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  1. added 2020-05-08
    Breaking the Ties: Epistemic Significance, Bacilli, and Underdetermination.Dana Tulodziecki - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38 (3):627-641.
    One premise of the underdetermination argument is that entailment of evidence is the only epistemic constraint on theory-choice. I argue that methodological rules can be epistemically significant, both with respect to observables and unobservables. Using an example from the history of medicine—Koch’s 1882 discovery of tuberculosis bacteria—I argue that even anti-realists ought to accept that these rules can break the tie between theories that are allegedly underdetermined. I then distinguish two types of underdetermination and argue that anti-realists, in order to (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-30
    The Anti-Realist Explanation for Science's Success: Semantics, Method and Attitude.Bruno Malavolta E. Silva - unknown - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy (AO):AO.
    Antirealist explanations for the success of science have been widely discussed up to today and have received several formulations. This makes it rather complex to assess them all. The objective of this paper is to help understand and assess the proposal of an anti-realist explanation for science’s success. I show the core assumptions contained in the several anti-realist explanations, how they relate to each other, and which background assumptions are required in order to warrant each position. I argue that, since (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-31
    The No Miracles Argument Without the Base Rate Fallacy.Richard Dawid & Stephan Hartmann - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4063-4079.
    According to an argument by Colin Howson, the no-miracles argument is contingent on committing the base-rate fallacy and is therefore bound to fail. We demonstrate that Howson’s argument only applies to one of two versions of the NMA. The other version, which resembles the form in which the argument was initially presented by Putnam and Boyd, remains unaffected by his line of reasoning. We provide a formal reconstruction of that version of the NMA and show that it is valid. Finally, (...)
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  4. added 2020-03-13
    Still Resisting: Replies to My Critics: K. Brad Wray: Resisting Scientific Realism, Cambridge University Press, 2018, 224 Pp., $105 HB. [REVIEW]K. Brad Wray - 2020 - Metascience 29 (1):33-40.
  5. added 2020-01-24
    Still resisting: replies to my critics.K. Brad Wray - forthcoming - Metascience:1-8.
    This is a reply piece to a series of book symposium contributions to my book, Resisting Scientific Realism. The contributions were by Steven French, Peter Vickers, Stathis Psillos, and Kyle Stanford.
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  6. added 2019-12-07
    Structural Realism Still Needs to Come Clean.Keane Farley - 2019 - Rerum Causae 11 (2):1-11.
    Structural realism is a flavour of scientific realism that argues we can know about the unobservable world because we can know about its structure. This paper presents the hitherto dormant ‘ontological problem’ for structural realism. It does so by recalling the now (in)famous ‘Newman Problem’ which is said to undercut the entire structural realist project by showing the favoured definition of structure to be trivial and weak. In the paper, I suggest the Newman Problem is actually symptomatic of a more (...)
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  7. added 2019-09-23
    Correction to: An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (5):529-529.
    In the Introduction section, 6th point under the paragraph “Given the parallels between Stanford’s PUA and the PUO, and those between Stanford’s NIS and the NIP, I have sketched the following reductio against Stanford’s NIS (Mizrahi 2016a, pp. 63–64):….. should read as -/- (6) Scientific antirealism is a philosophical theory.
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  8. added 2019-08-13
    Localism Vs. Individualism for the Scientific Realism Debate.Seungbae Park - 2019 - Philosophical Papers 48 (3):359-377.
    Localism is the view that the unit of evaluation in the scientific realism debate is a single scientific discipline, sub-discipline, or claim, whereas individualism is the view that the unit of evaluation is a single scientific theory. Localism is compatible, while individualism is not, with a local pessimistic induction and a local selective induction. Asay presents several arguments to support localism and undercut globalism, according to which the unit of evaluation is the set of all scientific disciplines. I argue that (...)
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  9. added 2019-08-13
    The Coherence of Evolutionary Theory with Its Neighboring Theories.Seungbae Park - 2019 - Acta Biotheoretica 67 (2):87-102.
    Evolutionary theory coheres with its neighboring theories, such as the theory of plate tectonics, molecular biology, electromagnetic theory, and the germ theory of disease. These neighboring theories were previously unconceived, but they were later conceived, and then they cohered with evolutionary theory. Since evolutionary theory has been strengthened by its several neighboring theories that were previously unconceived, it will be strengthened by infinitely many hitherto unconceived neighboring theories. This argument for evolutionary theory echoes the problem of unconceived alternatives. Ironically, however, (...)
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  10. added 2019-07-17
    Resisting Scientific Realism by K. Brad Wray. [REVIEW]Samuel Ruhmkorff - 2019 - British Journal for Philosophy of Science Review of Books.
    K. Brad Wray’s new book is an excellent overview of the scientific realism debate, as well as a development of the state-of-the-art. Wray, whose views seem most strongly influenced by Bas van Fraassen and Thomas Kuhn, develops crucial aspects of the debate, such as the argument from underconsideration and the ability of anti-realism to explain the success of science. This book is clearly written, tightly argued, and well researched. I recommend it highly to all philosophers and students of philosophy interested (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-15
    Realist Representations of Particles: The Standard Model, Top-Down and Bottom-Up.Anjan Chakravartty - forthcoming - In Contemporary Scientific Realism and the Challenge from the History of Science. London, England: Oxford University Press.
    Much debate about scientific realism concerns the issue of whether it is compatible with theory change over time. Certain forms of ‘selective realism’ have been suggested with this in mind. Here I consider a closely related challenge for realism: that of articulating how a theory should be interpreted at any given time. In a crucial respect the challenges posed by diachronic and synchronic interpretation are the same; in both cases, realists face an apparent dilemma. The thinner their interpretations, the easier (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-15
    Scientific Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Debates about scientific realism are closely connected to almost everything else in the philosophy of science, for they concern the very nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science, known collectively (...)
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  13. added 2019-06-10
    A Methodological Argument Against Scientific Realism.Darrell P. Rowbottom - forthcoming - Synthese:1-15.
    First, I identify a methodological thesis associated with scientific realism. This has different variants, but each concerns the reliability of scientific methods in connection with acquiring, or approaching, truth or approximate truth. Second, I show how this thesis bears on what scientists should do when considering new theories that significantly contradict older theories. Third, I explore how vulnerable scientific realism is to a reductio ad absurdum as a result. Finally, I consider which variants of the methodological thesis are the most (...)
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  14. added 2019-06-10
    Realist Representations of Particles: The Standard Model, Top-Down and Bottom-Up.Anjan Chakravartty - forthcoming - In Contemporary Scientific Realism and the Challenge from the History of Science.
    Much debate about scientific realism concerns the issue of whether it is compatible with theory change over time. Certain forms of ‘selective realism’ have been suggested with this in mind. Here I consider a closely related challenge for realism: that of articulating how a theory should be interpreted at any given time. In a crucial respect the challenges posed by diachronic and synchronic interpretation are the same; in both cases, realists face an apparent dilemma. The thinner their interpretations, the easier (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-10
    Realism, Antirealism, Epistemic Stances, and Voluntarism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2018 - In Juha Saatsi (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 225-236.
    Debates between different kinds of scientific realists and antirealists are longstanding and show every sign of continuing. In this chapter I examine one explanation of their longevity: lurking beneath various forms of realism and antirealism are conflicting commitments which (1) sustain these positions and (2) are immune to refutation. These deeper commitments are to different epistemic stances. I consider the nature of philosophical stances generally and, more specifically, of epistemic stances in relation to the sciences. I investigate the question of (...)
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  16. added 2019-06-07
    Introduction: Ancient Skepticism, Voluntarism, and Science.Anjan Chakravartty - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (2):73-79.
    In this introduction, I motivate the project of examining certain resonances between ancient skeptical positions, especially Pyrrhonism, and positions in contemporary epistemology, with special attention to recent work in the epistemology of science. One such resonance concerns the idea of suspension of judgment or belief in certain contexts or domains of inquiry, and the reasons for (or processes eventuating in) suspension. Another concerns the question of whether suspension of belief in such circumstances is voluntary, in any of the senses discussed (...)
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  17. added 2019-06-06
    Two Arguments for Scientific Realism Unified.Harker David - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):192-202.
    Inferences from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories remain central to the most influential arguments for scientific realism. Challenges to such inferences, however, based on radical discontinuities within the history of science, have motivated a distinctive style of revision to the original argument. Conceding the historical claim, selective realists argue that accompanying even the most revolutionary change is the retention of significant parts of replaced theories, and that a realist attitude towards the systematically retained constituents of our (...)
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  18. added 2019-06-06
    Scientific Realism: Darwinian Smoke and Platonic Mirrors.Aharon Kantorovich - 1996 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (2):301-309.
  19. added 2019-06-05
    Scientific Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2013 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Debates about scientific realism are closely connected to almost everything else in the philosophy of science, for they concern the very nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science, known collectively (...)
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  20. added 2019-03-17
    Is There an Ideal Scientific Image? Sellars and Charmakirti on Levels of Realilty.Catherine Prueitt - 2019 - In Jay Garfield (ed.), Wilfrid Sellars and Buddhist Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 48-66.
    Uses arguments from Dharmakirti to construct an attack on Sellars' idea of an ideal scientific image.
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  21. added 2019-03-07
    Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars.Willem A. deVries (ed.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Leading philosophers from both sides of the Atlantic present essays on Wilfrid Sellars's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, one of the crowning achievements of 20th-century analytic philosophy. They discuss empiricism, perception, epistemology, realism, and normativity, showing how vibrant Sellarsian philosophy remains in the 21st century.
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  22. added 2019-02-22
    An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (5):515-527.
    In this paper, I respond to Sterpetti’s attempt to defend Kyle P. Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and his New Induction over the History of Science from my reductio argument outlined in Mizrahi :59–68, 2016a). I discuss what I take to be the ways in which Sterpetti has misconstrued my argument against Stanford’s NIS, in particular, that it is a reductio, not a dilemma, as Sterpetti erroneously thinks. I argue that antirealists who endorse Stanford’s NIS still face an absurd consequence (...)
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  23. added 2019-01-31
    Philosophy of Language and the Challenge to Scientific Realism. By Christopher Norris. [REVIEW]Stathis Psillos - 2005 - Journal of Critical Realism 4 (1):255-261.
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  24. added 2019-01-17
    Localism Vs. Individualism for the Scientific Realism Debate.Seungbae Park - 2019 - Philosophical Papers 48 (3):359-377.
    Localism is the view that the unit of evaluation in the scientific realism debate is a single scientific discipline, sub-discipline, or claim, whereas individualism is the view that the unit of evaluation is a single scientific theory. Localism is compatible, while individualism is not, with a local pessimistic induction and a local selective induction. Asay (2016) presents several arguments to support localism and undercut globalism, according to which the unit of evaluation is the set of all scientific disciplines. I argue (...)
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  25. added 2019-01-17
    Philosophers and Scientists Are Social Epistemic Agents.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.
    In this paper, I reply to Markus Arnold’s comment and Amanda Bryant’s comment on my work “Can Kuhn’s Taxonomic Incommensurability be an Image of Science?” in Moti Mizrahi’s edited collection, The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive Transformation?. Philosophers and scientists are social epistemic agents. As such, they ought to behave in accordance with epistemic norms governing the behavior of social epistemic agents.
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  26. added 2018-12-01
    The Disastrous Implications of the 'English' View of Rationality in a Social World.Seungbae Park - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (1):88-99.
    Van Fraassen (2007, 2017) consistently uses the English view of rationality to parry criticisms from scientific realists. I assume for the sake of argument that the English view of rationality is tenable, and then argue that it has disastrous implications for van Fraassen’s (1980) contextual theory of explanation, for the empiricist position that T is empirically adequate, and for scientific progress. If you invoke the English view of rationality to rationally disbelieve that your epistemic colleagues’ theories are true, they might, (...)
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  27. added 2018-11-21
    Scientific Realism with Historical Essences: The Case of Species.Marion Godman - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    Natural kinds, real kinds, or, following J.S Mill simply, Kinds, are thought to be an important asset for scientific realists in the non-fundamental (or “special”) sciences. Essential natures are less in vogue. I show that the realist would do well to couple her Kinds with essential natures in order to strengthen their epistemic and ontological credentials. I argue that these essential natures need not however be intrinsic to the Kind’s members; they may be historical. I concentrate on assessing the merits (...)
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  28. added 2018-09-06
    The Relevance of Evidence From the History of Science in the Contemporary Realism/Anti-Realism Debate.K. Brad Wray - 2018 - Spontaneous Generations 9 (1):143-145.
    It is widely assumed that it is the anti-realist who stakes his case on evidence from the history of science. I argue that realists have failed to recognize the need to collect evidence from the history of science to support their methodological claims, and anti-realists do not rely on evidence from the history of science to the extent that many suggest.
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  29. added 2018-05-22
    Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism.Monton Bradley & Fraassen Bas C. Van - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):405 - 422.
    James Ladyman has argued that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, and that this renders constructive empiricism untenable. We maintain that constructive empiricism is compatible with modal nominalism. Although the central term 'observable' has been analyzed in terms of counterfactuals, and in general counterfactuals do not have objective truth conditions, the property of being observable is not a modal property, and hence there are objective, non-modal facts about what is observable. Both modal nominalism and constructive empiricism require clarification in the face (...)
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  30. added 2018-04-03
    The “Positive Argument” for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best Explanation.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):461–466.
    In this paper, I argue that the “positive argument” for Constructive Empiricism (CE), according to which CE “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does” (van Fraassen 1980, 73), is an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). But constructive empiricists are critical of IBE, and thus they have to be critical of their own “positive argument” for CE. If my argument is sound, then constructive empiricists are in the awkward position of having to reject their own (...)
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  31. added 2018-03-22
    Truth and Success, Again: Reply to Held on Generalist Versus Particularist (Anti-) Realism.Matteo Morganti - 2012 - The Reasoner 6 (6).
  32. added 2018-03-22
    Truth and Success: Reply to Held.Matteo Morganti - 2011 - The Reasoner 5 (7):106-107.
    A reply to Carsten Held's Analysis paper arguing for the unworkability of the traditional scientific realist inference from the success of scientific theories to their (probable) truth.
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  33. added 2018-02-25
    Realism and the Limits of Explanatory Reasoning.Juha Saatsi - 2018 - In The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. London: Routledge. pp. 200-211.
    This chapter examines issues surrounding inference to the best explanation, its justification, and its role in different arguments for scientific realism, as well as more general issues concerning explanations’ ontological commitments. Defending the reliability of inference to the best explanation has been a central plank in various realist arguments, and realists have drawn various ontological conclusions from the premise that a given scientific explanation best explains some phenomenon. This chapter stresses the importance of thinking carefully about the nature of explanation (...)
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  34. added 2018-02-17
    What You Don’T Know Can’T Hurt You: Realism and the Unconceived.Anjan Chakravartty - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):149-158.
    Two of the most potent challenges faced by scientific realism are the underdetermination of theories by data, and the pessimistic induction based on theories previously held to be true, but subsequently acknowledged as false. Recently, Stanford (2006, Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press) has formulated what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives: a version of the underdetermination thesis combined with a historical argument of the same form as the pessimistic induction. (...)
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  35. added 2018-02-17
    Smoke and Mirrors: How Science Reflects Reality.James Robert Brown - 1994 - Routledge.
    In Smoke and Mirrors , James Robert Brown fights back against figures such as Richard Rorty, Bruno Latour, Michael Ruse and Hilary Putnam who have attacked realistic accounts of science. This enlightening work also demonstrates that science mirrors the world in amazing ways. The metaphysics and epistemology of science, the role of abstraction, abstract objects, and a priori ways of getting at reality are all examined in this fascinating exploration of how science reflects reality. Both a defense of science and (...)
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  36. added 2017-11-01
    The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):329-342.
    In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, I construct a new argument for scientific realism which I call the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. I provide an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over (...)
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  37. added 2017-10-24
    Critiques of Minimal Realism.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Problemos 92:102-114.
    Saatsi’s minimal realism holds that science makes theoretical progress. It is designed to get around the pessimistic induction, to fall between scientific realism and instrumentalism, and to explain the success of scientific theories. I raise the following two objections to it. First, it is not clear whether minimal realism lies between realism and instrumentalism, given that minimal realism does not entail instrumentalism. Second, it is not clear whether minimal realism can explain the success of scientific theories, given that it is (...)
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  38. added 2017-10-18
    The Problem of Unobserved Anomalies.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Filosofija. Sociologija 29 (1):4-12.
    Scientific antirealism, the view that successful theories are empirically adequate, is untenable in light of the problem of unobserved anomalies that since past scientists could not observe the anomalies that caused the replacement of past theories with present theories, present scientists also cannot observe the anomalies that will cause the replacement of present theories with future theories. There are several moves that antirealists would be tempted to make to get around the problem of unobserved anomalies. All of them, however, are (...)
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  39. added 2017-08-16
    The Grand Pessimistic Induction.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Review of Contemporary Philosophy 17:7-19.
    After decades of intense debate over the old pessimistic induction (Laudan, 1977; Putnam, 1978), it has now become clear that it has at least the following four problems. First, it overlooks the fact that present theories are more successful than past theories. Second, it commits the fallacy of biased statistics. Third, it erroneously groups together past theories from different fields of science. Four, it misses the fact that some theoretical components of past theories were preserved. I argue that these four (...)
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  40. added 2017-08-02
    Should Scientists Embrace Scientific Realism or Antirealism?Seungbae Park - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (1):147-158.
    If scientists embrace scientific realism, they can use a scientific theory to explain and predict observables and unobservables. If, however, they embrace scientific antirealism, they cannot use a scientific theory to explain observables and unobservables, and cannot use a scientific theory to predict unobservables. Given that explanation and prediction are means to make scientific progress, scientists can make more scientific progress, if they embrace scientific realism than if they embrace scientific antirealism.
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  41. added 2017-07-14
    Introduction: Scientific Realism and Commonsense.Steve Clarke & Timothy D. Lyons - 2002 - In Steve Clarke & Timothy D. Lyons (eds.), Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realism and Commonsense. Dordrecht: Springer.
  42. added 2017-07-14
    Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realism and Commonsense.Steve Clarke & Timothy D. Lyons (eds.) - 2002 - Dordrecht: Springer.
  43. added 2017-07-13
    The Unificatory Power of Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (44):59–73.
    The no-miracles argument (Putnam, 1975) holds that science is successful because successful theories are (approximately) true. Frost-Arnold (2010) objects that this argument is unacceptable because it generates neither new predictions nor unifications. It is similar to the unacceptable explanation that opium puts people to sleep because it has a dormative virtue. I reply that on close examination, realism explains not only why some theories are successful but also why successful theories exist in current science. Therefore, it unifies the disparate phenomena.
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  44. added 2017-07-11
    Scientific Realism and the Pessimistic Meta-Modus Tollens.Timothy D. Lyons - 2002 - In Steve Clarke & Timothy D. Lyons (eds.), Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realism and Commonsense. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 63-90.
    Broadly speaking, the contemporary scientific realist is concerned to justify belief in what we might call theoretical truth, which includes truth based on ampliative inference and truth about unobservables. Many, if not most, contemporary realists say scientific realism should be treated as ‘an overarching scientific hypothesis’ (Putnam 1978, p. 18). In its most basic form, the realist hypothesis states that theories enjoying general predictive success are true. This hypothesis becomes a hypothesis to be tested. To justify our belief in the (...)
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  45. added 2017-05-04
    Common-Sense Realism and the Unimaginable Otherness of Science.Bradley Monton - 2007 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 11 (2):117-126.
    Bas van Fraassen endorses both common-sense realism — the view, roughly, that the ordinary macroscopic objects that we take to exist actually do exist — and constructive empiricism — the view, roughly, that the aim of science is truth about the observable world. But what happens if common-sense realism and science come into conflict? I argue that it is reasonable to think that they could come into conflict, by giving some motivation for a mental monist solution to the measurement problem (...)
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  46. added 2017-04-19
    Justifying the Special Theory of Relativity with Unconceived Methods.Park Seungbae - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (1):53-62.
    Many realists argue that present scientific theories will not follow the fate of past scientific theories because the former are more successful than the latter. Critics object that realists need to show that present theories have reached the level of success that warrants their truth. I reply that the special theory of relativity has been repeatedly reinforced by unconceived scientific methods, so it will be reinforced by infinitely many unconceived scientific methods. This argument for the special theory of relativity overcomes (...)
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  47. added 2017-03-14
    The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers’ Myth?Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):263-278.
    According to the antirealist argument known as the pessimistic induction, the history of science is a graveyard of dead scientific theories and abandoned theoretical posits. Support for this pessimistic picture of the history of science usually comes from a few case histories, such as the demise of the phlogiston theory and the abandonment of caloric as the substance of heat. In this article, I wish to take a new approach to examining the ‘history of science as a graveyard of theories’ (...)
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  48. added 2017-02-17
    Defense of Epistemic Reciprocalism.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Filosofija. Sociologija 28 (1):56-64.
    Scientific realists and antirealists believe that a successful scientific theory is true and merely empirically adequate, respectively. In contrast, epistemic reciprocalists believe that realists’ positive theories are true, and that antirealists’ positive theories are merely empirically adequate, treating their target agents as their target agents treat other epistemic agents. Antirealists cannot convince reciprocalists that their positive theories are true, no matter how confident they might be that they are true. In addition, reciprocalists criticize antirealists’ positive theories exactly in the way (...)
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  49. added 2017-02-08
    Clocks, God, and Scientific Realism.Edward L. Schoen - 2002 - Zygon 37 (3):555-580.
    Scientists, both modern and contemporary, commonly try to discern patterns in nature. They also frequently use arguments by analogy to construct an understanding of the natural mechanisms responsible for producing such patterns. For Robert Boyle, the famous clock at Strasbourg provided a perfect paradigm for understanding the connection between these two scientific activities. Unfortunately, it also posed a serious threat to his realistic pretensions. All sorts of internal mechanisms could produce precisely the same movements across the face of a clock. (...)
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  50. added 2017-02-06
    Scientific Antirealists Have Set Fire to Their Own Houses.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Prolegomena 16 (1):23-37.
    Scientific antirealists run the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism. I argue that the argument from underconsideration backfires on antirealists’ positive philosophical theories, such as the contextual theory of explanation (van Fraassen, 1980), the English model of rationality (van Fraassen, 1989), the evolutionary explanation of the success of science (Wray, 2008; 2012), and explanatory idealism (Khalifa, 2013). Antirealists strengthen the argument from underconsideration with the pessimistic induction against current scientific theories. In response, I construct a pessimistic induction against antirealists that (...)
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