Aristotle: Logic and Philosophy of Language

The subject of this paper is the issue of human speech in Aristotle, especially in his work Categories. Its primary goal is to elaborate an interpretation of Aristotle’s statements about human speech as a quantity (Cat. 4b20–b39, 5a15–b2) that would allow them to fit reasonably into the whole of Aristotle’s theory of language. The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first part a certain approach to the question of the reconstruction of Aristotle’s theory of language is proposed. (...) The second part, by means of the introduction of the criteria of separability and ontological priority of the first substance, creates a framework for the subsequent analysis of the two basic classifications, which constitute the main theme of Categories. The third part supplies its own interpretation of the ontological status of human speech in the context of the classification schemes in Categories, and this, in the fourth part, is inserted into the greater whole of Aristotle’s theory of language. (shrink)

Un paralogisme semble commis dans la démonstration par Aristote du principe psychologique de non-contradiction : à partir d’un principe performatif d’assertion (dire quelque chose, c’est le croire), une approche moderne nous incline à prétendre qu’Aristote présuppose une transparence référentielle des contextes opaques de croyance afin de corréler les versions psychologique et logique. Nous tenterons de restituer la preuve du principe (I). Au moyen de la formalisation moderne, nous appliquerons cette explication à quelques paradoxes (II). Nous en conclurons la nature de (...) la non-contradiction (III), avant de proposer une "dissolution" syntaxique du problème d'opacité des contextes d'attitudes propositionnelles. Cette dissolution exprimera un certain scepticisme face aux approches formelles de l'intentionnalité. (shrink)

Aristotle’s De Interpretatione has been referred to as the most influential text to be written in the history of semantics. I argue, however, that it is Plato who lays the foundation for subsequent reflection on signification. In the Cratylus, Plato confronts the two prevalent views of his time on the nature of the relationship between a name and a thing named: conventionalism, which holds that there is an arbitrary, imposed relationship between names and what they name; and naturalism, which holds (...) that there is a natural relationship between names and what they name. The true originality of Plato’s line of reasoning consists in arguing that whether we begin with naturalism or conventionalism, we are soon forced to introduce a third, mediating term between word and thing into the relation of signification. Plato thus establishes the tertiary nature of the sign-relation, a position that Aristotle takes for granted. (shrink)

I examine the treatment of metaphor by medieval logicians and how it stemmed from their reception of classical texts in logic, grammar, and rhetoric. I consider the relation of the word 'metaphor' to the notions of translatio and transumptio, and show that it is not always synonymous with these. I also show that in the context of commentaries on the Sophistical Refutations metaphor was subsumed under equivocation. In turn, it was linked with the notion of analogy not so much in (...) the Greek sense of a similarity between two proportions or relations as in the new medieval sense of being said secundum prius et posterius. Whether or not analogy could be reduced to metaphor, or the reverse, depended on the controversial issue of the number of acts of imposition needed to produce an equivocal term. A spectrum of views is canvassed, including those found in the logic commentaries of John Duns Scotus. (shrink)

This article considers three medieval approaches to the problem of future contingent propositions in chapter 9 of Aristotle's _De interpretatione_. While Boethius assumed that God's atemporal knowledge infallibly pertains to historical events, he was inclined to believe that Aristotle correctly taught that future contingent propositions are not antecedently true or false, even though they may be characterized as true-or-false. Aquinas also tried to combine the allegedly Aristotelian view of the disjunctive truth-value of future contingent propositions with the conception of all (...) things being timelessly present to God's knowledge. The second approach was formulated by Peter Abelard who argued that in Aristotle's view future contingent propositions are true or false, not merely true-or-false, and that the antecedent truth of future propositions does not necessitate things in the world. After Duns Scotus, many late medieval thinkers thought like Abelard, particularly because of their new interpretation of contingency, but they did not believe, with the exception of John Buridan, that this was an Aristotelian view. (shrink)

On the unity of modal syllogistics in Aristotle. The goal of this paper is an interpretation of Aristotle's modal syllogistics closely oriented on the text using the resources of modern modal predicate logic. Modern predicate logic was successfully able to interpret Aristotle's assertoric syllogistics uniformly, that is, with one formula for universal premises. A corresponding uniform interpretation of modal syllogistics by means of modal predicate logic is not possible. This thesis does not imply that a uniform view is abandoned. However, (...) it replaces the simple unity of the assertoric by the complex unity of the modal. The complexity results from the fact that though one formula for universal premises is used as the basis, it must be moderated if the text requires.Aristotle introduces his modal syllogistics by expanding his assertoric syllogistics with an axiom that links two apodictic premises to yield a single apodictic sentence. He thus defines a regular modern modal logic. By means of the regular modal logic that is thus defined, he is able to reduce the purely apodictic syllogistics to assertoric syllogistics. However, he goes beyond this simple structure when he looks at complicated inferences.In order to be able to link not only premises of the same modality, but also premises with different modalities, he introduces a second axiom, the T-axiom, which infers from necessity to reality or - equivalently - from reality to possibility. Together, the two axioms, the axiom of regularity and the T-axiom, define a regular T-logic. It plays an important role in modern logic. In order to be able to account for modal syllogistics adequately as a whole, another modern axiom is also required, the so-called B-axiom. It is very difficult to decide whether Aristotle had the B-axiom. Each of the two last named axioms is sufficient to achieve the required contextual moderation of the basic formula for universal propositions. (shrink)

In An. Post. I, 2, 72 a 8ff., Aristotle gives a description of the kinds of premisses that can occur in a demonstration. It is the purpose of this paper to explore some difficulties that arise in the interpretation of this passage and of the related passage at An. Post. I, 10, 76b 33 ff.

In 1928, Friedrich Solmsen argued that Aristotle's Posterior Analytics was largely composed before the Prior Analytics. Ross rejected Solmsen's position in 1939, and a rather lengthy series of rebuttals and counter-attacks between the two scholars followed. Quite recently, Jonathan Barnes has revived this issue with arguments in favour of something very close to Solmsen's thesis: that Aristotle first developed a theory of demonstration before he had worked out the syllogistic, and that the Posterior Analytics was originally conceived against this background. (...) Subsequently, when Aristotle formulated a syllogistic, he is supposed by Barnes to have revised or added to the contents of the Posterior Analytics so as to make syllogistic the logic of Aristotelian science. Thus, Barnes says: ‘the syllogism is in fact an incidental adjunct to the theory of demonstration: the theory can be formulated without reference, explicit or implicit, to Syllogistic, and it could have been discovered by someone who knew nothing whatever about the Syllogism’. (shrink)

Quine has often expressed his impatience with the fact that "Identity evidently invites confusion between sign and object" He finds the confusion in the works of a great many philosophers. What is most interesting, however, is that he excludes Aristotle from his disapprobation. "On the other hand Aristotle had the matter straight: things are identical when 'whatever is predicated of the one should be predicated of the other'. I believe a closer inspection of Aristotle's views would lead Quine to abandon (...) this small truce with the Philosopher--unfortunately for Quine. (shrink)

A revised version of the author’s Göttingen doctoral dissertation, this book is as much an independent essay in modal logic as it is an interpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic. In chapter 1 the author develops what he calls a "rich framework" including speech-act operators as well as epistemic and alethic modal operators, all expressed in a notation of his own devising; for example, "Pc if ENj Pc RNc S, Rc ENj Pa Rp S" translates as "The speaker claims that if (...) he is not justified in claiming that it is not certain that S, it is certain that he is not justified in allowing that it is possible that S." A dual system of quantification is then introduced, with and without existential import for both universal and particular propositions. In chapters 2 and 3 the author uses his framework as a model for discussing various difficulties in Aristotle’s assertoric and modal logic, insisting that his results are relevant to Aristotle’s even when they do not "correspond" to them. An appendix takes up the famous sea-battle of De interpretatione 9. The author is at his best when examining particular problems in Aristotle’s logic; in this regard his criticism of the operation of conversion stands out as especially effective. He is at his worst when pursuing the "intrinsic interest" of his model above and beyond its usefulness in studying Aristotle and when making unwarranted claims of originality for his objectives. One such objective is to stress what he calls the "teleological" character of Aristotle’s logic, a character which he says "is lost sight of in modern accounts" of Aristotle’s work. He appears to be unaware of Ernst Kapp’s classic Greek Foundations of Traditional Logic, which repeatedly calls attention to just this character. The author acknowledges the existence of twentieth century modal logic only once, in a one page criticism of Prior’s defense of the distinction between de dicto and de re modalities. This occurs within a curious argument, based on a premise taken from Ammonius and Abelard, that the concept of logical necessity is "bogus."—J.D. (shrink)

This is the most interesting contemporary study of Aristotle’s syllogistic I have seen. The author combines a genuine insight into Aristotle’s way of thinking with a useful grasp of contemporary logical theory. He uses contemporary notions like compactness, completeness, consistency, and the like in such a way as genuinely to illuminate Aristotle’s thought, rather than to obfuscate it or to reduce classical patterns of reasoning to those of our day. In other words, he shows how Aristotle’s central doctrines are in (...) many cases anticipations of contemporary concepts, thereby establishing a continuity in logical theory which goes at least some steps toward mitigating the effects of historicism in the domain of the history of logic. His style is as lucid as the subject-matter permits. The book is accessible to anyone with a minimum knowledge of syllogistic and some of the central notions of present-day metamathematics. Not the least helpful feature of the book is its quiet correction of errors made by the author’s predecessors in the analytical tradition’s attempt to assimilate Aristotle into current technical procedures. (shrink)

I argue that Spinoza’s ethical theory may be viewed as a transformation of Aristotle’s teleological account which has been corrected of several fundamental flaws which Spinoza found in Aristotle. The result of Spinoza’s redefinition of ethical activity is a developmental account of ethics which has close kinship with the views of process theoreticians.

The purpose of this paper is to inquire into the meaning of the troublesome Aristotelian expression ‘Ο λόγοσ τῆσ οὐσίασ as it occurs at the very opening of Categories 1a 1–2, 7. That the passage has presented serious difficulties to commentators and translators alike can be easily ascertained through a survey and comparison of the relevant literature. It would seem from the disagreements among translators that the passage is either vague in the original Greek or that Aristotle did not have (...) a special doctrine to put across at the very opening such that would require technical formulations that would comply with the ontology presented in this treatise. (shrink)