Aristotle: Metaphysics

It is well known that Aristotle tries to make room for self-motion – an idea he inherits to some extent from Plato – within his other commitments to causal determinism while at the same time modifying the idea. However, one argument in Physics VII 1 seems to pose a problem for the bare possibility of self-motion; in it he seems to argue that everything that moves must be moved by something else. The text in which this argument appears is itself (...) vexed on a number of fronts, because it is not clear how Physics VII fits with the rest of the Physics, and also because there are two distinct manuscript traditions for Physics VII. So the argument in Physics VII 1 has not been adequately taken into account in discussions of self-motion. I argue for a new and charitable reading of Aristotle’s Physics VII 1 α241b35-242a49 / β241b25-242a15. I show that the argument is compatible with Aristotle’s endorsements of self-motion; I defend the argument’s most controversial premise; and I argue that my reading has some useful implications for understanding Aristotelian self-motion. (shrink)

Recently, a strong hylomorphic reading of Aristotelian emotions has been put forward, one that allegedly eliminates the problem of causal interaction between soul and body. Taking the presentation of emotions in de An. I 1 as a starting point and basic thread, but relying also on the discussion of Rh. II, I will argue that this reading only takes into account two of the four causes of emotions, and that, if all four of them are included into the picture, then (...) a causal interaction of mind and body remains within Aristotelian emotions, independent of how strongly their hylomorphism is understood. Beyond the discussion with this recent reading, the analysis proposed of the fourfold causal structure of emotions is also intended as a hermeneutical starting point for a comprehensive analysis of particular emotions in Aristotle. Through the different causes Aristotle seems to account for many aspects of the complex phenomenon of emotion, including its physiological causes, its mental causes, and its intentional object. (shrink)

In Physica I,8 Aristotle endeavors to show that a long-term Eleatic puzzle about coming-to-be can be resolved by appealing to his own ontological principles of change (substratum, privation, and form). In this paper, I posit that the key to Aristotle’s resolution lies in the introduction of aspectual distinctions within numerical unities. These distinctions within the terminus a quo and the terminus as quem of coming-to-be made it possible for Aristotle to maintain, while answering the puzzle, that there is no coming-to-be (...) ex nihilo and, at the same time, that the product of coming-to-be is something that did not exist before; i.e. that there is coming-to-be. Finally, I suggest that this resolution could be seen as an interesting case of the application of conceptual tools developed in the Sophistici Elenchi, and I analyze the advantages of this resolution over the Platonic resolution of a similar sort of Eleatic problem. (shrink)

This note falls into two main parts. In the first part, I shall consider the question of whether or not Aristotle believed that there can be true statements about what will happen in the future. I will first clarify this question, which will involve consideration of some logical and metaphysical notions in Aristotle. I will then argue that the answer to the question is ‘No’ (with a qualification). In the second part, I shall argue that his view is correct. I (...) will do this ‘indirectly’, by way of presenting and refuting three prominent objections to the view. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to present in complete and accurate way one of the possible positions, i.e nondeflationary treatment of existence, in an interesting metaphysical dispute – the dispute over the status of existence. Moreover, the arguments and thesis from historically distinct periods are analysed to show that the knowledge of the history of philosophy is not a ballast. On the contrary, it can be creatively used in the contemporary discussion and deepen the understanding of this issue. -/- (...) The issue of the truth and the search for a proper description of reality has played a central role already in the very beginnings of philosophical research. However, reflection on the existence remained in the shadow of the drop-down theory of being and related theory of essence. At that time was developed (to the fullest extent expressed by Aristotle) a deflationary (reductionist) theory, according to which existence is not real, because it does not add anything to the essence which was identified with a being. Mere existence, as a part of reality that requires knowledge and examination, appeared later, in the era of flourishing Arab (Muslim and Jewish) and Latin philosophy, in the context of the philosophical study of the nature of God the Creator, who creates a whole reality out of nothingness. At that time the first metaphysical theories appeared, in which the existence was recognised as a real, irreducible element of reality. -/- In this paper the history of extracting the non-reductionist theories of existence (in which it is treated as a real ‘component’ of being) is presented, with particular attention to the position of St. Thomas Aquinas as the creator of one of the most mature version of these theories. Subsequently, based on the example of the main representatives, the scholastic debate over the so-called ‘real difference’ (centred around the merits of maintaining the non-deflationary position) is shown. In the last section the contemporary debate over the existence is presented, with a focus on philosophers appealing (affirmatively or critically) to the theory of Aquinas. -/- The presentation is mainly historical. Metaphysical theories, within which the status of the existence is recognised in different ways, are considered. The main point of reference is the doctrine of esse of Aquinas (as a blueprint for non-deflationary approach to existence), which is juxtaposed with the positions of other philosophers, i.e. with the classical (Aristotle, Godfrey of Fontaines) and contemporary reductionism (Frege, Russell, Quine, Kenny) and also other types of non-reductionist theories (Avicenna, Giles of Rome, Geach, Miller). The main conclusion is that the nondeflationary theory of Aquinas is coherent, plausible and still actual in XXI century. (shrink)

A trope is an abstract particular. Trope theorists maintain that tropes exist and argue that they can solve important philosophical problems, such as explaining the nature of properties. While many contemporary interpreters of Aristotle read him as a trope theorist, few commentators distinguish different versions of trope theory. Which, of any, of these versions did Aristotle hold? Classical trope theorists say that individuals just are bundles of tropes. This essay offers a reading of Categories 2-5 and Metaphysics VII-VIII that aligns (...) Aristotle's view with nonclassical trope theory, according to which objects are more than just bundles of tropes. (shrink)

How should we understand the relationship, for Aristotle, between matter, form, and hylomorphic composite? Are matter and form distinct from each other, so that each hylomorphic unity harbours a plurality within it, or would such a plurality undermine the unity of the composite? A recent strand of argument in both Aristotelian and contemporary literature on hylomorphism has concluded that no genuine unity can be composed of a plurality. I will argue that the objection motivating this conclusion falls away as improperly (...) formulated in light of Aristotle's metaontology—in particular, his thesis that unity is indeterminate. The genuine objection threatening hylomorphic unity is one that Aristotle himself formulates as a central concern in his Metaphysics: no substance can be composed of substances. He answers this genuine objection in his appeal to the actuality/potentiality distinction, and in Metaphysics VIII.6 he reminds us why no more basic problem of hylomorphic unity arises. Against the backdrop of Aristotle's metaontology, hylomorphic unity cannot be undermined by the plurality, just as such, of matter and form. (shrink)

In its early modern form, philosophy gave a decisive impetus to the science and technology that have transformed the planet and brought on the so-called Anthropocene. Can philosophy now help us understand this new age and act within it? The contributors to this volume take a broad historical view as they reflect on the responsibilities and possibilities for philosophy today. -/- The term ‘Anthropocene’ signifies the era of the arrival of human beings as a force that affects global ecosystems in (...) ways that are potentially disastrous for humanity itself, as well as for countless other species. This volume explores whether philosophy has meaningful tasks to fulfill in this unparalleled situation. Do philosophers need to reflect on new topics today? Do they need to think in new ways? Do they need new relationships to their own tradition? And are there concrete actions they should take, over and above philosophical reflection? The contributors to this volume thus take on the question of the relevance and responsibility of philosophy, drawing upon diverse legacies, in the current global situation. (shrink)

Being has been the central and dominating concept of twenty-five hundred years of Western philosophy. Ontology is the branch of metaphysics that concerns itself with the nature of being. In this sense it is at the core of metaphysics and is the central problem of philosophy. As Aristotle has put it, “That which now and always has been asked and now and always perplexes us is the question: ‘what is being?’” Aristotle did not use the word ontology, but called the (...) study of being, “First Philosophy”. The special sciences study being “in some way”, το ον πως, whereas “first philosophy” studies being as being, being qua being, being as it is in itself; το ον η ον, or as Plato had put it before him, the being of being, το όντως ον. First philosophy, therefore, is a science which is prior to all the other sciences and is therefore termed the science of sciences, επιστήμη επιστημών. (shrink)

Hajime Tanabe, the Kyoto- School philosopher of modern Japan, attempts to interpret Aristotle's ontology as being involved in the logic of self-identical being without self-negative conversion in action from his own dialectical perspective. For Tanabe, the eternal essence or Form is to be mediated by the dynamic character of matter, i.e., the temporality pertinent to the changing movement. For Aristotle, however, the essence or pure activity as the principle of being is devoid of such a dynamic mediation, but is rather (...) regarded as the past being, i.e., what it should be originally and eternally. In other words, for Aristotle, evil and matter are the lacks of goodness and the eternal Form that are identical with the essence of the individual substance. Evil is to be self-negatively mediated to goodness in free action through conversion in Tanabe's perspective. Movement pertaining to matter is not simply an incompletion of pure activity, but is rather self-negatively converted into the activity as the transcendent principle of the dialectical unification of time and eternity, matter and Form, evil and Goodness. The individual existence has freedom to unify the self-contradistinctive opposed moments, i.e., subjective action and objective being in a way of mutually negating conversion. The difference between Tanabe and Aristotle lies in that for Tanabe practice is relevant to the future, whereas for Aristotle contemplation is concerned with eternity as invariable and imperishable being since the past. While Aristotle's logic is confined to the self-identity of being in contemplation, Tanabe's logic is structured by the triadic elements of individuality, species as the relative universal, and genus as the absolute universal in terms of the negative conversion in action. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 98 Heft: 4 Seiten: 458-473.

The notion of identity is investigated through Aristotle and Hegel as supporters of two different ontological conceptions: pluralism of substances and relational holism. Through Aristotle, I examine both the thesis according to which the identity of an object is constituted by its properties and the difficulties which this thesis encounters. Aristotle easily defines the identity in species, in genus, and in number; some problems arise regarding the identity of individuals: for these, it is not enough to indicate the definition and (...) the proper qualities, but matter is needed. Matter cannot, however, be a criterion for identifying duplicate objects: in this case, it plays at most the role of a “weak individuator.” A weak individuator involves relations with other entities. The use of relations in determining the identity of an entity is extensively treated by Hegel, according to whom, in order to define the identity of an object a multiplicity of particular objects is required and, therefore, relations among entities. I conclude by proposing a notion of the object understood not as an independent, separate, and autonomous item, but as a portion of the world, which is given in a phenomenological context and identifies a dialectical context. (shrink)

I. Introduzione. I.1. Un’editio minor come sfida aperta. I.2 Per una più selettiva eliminatio. II.1 Sulla storia del problema : l’eredità del XIX secolo (Brandis 1823, Christ 1885, Gercke 1892) nelle edizioni del XX (Ross 1924, Jaeger 1957). II.2. Studi recenti : la necessità di un superamento. II.3. Lo stemma di riferimento : Harlfinger (1979). II.4. L’applicazione dello stemma nel libro Alpha edito da Primavesi. II.5. La revisione dello stemma, proposta per Kappa e Lambda (2009, 2010). II.6. La reazione : (...) discussioni sul ruolo della tradizione β in Kappa e Lambda (2015). III. Una verifica dello stemma in agenda : la divisione delle due famiglie. III.1 Fra i codici β : L’Ambrosianus F 113 Sup. come codex descriptus ? (libri I-IX inc.). III.2. L’ipotesi dell’ interpositus ε e le sue implicazioni sistematiche. III.3 Allievo e maestro nel XV secolo : Matthaios Chamariotes (C) e Giorgio Scholarios, Gennadeios II (Vk). III.4. Il non liquet sulle parti inferiori dello stemma e il concetto di contaminazione. IV.1. Rivedendo lo stemma dall’interno : il problema critico degli errori-guida (Leitfehler). IV.2. Iudicium e valutazione degli errori. IV.3. Errori separativi ed errori congiuntivi secondo la Textkritik di Paul Maas. IV.4. Una verifica importante : il ruolo di γ. V. Un’ipotesi alternativa . V.1. Il testo della Metafisica nei codici poziori. V.2. Un ritorno alla sigla ". V.3. Un nuovo stemma dei codici principali della Metafisica. Appendice : una verifica sull’ipotesi γ. (shrink)

This book examines Aristotle's metaphysics and his account of nature, stressing the ways in which his desire to explain observed natural processes shaped his philosophical thought. It departs radically from a tradition of interpretation, in which Aristotle is understood to have approached problems with a set of abstract principles in hand, principles derived from critical reflection on the views of his predecessors. A central example of the book interprets Aristotle's essentialism as deriving from an examination of the kinds of unity (...) that various sorts of things have: elemental motion, alteration, transformation and the growth of organisms. An important conclusion of this argument is that an essence may, under certain circumstances, lack some of its essential attributes. This is a major re-evaluation of Aristotle's metaphysics that will interest philosophers, classicists and historians of science. (shrink)

Arthur Madigan presents a clear, accurate new translation of the third book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, together with two related chapters from the eleventh book. Madigan's accompanying introduction and commentary give detailed guidance to these texts, in which Aristotle sets out what he takes to be the main problems of metaphysics or 'first philosophy' and assesses possible solutions to them; he takes his starting-point from the work of earlier philosophers, especially Plato and some of the Presocratics. These texts serve as a (...) useful introduction both to Aristotle's own work on metaphysics and to classical metaphysics in general; they are also a good example of Aristotle's dialectical method, which reasons not from known truths but from reputable opinions. (shrink)

Modern philosophy is, for what appear to be good reasons, uniformly hostile to sui generis final causes. And motivated to develop philosophically and scientifically plausible interpretations, scholars have increasingly offered reductivist and eliminitivist accounts of Aristotle's teleological commitment. This trend in contemporary scholarship is misguided. We have strong grounds to believe Aristotle accepted unreduced sui generis teleology, and reductivist and eliminitivist accounts face insurmountable textual and philosophical difficulties. We offer Aristotelians cold comfort by replacing his apparent view with failed accounts. (...) And so we ought to admit Aristotle’s prima facie commitments and deal with — if not accept — the consequences. (shrink)

Doing and Being confronts the problem of how to understand two central concepts of Aristotle's philosophy: energeia and dunamis. While these terms seem ambiguous between actuality/potentiality and activity/capacity, Aristotle did not intend them to be so. Through a careful and detailed reading of Metaphysics Theta, Beere argues that we can solve the problem by rejecting both "actuality" and "activity" as translations of energeia, and by working out an analogical conception of energeia. This approach enables Beere to discern a hitherto unnoticed (...) connection between Plato's Sophist and Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta, and to give satisfying interpretations of the major claims that Aristotle makes in Metaphysics Theta, the claim that energeia is prior in being to capacity and the claim that any eternal principle must be perfectly good. (shrink)

Stephen Makin presents a clear and accurate new translation of an influential and much-discussed part of Aristotle's philosophical system, accompanied by an analytical and critical commentary focusing on philosophical issues. In Book Theta of the Metaphysics Aristotle introduces the concepts of actuality and potentiality---which were to remain central to philosophical analysis into the modern era---and explores the distinction between the actual and the potential.

In Metaphysics A, Aristotle offers some objections to Plato’s theory of Forms to the effect that Plato’s Forms would not be explanatory in the right way, and seems to suggest that they might even make the explanatory project worse. One interesting historical puzzle is whether Aristotle can avoid these same objections to his own theory of universals. The concerns Aristotle raises are, I think, cousins of contemporary concerns about the usefulness and explanatoriness of abstract objects, some of which have recently (...) been receiving attention in the philosophy of mathematics. After discussing Aristotle’s objections and their contemporary cousins, the paper discusses some of the main available lines of response to these sorts of challenges, before concluding with an examination of whether these responses could assist Plato or Aristotle in responding to these challenges. (shrink)

Arthur Madigan presents a clear, accurate new translation of the third book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, together with two related chapters from the eleventh book. Madigan's accompanying introduction and commentary give detailed guidance to these texts, in which Aristotle sets out the main questions of metaphysics and assesses the main answers to them, and which serve as a useful introduction not just to Aristotle's own work on metaphysics but to classical metaphysics in general.

In this engaging book, Kosman offers a vigorous extended defence of a distinctive and highly ambitious claim, namely, that Aristotle’s account of potentiality/ability and actuality/activity in book Theta of the Metaphysics is an integral and central part of Aristotle’s account of what being is, which means that, for Kosman, Aristotle defends the thesis that being is, precisely, activity. In addition to the distinctive character of this claim, there are two notable suppositions behind it, which, likewise, Kosman defends. First, the Metaphysics (...) is addressed to a single, overall question, namely ‘What is it for something to be?’, a question that Aristotle introduces in book Gamma, takes on in books Zeta and Eta, gives a distinctive answer to in Theta and takes to its point of culmination in Lambda. This question, as Kosman spells out instructively and at length, is tackled by Aristotle through a distinction between primary being, or substance , and other beings .. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of the evolution of the concept of energeia from its origins in Aristotle to its adaptations in Neoplatonism. The term energeia is formed from the verb energeia, "to be active or effective, to operate." In his earliest works Aristotle uses it to indicate the active exercise of a faculty as opposed to mere possession of that faculty. From this beginning the word took on two fundamental senses: activity and actuality. The first chapter traces these developments (...) in Aristotle, including the distinction between energeia and kinesis and the arguments for the priority of actuality in the Metaphysics. ;One of Aristotle's most influential applications of the concept of energeia was the theory of the Prime Mover. The Prime Mover is a being whose "essence is energeia"; here energeia is both activity and actuality, for the Prime Mover is nothing other than the self-subsistent activity of thought. Chapter 2 argues that a proper understanding of energeia illuminates much that has traditionally been found puzzling about the Prime Mover. ;Later thinkers were fascinated by the Prime Mover and often attempted to incorporate a similar conception of God into their own systems. In doing so they further exploited the possibilities inherent in the fusion of the notions of activity and actuality. Chapter 3 discusses such developments in Theophrastus, Philo of Alexandria, Numenius, Alcinous, and Alexander of Aphrodisias. It also examines the evolution of the word among non-philosophical authors, where energeia was beginning to take on a sense similar to the modern term 'energy.' ;The final two chapters discuss energeia among the Neoplatonists. Chapter 4 is devoted to the theory of two acts in Plotinus, one of the most interesting and innovative adaptations of energeia in its "fused" sense. Chapter 5 turns to the followers of Plotinus in the West: Porphyry, Marius Victorinus, and the author of the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides. It examines their reflections on the notion of a God who is both supremely active and supremely real, ending with a look at how, through the mediation of Boethius, these reflections prepared the way for the Thomistic conception of the act of being. (shrink)

Metaphysics Z.ll has in recent years received considerable attention, because of its importance for the exposition of Aristotle's psychology, which for some time now has been an immensely popular topic among Aristotelian scholars. Z.ll has proved contentious, however, especially over its statement of Aristotle's criticism of Socrates the Younger, who was wont to make a certain ‘comparison’ in the case of animals. Virtually nothing is known about this Socrates the Younger, nor is it known exactly what ‘comparison’ he made with (...) animals. But, as most interpreters suppose from the context of Z. 11, his comparison certainly had much in common with that made by ‘some', who argue that natural objects, like man, are comparable to geometrical figures, like the circle, with respect to their relationship to their matter . Just as the physical matter of circles, such as bronze, stone, and the like, are no part of the essence of the circle, so too the physical matter of man—flesh and bones—is no part of the essence of man. This comparison may hold true, even if, unlike circles, man is in fact found only in a single sort of matter, because the case of man may be like the counterfactual case in which all circles happen to be made of bronze. The bronze would still not belong to the essence of the circle; it would just be difficult psychologically to separate circularity from bronze. (shrink)