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  1. 'What Am I?' Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem - Reply. [REVIEW]J. Almog - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):717-734.
    In his Meditations, René Descartes asks, "what am I?" His initial answer is "a man." But he soon discards it: "But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No: for then I should inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead down the slope to harder ones." Instead of understanding what a man is, Descartes shifts to two new questions: "What is Mind?" and "What is Body?" These questions develop (...)
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  2. Is Obesity a Public Health Problem?Jonny Anomaly - 2012 - Public Health Ethics 5 (3):216-221.
    It is often claimed that there is an obesity epidemic in affluent countries, and that obesity is one of the most serious public health threats in the developed world. I will argue that obesity is not an 'epidemic' in any useful sense of the word, and that classifying it as a public health problem requires us to make fairly controversial moral and empirical assumptions. While evidence suggests that the prevalence of obesity is on the rise, and that obesity can lead (...)
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  3. Consciousness and the Embodied Self.Andrew R. Bailey - unknown
    This paper deals with the relationship between the embodied cognition paradigm and two sets of its implications: its implications for the ontology of selves, and its implications for the nature and extent of phenomenal consciousness. There has been a recent wave of interest within cognitive science in the paradigm variously called ‘embodied,’ ‘extended,’ ‘situated’ or ‘distributed’ cognition. Although ideas applied in the embodied cognition research program can be traced back to the work of Heidegger, Piaget, Vygotsky, Merleau-Ponty, and Dewey, the (...)
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  4. Survival and Disembodied Existence.Patrick K. Bastable - 1972 - Philosophical Studies 21:282-283.
  5. Materialism and Disembodied Minds.B. L. Blose - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (September):59-74.
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  6. Phenomenal Consciousness Disembodied.Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan - 2014 - In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 45-74.
    We evaluate the role of embodiment in ordinary mental state ascriptions. Presented are five experiments on phenomenal state ascriptions to disembodied entities such as ghosts and spirits. Results suggest that biological embodiment is not a central principle of folk psychology guiding ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness. By contrast, results continue to support the important role of functional considerations in theory of mind judgments.
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  7. The Apparent Truth of Dualism and the Uncanny Body.Stephen Burwood - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):263-278.
    It has been suggested that our experiences of embodiment in general appear to constitute an experiential ground for dualist philosophy and that this is particularly so with experiences of dissociation, in which one feels estranged from one’s body. Thus, Drew Leder argues that these play “a crucial role in encouraging and supporting Cartesian dualism” as they “seem to support the doctrine of an immaterial mind trapped inside an alien body”. In this paper I argue that as dualism does not capture (...)
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  8. Definitions and Disembodied Minds.L. S. Carrier - 1974 - Personalist Forum 55 (4):334-43.
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  9. Plantinga on Disembodied Existence.W. R. Carter - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (3):360-363.
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  10. Contingent Materialism.David J. Cole & F. Foelber - 1984 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1):74-85.
  11. Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons.Kevin Corcoran (ed.) - 2001 - Cornell University Press.
    This collection brings together cutting-edge research on the metaphysics of human nature and soul-body dualism.Kevin Corcoran's collection, Soul, Body, and ...
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  12. Persons and Bodies.Kevin J. Corcoran - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):324-340.
    Defenders of a priori arguments for dualism assume that the Cartesian thesis that possibly, I exist but no bodies exist and the physicalist thesis that I am identical with my body, are logically inconsistent. Trenton Merricks offers an argument for the compatibility of those theses. In this paper I examine several objections to Merricks’ argument. I show that none is ultimately persuasive. Nevertheless I claim that Merricks’ argument should not be accepted. I next propose a view of persons that is (...)
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  13. God and Disembodied Existence.Kenneth Ray Denniston - 1978 - Dissertation, University of Oregon
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  14. Conceptual Problems Confronting a Totally Disembodied Afterlife.Theodore M. Drange - 2015 - In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 329-333.
    This paper presents and defends an argument for the conclusion that a personal afterlife in the absence of any sort of body at all is not conceptually possible. The main idea behind the argument is that there would be no way for the identities of people in a bodiless state to be established, either by others or by themselves. The argument raises a significant challenge to explaining just how someone in a totally disembodied afterlife could ever be identified—a challenge that (...)
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  15. More on Disembodied Minds.George F. Englebretsen - 1974 - Philosophical Papers 3 (May):48-50.
  16. Armstrong on Disembodied Minds.George F. Englebretsen - 1972 - Dialogue 11 (December):576-579.
  17. Evidence for Early Dualism and a More Direct Path to Afterlife Beliefs.David Estes - 2006 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):470-+.
    Ample evidence for dualism in early childhood already exists. Young children have explicit knowledge of the distinction between mental and physical phenomena, which provides the foundation for a rapidly developing theory of mind. Belief in psychological immortality might then follow naturally from this mentalistic conception of human existence and thus require no organized cognitive system dedicated to producing it.
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  18. Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence.Nicholas Everitt - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):333-347.
    In a number of places, Richard Swinburne has defended the logical possibility of perception without a body; and has inferred from this logical possibility that substance dualism is true. I challenge his defence of disembodied perception by arguing that a disembodied perceiver would not be able to distinguish between perceptions and hallucinations. I then claim that even if disembodied perception were possible, this could not be used to support substance dualism: such an inference would be either invalid or question-begging.
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  19. Survival and Disembodied Existence.Antony Flew - 1970 - Philosophical Books 11 (3):21-23.
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  20. Survival and Disembodied Existence.Antony Flew & Terence Penelhum - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (4):528.
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  21. Survival and Disembodied Existence.James E. Giles - 1972 - Philosophia 2 (3):257-260.
  22. Disembodied Persons.Grant R. Gillett - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (July):377-386.
    In discussing Disembodied Persons we need to confront two problems: A. Under what conditions would we consider that a person was present in the absence of the normal bodily cues? B. Could such circumstances arise? The first question may be regarded as epistemic and the second as metaphysical.
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  23. Modal Dualism: A Critique.Stewart C. Goetz - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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  24. Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear From Ghosts Than Zombies.Philip Goff - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):119-139.
    Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious experience. Much of the consciousness literature focuses on considering how threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to physicalism. There is not much attention given to the converse possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is, creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a ghost.
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  25. Disembodied Life.Rubin Gotesky - 1964 - World Futures 3 (2):61-78.
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  26. The Engines of the Soul.William D. Hart - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
    Dr Hart sets out to answer this question by showing that the issue is as much about the nature of causation as it is about the natures of mind and matter.
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  27. Armstrong and Strawson on 'Disembodied Existence'.Max O. Hocutt - 1974 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (September):46-59.
  28. Brain/Body Dualism.Robert A. Jaeger - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 34 (November):427-435.
  29. Cartesian Conceivings.J. Jones - 2004 - Metaphysica 5 (1):135-50.
  30. An Objection to Swinburne's Argument for Dualism.Norman Kretzmann - 1996 - Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):405-412.
  31. Is the Notion of Disembodied Existence Self-Contradictory?Casimir Lewy - 1942 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 43:59-78.
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  32. Disembodied Existence, Physicalism, and the Mind-Body Problem.Douglas C. Long - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (May):307-316.
    The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an important role in beliefs about immortality, ultimate rewards and punishments, the transmigration of souls, and the like. There has also been long and heated disagreement about whether the idea of disembodied existence even makes sense, let alone whether anybody can or does survive dissolution of his material form. It may seem doubtful that anything new could be added to the debate at (...)
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  33. Descartes' Argument for Mind-Body Dualism.Douglas C. Long - 1969 - Philosophical Forum 1 (3):259-273.
  34. A New Objection to A Priori Arguments for Dualism.Trenton Merricks - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1):81-85.
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  35. VII—Disembodied Brains.David Murray - 1970 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70 (1):121-138.
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  36. Disembodied Existence and Central State Materialism.Douglas Odegard - 1970 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (August):256-60.
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  37. Remarks on Disembodied Existence.D. Pecnjak - 1995 - Acta Analytica 10 (13):209-13.
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  38. Against Materialism.Alvin Plantinga - 2006 - Faith and Philosophy 23 (1):3-32.
  39. PENELHUM, Terence.-"Survival and Disembodied Existence". [REVIEW]David Polden - 1971 - Philosophy 46:176.
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  40. Swinburne's Modal Argument for the Existence of a Soul.Agnieszka Rostalska & Rafal Urbaniak - 2009 - Philo 12 (1):73-87.
    This paper evaluates Richard Swinburne’s modal argument for the existence of souls. After a brief presentation of the argument, wedescribe the main known objection to it, which is called the substitution objection (SO for short), and explain Swinburne’s response to that objection. With this as background, we formalize Swinburne’s argument in a quantified propositional modal language, modifying it so that it is logically valid and contains no tacit assumptions, and we explain why we find Swinburne’s response to SO unsatisfactory. Next, (...)
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  41. On an Argument for Dualism.Sydney Shoemaker - 1983 - In Carl A. Ginet & Sydney Shoemaker (eds.), Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
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  42. Can Disembodied Persons Be Spatially Located?Brian J. Smart - 1971 - Analysis 31 (March):133-138.
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  43. Swinburne's Argument for Dualism.Thomas W. Smythe - 1994 - Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):127-133.
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  44. Disembodied Minds and Personal Identity.Thomas W. Smythe - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:415-423.
    Discussion of the human soul has bulked large in the literature of philosophy and religion. I defend the possibility of disembodied Cartesian minds by examining the criticisms of three philosophers who argue that there are serious difficulties about any attempt to account for the identity of such Cartesian minds through time. I argue that their criticisms of the possibility of disembodied minds are damaging but not fatal. I hold that the central issue behind their criticisms of Cartesian minds is whether (...)
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  45. Central State Materialism, Dualism, and Disembodied Existence.David A. Spieler - 1974 - Personalist 55 (4):354-355.
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  46. Is Disembodied Existence Logically Impossible?David Arthur Spieler - 1972 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
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  47. Disembodied Minds and the Problem of Identification and Individuation.Jesse R. Steinberg & Alan M. Steinberg - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (1):75-93.
    We consider and reject a variety of attempts to provide a ground for identifying and differentiating disembodied minds. Until such a ground is provided, we must withhold inclusion of disembodied minds from our picture of the world.
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  48. Panpsychism? Reply to Commentators with a Celebration of Descartes.Galen Strawson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):184-280.
  49. The Modal Argument for Substance Dualism.Richard Swinburne - 1997 - In The Evolution of the Soul. (Revised Edition).
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  50. The Evolution of the Soul.Richard Swinburne - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a revised and updated version of Swinburne's controversial treatment of the eternal philosophical problem of the relation between mind and body. He argues that we can only make sense of the interaction between the mental and the physical in terms of the soul, and that there is no scientific explanation of the evolution of the soul.
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