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  1. added 2019-07-17
    Um Estudo sobre os Paralogismos Acidentais nas 'Refutações Sofísticas' de Aristóteles.Victor Augusto Barbosa Vieira - 2019 - Dissertation, UFG, Brazil
    Our object of study in this dissertation is the paralogism due to the concomitant ( which we’ll call abreviated “PDC”). This paralogism is analysed by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations as a false argument. Our study about this paralogismo is divided into four chapters. Trough the first chapter we pretend to answer an important question about the PDC’s appearance. Although this paralogism is a false argument, it possess certain similarity with arguments recognized as good by the one refuted. This similarity (...)
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  2. added 2018-08-06
    Desanudando argumentos. Las aplicaciones filosóficas de la dialéctica según las Refutaciones Sofísticas.Gabriela Rossi - 2016 - Méthexis 19 (1):79-109.
  3. added 2018-08-06
    Algunas notas sobre la discusión con los eléatas en Física I de Aristóteles.Gabriela Rossi - 2001 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 20:137-159.
    The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the role of some peculiar elements of Aristotle's dialectical development —namely, those emerging in the Sophistical Refutations (SE)— in the analysis and discussion of the Eleatic thesis in Physics I, 2-3. The paper adresses some of Aristotle's preliminary thoughts (Phys. I, 2) (which are read as methodological considerations), and some remarks against Melissus' argument (Phys. I, 3), in order to find connections between such claims and passages of SE, as well as the (...)
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  4. added 2018-03-24
    Syllogisms Diagrammed: OOA to OOO.Mark Andrews - manuscript
    This document diagrams the forms OOA, OOE, OOI, and OOO, including all four figures. Each form and figure has the following information: (1) Premises as stated: Venn diagram showing what the premises say; (2) Purported conclusion: diagram showing what the premises claim to say; (3) Relation of premises to conclusion: intended to describe how the premises and conclusion relate to each other, such as validity or contradiction. Used in only a few examples; (4) Distribution: intended to create a system in (...)
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  5. added 2016-11-01
    Aristotle on the Demarcation of Dialectical and Sophistical Arguments.Paolo Fait - 2016 - Antiquorum Philosophia 10:25-46.
  6. added 2016-04-17
    A defesa do princípio de não-contradição e a refutação da sofística no livro IV da Metafísica de Aristóteles.Samantha da Graça Simões - 2014 - Dissertation, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
  7. added 2016-04-17
    A refutação da sofística no livro Gama da Metafísica de Aristóteles.M. Reus Engler - 2010 - Intuitio 3 (1):99-119.
  8. added 2016-04-16
    Uma solução aristotélica para o paradoxo do mentiroso em Metafísica IV, 8.Nazareno Eduardo de Almeida - 2013 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 58 (3):429-466.
  9. added 2015-09-29
    Exempla Docent. How to Make Sense of Aristotle’s Examples of the Fallacy of Accident (Doxography Matters).Leone Gazziero - 2015 - Acta Philosophica 24 (2):333-354.
    Scholarly dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s fallacy of accident has traditionally focused on his examples, whose compatibility with the fallacy’s definition has been doubted time and again. Besides a unified account of the fallacy of accident itself, the paper provides a formalized analysis of its several examples in Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi. The most problematic instances are dealt with by means of an internal reconstruction of their features as conveyed by Aristotle’s text and an extensive survey of their interpretation in the Byzantine and (...)
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  10. added 2015-06-29
    Aristotle on Non-Contradiction: Philosophers Vs. Non-Philosophers.Jean-Louis Hudry - 2013 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 7 (2):51.
  11. added 2014-05-15
    «ΚΑI OΤΙ EΣΤΙ ΤΙΣ ΤΡΙΤΟΣ AΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ» (Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 22 178b36–179a10). Prolegomena to ancient history of the argument of 'third man'.Leone Gazziero - 2010 - Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science (2):181-220.
    Few arguments from the past have stirred up as much interest as Aristotle’s “Third man” and not so many texts have received as much attention as its account in chapter 22 of the Sophistici elenchi. And yet, several issues about both remain highly controversial, starting from the very nature of the argument at stake and the exact signification of some of its features. The essay provides a close commentary of the text, dealing with its main difficulties and suggesting an overall (...)
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  12. added 2014-03-24
    The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument.Graciela Marta Chichi - 2002 - Argumentation 16 (3):333-348.
    In this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the ad hominem-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the ad hominem, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or (...)
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  13. added 2014-03-09
    Mistakes of Reason: Practical Reasoning and the Fallacy of Accident.Allan Bäck - 2009 - Phronesis 54 (2):101-135.
    For Aristotle the fallacy of accident arises from mistakes about being per accidens and not from accidental predication. Mistakes in perceiving per accidens come from our judgements about being per accidens and so commit that fallacy. Practical syllogisms have the same formal structure as being and perceiving per accidens . Moreover perceiving per accidens typically provides the minor premise for the practical syllogism as it makes it possible for us to know singular propositions, especially those about substances. Thus these minor (...)
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  14. added 2014-03-04
    Context-Sensitive Argumentation: Dirty Tricks in the Sophistical Refutations and a Perceptive Medieval Interpretation of the Text.Sten Ebbesen - 2011 - Vivarium 49 (1-3):75-94.
    Aristotle in the central chapters of his Sophistical Refutations gives advice on how to counter unfair argumentation by similar means, all the while taking account not only of the adversary's arguments in themselves, but also of his philosophical commitments and state of mind, as well as the impression produced on the audience. This has offended commentators, and made most of them, medieval and modern alike, pass lightly over the relevant passages. A commentary that received the last touch in the very (...)
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  15. added 2013-12-08
    TRÊS TIPOS DE ARGUMENTO SOFÍSTICO.Lucas Angioni - 2012 - Dissertatio 36:187-220.
    This paper attempts to clarify the nature and the importance of a third kind of sophistic argument that is not always found in the classification of those arguments in the secondary literature. An argument of the third kind not only is a valid one, but is also constituted of true propositions. What makes it a sophistic argument is the fact that it produces a false semblance of scientific explanation: its explanation seems to be appropriate to the explanandum without being so. (...)
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  16. added 2013-11-13
    False Endoxa and Fallacious Argumentation.Colin Guthrie King - 2013 - Logical Analysis and the History of Philosophy 15:185–199.
    Aristotle determines eristic argument as argument which either operates upon the basis of acceptable premisses (endoxa) and merely give the impression of being deductive, or argument which truly is deductive but operates upon the basis of premisses which seem to be acceptable, but are not (or, again, argument which uses both of these mechanisms). I attempt to understand what Aristotle has in mind when he says that someone is deceived into accepting premisses which seem to be acceptable but which are (...)
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  17. added 2013-03-31
    What is a Sophistical Refutation?David Botting - 2012 - Argumentation 26 (2):213-232.
    From Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations the following classifications are put forward and defended through extensive excerpts from the text. (AR-PFC) All sophistical refutations are exclusively either ‘apparent refutations’ or ‘proofs of false conclusions’. (AR-F) ‘Apparent refutations’ and ‘fallacies’ name the same thing. (ID-ED) All fallacies are exclusively either fallacies in dictione or fallacies extra dictionem . (ID-nAMB) Not all fallacies in dictione are due to ambiguity. (AMB-nID) Not all fallacies due to ambiguity are fallacies in dictione . (AMB&ID-ME) The set of (...)
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  18. added 2013-03-29
    The Ingredients of Aristotle’s Theory of Fallacy.Pieter Sjoerd Hasper - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (1):31-47.
    In chapter 8 of the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle claims that his theory of fallacy is complete in the sense that there cannot be more fallacies than the ones he lists. In this article I try to explain how Aristotle could have justified this completeness claim by analysing how he conceptualizes fallacies (dialectical mistakes which do not appear so) and what conceptual ingredients play a role in his discussion of fallacies. If we take the format of dialectical discussions into account, we (...)
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