limited practices do not automatically fix the extensions of predicates over the domain of all objects. The linguistic community using the predicate has rarely considered, much less decided, all questions that might arise about the predicate’s extension. To this extent, the ontological view is correct. But a (...)
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  22. Report From a Socratic Dialogue on the Concept of Risk.Erik Persson - 2005 - In Kristina Blennow (ed.), Uncertainty and Active Risk management in Agriculture and Forestry. Alnarp, Sweden: SLU. pp. 35-39.
    The term ’risk’ is used in a wide range of situations, but there is no real consensus of what it means. ‘Risk ‘is often stipulatively defined as “a probability for the occurrence of a negative event” or something similar. This formulation is however not very informative, and it fails to capture many of our intuitions about the concept or risk. One way of trying to find a common definition of a term within a group is to use a Socratic Dialogue (...)
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  23. Central Limit Theorem for Functional of Jump Markov Processes.Nguyen Van Huu, Quan-Hoang Vuong & Minh-Ngoc Tran - 2005 - Vietnam Journal of Mathematics 33 (4):443-461.
    Some conditions are given to ensure that for a jump homogeneous Markov process $\{X(t),t\ge 0\}$ the law of the integral functional of the process $T^{-1/2} \int^T_0\varphi(X(t))dt$ converges to the normal law $N(0,\sigma^2)$ as $T\to \infty$, where $\varphi$ is a mapping from the state space $E$ into $\bbfR$.
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  24. Bayesian Networks in Philosophy.Stephan Hartmann & Luc Bovens - 2002 - In Benedikt Lowe, Wolfgang Malzkorn & Thoralf Räsch (eds.), Foundations of The Formal Sciences II. Applications of Mathematical Logic in Philosophy and Linguistics [Trends in Logic]. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 39-46.
    There is a long philosophical tradition of addressing questions in philosophy of science and epistemology by means of the tools of Bayesian probability theory (see Earman (1992) and Howson and Urbach (1993)). In the late '70s, an axiomatic approach to conditional independence was developed within a Bayesian framework. This approach in conjunction with developments in graph theory are the two pillars of the theory of Bayesian Networks, which is a theory of probabilistic reasoning in artificial intelligence. The theory has been (...)
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  25. A Probabilistic Theory of the Coherence of an Information Set.Stephan Hartmann & Luc Bovens - 2001 - In Beckermann Ansgar (ed.), Argument & Analysis: Proceedings of the 4th International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy. Bielefeld.
    Bonjour (1985: 101 and 1999: 124) and other coherence theorists of justification before him (e.g. Ewing, 1934: 246) have complained that we do not have a satisfactory analysis of the notion of coherence. The problem with existing accounts of coherence is that they try to bring precision to our intuitive notion of coherence independently of the particular role that it is meant to play within the coherence theory of justification (e.g Lewis, 1946: 338). This is a mistake: it does not (...)
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  26. Two Types of Moral Dilemma.John R. Welch - 2001 - In Matti Häyry & Tuija Takala (eds.), The Future of Value Inquiry. Rodopi.
    This chapter identifies two types of moral dilemma. The first type is described as ethical clash: whether affirmative action is just or unjust, for example, or whether withholding information from an inquisitive relative is honest or dishonest. In these cases the dilemma takes the form of conflict between an ethical predicate and its complement. The second type of moral dilemma is ethical overlap. Instead of a clash between a single predicate and its complement, here two or more predicates apply. Dilemmas (...)
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  27. Reasonable Doubt and the Presumption of Innocence: The Case of the Bayesian Juror.Piers Rawling - 1999 - Topoi 18 (2):117-126.
    There is a substantial literature on the Bayesian approach, and the application of Bayes'' theorem, to legal matters. However, I have found no discussion that explores fully the issue of how a Bayesian juror might be led from an initial "presumption of innocence" to the judgment (required for conviction in criminal cases) that the suspect is "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt". I shall argue here that a Bayesian juror, if she acts in accord with what the law prescribes, will virtually (...)
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  28. Singular Analogy and Quantitative Inductive Logics.John R. Welch - 1999 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 14 (2):207-247.
    The paper explores the handling of singular analogy in quantitative inductive logics. It concentrates on two analogical patterns coextensive with the traditional argument from analogy: perfect and imperfect analogy. Each is examined within Carnap’s λ-continuum, Carnap’s and Stegmüller’s λ-η continuum, Carnap’s Basic System, Hintikka’s α-λ continuum, and Hintikka’s and Niiniluoto’s K-dimensional system. Itis argued that these logics handle perfect analogies with ease, and that imperfect analogies, while unmanageable in some logics, are quite manageable in others. The paper concludes with a (...)
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  29. Analogy in Ethics: Pragmatics and Semantics.John R. Welch - 1997 - In Paul Weingartner, Gerhard Schurz & Georg Dorn (eds.), The Role of Pragmatics in Contemporary Philosophy. Die Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft. pp. Vol. II, 1016-1021.
    This chapter explores arguments from analogy containing ethical predicates like 'just', 'courageous', and 'honest'. The approach is Wittgensteinian in a double sense. The role of paradigm cases in ethical discourse is emphasized, first of all, and the inductive logics to be employed spring from Wittgenstein's remarks on probability (1922). Although these logics rely on a semantic concept of range, they yield results for the ethical problems treated here only if grounded in certain kinds of pragmatic consensus.
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  30. Hacia una lógica de analogía.John R. Welch - 1994 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 20 (1):161-167.
    How do we distinguish good and bad analogies? Luis A. Camacho proposed that false analogies be construed as false material conditionals. This article offers a counter-proposal: analogies of all sorts can be understood as singular inductive inferences. For the sake of simplicity, this proposal is illustrated with reference to Carnap's favorite inductive method c*.
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  31. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 122: Statistics in Science.Roger Cooke & Domenico Costantini (eds.) - 1990 - Springer Verlag.
  32. Is Probability Inapplicable -- In Principle -- To the God-Hypothesis?Robert A. Oakes - 1970 - New Scholasticism 44 (3):426-430.
  33. Toward a Statistical Theory of Learning.William K. Estes - 1950 - Psychological Review 57 (2):94-107.
  34. A Doomsday Argument Primer.Nick Bostrom - unknown
    Rarely does philosophy produce empirical predictions. The Doomsday argument is an important exception. From seemingly trivial premises it seeks to show that the risk that humankind will go extinct soon has been systematically underestimated. Nearly everybody's first reaction is that there must be something wrong with such an argument. Yet despite being subjected to intense scrutiny by a growing number of philosophers, no simple flaw in the argument has been identified.
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  35. To the Money Tree: An Introduction to Trading the Coin-Flip Environment.Jeremy Gwiazda - manuscript
    The purpose of this paper is to point the way to the money tree. Currently, almost all investment professionals think that outperformance requires an “edge,” that is, the ability to predict the future to some degree. In this paper, I suggest that money can be made in a 0, or even slightly negative, expected value environment by carefully choosing investment/bet sizes. Philosophical considerations are found mainly in Section 4.
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  36. On the Explanatory Power of Indeterminate Probabilities.Jeffrey Helzner & Horacio Arlo-Costa - unknown
    Building on work that we reported at ISIPTA 2005 we revisit claims made by Fox and Tversky concerning their "comparative ignorance" hypothesis for decision making under uncertainty.
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