Aristotle: Natural Science

Originating from two conferences that took place in September 2013 and June 2015 at Sapienza University of Rome, this outstanding specialist volume aims to systematically illuminate the arguments that Aristotle uses in trying to establish the ‘first principles’ of his natural philosophy in Physics I. Not only is it successful in achieving this overall goal, but it is also timely, as its publication anticipates the forthcoming proceedings of the July 2014 Symposium Aristotelicum, devoted to the Physics.

It is well known that Aristotle tries to make room for self-motion – an idea he inherits to some extent from Plato – within his other commitments to causal determinism while at the same time modifying the idea. However, one argument in Physics VII 1 seems to pose a problem for the bare possibility of self-motion; in it he seems to argue that everything that moves must be moved by something else. The text in which this argument appears is itself (...) vexed on a number of fronts, because it is not clear how Physics VII fits with the rest of the Physics, and also because there are two distinct manuscript traditions for Physics VII. So the argument in Physics VII 1 has not been adequately taken into account in discussions of self-motion. I argue for a new and charitable reading of Aristotle’s Physics VII 1 α241b35-242a49 / β241b25-242a15. I show that the argument is compatible with Aristotle’s endorsements of self-motion; I defend the argument’s most controversial premise; and I argue that my reading has some useful implications for understanding Aristotelian self-motion. (shrink)

In Physica I,8 Aristotle endeavors to show that a long-term Eleatic puzzle about coming-to-be can be resolved by appealing to his own ontological principles of change (substratum, privation, and form). In this paper, I posit that the key to Aristotle’s resolution lies in the introduction of aspectual distinctions within numerical unities. These distinctions within the terminus a quo and the terminus as quem of coming-to-be made it possible for Aristotle to maintain, while answering the puzzle, that there is no coming-to-be (...) ex nihilo and, at the same time, that the product of coming-to-be is something that did not exist before; i.e. that there is coming-to-be. Finally, I suggest that this resolution could be seen as an interesting case of the application of conceptual tools developed in the Sophistici Elenchi, and I analyze the advantages of this resolution over the Platonic resolution of a similar sort of Eleatic problem. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the role of some peculiar elements of Aristotle's dialectical development —namely, those emerging in the Sophistical Refutations (SE)— in the analysis and discussion of the Eleatic thesis in Physics I, 2-3. The paper adresses some of Aristotle's preliminary thoughts (Phys. I, 2) (which are read as methodological considerations), and some remarks against Melissus' argument (Phys. I, 3), in order to find connections between such claims and passages of SE, as well as the (...) Topics. -/- . (shrink)

In its early modern form, philosophy gave a decisive impetus to the science and technology that have transformed the planet and brought on the so-called Anthropocene. Can philosophy now help us understand this new age and act within it? The contributors to this volume take a broad historical view as they reflect on the responsibilities and possibilities for philosophy today. -/- The term ‘Anthropocene’ signifies the era of the arrival of human beings as a force that affects global ecosystems in (...) ways that are potentially disastrous for humanity itself, as well as for countless other species. This volume explores whether philosophy has meaningful tasks to fulfill in this unparalleled situation. Do philosophers need to reflect on new topics today? Do they need to think in new ways? Do they need new relationships to their own tradition? And are there concrete actions they should take, over and above philosophical reflection? The contributors to this volume thus take on the question of the relevance and responsibility of philosophy, drawing upon diverse legacies, in the current global situation. (shrink)

In 1988 the philosopher Gilles Deleuze remarked that throughout his career he had always been 'circling around' a concept of nature. Showing how Deleuze weaves original readings of Plato, the Stoics, Aristotle, and Epicurus into some of his most famous arguments about event, difference, and problem, Michael James Bennett argues that these interpretations of ancient Greek physics provide vital clues for understanding Deleuze's own conception of nature. -/- "Deleuze and Ancient Greek Physics" delves into the original Greek and Latin texts (...) and situates Deleuze's interpretations in relation to contemporary scholarship on ancient philosophy. It reveals that these readings are both more complex and controversial than they may at first appear. Generating both new critical analyses of Deleuze and an appreciation for his classical erudition, this book will be a valuable resource for anyone interested in ancient Greek philosophy, Deleuze's philosophical project, or his unique methodology in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

Aristotle refers to some animal kinds as μέγιστα γένη, or greatest kinds. The goal of this paper is to make clear the nature and significance of these kinds. I argue that Aristotle thinks of greatest kinds as the most general kinds within a specified domain. I then consider the fact that Aristotle’s discussion of animals’ reproductive parts and modes of reproduction in Generation of Animals is organized around divisions related to the cause of each of the features being explained. I (...) conclude that, while classification is an important goal in Aristotle’s biological treatises, it is of little significance that some of the kinds he identifies are referred to as greatest kinds. The important divisions are, for Aristotle, the divisions that best serve his goal of explaining the various features of animals and these divisions sometimes group together and sometimes cut across the commonly recognized, including the greatest, animal kinds. (shrink)

This paper examines how within De Caelo Aristotle argues that the heavens rotate to the right, because this is best. I isolate and evaluate its presuppositions and show how it comprises both a dialectical argument to cosmological principles and a partial demonstrative explanation on the basis of such principles. Second, I consider the expressions of epistemological hesitation that Aristotle offers in regard to this arguments, and draw conclusions concerning the status of cosmology as an Aristotelian science. In order to "save (...) the phenomena," to allow the endoxon that the heavens are alive and divine to stand, Aristotle needs to make the point that the world and its doings, including all of our human doings, depend on an actuality that is in some sense better than the occasional, incomplete activities in which we engage. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 61, Issue 1, pp 33 - 42 _De caelo_ 2.6 describes irregular motion differently from the discussion at _Physics_ 5.4. The desire to make the one discussion congrue with the other has strained interpretation of the _De caelo_ passage. Aristotle provides a theory of irregular motion that is tripartite and the passage ought to be interpreted in such a way as to explain this tripartite motion. _Akmē_ is not a ‘top speed’ as it is generally translated, but (...) a point in an object’s motion when _epitasis_ must become _anesis_. Although the terms _epitasis_ and _anesis_ cover ‘acceleration’ and ‘deceleration’ they cannot be reduced to them. (shrink)

Aristotle's biological works - constituting over 25% of his surviving corpus and for centuries largely unstudied by philosophically oriented scholars - have been the subject of an increasing amount of attention of late. This collection brings together some of the best work that has been done in this area, with the aim of exhibiting the contribution that close study of these treatises can make to the understanding of Aristotle's philosophy. The book is divided into four parts, each with an introduction (...) which places its essays in relation to each other and to the wider issues of the book as a whole. The first part is an overview of the relationship of Aristotle's biology to his philosophy; the other three each concentrate on a set of issues central to Aristotelian study - definition and demonstration; teleology and necessity in nature; and metaph themes such as the unity of matter and form and the nature of substance. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to consider the shortcomings of the physicalist rainfall example set forth by Aristotle in Physics II.8. I first outline the ancient physicalist account of the coming-to-be of natural organisms and the accompanying rejection of the teleological character of such processes. Then I examine the rainfall example itself. The fundamental difficulty is that rainfall does not appear to have a proper nature. Hence it is not natural in the strict sense and cannot be used (...) in arguments either for or against natural teleology. Rainfall can at most have an end in a weak sense, which makes it inadequate as a paradigm. Furthermore, the physicalist conception of action for an end is itself flawed. I argue that they construe it anthropomorphically and falsely presuppose a symmetry between coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. I would like to thank Hasse Hamalainen and Marcin Karas for looking at earlier drafts of this paper. I am also especially grateful for the numerous remarks and suggestions of three anonymous referees. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

_ Source: _Volume 60, Issue 1, pp 88 - 126 The dominant interpretation of Metaphysics Θ.8 commits Aristotle to the claim that the heavenly bodies’ eternal movements are not the exercises of capacities. Against this, I argue that these movements are the result of necessarily exercised capacities. I clarify what it is for a heavenly body to possess a nature and argue that a body’s nature cannot be a final cause unless the natural body possesses capacities that are exercised for (...) the sake of its nature qua form. This discussion yields a better understanding of what capacities are, what explanatory work capacities do, and what it is to possess a nature. (shrink)

A thoughtful study which integrates Aristotle's philosophy of science in the Organon and in the Parts of Animals with his actual biological investigations.

Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes--formal, final, efficient and material--is famous. But Posterior Analytics B 11 lists "if certain things hold, it is necessary that this does" in place of a standard expression for the material cause. This cause has been dubbed the grounding cause. It has interested scholars since the Greek commentators, who simply assumed that Aristotle meant the material cause. This traditional thesis has been challenged by two views: first, that the grounding cause is a special type of (...) material cause ; second, that it is no material cause at all . ;I set out two arguments for the traditional thesis and consider nine objections to it. Since most of these objections, which constitute the support for the revisionist thesis, can be answered, I reject the revisionist thesis. But in my treatment of one objection it also becomes clear that the traditional thesis is mistaken. The grounding cause is a necessitating cause, yet in Physics B 9 Aristotle makes it clear that many material causes are not necessitating causes. Thus, some form of the modified traditional thesis is true. ;But which form? D. M. Balme suggests that Aristotle means to include only mathematical causes because hypothetical necessity covers all of the relation between matter and product in things which come to be. But Aristotle seems to accept necessitating material causes in several passages in the biological works. In other passages he seems to adopt the position Balme attributes to him. I argue that he does not actually adopt this position, and that he does accept simple necessity in some things which come to be. Thus, the grounding cause is a necessitating material cause, and such causes are found not only in mathematics, but also among things which come to be. (shrink)

The dissertation examines Aristotle's method in his three great treatises on biology--the History of Animals, the Parts of Animals, and the Generation of Animals. It argues that these works exhibit a dialectical method, based on the techniques and methods developed in Aristotle's Topics. In particular, Aristotle applies a dialectical method to the difficult task of justifying the principles of biology. ;Finding a dialectical method in the biology suggests a new solution to a well-known conflict between Aristotle's theory of science and (...) his scientific practice. His Posterior Analytics pictures a science as a body of necessarily true propositions joined by syllogistic deductions, and implies that scientific method would be rigidly formal and demonstrative. But the biology follows a different course, it seems, for it contains no demonstrations, studies the perishable and changing, and is guided by a far more inductive method of procedure. But if there is a portion of Aristotle's full theory of science to which the biology does adhere, then the tension can be considerably eased. ;The dissertation is in two parts. Part One centers on the theory of science, and a special problem arising from it, which I have called the problem of classification. Chapter I argues that the theory of science requires classification of a definite character. Chapter II claims that the works on biology fail to classify in this way. Chapter III argues that dialectic is a crucial component of the theory, able to seek out and test scientific principles, and thus provides a new avenue into Aristotle's method in biology. ;Part Two explores the use of dialectic in the biology. Chapter IV of the dissertation argues that, in a variety of important ways, the Generation of Animals operates dialectically. Chapter V extends this analysis to the Parts of Animals, and Chapter VI does the same for the History of Animals. A concluding chapter summarizes my argument and takes a final look at the tension between theory and practice. (shrink)