Aristotle and Other Philosophers

Classically, most philosophers asked philosophical questions without answering them. In this book, the author follows Bertrand Russel’s approach in his book The Problems of Philosophy , by offering possible answers to philosophical questions. The book consists eight chapters that aim to offer answers to eight questions, namely: Sources of Islamic Civilization, Achievements of Muslim Philosophers, Falsification of the Sudden Light, Aristotle’s Categories, Zaki Nageeb’s Criticism of Greek Philosophy, The Natural Terms, Comparative Study between Avicenna and Al-Ghazzali, Despotism in Theology and (...) Philosophy, and a Modern Vision of Athens Democracy. The book represents a new experience that provides insights and discussions to answer some philosophical questions that used as topics for discussions among researchers in the philosophical and cultural circles. (shrink)

This article aims to address the widespread thesis according to which medieval scholastics would not handle the idea of fine art. Based on a suggestion by Anzulewicz, the author shows how Albert the Great did understand the peculiarity of fine arts and put them in close relationship with liberal arts. There are fine arts, such as music, which are sought after for their own sake and can, therefore, be considered as fully liberal. In contrast to them, there are other arts (...) called mechanical, whose purpose is utilitarian. In the third place, there are other arts which, although also possessing some utility, are chosen for their own sake and are therefore partly liberal; we should place fine arts such as architecture in that group. The more art participates in reason and the beauty of the soul, the more it will be fine and liberal. The product is called to be a metaphor for the honest good of virtue. The very contemplation of this beauty embodied by art evokes an aesthetic enjoyment. In this way, we can see that Albert, no less than Aquinas, speaks of the pleasure linked to the contemplation of beauty. (shrink)

This volume is the first in English to provide a full, systematic investigation into Aristotle's criticisms of earlier Greek theories of the soul from the perspective of his theory of scientific explanation. Some interpreters of the De Anima have seen Aristotle's criticisms of Presocratic, Platonic, and other views about the soul as unfair or dialectical, but Jason W. Carter argues that Aristotle's criticisms are in fact a justified attempt to test the adequacy of earlier theories in terms of the theory (...) of scientific knowledge he advances in the Posterior Analytics. Carter proposes a new interpretation of Aristotle's confrontations with earlier psychology, showing how his reception of other Greek philosophers shaped his own hylomorphic psychology and led him to adopt a novel dualist theory of the soul–body relation. His book will be important for students and scholars of Aristotle, ancient Greek psychology, and the history of the mind–body problem. (shrink)

In Physica I,8 Aristotle endeavors to show that a long-term Eleatic puzzle about coming-to-be can be resolved by appealing to his own ontological principles of change (substratum, privation, and form). In this paper, I posit that the key to Aristotle’s resolution lies in the introduction of aspectual distinctions within numerical unities. These distinctions within the terminus a quo and the terminus as quem of coming-to-be made it possible for Aristotle to maintain, while answering the puzzle, that there is no coming-to-be (...) ex nihilo and, at the same time, that the product of coming-to-be is something that did not exist before; i.e. that there is coming-to-be. Finally, I suggest that this resolution could be seen as an interesting case of the application of conceptual tools developed in the Sophistici Elenchi, and I analyze the advantages of this resolution over the Platonic resolution of a similar sort of Eleatic problem. (shrink)

Book 1 of Euclid's Elements opens with a set of unproved assumptions: definitions , postulates, and ‘common notions’ . The common notions are general rules validating deductions that involve the relations of equality and congruence. The attested postulates are five in number, even if a part of the manuscript tradition adds a sixth, almost surely spurious , that in some manuscripts features as the ninth, and last, common notion. The postulates are called αἰτήματα both in the manuscripts of the Elements (...) and in the ancient exegetic tradition. It is not said, however, that this denomination is original, as it coincides with the nomen rei actae associated with the verbal form introducing the postulates themselves. Since antiquity it has been recognized that the postulates naturally split into two groups of quite different character: the first three are rules licensing basic constructions, the fourth and the fifth are assertions stating properties of particular geometric objects . I transcribe postulates 1–3 in the text established by Heiberg : ᾐτήσθω ἀπὸ παντὸς σημείου ἐπὶ πᾶν σημεῖον εὐθεῖαν γραμμὴν ἀγαγεῖν καὶ πεπερασμένην εὐθεῖαν κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἐπ᾽ εὐθείας ἐκβαλεῖν καὶ παντὶ κέντρῳ καὶ διαστήματι κύκλον γράϕεσθαι. (shrink)

In On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle rejects the very possibility of such a thing as Anaximander’s apeiron. Characterized as a kind of intermediate stuff, the apeiron turns out to consist of contraries and as such is impossible. Commentators have rightly noted this point and some have also indicated that Aristotle offers an argument of sorts for his negative estimate. However, the argument has received scant attention, and it is fair to say that it remains unclear exactly why Aristotle rejects Anaximander’s (...) intermediate stuff. Indeed, it is unclear how Aristotle’s argument is supposed to run in the first place. This paper offers a reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument for the impossibility of the apeiron, and on this basis offers to explain Aristotle’s grounds for rejecting Anaximander’s intermediate stuff. This is especially called for in light of the fact that Aristotle himself thinks that there can be intermediate stuffs. Finally, some attention is given to the parallel between the apeiron and Aristotle’s prime matter. (shrink)

BOOK REVI~WS 137 Gail Fine. On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv + 4oo. Cloth, $55.oo. To many readers it will no doubt seem odd at first that an author could spend over four hundred printed pages discussing a portion of a treatise comprising just a scant five pages of Greek text, even supposing that the work faithfully reports Aristotelian doctrine. However, in working through Fine's book , one comes to (...) see that it contains not only a thorough treatment of the first book of the Peri Ide0n, but also comprehensive interpretations of the metaphysical systems of Socrates, Plato , and Aristotle, and the parallels and differences among these systems. The book also contains clearheaded and instructive accounts of so-called "Third Man" arguments, and critical discussion of some influential interpretive hypotheses put forward in the writings of G. E. L. Owen. In the end, it is actually something of a marvel.. (shrink)

Many have argued against the claim that Plato posited the mathematical objects that are the subjects of Metaphysics M and N. This paper shifts the burden of proof onto these objectors to show that Plato did not posit these entities. It does so by making two claims: first, that Plato should posit the mathematical Intermediates because Forms and physical objects are ill suited in comparison to Intermediates to serve as the objects of mathematics; second, that their utility, combined with Aristotle’s (...) commentary on Plato’s posit of Intermediates, provides good reason to conclude that Plato did posit them. (shrink)

Aristotle dedicates the first chapters of Politics B to a critical examination of Plato’s Kallipolis from the standpoint of the end of the city and the means to achieve it. Many modern commentaries have depicted Aristotle’s critique as unfair to Plato. Through a detailed philosophical commentary, Mayhew attempts to demonstrate on the contrary that “Aristotle is right, and his modern critics wrong”.

This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition (...) of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution. (shrink)

Embora Aristóteles considere a fórmula ontológica de Parménides ὠς (ȍπως) ἒστƖνcomo primitiva e incomplete faz dela, todavia, o fundamento de todo o discurso verdadeiro e sensato. Interessado, sobretudo, em rever a teoria das Ideias de Platão, é bem provável, inclusive, que ele tenha encontrado na fórmula de Parménides, além de motivacao para o seu próprio empenho, o fundamento sintático-semântico do discurso ontológico, mais precisamente, dos modos ou categorias pelos quais podemos expressar-nos gramatical e fllosoflcamente. /// Aristotles' Treatment of Parmenides 1 (...) Ontological Thesis. Aristotle considers Parmenides' thesis about being, expressed in the formula ὠς (ȍπως) ἒστƖν as primitive and incomplete, but he neverthelesses employs it as the foundation of true and sensible discourse. Concerned in revising Plato's theory of forms, he found in Parmenides' formula, not only a motivation for his own viewpoint, but indeed the basis for the semantico-syntactic structure of ontological discourse, of the categories and modes in terms of which we can express ourselves grammatically and philosophically. (shrink)

281ARISTOTLE? S REVIEW OF THE PRESOCRATICS * Catherine Collobert is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Ottawa. Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 40, no. 3 281?95 [281] Aristotle?s Review of the Presocratics: Is Aristotle Finally a Historian of Philosophy?1 CATHERINE COLLOBERT* ?JUST AS INEXPERIENCED SOLDIERS IN FIGHTS, rushing forward from all sides, often strike fine blows, but without knowledge, so they do not seem to understand what they say? . This negative judgment of Aristotle about his (...) predecessors has been the object of numerous controversies, which could be summarized by the following question: was Aristotle writing philosophy or history of philosophy when he set out the doctrines of his predecessors? This controversy was reopened2 by H. Cherniss,3 according to whom the Aristotelian review of the Presocratics rests upon, on the one hand, the firm belief of Aristotle that each Presocratic groped around the truth and, on the other hand, the fact that Aristotle judged their mistakes and successes in the light of his own system, understood as the final realization of previous doctrines.4 W. K. C. Guthrie I would like to thank J. Brunschwig, M. Conche, and L.-A. Dorion for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 1 I do not want to suggest that there is no development in Aristotle?s thought. I am thus not assuming a unitarian standpoint. However, as will become clear, the statements I quote, even if.. (shrink)

From very early on, Western philosophers have been obsessed with the understanding of a relatively few works of philosophy which have played a disproportionately large and fundamental role in developing the Western philosophical canon, dominating the curriculum in the past and in the present; there is no indication that they will not do so in the future.Uses and Abuses of the Classics examines the various ways in which the different periods of the history of philosophy have approached these texts. The (...) editors have chosen for analysis some of the major philosophers from periods of the history of philosophy in which the interpretation of the classics has been particularly significant.Contributions to this book include entries on: Aristotle's reading of Plato; Averroes on Aristotle; Nietzsche on the Beginnings of Western Philosophy; and Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. (shrink)

Aquinas consistently criticizes Plato and his followers for their commitment to the existence of separate forms or ideas. There is no whiteness existing by itself apart from any particular white things or any particular person's thoughts about them. The same goes for every natural form, from humanity to heat. And yet Aquinas is happy to appeal to such separate forms as examples to illustrate his own metaphysical views. This seems like a strange and dangerous procedure. If Aquinas considers Platonic forms (...) to be incoherent, then surely their incoherence will infect the notions he uses them to illustrate. But does Aquinas consider Platonic forms to be incoherent? I don't think so. The very fact that he uses them as examples to illustrate his own views suggests otherwise. And at one point Aquinas even grants that God could create a Platonic form such as a separate whiteness. Why, then, does he reject such forms? What has Aquinas got against them? An examination of his main critical discussions of Platonic forms shows that he rejects them not because he thinks they are impossible, but because he thinks they are unnecessary. In other words, Aquinas rejects Platonic forms on grounds of parsimony, since he thinks they cannot explain any of the things that Plato posited them to explain, such as the changes things undergo, the nature and existence of things, and our knowledge of them. Where Plato's separate forms fail, however, Aquinas thinks Aristotle's inherent forms succeed. (shrink)

Sense experience, naïvely conceived, is a way of knowing perceptible properties: the colors, sounds, smells, flavors, and textures in our perceptual environment. So conceived, ordinary experience presents the perceiver with the essential nature of a property like Sky Blue or Middle C, such that how the property appears in experience is identical to how it essentially is. In antiquity, as today, it was controversial whether sense experience could meet the conditions for knowledge implicit in this naïve conception. Aristotle was a (...) partisan in this debate, but his position is poorly understood. This dissertation examines how Aristotle’s perceptual psychology responds to ancient challenges to the naïve conception, and so articulates his defense of perceptual knowledge. -/- Aristotle’s defense relies on an ontology of “perceptual qualities"—a core class of perceptible properties—according to which those qualities, despite having a perceiver-independent essence rooted in the physics of causation and affection, nevertheless can be present in experience as they essentially are. Chapter 1 defends this realist and objectivist reading against competing interpretations, which overlook a crucial distinction between perceptual qualities and perceptual objects. Chapter 2 presents Aristotle’s ontology as a physicalism that uncharacteristically allows for perceptual qualities to appear in experience as they essentially are. -/- This ontology informs Aristotle’s account of the psychological conditions under which perceivers actually are presented with the essence of perceptual qualities. The locus of this account is an obscure passage where Aristotle purports to show that the senses “discriminate” perceptual qualities because the senses are “mean states” (An. 2.11, 424a5–7). Chapter 3 develops a comprehensive interpretation of the sensory mean state, which Chapter 4 uses to elucidate Aristotle’s argument for sensory discrimination. Sensory discrimination turns out to be a process in which the essence of a perceptual quality comes to be present in the affection it produces in a perceiver. For Aristotle, this shows that sense perception meets a condition for knowledge that his predecessors, including Plato, thought it could not meet. For in his view, but not in theirs, sense experience shares in both the truth and the essence of the qualities it perceives. (shrink)