Contents
53 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 53
  1. Aristotle and the necessity of scientific knowledge.Lucas Angioni - manuscript
    This is a translation, made by myself, of the paper to be published in Portuguese in the journal Discurso, 2020, in honour of the late professor Oswaldo Porchat. I discuss what Aristotle was trying to encode when he said that the object of scientific knowledge is necessary, or that what we know (scientifically) cannot be otherwise etc. The paper is meant as a continuation of previous papers—orientated towards a book on the Posterior Analytics—and thus does not discuss in much detail (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. The Soul Itself in Aristotle’s Science of Living Things.Klaus Corcilius - forthcoming - In David Lefebvre (ed.), The Science of Life in Aristotle and the Early Peripaton. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.
  3. "And the Soul Exists as the Sort of Thing Capable of Undergoing This": Induction in Posterior Analytics II.19 and the Power of the Intellect.Joshua Lo - 2024 - The Aquinas Review 2024:55-92.
  4. Demonstration and Necessity: A short note on Metaphysics 1015b6-9.Lucas Angioni - 2023 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 33 (33):1-24.
    I discuss a short string of five sentences in Metaphysics V.5, 1015b6-9 relating demonstration to necessity. My proposal is that Aristotle focuses his attention on the demonstration as a demonstration. Other interpretations reduce the necessity in question to the modality of the component sentences of the demonstrations (the conclusion and the premises). My view does not deny that the modality of the component sentences is important, but takes seriously the idea that a demonstration itself should be understood as necessary—as not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Some remarks against non-epistemic accounts of immediate premises in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.Breno Zuppolini - 2023 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 17 (2):29-43.
    Most interpretations of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics believe that the term ‘ameson’ is used to describe the principles or foundations of a given system of justification or explanation as epistemically prior to or more fundamental than the other propositions in the system. Epistemic readings (as I shall call them) arguably constitute a majority in the secondary literature. This predominant view has been challenged by Robin Smith (1986) and Michael Ferejohn (1994; 2013), who propose interpretations that should be classified as non-epistemic according (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. O Princípio de Não-Contradição como Condição sine qua non para evita o colapso do discurso significativo – Uma defesa da Leitura Semântica Geral de Metafísica Γ 4 1005b35- 1007a8.Débora Oliveira Silva - 2022 - Dissertation, Federal University of Rio Grande Do Sul
  7. TRÊS USOS ARISTOTÉLICOS DO TERMO ‘PRIMEIRO’ NO CONHECIMENTO MATEMÁTICO.Rafael Cavalcanti Souza - 2022 - Meio Ambiente: Espacialidades e Temporalidades.
  8. A noção de imediato nos Segundos Analíticos de Aristóteles.Jingfang Yu - 2022 - Dissertation, Federal University of Rio Grande Do Sul
  9. Aristotle’s solution for Parmenides’ inconclusive argument in Physics I.3.Lucas Angioni - 2021 - Peitho 12 (1):41-67.
  10. Intelligibility, Insight, and Intelligence.Sean Kelsey - 2021 - In Caleb M. Cohoe (ed.), Aristotle's on the Soul: A Critical Guide. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 211-228.
    Aristotle maintains that defining nous requires first defining its activity, which requires first having considered its objects, intelligible beings. This chapter is about the nature of these objects: what about them makes them intelligible? My principal proposals will be that what makes them intelligible is that they are separate or unmixed, and that because, insofar as they are intelligible, they are, in their essence, activity. I am not unaware that this makes it sound as though Aristotle takes intelligibility to consist (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Aristóteles e a necessidade do conhecimento científico.Lucas Angioni - 2020 - Discurso 50 (2):193-238.
    I discuss the exact meaning of the thesis according to which the object of scientific knowledge is necessary. The thesis is expressed by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, in his definition of scientific knowledge. The traditional interpretation understands this definition as depending on two parallel and independent requirements, the causality requirement and the necessity requirement. Against this interpretation, I try to show, through the examination of several passages that refer to the definition of scientific knowledge, that the necessity requirement specifies (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  12. (1 other version)A indemonstrabilidade dos princípios nos Segundos Analíticos de Aristóteles.John Endrew - 2020 - Guairacá: Revista de Filosofia 36 (1):81-90.
  13. The Supposed Material Cause in Posterior Analytics 2.11.Nathanael Stein - 2020 - Phronesis 66 (1):27-51.
    Aristotle presents four causes in Posterior Analytics 2.11, but where we expect matter we find instead the confusing formula, ‘what things being the case, necessarily this is the case’, and an equally confusing example. Some commentators infer that Aristotle is not referring to matter, others that he is but in a non-standard way. I argue that APo. 94a20-34 presents not matter, but determination by general features or facts, including facts about something’s genus. The closest connection to matter is Aristotle’s view (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Comprehension, Demonstration, and Accuracy in Aristotle.Breno Zuppolini - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (1):29-48.
    according to aristotle's posterior analytics, scientific expertise is composed of two different cognitive dispositions. Some propositions in the domain can be scientifically explained, which means that they are known by "demonstration", a deductive argument in which the premises are explanatory of the conclusion. Thus, the kind of cognition that apprehends those propositions is called "demonstrative knowledge".1 However, not all propositions in a scientific domain are demonstrable. Demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles, whose knowledge is called "comprehension".2 If the knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  15. What really characterizes explananda: Prior Analytics I.30.Lucas Angioni - 2019 - Eirene: Studia Graeca Et Latina 55:147-177.
    In Prior Analytics I.30, Aristotle seems too much optmistic about finding out the principles of sciences. For he seems to say that, if our empirical collection of facts in a given domain is exhaustive or sufficient, it will be easy for us to find out the explanatory principles in the domain. However, there is a distance between collecting facts and finding out the explanatory principles in a given domain. In this paper, I discuss how the key expression in the sentence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  16. Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas on What is “Better-Known” in Natural Science.John H. Boyer & Daniel C. Wagner - 2019 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 93:199-225.
    Aristotelian commenters have long noted an apparent contradiction between what Aristotle says in Posterior Analytics I.2 and Physics I.1 about how we obtain first principles of a science. At Posterior 71b35–72a6, Aristotle states that what is most universal (καθόλου) is better-known by nature and initially less-known to us, while the particular (καθ’ ἕκαστον) is initially better-known to us, but less-known by nature. At Physics 184a21-30, however, Aristotle states that we move from what is better-known to us, which is universal (καθόλου), (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Aristotle’s Argument from Truth in Metaphysics Γ 4.Graham Clay - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):17-24.
    Some of Aristotle’s statements about the indemonstrability of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics Γ 4 merit more attention. The consensus seems to be that Aristotle provides two arguments against the demonstrability of the PNC, with one located in Γ 3 and the other found in the first paragraph of Γ 4. In this article, I argue that Aristotle also relies upon a third argument for the same conclusion: the argument from truth. Although Aristotle does not explicitly state this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18. The aporia of ἢ ἐϰ παντὸς in Posterior Analytics II.19.Adam Crager - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (4):387-438.
    This article sketches, and works to motivate, a controversial approach to Posterior Analytics II.19. But its primary goal is to recommend a novel solution to one particular interpretive aporia that’s especially vexed recent scholars working on Post. An. II.19. The aporia concerns how to understand the enigmatic "ē ek pantos" ( “or from all...”) in the genealogical account of foundational knowledge at II.19 100a3-9. Our proposed solution to the aporia is discussed in connection with a number of larger philosophical issues (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Reason, Experience and the Knowledge of the Principles in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics 2.19.Miira Tuominen - 2019 - In Ian-Ivar Lindén (ed.), ARISTOTLE ON LOGIC AND NATURE. Peeters. pp. 103-138.
  20. Why Does Aristotle Defend the Principle of Non‐Contradiction Against its Contrary?Daniel Coren - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (1):39-59.
    In his Metaphysics Γ.4, Aristotle defends the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The PNC says that all contradictions are false. So if some contradictions are true, then PNC is false. Even if PNC’s contrary is false, PNC’s contradictory might still be true. But it’s been noted in the literature for over a century that Aristotle seems to be exclusively interested in attacking PNC’s contrary (‘All contradictions are true’) rather than PNC’s contradictory (‘Some contradictions are true’). So his defense of PNC seems (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21. Aristotle on Kind‐Crossing.Philipp Steinkrüger - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 54:107-158.
    This paper concerns Aristotle's kind‐crossing prohibition. My aim is twofold. I argue that the traditional accounts of the prohibition are subject to serious internal difficulties and should be questioned. According to these accounts, Aristotle's prohibition is based on the individuation of scientific disciplines and the general kind that a discipline is about, and it says that scientific demonstrations must not cross from one discipline, and corresponding kind, to another. I propose a very different account of the prohibition. The prohibition is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  22. Aristotle on Dialectic and First Principles.António Pedro Mesquita - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).
    Over time, several authors have argued that, for Aristotle, dialectic is a method of discovery or establishment of the principles of science in general. In this article, I will present four arguments against this view and propose a deflationary view of the role of dialectic in this regard. Accord ing to this view, such a role consists only in the defence of common principles against potential eristic attacks. Keywords: Science, dialectic, first principles, common principles, proper principles.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Ontological Underpinnings of Aristotle's Philosophy of Science.Breno A. Zuppolini - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Campinas, Brazil
  24. Book review: David Bronstein, Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. (pp.xiii-272). [REVIEW]Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):179-186.
    ABSTRACT This is a review of David Bronstein's book "Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics.David Bronstein - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
    David Bronstein sheds new light on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics--one of the most important, and difficult, works in the history of western philosophy--by arguing that it is coherently structured around two themes of enduring philosophical interest: knowledge and learning. He argues that the Posterior Analytics is a sustained examination of scientific knowledge, an elegantly organized work in which Aristotle describes the mind's ascent from sense-perception of particulars to scientific knowledge of first principles. Bronstein goes on to highlight Plato's influence on Aristotle's (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  26. Aristotle on Induction and First Principles.Marc Gasser-Wingate - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16:1-20.
    Aristotle's cognitive ideal is a form of understanding that requires a sophisticated grasp of scientific first principles. At the end of the Analytics, Aristotle tells us that we learn these principles by induction. But on the whole, commentators have found this an implausible claim: induction seems far too basic a process to yield the sort of knowledge Aristotle's account requires. In this paper I argue that this criticism is misguided. I defend a broader reading of Aristotelian induction, on which there's (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  27. No-Boundary Emergence and Book of Change.Sheng Sun & Jianhui Li - 2016 - BIOCOSMOLOGY – NEO-ARISTOTELISM 6 (1):102-120.
    This work attempts to respond to Tomas Aquinas' Cosmological Argument in a way that combines Set Theory with the idea of the ‘Book of Change’. The study defines the ith Cause Set on which to operate on, which leads to the ontological commitment of austerity that the ‘First Cause's Compromise with emergence’ cannot be avoided. It is argued in the present paper that the concept that ‘emergence only consists of Synchronic Emergence and Diachronic Emergence’ should be extended to a broader (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Compositional & Functional Matter: Aristotle on the Material Cause of Biological Organisms.Christopher Byrne - 2015 - Apeiron 48 (4):387-406.
    Aristotle uses two kinds of material cause in his analysis of biological organisms: compositional matter, which persists through their birth and death;and functional matter, which consists of the organs and functional parts out of which biological organisms are made while they are alive. These two kinds of material cause, it has been argued, have quite different explanatory roles: functional matter is required by biological organisms to perform their essential functions,but compositional matter contributes nothing necessary to them and is only responsible (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Causality and attribution in an Aristotelian Theory.Srećko Kovač - 2015 - In Arnold Koslow & Arthur Buchsbaum (eds.), The Road to Universal Logic: Festschrift for 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves Béziauvol. 1, Cham, Heidelberg, etc.: Springer-Birkhäuser. Springer-Birkhäuser. pp. 327-340.
    Aristotelian causal theories incorporate some philosophically important features of the concept of cause, including necessity and essential character. The proposed formalization is restricted to one-place predicates and a finite domain of attributes (without individuals). Semantics is based on a labeled tree structure, with truth defined by means of tree paths. A relatively simple causal prefixing mechanism is defined, by means of which causes of propositions and reasoning with causes are made explicit. The distinction of causal and factual explanation are elaborated, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  30. Observações sobre a estrutura da significação em Metafísica Γ 4.Vivianne Moreira - 2015 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 9 (1):22-40.
    This article is intended to examine the structure and scope of the argumentation drawn in Metaphysics Γ 4, 1006a18-b34. As we shall see, though this passage does not bring a complete proof of the Principle of Non-Contradiction, it corresponds to its first step, which consists in determining the conditions of meaning necessary for discourse. That passage encloses in nuce the reasons which underlie Aristotelian conviction con- cerning the conventional nature of names and also brings to light the way this conven- (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. Aristotle's metabasis-prohibition and its reception in late antiquity.Philipp Julius6 Steinkrüger - 2015 - Dissertation, Ku Leuven
    This dissertation deals with an important topic in the history of the theory of scientific knowledge, a theory which became the paradigm for science for the next two millennia. It is well known that Aristotle characterized scientific knowledge with two conditions: first, it must be necessary; and secondly, knowledge is only scientific if the reason or cause of what we know is revealed. To give an example, the theorem that the interior angle-sum of a triangle is 180° is a necessary (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. A aporia 11 e o projeto aristotélico de fundação da filosofia primeira.Wellington Damasceno de Almeida - 2014 - In Lucas Angioni (ed.), Lógica e Ciência em Aristóteles. Phi. pp. 331-358.
  33. The Object of Aristotelian Induction: Formal Cause or Composite Individual?Christopher Byrne - 2014 - In Paolo C. Biondi & Louis F. Groarke (eds.), Shifting the Paradigm: Alternative Perspectives on Induction. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 251-268.
    According to a long interpretative tradition, Aristotle holds that the formal cause is the ultimate object of induction when investigating perceptible substances. For, the job of induction is to find the essential nature common to a set of individuals, and that nature is captured solely by their shared formal cause. Against this view, I argue that Aristotle understands perceptible individuals as irreducibly composite objects whose nature is constituted by both their formal and their material cause. As a result, when investigating (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Givens and Foundations in Aristotle’s Epistemology.Miguel García-Valdecasas - 2014 - Studia Neoaristotelica 11 (2):205-231.
    Aristotle’s epistemology has sometimes been associated with foundationalism, the theory according to which a small set of premise-beliefs that are deductively valid or inductively strong provide justification for many other truths. In contemporary terms, Aristotle’s foundationalism could be compared with what is sometimes called “classical foundationalism”. However, as I will show, the equivalent to basic beliefs in Aristotle’s epistemology are the so-called first principles or “axiómata”. These principles are self-evident, but not self-justificatory. They are not justified by their act of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. A defesa do princípio de não-contradição e a refutação da sofística no livro IV da Metafísica de Aristóteles.Samantha da Graça Simões - 2014 - Dissertation, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
  36. Fundacionalismo e silogística.Breno A. Zuppolini - 2014 - In Lucas Angioni (ed.), Lógica e Ciência em Aristóteles. Phi. pp. 161-202.
  37. Definição da definição.Constança Barahona - 2013 - Filosofia Antiga E Medieval (Encontro Nacional Anpof).
    A discussão nos livros dos Tópicos giram em torno dos debates dialéticos e seus elementos. Aristóteles discorre sobre os gêneros, as propriedades e os chamados acidentes e suas relações predicativas em categorias. Interessa-nos, sobretudo, compreender o papel desempenhado pela Definição e qual sua relação com os demais instrumentos para a dialética.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Aristotle on Non-Contradiction: Philosophers vs. Non-Philosophers.Jean-Louis Hudry - 2013 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 7 (2):51.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  39. Virtues of Thought.Aryeh Kosman - 2013 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard.
    Exploring what two foundational figures, Plato and Aristotle, have to say about the nature of human awareness and understanding, Aryeh Kosman concludes that ultimately the virtues of thought are to be found in the joys and satisfactions that come from thinking philosophically, whether we engage in it ourselves or witness others' participation.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  40. Definição, não contradição e indemonstrabilidade dos princípios: uma proposta de leitura para metafísica 4 à luz de segundos analíticos I,22.Daniel Lourenço - 2013 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
  41. Os seis requisitos das premissas da demonstração científica em Aristóteles.Lucas Angioni - 2012 - Manuscrito 35 (1):7-60.
    I discuss in this paper the six requirements Aristotle advances at Posterior Analytics A-2, 71b20-33, for the premisses of a scientific demonstration. I argue that the six requirements give no support for an intepretation in terms of “axiomatization”. Quite on the contrary, the six requirements can be consistently understood in a very different picture, according to which the most basic feature of a scientific demonstration is to explain a given proposition by its appropriate cause.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  42. A refutação da sofística no livro Gama da Metafísica de Aristóteles.M. Reus Engler - 2010 - Intuitio 3 (1):99-119.
  43. O problema do conhecimento dos primeiros princípios em Aristóteles: indução, inteligência, dialética e diaporemática.Carolina Muranaka Saliba Barreto - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Campinas
    Essa dissertação de mestrado cuida do problema do conhecimento dos primeiros princípios em Aristóteles, mais precisamente, das vias de acesso adequadas a provê-lo. Dada a primordialidade de um tal conhecimento, erige-se a questão de método: por qual via estaria garantido o acesso àquilo que constitui todo o fundamento e “razão para” do edifício do conhecimento filosófico e científico? Aristóteles, nos Segundos Analíticos, atribui à indução (epagoge) e à inteligência (nous) este papel, mas nos Tópicos o filósofo menciona que a dialética (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Conhecimento Prévio e Conhecimento Científico em Aristóteles.Carlos Alexandre Terra - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Campinas
    Pretendemos averiguar como Aristóteles concebe a passagem do nosso conhecimento prévio do mundo ao conhecimento científico, avaliando os pressupostos e consequências de sua resposta ao paradoxo de Mênon e atentando para a metodologia científica defendida nos Segundos Analíticos. Quanto ao conhecimento preliminar necessário à edificação da ciência, procuraremos caracterizar seus tipos e também os meios pelos quais ele pode vir a ser adquirido por nós. Buscaremos estabelecer também as propriedades que o conhecimento científico deve possuir em relação à sua necessidade, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  45. Aristóteles, Metafísica Livros I, II e III.Lucas Angioni - 2008 - Campinas, Brazil: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de Campinas.
    Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics I-III into Portuguese, with a few notes and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2007, is preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  46. O conhecimento científico no livro I dos Segundos Analíticos de Aristóteles.Lucas Angioni - 2007 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 1 (2):1-24.
    I examine Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge in Posterior Analytics 71b 9-12 and try to understand how it relates to the sophistical way of knowing and to "kata sumbebekos knowledge". I claim that scientific knowledge of p requires knowing p by its appropriate cause, and that this appropriate cause is a universal (katholou) in the restricted sense Aristotle proposes in 73b 26-27 ff., i.e., an attribute coextensive with the subject (an extensional feature) and predicated of the subject in itself (an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  47. O Problema da Apreensão dos Princípios no Livro II dos Segundos Analíticos de Aristóteles.Carlos Alexandre Terra - 2006 - Dissertation, University of Campinas
    Our purpose is to study Aristotle?s solution, in the second book of the Posterior Analytics, for the problem of the apprehension of the principles of science. We attend to the relations between the concepts of induction (epagoge) and intelligence (nous) found in the chapter 19, which seems to confirm that the acquisition of the principles is reached by a process of empirical observation. We examine the method, proposed in chapters 13 to 17, for the right formulation of definitions, which seems (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. Aristóteles, Metafísica Livros IX e X.Lucas Angioni - 2004 - Campinas, Brazil: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de Campinas.
    Translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX and X (Theta & Iota) into Portuguese, with a few notes, experimental glossary and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2004, is preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  49. Dialética, Indução e Inteligência na aquisição dos Primeiros Princípios.Marco Zingano - 2004 - Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 8 (1):27-41.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  50. Aristóteles e o Uso da Matemática nas Ciências da Natureza.Lucas Angioni - 2003 - In M. Wrigley P. Smith (ed.), Coleção CLE (Universidade de Campinas, Brazil). CLE. pp. 207-237.
    I discuss the issue whether Aristotle's philosophy of science allows the use of mathematical premises or mathematical tools in general for explanaing phenomena in the natural sciences. I thereby discuss the concept of "metabasis eis allo genos" as it appears in Posterior Analytics I.7.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
1 — 50 / 53