Aristotle: Aesthetics, Misc

The author considers that the Penal Sciences face a wide range of human pathogenic issues, ranging from terrorism and human trafficking to corruption and the use of substances and are, thus, the ideal discipline for investigating the various scientific issues and the implementation of the scientific findings arising from such investigations. He also believes that the Penal Sciences, being inextricably linked to human values and constitutional rights, are, by their nature, beneficial towards the promotion and consolidation of values, such as (...) freedom, solidarity and, especially, Social Justice. The latter concept is perceived by the author not only as a form of justice, which provides everyone with their due of proportion to their value, according to the famous saying of Ulpian “suum cuique tribuere”, but rather as a form of restitution from social injustices and as a treatment for social needs, particularly for our fellow human beings who are marginalized by society in conditions of poverty and degradation. It is interesting, at this point, to emphasize that the United Nations, in an important report from 2006 entitled “Social Justice in an Open World. The Role of the United Nations”, defines Social Justice as the fair and compassionate distribution of the fruits of economic growth (“Social Justice in an Open World. The Role of the United Nations”, edited by the International Forum for Social Development, New York: United Nations, 2006, p. 7, available online). The vision, therefore, of a society focused on goals such as combating socio-economic disparities and providing effective assistance for the weaker members of society signifies, especially in this period of Crisis, is a primary objective worthy, according to the author, of captivating us. Perhaps, indeed, the new target for Criminal Policy, following that of Restorative Justice, should now be that of Social Justice and, in fact, with a double project and aim: first for a fairer distribution of social goods and, also, for greater solidarity towards the weaker members of society. Indeed, it is a known fact to those involved with the Penal Sciences, that a dominant contemporaneous trend is that of Restorative Justice, in the sense that Criminal Law and Criminology finally have to address the needs of the victim of a criminal act and to advocate for relevant methods for extrajudicial settlements and for the conciliation of the offender and the victim. Restorative Justice is, hence, based on the triptych of the perpetrator assuming responsibilities for their actions, of restoring, as far as possible, the effects of the injurious actions against the victim and, also, of actively expressing the desire for conciliation with the victim. Certainly it would be greatly desirable if these ideas were to be consolidated within Greek legislation, albeit within the, always progressive, Greek Law for Minors there is a provision for the reformatory conciliation measure, pursuant to article 122 case e of the Greek Penal Code. However, the author believes that in this period of time, a time of profound crisis at all levels, there is need for more than simple offender-victim conciliation. There is a need for this spirit of reconciliation and solidarity to be extended to benefit all those who are experiencing hard times and may, therefore, in their deprivation and frustration, are led to committing crime. The author, at this point, refers to all the socially weak and often marginalized groups of people, who are scientifically characterized as "weak" or "vulnerable" and who try, with great courage, to survive without breaching the threshold of breaking the law. It is apparent here, according to the author, that if Criminal Policy actually aims to provide solutions to the problems of crime, it should not solely be limited to repairing the damage and conciliating the victim and perpetrator, but it should strike against the causative factors of crime and the primarily socio-economic inequalities and other forms of injustice which cause, according to Aristotle in his "Politics" (V. 1301b27, 1301a32 et seq., 1266b40), social reactions, attitudes and – Ι would add - a sequence of serious criminal acts. In other words, another kind of Justice is required in addition to Restorative, so that it may become the mission of our Criminal Policy to eliminate the injustices and inequalities that lead to crime. In view of this direction certain introductory thoughts are developed in this article. (shrink)

A free copy of the review can be obtained by following this link: -/- http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/pKdJUN4BCKP7z8SneF6X/full .

Improvisation is the origin of art and science, tragedy and comedy, acting and doing, of the self as improvising and improvised. But clearly we cannot use improvisation to explain improvisation. We cannot be satisfied with an argument that improvisation is, well, improvisational--nor simply free-play. Rather, improvisation as αὐτο-σχεδιάζεῖν, means self-schematization.

In this paper I review four texts in which Aristotle comments on Empedocles ' writing style. I show that Aristotle thought that Empedocles was a fine poet. That is fine, if a poet is what you want.

What is the origin of language? For Levinas, from Aristotle to von Humboldt, the tradition of Western metaphysics has understood language as a representation of reality, going beyond or transcending experience. In this way, language is a metaphor that substitutes for experience—and all language is originally metaphorical. Experience however, is essentially inexpressible—for it not only transcends language, but it does so because experience is always experience of the other, of that which remains infinitely other. And language reminds us of its (...) failure (a failure which Derrida sees, ironically, as a success) to express this other by maintaining a trace of the inexpressible in every expression—and metaphor is failure of expression par excellence. But what is the origin of this original failure? In fact, it can be found in the way in which language makes metaphors (which is the way in which it makes itself, transcends itself, substitutes for itself, becomes other than itself). For as Aristotle reminds us: metaphor-making (indeed, all language, every word and deed) is poiēsis—and the origin of poiēsis is improvisation. If we have, however, discovered the origin of language in improvisation—but what is that? (shrink)

Usage and limits of analogy and metaphor in Aristotle’s science could be confusing. In some passages Aristotle uses both elements in explanations, and their clarity is defended. However, in other texts the metaphor is excluded from science. In this article, I will analyze the difference between metaphor and analogy and examine in what context metaphor can be used. My thesis is that Aristotle uses the analogy as an argumentative resource understood by epagoge. On the case of metaphors, they should be (...) excluded from science, but is a valid strategy for some kind of speeches, and as a pedagogical element of explanations. Key words: metaphor, analogy, argumentation, science, language. (shrink)