Aristotle

The concept of Justice constitutes a requisite foundation in Aristotle’s and Adam Smith’s (1723-1790) moral thought. This essay examines Smith’s understanding and application of the Aristotelian concept of justice through a comparative study, which elucidates the prima facie resemblance between Smith’s and Aristotle’s moral thought. It also attests that both the thinkers acknowledge the external and internal meaning of justice, namely, the harmony of the whole society and the moral agent’s state of character. Smith’s commitment to the theory of justice (...) is, in fact, for the purpose of preserving liberty, which illuminates that a free society takes priority over a beneficent one in his political ideal. (shrink)

With contributions by John J. Cleary, Gregor Damschen, Rainer Enskat, Francisco J. Gonzalez, Jürgen Mittelstraß and Carlo Natali (all on Plato) as well as by Enrico Berti, Nicolas Braun, Graciela M. Chichi, Wolfgang Kullmann, Helmut Mai, Alejandro G. Vigo, Franco Volpi and Hermann Weidemann (all on Aristotle).

In Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, Aristotle seems to argue that certain external goods are needed for happiness because, in the first place, they are needed for virtuous activity. This has puzzled scholars. After all, it seems possible for a virtuous agent to exercise her virtuous character even under conditions of extreme hardship or deprivation. Indeed, it is natural to think these are precisely the conditions under which one's virtue shines through most clearly. Why then does Aristotle think that a wide range (...) of external goods is required for virtuous activity, and therefore, for happiness? -/- I argue that there is good sense to be made of Aristotle's stance on external goods. Specifically, I explain how, on this view, a range of external goods is required for the full exercise of virtue, and I show that it is only this full exercise that is constitutive of eudaimonia. Drawing on passages in Politics 7.13 and Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, I develop and defend a distinction between the "mere" exercise of virtue, and the full or complete exercise of virtue. I argue that, for Aristotle, the distinguishing feature of this distinction is the value of the virtuous action's ends. An action that fully expresses virtue aims at an end that is unqualifiedly good, while an action that merely exercises virtue does not. I argue that the external goods Aristotle mentions in NE 1.8 are necessary for performing actions with unqualifiedly good ends, and so necessary for the complete exercise of virtue. In addition to providing a more satisfactory account than existing proposals of the role of external goods in Aristotelian happiness, my interpretation has two additional upshots. First, it brings to light an under-appreciated and independently compelling feature of Aristotle's ethical thought: the value of virtuous actions depends in part on the value of the ends they aim to realize. Second, it finds in Aristotle a distinct and powerful way of thinking about the badness of certain kinds of misfortune and deprivation: they are bad in part because they prevent us from fully realizing our capacity for moral agency, from fully engaging with value in the world. (shrink)

This Paper attempts to Jude the axiology of Aristotle’s Philosophy based on Aristotelian Philosophy. For this Purpose, we will first Prove axiology as a kind of knowledge and then we will study the relation between axiology and two others knowledge domains, that is, ontology and epistemology. We will demonstrate that values like goodness and beauty, are same final cause and formal cause for explanation of values of every thing. At least, in the nature, goodness and beauty are the idea of (...) reality which is Present in every things. Although values Such as beauty and splendor, good and bad exist in relation with us. Indeed, Such values don’t have objective being nor ideal existence. Form epistemology Point of view, the values are known with their formal Cause ,that is, with their general form. In Aristotle’s axiology the concept of the end(Telos) is a fundamental concept which shows that the Aristotle’s Philosophy system is a coherent system. thus Aristotle maintains to ontological and epistemological aspects of the values. Also He has even considered hierarchy of value for creatures, knowledge and values itself. Thus , every thing lied in the hierarchy of valuation which has roots in the concept of the end. It also shows that Aristotle either in the position of philosopher or the position of valuation cannot be free from the valuation of ontology and epistemology. Whit such approach, the second section of the paper attempts to show that the end in Aristotle’s Ethic is Idea of perfect that the human attempts to reach happiness in accordance whit the most complete and the most excellent of the virtue and every one should take care of domination of reason over human behavior and whit continuous practice and one can accomplish the virtues whit no extreme this way, all ethic virtues will be obtained by trusting to one’s capability. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a categorial theory of meaning which asserts that the meaning of a sentence is the function from the actualization of some potentiality or the potentiality of some actuality to the truth of the sentence. I argue that it builds on the virtues of David Lewis’s Possible World Semantics but advances beyond problems that Lewis’s theory faces with its distinctly Aristotelian turn toward actuality and potentiality.

Is the virtue of the good citizen the same as the virtue of the good man? Aristotle addresses this in Politics 3.4. His answer is twofold. On the one hand, (the account for Difference) they are not the same both because what the citizen’s virtue is depends on the constitution, on what preserves it, and on the role the citizen plays in it, and because the good citizens in the best constitution cannot all be good men, whereas the good man’s (...) virtue is uniform. On the other hand, (the account for Identity) the two virtues are identical in the good men in the best constitution, in which all are good citizens, each possessing the ability for ruling and for being ruled. This nuanced answer can be seen as Aristotle’s synthesis of a Periclean view (contribution to state blots out personal wrongs) and a Socratic view (no good citizen is without justice). Its nuances reflect the extent to which Aristotle’s conceptions of good citizenship and the best constitution accommodate deviations of what is probable from the human ideal set out in his ethical writings. In the present chapter, I will first address three puzzles regarding the nuances of Aristotle’s answer. Second, I will consider one question about its implication: Does Aristotle’s account for Difference turn out to entail something ultra-Periclean: that no one can simultaneously be a good man and a good citizen in any constitution other than the best? I shall argue the negative. (shrink)

The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists se centra en la relación mutua entre las capacidades humanas de sentir placer y dolor y el carácter afectivo que las une con las facultades cognitivas de aprender, comprender, recordar, evocar, planificar y anticiparse. Para esto, Warren consagra toda su agudeza analítica a eminentes obras del pensamiento antiguo: particularmente nos referimos a los diálogos platónicos República, Protágoras y Filebo. Otro tanto hace con De Anima, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, Ética (...) a Nicómaco, Retórica y Poética de Aristóteles. Finalmente, hacia la mitad y sobre el final del libro, se dedica a poner en diálogo sus análisis sobre Platón y Aristóteles con las escuelas hedonistas clásicas del helenismo: epicúreos y cirenaicos. (shrink)

Marx's determination of the species-essence (Gattungswesen) provides a consistently critical orientation by inverting Aristotle's commitment to the priority of actuality over potentiality in accounts or definitions of the human essence. This privileging of potentiality in definition renders the human essence historically developmental and makes good on some of Aristotle's own commitments. If, as Aristotle holds, the form of the species has the power or potency to cause the development of a child into a fully formed adult, then its definition ought (...) to privilege potency. Further, if distinctly human capacities are rational capacities for opposites, then no account that begins with one actual side will provide a satisfactory account of human abilities. Marx was aware of Aristotle's position on potentiality and in the 1844 Manuscripts, Grundrisse, and Capital Marx developed the critical dimension of his philosophical anthropology by thinking the human as a constrained set of historically developing potentialities. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's ethical theory shares deep structural similarities with neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that this assumption is a mistake, and that Aristotle's ethical theory is both importantly distinct from the theories his work has inspired, and independently compelling. I take neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics to be characterized by two central commitments: (i) virtues of character are defined as traits that reliably promote an agent's own flourishing, and (ii) virtuous actions are defined as the sorts of actions (...) a virtuous agent reliably performs under the relevant circumstances. I argue that neither of these commitments are features of Aristotle's own view, and I sketch an alternative explanation for the relationship between virtue and happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics. Although, on the interpretation I defend, we do not find in Aristotle a distinctive normative theory alongside deontology and consequentialism, what we do find is a way of thinking about how prudential and moral reasons can come to be aligned through a certain conception of practical agency. (shrink)

-/- Bradley is one of the most important philosophers in the 20th century. He contributed to virtually every area of the philosophical discipline. However, he is mostly known for his work in metaphysics which finds a systematic exposition in his magnum opus: Appearance and Reality: An Essay in Metaphysics (1893). Bradley’s concept of metaphysics is implicit in all his writings, especially in his account of morality as self-realization in Ethical Studies and of course the theory of judgement and inference he (...) develops in the Principles of Logic. Same is true in respect of his discussion of the problem of truth and allied matters in Essays on Truth and Reality. Nonetheless it is in Appearance and Reality that his concept of metaphysics receives its explicit articulation. Bradley holds metaphysics in high esteem, seeing a close affinity between religion, mysticism and metaphysics. Hence he regards metaphysics as one of the highest vocations to which a human being is called. As a form of thinking, metaphysics provides us with an important avenue for understanding the nature of things as they are in themselves rather than merely in terms of their accidental determinations, that is to say, rather than merely as appearances. (shrink)

This paper proposes an interpretation of the rainfall example in which Aristotle does not himself think that crop growth is the final cause of rain. The grounds for this interpretation will be an ‘elemental teleology’ which affirms that the only final cause of the movements of the elements is the goal of reaching their proper places of rest. Textual evidence for the presence of this doctrine in Aristotle’s thought is examined in the first two thirds of the paper. My interpretation (...) is then offered along with an argument for why it is both possible and preferable to the alternative reading which claims that Aristotle believed that rain falls for the sake of the crops. (shrink)

The mind-body relationship is a fundamental issue that has interested philosophers from very different schools of thought. Nowadays we can observe several positions being taken on this topic — my aim is to emphasize the phenomenological perspective on the mind-body relationship and, in particular, the role of Aristotelian thought in the contributions of philosophers such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. This paper consists of three different parts: in the first part, I will briefly sketch out a phenomenological account of the living (...) body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty; in the second part, I will try to find parallels between phenomenology and Aristotle’s philosophy. Finally, I will argue for an Aristotelian reading of schizophrenia, a pathology that seems to be caused by a disruption of the corporeal Self. (shrink)

The testimonia concerning weight in early Greek atomism appear to contradict one another. Some reports assert that the atoms do have weight, while others outright deny weight as a property of the atoms. A common solution to this apparent contradiction divides the testimonia into two groups. The first group describes the atoms within a κόσμος, where they have weight; the second group describes the atoms outside of a κόσμος, where they are weightless. A key testimonium for proponents of this solution (...) is Aëtius 1.3.18. It apparently denies weight as a property of the atoms, and supposedly describes the atoms when they are outside of a κόσμος. I argue against this interpretive solution by demonstrating, first, that Aëtius 1.3.18 does not deny that weight is a property of the atoms. Second, I argue that the report does not describe the atoms when they are outside of a κόσμος. Although these are largely negative conclusions, I contend that we are not left without a solution to the present interpretive difficulty. Once our testimonia concerning weight in early Greek atomism are examined thoroughly, it is clear that there is no conflict among them. (shrink)

Aristotle famously asserted that the mind is identical with its object in an act of cognition. This “identity doctrine” has caused much confusion and controversy, with many seeking to avoid a literal interpretation in favor of one that suggests that “identity” refers to a formal isomorphism between the mind and its object. However, in this paper I suggest that Aristotle’s identity doctrine is not an epistemological claim about an isomorphism between a representation of an object and the object itself, but (...) is a phenomenological claim about the character of human cognition and intelligible being. Drawing on texts from Edmund Husserl and Aristotle, I offer a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s identity doctrine. I ultimately argue that, for Aristotle, mind and being are essentially unified, for intelligible being is partially constitutive of the mind. (shrink)

Hylomorphism is the theory that objects are composites of form and matter. Recently it has been argued that form is structure, or the arrangement of an object's parts. This paper shows that the principle of form cannot be ontologically exhausted by structure. That is, I deny form should be understood just as the arrangement of an object's parts. I do so by showing that structure cannot play the role form is supposed to in a certain domain of objects, specifically, in (...) mereological simples. Thus, I show that Hylomorphism does not reduce to Structuralism. I also draw out some important consequences from my argument for Hylomorphism in general. (shrink)

I present three critical points against G.E.R. Lloyd's ‘The Fortunes of Analogy’. First, I argue that Lloyd unduly criticises Aristotle's view of analogies. Second, I argue that Lloyd needs to discuss the means of limiting the semantic stretch of terms, for instance through the distinction between fiat and bona fide boundaries. Third, I point out some terminological issues in Lloyd's account, especially concerning the applicability of validity, soundness, and fallaciousness to analogies.

This paper challenges the ‘Standard Account’ of the so-called endoxic method that Aristotle articulates in a well-known passage from book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics. That account is problematic because it misreads what Aristotle says and thereby attributes to him an unusually rigid and conservative method that he himself does not seem to employ. This paper carefully analyzes the semantics and syntax of the book VII passage in order to present a novel and improved understanding of the endoxic method. This (...) improved account helps adjudicate scholarly debates about the method’s purpose and scope. (shrink)

Haec tractatio est responsio critica ad tractationem Ludovici Groarke, titulo “Orbitae ellipticae, possintne Aristotelice explicari?”, necnon ad commentationem Jacobi Franklin, cui titulus “De orbitis ellipticis ac Aristotelica revolutione scientifica”. Auctor imprimis ostendit explanationem “Aristotelicam” orbitarum ellipticarum a L. Groarke propositam non solum analysi Newtonianae repugnare, sed etiam in se esse incohaerentem. Porro auctor alia L. Groarke proposita impugnat: scil. nostri temporis physicam mathematicam esse essentialiter Platonicam, item Newtonianam orbitarum ellipticarum explicationem assymetriam prae se ferre inexplicabilem. Auctor e contra arguit, textibus (...) nonnulis S. Thomae Aquinatis innixus, physicam modernam, mathematica sui methodo non exclusa, realisticae epistemologiae Aristotelicae esse congruam, immo pure Aristotelice intelligi posse. Auctor tamen reicit quod J. Franklin insinuat, scil. physicam modernam nunc Aristotelicae philosophiae naturalis explere munia. Physica mathematica enim, methodo sua constricta, quaestiones genuine philosophicas movere non potest, ac proinde philosophiae naturalis vice fungi nequit.This discussion article is a critical reaction to L. Groarke’s paper “Can Aristotelianism Make Sense of Perihelion–Aphelion Orbits?” and J. Franklin’s comment “Elliptical Orbits and the Aristotelian Scientific Revolution”. In the first place, the author shows that Groarke’s proposed “Aristotelian” explanation of elliptical planetary orbits is inconsistent both in itself and with the Newtonian analysis. Furthermore, he challenges Groarke’s claims that modern mathematical physics is inherently Platonic and that the Newtonian explication of elliptical orbits involves unexplained assymmetries. With the help of several Aquinas’s texts the author argues that modern physics, including its maths-driven methodology, is not incompatible with Aristotelian realist epistemology but can be interpreted in a purely Aristotelian vein. On the other hand, the author rejects the view implied by Franklin that modern physics is an up-to-date replacement of Aristotelian philosophy of nature. Due to its methodological limits, mathematical physics is incapable of asking genuinely philosophical questions concerning the essence of bodies, and so it cannot be expected to do the job of natural philosophy. (shrink)

A considerable part of the work of Brentano from his youth to the end of his life is concerned with the thought of Aristotle. His peculiar way to access Aristotle makes of Brentano a rather eccentric figure among the nineteenth and early twentieth century’s Aristotelian scholarship. On the one hand, he doesn’t reject emphasizing the use of philological and historical resources in order to understand ancient texts and indeed he makes extensive use of them himself; on the other hand, he (...) believes that the main guide for the study of ancient philosophy should be a philosophical hermeneutics. Therefore, he develops a sharp criticism against Zeller and other scholars. Is for this reason that Brentano considered medieval scholastics as more appropriate interpreters of classical philosophy than them, in particular Aquinas. In our remarks, we will seek to review the main features of the method for interpreting Aristotle defended by Brentano. (shrink)

The First Mover According to Plotinus and Aristotle.

I examine the treatment of metaphor by medieval logicians and how it stemmed from their reception of classical texts in logic, grammar, and rhetoric. I consider the relation of the word 'metaphor' to the notions of translatio and transumptio, and show that it is not always synonymous with these. I also show that in the context of commentaries on the Sophistical Refutations metaphor was subsumed under equivocation. In turn, it was linked with the notion of analogy not so much in (...) the Greek sense of a similarity between two proportions or relations as in the new medieval sense of being said secundum prius et posterius. Whether or not analogy could be reduced to metaphor, or the reverse, depended on the controversial issue of the number of acts of imposition needed to produce an equivocal term. A spectrum of views is canvassed, including those found in the logic commentaries of John Duns Scotus. (shrink)

En la cúspide del conocimiento humano halla su sede la sabiduría. Un saber que se alcanza en la simplicidad más alta del ser humano, allí donde confluyen todas sus potencias y facultades, no solamente la inteligencia, sino también la voluntad y los afectos. Cualquier clase de conocimiento aséptico respecto de cualquier influencia afectiva o volitiva lleva a una reducción que de manera propia puede llamarse “intelectualismo”. El concepto de razón “pura” es un reduccionismo que conduce a una grave disgregación en (...) la criatura racional, y a la enajenación de su mismo ser. El que no conoce amando y no ama conociendo, ni conoce verdaderamente, ni verdaderamente ama. El conocimiento que compendia estas características antropológicas se denomina “conocimiento afectivo”. En este trabajo se hace una exploración sobre el alcance de este tipo peculiar de conocimiento siguiendo los principios de Aristóteles y Tomás de Aquino. (shrink)

Aristotle axiomatically divides the 28 syllogisms of necessity of Anal, prior. I 9-11 into two classes: those with a necessary conclusion and those with a non-necessary conclusion. The fact that Aristotle axiomatically comprehends only 24 syllogisms of necessity, however, raises two questions: 1. What method does he use to decide about the remaining four syllogisms? 2. Is this method consistent with the initial one? This essay pursues the answers to these questions first by means of semantic analysis, showing that Aristotle (...) ultimately considers assertoric propositions to be possible and therewith non-necessary propositions. Aristotle employs this approach, developed within the axiomatic, to the four syllogisms in question, thereby integrating them into the axiomatic. Finally, this essay answers the question of consistency by way of a formalization of the syllogisms of necessity. (shrink)

In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle gives us two definitions of happiness : In book I he defines eudaimonia as activity in accordance with the best and most perfect virtue, and very much later in the treatise, in book X, he states that the contemplative life of the philosopher is the most blessed life, and the life of the politician only second in rank. This paper argues that most interpreters have misunderstood the first definition due to the temptation to read the (...) first book with the tenth in mind. A new interpretation of the first definition is corroborated and linked with Aristotle's statements in book X, so that the entire work seems to be more consistent. Furthermore, a solution to the vexed problem whether moral virtues play a role in the contemplative life is suggested. (shrink)

Aristotle's account of natural slavery appears to be internally inconsistent concerning whether slavery is advantageous to the natural slave. Whereas the Politics asserts that slavery is beneficial to the slave, the ethical treatises deny such a claim. Examination of Aristotle's arguments suggests a distinction which resolves the apparent contradiction. Aristotle distinguishes between the common benefit between two people who join together in an association And the same benefit which exists between a whole and its parts. Master and slave share no (...) common benefit, but instead the slave receives the same benefit a master does, albeit only through participation in the master as a part within a whole. Although Aristotle's distinction hardly justifies his doctrine of slavery, it saves Aristotle from one alleged internal inconsistency and sheds light on what Aristotle means by association and the common good. (shrink)

This is a working paper that presents the first phase of what will eventually be a huge project, namely a critical appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Early on it provides a sketch of the main strands of Aristotle’s theoretical web in his N. Ethics. Following that, the paper offers some critical commentary concerning some of Aristotle’s main positions: especially his views on moral virtue, the soul, intellectual virtue, and human well-being. The paper then turns to the development of some significantly (...) different ways of construing both intellectual virtue as well as moral virtue. With respect to intellectual virtue, I present my own perspective in interconnection with a process-oriented way of understanding reality, as opposed to Aristotle’s substance-oriented way. With respect to moral virtue, I present my interpretation in relation to a thisworldly understanding of the human spirit/soul, as well as a humanistic-Marxist interpretation of human well-being. Toward the paper’s end, I offer some suggestions concerning a modified “doctrine of the mean” that would be a sort of critical synthesis of the views of Aristotle and Confucius. (shrink)

Nous nous sommes proposés ici de montrer qu’Aristote caractérise le fou dans le cadre d’un système différencié d’autres notions, sans en faire seulement un cas limite, quasiment impensé. Le point de départ de l’étude est l’analyse de la triade ἀκούσιον/δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν/ἀγνοῶν qui convoque aux côtés du fou : l’homme en colère, l’homme pris de vin, celui qui dort, le méchant, l’intempérant/incontinent, le malade. Cela implique de déterminer les types d’ignorance en cause dans les actes accomplis dans chaque cas et, a (...) contrario, en contraste avec la position socratique, les différentes formes de «l’être dans le savoir» : le savoir en entéléchie première et le savoir en acte ; le savoir du général et celui du particulier ; le savoir en acte sans intervention des affections et le savoir avec affections. Dans l’ensemble des catégories d’acteurs envisagées qui, selon les cas ne mettent pas en acte leur savoir de la différence entre le bien et le mal temporairement, ou le font durablement au point de transformer leur ignorance un état stable de méchanceté ou encore par choix, comme l’acratique, dans cet ensemble donc, le fou apparaît comme celui qui agit par ignorance et non pas de l’un ou de l’autre des paramètres d’une action particulière, mais de tous, à l’exception d’un seul : l’agent car, dit Aristote, «comment s’ignorer soi-même». Un autre moment de l’article consiste à analyser ce qu’est le soi-même en question et conclut à la réduction de l’αὐτός à ce qui accompagne la mise en acte de l’existence que ce soit dans l’agir, le faire ou le vivre. Le fou, en agissant, activerait simplement son sentiment d’exister et en cela ne pourrait «s’ignorer lui-même». Mais il faudra qu’il sorte de cette position et que, revenu à la connaissance de tous les paramètres d’un acte, il se repente de ce qu’il a accompli, pour avoir droit à la qualification d’ἀκούσιος. Chez Aristote la folie semble donc ne pouvoir être philosophiquement prise en compte que comme une crise dont on sort pour mettre en acte son savoir des paramètres d’une action particulière et n’est pas excusable parce que le fou «n’aurait pas eu conscience de son acte» mais parce qu’il a retrouvé la connaissance de ce qui compose un acte. (shrink)