Aristotle

Aristotle believes that certain pursuits are objectively choice worthy regardless of our attitudes towards them. Moreover, in order to have the correct beliefs about which actions are choice worthy, they must have acquired the right dispositions during their upbringing. Bernard Williams argues that Aristotle’s theory of moral education undermines belief in objective values. In response to Williams, Julia Annas argues that Aristotle does not ground ethics in the external point of view, but rather in the desires and commitments that people (...) already have. In this thesis, I argue that Aristotle held the view to which Williams objects and that Williams’ objection fails. Aristotle’s appeals to nature shows that he does not ground values in individual desires and commitments. Moreover, moral education does not alone undermine our confidence in the truth of our commitments. (shrink)

In Plato’s Republic, Socrates presents an image of human beings in a cave to portray the political situation. I contend a close reading of Aristotle’s extant Corpus Aristotelicum reveals a possible path to liberation from his version of the cave. For Aristotle, human beings are slaves if they are unable to follow the rule of the soul. Within the soul, the intellect is the ruling part. Following Simpson, I think it is plausible that all four surviving ethical works were written (...) by Aristotle with the possibility that each had a particular audience. An exegesis of these works as well as his treatise on politics brings to light the liberal education that he intends for some of his students. This education appears to begin with habituation toward the virtues culminating in the attainment of the virtue of prudence such that the student will be liberated both from excessive pursuit of external goods and the passions of the body. Once free, this student will be able to solely pursue the intellectual virtue of wisdom and find happiness in the contemplative life. For Aristotle, the peak of human life is found in the attainment of nobility-and-goodness as described in the Eudemian Ethics. The noble-and-good human being has all the necessary and measured amounts of both the external goods and the goods of the body. This human being also has complete virtue and pursues the goods of the soul to excess culminating in a life devoted to contemplating the god, which I take to be a reference to the motionless first mover. The Great Ethics appears to be addressed to a politically ambitious student and it seems that Aristotle specifically attempts to persuade this student toward a serious pursuit of virtue, justice, and prudence with a view to both citizenship and friendship. The audience of this treatise is repeatedly told that it is just and prudent to give up wealth and rule to those of greater virtue. Otherwise, such goods would be harmful to those without the proper virtues. Although serious is a neutral term itself, when it is combined with the verb to rule, the term can take on a negative connotation. This combined word means to scheme, to intrigue, or to be eager for office, and is found in the Politics. For Aristotle, democracies undergo revolution and turmoil when those eager for office act as demagogues. Regarding the other works, I assert the Eudemian Ethics is likely addressed to someone who has experience with or at least knows of the theoretical or natural sciences. The Nicomachean Ethics appears to be addressed to those especially from the standpoint of the judge, ruler, and lawgiver. On Virtues and Vices seems to be directed to a younger audience and almost anyone in the polis or political community concerned with virtue and vice. Overall, education in youth is directed toward the free, the noble, and the true. Aristotle gives the impression that this education is an early preparation for the contemplative life. Later education has an openness to this life and generally comes into being through a combination of following the law, habituation, and being persuaded by speech or teaching. Overall, Aristotle seems to direct certain students or audiences to specific ends. Some could be led to pursue wisdom, some might pursue prudence in light of possibly serving as judges, rulers, or lawgivers, while others may pursue prudence with a view to both citizenship and friendship. Lastly, Aristotelian freedom differs from liberty in liberal democracy in a few important ways. First, liberal democracy overemphasizes external freedom within the regime. Second, in liberal democracy there is an excessive pursuit of property and a later push towards absolute equality that is unjust by Aristotle’s standards. Third, in liberal democracy and early modern political philosophy, education is an entirely separate topic and there is no longer a direct connection between education and the regime as found in Aristotelian political philosophy. (shrink)

Descartes holds that, insofar as nature is a purposeless, unthinking, extended substance, there could be no final causes in physics. Descartes’ derivation of his three laws of motion from the perfections of God thus underwrites a rejection of Aristotle’s conception of natural self-motion and teleology. Aristotle derived his conception of the purposeful action of sublunar creatures from his notion that superlunar bodies are perfect, eternal, living beings, via the thesis that circular motion is more complete or perfect than rectilinear motion. (...) Descartes’ reduction of circular motion to rectilinear motion, achieved through his theological foundation of the laws of motion, thus marks a crucial break from Aristotle’s philosophy of nature. This paper argues that the shift from the Aristotelian conception of nature as self-moving and teleological to the Cartesian conception of nature as purposeless and inert, is not an empirical discovery but is rooted in differing conceptions of where perfection lies in nature. (shrink)

A researcher dealing with the topic of the presence of Aristotle’s philosophy in the modern Russian space of the humanities is faced with the task of comprehending the origins of the attitude towards Aristotle in the history of Russian science. Aristotle in Russia, unlike Europe, is represented in a rather limited way, and even where he is present, modern Russian philosophy uses a rather narrow layer of thought from his heritage. The article is devoted to the theme of a special (...) attitude to the fi gure of Aristotle in the fi eld of domestic social and humanitarian thought of the XIX century. During the formation of Russian philosophy as an independent phenomenon of global culture, Aristotle also falls into the fi eld of view of its founders. The interest in Aristotle was not originally of a scientifi c nature, but stemmed from current socio-political disputes, which would later become known as the disputes between Slavophiles and Westernizers. Aristotle in this case acts as a part of world culture, in which domestic intellectuals of the 19th century claim to a special place. This era is considered as a period that laid the basic principles of attitude towards Aristotle in Russia in the 20th century. Such principles are the attitude towards Aristotle as a historian of science and as a part of world culture. (shrink)

The main question of this article is that what are the important differences or similarities between Aristotle's and Frege's analysis of the categorical proposition? Based on the famous view, Aristotle analyzes the categorical proposition into three components: Subject, Predicate and Relation; while Frege analyzes the categorical proposition into two components of Variable and Function, and therefore; these two analyses are completely different and there is no similarity between them. In the other article, I have argued that in the Aristotle's viewpoint, (...) in the logical analysis of the categorical proposition, against its linguistic analysis, it is divided into two main components of subject and predicate. At this article, I have shown that by accepting of this analysis and based on it, it becomes clear that: firstly, there are important similarities between these two analyses: 1) both are two-part analyses 2) Aristotle, like Frege, considers «to be attributed to something else» to be the essential feature of the predicate part; Secondly, there are important differences between them: 1) Aristotle considers «to be attributed to something else» to be merely the essential property of the Role of Predicate, but Frege considers it to be also the essential property of general concepts that replaces in this role, and therefore 2) Frege, against Aristotle, maintains that general concepts cannot be the subject of propositions. This viewpoint of Frege is based on the «Fundamental distinction between Object and Concept». Therefore the root of the differences between the two analyses should be sought in this assertion.. (shrink)

This study examines the concepts of rhetoric used in ancient times, using a process of research based upon “Interpretivist Research Philosophy”. Common thinking among rhetoricians and philosophers in general argues that one concept of rhetoric was utilized. This paper argues that there were at least three concepts of rhetoric known in Antiquity. Each was unique in its own right and contributed to what was to be a new body of knowledge. Research conclusions stem from a study of the works of (...) ancient authors, including Plato and Aristotle, and from schools of philosophies, including the writings of Stoics and Sophists. The reviewed literature supports the thesis presented in this paper that at least three concepts of rhetoric were known and used. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 3, Page 334-356, July 2022.

Three errors of "The Blind Watchmaker" theory are examined with Aristotelian thought.

This paper discusses two passages from Alexander of Aphrodisias’s commentary on Aristotle’s Topics that are transmitted in Ps-Jābir’s Kitāb al-Nukhab. It argues that the Arabic translation of Alexander’s commentary may have been made from a fuller version than what came down to us in Greek. Especially since the author of the Jābir-corpus form a tradition different from the school of Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq and authors associated to the ‘Baghdad school’, whose earliest figure is Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus, the Arabic (...) fragments of Alexander’s commentary preserved in the Kitāb al-Nukhab promise to shed more light on the early reception of the Topics and the different contexts in which Aristotelian dialectic was studied in the Islamic world. (shrink)

In the ‘Foreword’, I address some aspects of Academician Georg Brutian’s philosophy. The Initial Anthropology paper follows. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle considers the relation of ethical theory to anthropology in a specific way. He sets out an initial anthropology that describes the human through its common and non-common elements to plants as well as to ‘other animals’. The conclusion is that the human animal is the only living being that is endowed with reason and carries out ‘practical life’. We (...) may call this difference ‘the anthropological difference’. In his ethical theory, Aristotle points to the limits of the anthropological difference. On the one hand, he holds that only practical theory can explain the ‘practical life’ as well as the ‘human Good’. On the other hand, he highlights that the human is higher than the ‘other animals’, since the human is endowed with the divine element of intellect; nevertheless, there are beings that are ‘more divine’ than the human. Thus Aristotle corroborates the human and its practical life, without abandoning the Socratic-Platonic view of the Divine. In this aspect, the alleged anthropocentrism of Aristotle’s ethics is to be reconsidered. (shrink)

This article deals with Ibn Sīnā’s criticisms of Aristotle regarding what the place of God should be in the science of metaphysics. From Aristotle’s point of view, the existence of God is proved by the proof of motion in physics and is held as a subject matter in a science that comes after physics, which is metaphysics. According to him, metaphysics is the most sublime science because God is its subject matter. The most striking criticism against Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics (...) was put forward by Ibn Sīnā. From Ibn Sīnā’s point of view, the most important problem encountered in Aristotle’s understanding of metaphysics is that ontology and theology are intertwined. According to him, God cannot be a subject matter in metaphysics, rather, proving the existence of God is the aim of metaphysics. The subject matter of metaphysics is being qua being, and its aim is to prove the Necessary Existent that is the principle of existence. Accordingly, for Ibn Sīnā, metaphysics is an ontological science in terms of its subject and a theological science in terms of its aim. This new conception of metaphysics, developed by Ibn Sīnā, had a profound effect not only on Islamic thought but also on Western philosophy. In a way, the ontotheological notes of Islamic and Western thought from the Middle Ages to the present have progressed through the metaphysical symphony composed by Ibn Sīnā. (shrink)

Within contemporary discussions on organizational wisdom, management scholars frequently turn to Aristotle’s work to conceptualize wisdom as phronesis, or practical wisdom. Contrary to the prevailing view, this paper argues that Aristotle did not propose an exclusively practical or particularistic conception of wisdom but, instead acknowledged that wisdom broadly conceived consists of two types of intellectual virtue: theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom. Aristotle’s ultimate position regarding the relations between sophia and phronesis has remained, however, ambiguous, giving rise to different interpretations, and, (...) more substantively, to the major appropriations of Aquinas, Heidegger and Gadamer. An analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of exemplary contributions to management wisdom suggests that research has predominantly applied Heideggerian and Gadamerian understandings of Aristotelian wisdom, while an Aquinian interpretation is largely absent in contemporary elaborations. Interpreting the Aristotelian notion of wisdom as dedicated purely to practical phronesis narrows the discussion on the nature of wisdom within an Aristotelian framework in ways that do not give full credit to the breadth and complexity of Aristotle’s thought. (shrink)

It is commonly put forth that Aristotle’s ethics is a virtue ethics. This is contrasted with ethics that is orientated toward right actions. For Aristotle, this is a pseudo-distinction. One cannot build one’s virtues except through performing right actions. For Aristotle, one performs right actions for their own sake, not for the sake of building virtues or even building character. But the performance of noble deeds, which is the ultimate counsel to life that Aristotle gives, has as its natural consequence (...) the building of virtue and the building of character. This, in turn, brings happiness. Since none of Aristotle’s writings is extant, it is not easy to ferret out Aristotle’s meaning. However, if one reads the lecture notes of Aristotle’s students with some care, it is clear that one should not act for the sake of building character or obtaining happiness. Indeed, the purpose of political society, for Aristotle, is to create a venue for the performance of noble actions. Noble acts, just acts, are the goal for mankind. Nothing else. That happiness flows from this is proof for Aristotle that this is the right path for humankind to take. (shrink)

In Metaphysics B 3 Aristotle sets out a famous argument for the thesis that being is not a genus. In his commentary on Metaphysics B, Syrianus criticizes this argument and explains in what sense being is to be regarded as a genus. I reconstruct both Syrianus’ criticisms and his own view. I bring out ways in which they can help us rethink key assumptions of Aristotle’s ontology and shed light both on Syrianus’ critical attitude towards Aristotle and on some of (...) Syrianus’ main views in metaphysics. (shrink)

When Gadamer elaborates his conception of philosophical hermeneutics as a transcendental inquiry, he appeals to Aristotle’s practical philosophy as a “model”, which can elucidate his own conceptual...

In this paper, we argue that the neo-Aristotelian conception of “friendships of character” appears to misrepresent the essential nature of "genuine", or "true", friendship. We question the neo-Aristotelian imperative that true friendship entails disinterested love of the other “for their own sake” and strives at enhancing moral virtue. We propose an alternative conception of true friendship as involving affective and motivational features which we call closeness, intimacy, identity, and trust. Even on this minimal construal, however, friendship can turn vicious when (...) one of its characteristics becomes overpowering and thereby destroys the very goods for which the friendship was originally sought. (shrink)

This article is part of a larger project that explores how to channel people’s passion for popular arts into legal social justice by reconceiving law as a kind of poetry and justice as dance, and exploring different possible relationships between said legal poetry and dancing justice. I begin by rehearsing my previous new conception of social justice as organismic empowerment, and my interpretive method of dancing-with. I then apply this method to the following four “ethico-political choreographies of justice”: the choral (...) dance of souls qua winged chariot-teams, a dancingly beautiful friendship with the community, a tightrope-dance of the cool, and humans dancingly reimagined as positioned actors in fluidly moving groups. I then synthesize these analyses into “dancing justice,” defined as the dynamic equilibrium sustained by a critical mass of a community’s members comporting themselves like social dancers. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to examine the thought of John Philoponus contra Aristotle, as it pertains to consciousness and its emergence, in light of both contemporary cosmology and philosophy. It will be argued that in an eternal universe the emergence of consciousness is an impossibility. The inspiration for this line of reasoning is found in Philoponus’ sixth century arguments against Aristotle on the eternity of the world. It will be shown that much of Philoponus’ argumentation is corroborated by (...) contemporary cosmology and philosophy. (shrink)