Aristotle

Argues that the central cognitive component of ethical virtue for Aristotle is awareness of the value of particulars.

En la cúspide del conocimiento humano halla su sede la sabiduría. Un saber que se alcanza en la simplicidad más alta del ser humano, allí donde confluyen todas sus potencias y facultades, no solamente la inteligencia, sino también la voluntad y los afectos. Cualquier clase de conocimiento aséptico respecto de cualquier influencia afectiva o volitiva lleva a una reducción que de manera propia puede llamarse “intelectualismo”. El concepto de razón “pura” es un reduccionismo que conduce a una grave disgregación en (...) la criatura racional, y a la enajenación de su mismo ser. El que no conoce amando y no ama conociendo, ni conoce verdaderamente, ni verdaderamente ama. El conocimiento que compendia estas características antropológicas se denomina “conocimiento afectivo”. En este trabajo se hace una exploración sobre el alcance de este tipo peculiar de conocimiento siguiendo los principios de Aristóteles y Tomás de Aquino. (shrink)

One of the more attractive features of Greek moral philosophy and its medieval dependents is that it provides an obvious motivation for being moral: rational self-interest. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas are all rational egoists, and each argues that acting only for the sake of one's own happiness is compatible with treating other people morally. Each bridges the gap between egoism and altruism by arguing that a rational person has sufficient reason to care about other people. This raises two main (...) problems: can egoistic or "selfish love" count as genuine love, and even if it can, can "selfish love" insure that an egoist will have the proper moral respect for all who are worthy of moral respect? ;Socrates believes that nothing can be loved or desired both as an end and as a means, and so he cannot justify any but an exploitative love which cares for the other not for the other's own sake, but only for the instrumental benefits he, she or it provides the lover. ;Plato succeeds in justifying love for another for the other's own sake by arguing that one's beloved is a constituent of and not just an instrumental means to one's own happiness. Nevertheless, Plato does not justify respect for the other as an independent end-chooser, and this prevents him from justifying moral respect for the autonomy of the other. ;Aristotle makes up for this deficiency of Plato's by founding the best sort of love on the mutual respect required by co-operation in deliberation, decision and action in mutually valued projects. This solution, however, prevents Aristotle from justifying moral respect for anyone who is not sufficiently virtuous, and this threatens to limit severely the number of people for whom Aristotle can justify proper moral respect. Aristotle can disarm this threat, even in the form in which it is posed by Christian charity. ;Aquinas argues that Aristotelian love is insufficient for justifying Christian charity. The difference between them, however, does not concern the theory of what love consists in, but in how to apply the theory of love. (shrink)

What is the relationship between Aristotle's concern for the best regime and virtue and his concern for practical political matters? This is one of the most perplexing interpretative questions of the Politics. By investigating the meaning of aristocracy in the Politics, we get a much better understanding of this relationship than currently exists. We learn that there are actually two best regimes in the Politics. There is the regime discussed in books VII and VIII, which Aristotle explicitly presents as the (...) best regime. It is an aristocratic regime and it functions as an aristocratic standard for commonly existing regimes. Aristotle's concern for it and the virtue that defines it is part of his concern for practical political matters. But Aristotle also quietly presents another regime as the best regime in the Politics. It is aristocracy in the strict sense of the term or the simply best regime. Aristotle discusses it in book III of the Politics and it turns out to be the same as the best regime in logos of Plato's Republic, the regime ruled by philosopher-kings. The simply best regime is not any sort of standard for existing regimes. Aristotle's concern for it and the virtue that defines it is not directly related to his concern for practical political matters. The investigation of aristocracy reveals that the concern for the best regime and virtue in the Politics is both part of and separate from the concern for practical political matters. But since Aristotle only quietly presents the teaching on the simply best regime, the investigation also elucidates the peculiar character of his political thought, of how it aims primarily yet not exclusively at practical political matters. (shrink)

As Hegel once said, in Byzantium, between homoousis and homoiousis, the difference of one letter could decide over the life and death of thousands. As the present essay would like to argue, Byzantine thinking was not only attentive to conceptual, but also to iconic differences. The iconoclastic controversy arose from two different interpretations of the nature of images: whereas iconoclastic philosophy is based on the assumption of a fundamental ‘iconic identity’, iconophile philosophy defends the idea of ‘iconic difference’. While the (...) reception in the Latin West of the controversies over the image as a mere problem of referentiality of the Letter explains why its originality has remained underestimated for centuries, re-examining Byzantine visual thinking in the light of today’s ‘iconic turn’ reveals its striking modernity. (shrink)

The First Mover According to Plotinus and Aristotle.

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle examines the nature of happiness, which he defines as a specially good kind of life. He considers the nature of practical reasoning, friendship, and the role and importance of the moral virtues in the best life. This new edition features a revised translation and valuable new introduction and notes.