About this topic
Summary One of the most disputed recent questions on this area concerns how Aristotle's conception of the soul relates to contemporary philosophy of mind. Is Aristotle a precursor of functionalism and a committed naturalist? Does his conception of soul rest on his antiquated and indefensible physics? Is Aristotle, instead, a sort of dualist? Is his position only fully articulable in terms of his own metaphysics of potentiality and actuality, matter and form? Another area of discussion has been whether Aristotle's understanding of soul and body fits with his general account of form and matter, given that the matter of the living thing, the body, does not seem able to persist in the way that the matter of other hylomorphic compounds persists. A related debate concerns whether we should think that the soul is the form of "an organic body" because the bodies of living things have parts that serve as tools or instruments or because the body as a whole is an instrument of the soul. Further important areas of research in this category include how Aristotle's general account of the soul relates to his specific accounts of soul and whether Aristotle thinks that any kind of soul could be separable from its body.
Key works Here I provide references to some of the debates mentioned above: A number of authors have interpreted Aristotle as, in some sense, a precursor of functionalism (e.g. Barnes 1972, Nussbaum & Putnam 1992) and as a committed naturalist (e.g. Frede 1992). Burnyeat has argued that Aristotle's conception of soul rests on his antiquated and indefensible physics (Burnyeat 1992). Aristotle has also been claimed by some as a sort of dualist (Robinson 1983). Some have drawn attention to the risk of misinterpreting Aristotle by fitting him into contemporary categories. Shields has drawn attention to such misreadings in the case of the unity of soul and body by laying out the importance of Aristotle's own account of form and matter for understanding his position on body-soul unity (Shields 2007). Ackrill (Ackrill 1973) introduced the problem of the sense in which body counts as matter to the contemporary discussion and it is often referred to as Ackrill's problem. Whiting provides an influential response (Whiting 1992). Menn defends the idea that the the body as a whole is an instrument of the soul (Menn 2002). Bolton discusses Aristotle's definitions of soul and how they relate (Bolton 1978).
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  1. Place of the Soul in the Philosophies of Aristotle and Mulla Sadra.Reza Akbabrian & Abulhassan Ghaffari - unknown - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 56.
    Aristotle discusses the soul in itself in metaphysics, and as its relation to the body in physics. This issue originates in the division of sciences in Aristotle's works. The same trend continues in the works of the philosophers following him. Although Farabi presented a new classification of sciences, he maintained the main form of Aristotle's divisions and posed the related problems like him. Based on his fundamental theories, including the principiality of existence, gradation of being, and the trans-substantial motion, Mulla (...)
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  2. El hysteron/proteron del tiempo - The hysteron/proteron of time.Diana Acevedo - forthcoming - Ideas y Valores. Revista Colombiana de Filosofía 65 (159).
    Aristotle's Physics 218b21-219a has been interpreted as proof that the concept of time is determined by the perceptive (or perceptual) conditions of the mind (psyche). In this paper I will criticize such an interpretation in order to argue that the mind's conditions for the perception and experience of time are just a starting point for the investigation: what is prior and nearer to sense, and better known to man (Anal. Post. I, 2). The arrival point of Aristotle's investigation about the (...)
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  3. Aristotle and the pain of animals: Nicomachean Ethics 1154b7–9.Wei Cheng - forthcoming - Classical Quarterly.
    This paper explains the motivation behind Aristotle’s appeal in Nicomachean Ethics 1154b7–9 to the physiologoi, who notoriously declare that animals are constantly in pain. It argues that the physiologoi are neither the critical target of this chapter nor invoked to verify Aristotle’s commitment to the imperfection of the human condition. Rather, despite doctrinal disagreement, they help Aristotle develop a naturalistic story about how ordinary people easily indulge in sensory pleasures.
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  4. Il dolore dell’anima separata. Giovanni di Napoli e il consolidamento dell’escatologia tomista.Maria Evelina Malgieri - 2023 - Noctua 10 (1):106-134.
    q. 16 of John of Naples’ Quodlibet III – Utrum dolor vel passio damnatae animae separatae sit, sicut in subiecto immediato, in eius essentia vel potentia – evokes one of the most delicate debates, both from a theological and philosophical point of view, of scholastic eschatology between the end of the 13th century and the first decades of the 14th: that relating to the action of hellfire (considered, due to the auctoritas of Gregory the Great, corporeal and identical in essence (...)
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  5. Aristotle on Earlier Definitions of Soul and Their Explanatory Power: DA I.2–5.Jason W. Carter - 2022 - In Caleb Cohoe (ed.), Aristotle's On the Soul: A Critical Guide. Cambridge, UK: pp. 32 - 49.
    In DA I.2–5, Aristotle offers a series of critical discussions of earlier Greek definitions of the soul. The status of these discussions and the role they play in the justification of Aristotle’s theory of soul in DA II–III is controversial. In contrast to a common view, I argue that these discussions are not dialectical but philosophical. I also contend that Aristotle does not consider earlier philosophical definitions of soul to be endoxa, but rather contradoxa – beliefs about which the many (...)
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  6. Review of S. Kelsey, Mind and world in Aristotle’s De Anima. [REVIEW]Evan Keeling - 2022 - Bryn Mawr Classical Review 8:1-4.
  7. The Undivided Self: Aristotle on the 'Mind-Body' Problem. [REVIEW]Bryan C. Reece - 2022 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 1.
  8. Why Nous Cannot Be a Magnitude: De Anima I.3.Krisanna Scheiter - 2022 - In Caleb Cohoe (ed.), Aristotle's On the Soul: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press. pp. 50-65.
    I examine Aristotle’s reasons in DA I.3 for rejecting the claim that understanding (nous) is a magnitude (megethos), an idea Aristotle associates most explicitly with Plato, who describes nous as a self-moving circle in the Timaeus. Aristotle shows that his definition of soul, on which soul is not a magnitude or body of any kind, can explain perception, thought, and motion better than his predecessor’s materialist accounts. But unlike perception and motion, nous is not actualized through the body nor does (...)
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  9. Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition. Volume Three: Concept Formation.Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist & Juhana Toivanen (eds.) - 2022 - Boston: Brill.
  10. Aristotle and Aristoxenus on Effort.John Robert Bagby - 2021 - Conatus 6 (2):51-74.
    The discussions of conatus – force, tendency, effort, and striving – in early modern metaphysics have roots in Aristotle’s understanding of life as an internal experience of living force. This paper examines the ways that Spinoza’s conatus is consonant with Aristotle on effort. By tracking effort from his psychology and ethics to aesthetics, I show there is a conatus at the heart of the activity of the ψυχή that involves an intensification of power in a way which anticipates many of (...)
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  11. Aristotle's on the Soul: A Critical Guide.Caleb Cohoe (ed.) - 2021 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
    Aristotle's On the Soul aims to uncover the principle of life, what Aristotle calls psuchē. For Aristotle, soul is the form which gives life to a body and causes all its living activities, from breathing to thinking. Aristotle develops a general account of all types of living through examining soul's causal powers. The thirteen new essays in this Critical Guide demonstrate the profound influence of Aristotle's inquiry on biology, psychology and philosophy of mind from antiquity to the present. They deepen (...)
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  12. Distributed Cognition, Neuroprostheses and their Implications to Non-Physicalist Theories of Mind.Jean Gové - 2021 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 26 (1):123-142.
    This paper investigates the notion of ‘distributed cognition’—the idea that entities external to one’s organic brain participate in one’s overall cognitive functioning—and the challenges it poses to the notion of personhood. Related to this is also a consideration of the ever-increasing ways in which neuroprostheses replace and functionally replicate organic parts of the brain. However, the literature surrounding such issues has tended to take an almost exclusively physicalist approach. The common assumption is that, given that non-physicalist theories (chiefly, dualism, and (...)
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  13. Animism and natural teleology from Avicenna to Boyle.Jeff Kochan - 2021 - Science in Context 34 (1):1-23.
    Historians have claimed that the two closely related concepts of animism and natural teleology were both decisively rejected in the Scientific Revolution. They tout Robert Boyle as an early modern warden against pre-modern animism. Discussing Avicenna, Aquinas, and Buridan, as well as Renaissance psychology, I instead suggest that teleology went through a slow and uneven process of rationalization. As Neoplatonic theology gained influence over Aristotelian natural philosophy, the meaning of animism likewise grew obscure. Boyle, as some historians have shown, exemplifies (...)
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  14. Animism, Aristotelianism, and the Legacy of William Gilbert’s De Magnete.Jeff Kochan - 2021 - Perspectives on Science 29 (2):157-188.
    William Gilbert’s 1600 book, De magnete, greatly influenced early modern natural philosophy. The book describes an impressive array of physical experiments, but it also advances a metaphysical view at odds with the soon to emerge mechanical philosophy. That view was animism. I distinguish two kinds of animism – Aristotelian and Platonic – and argue that Gilbert was an Aristotelian animist. Taking Robert Boyle as an example, I then show that early modern arguments against animism were often effective only against Platonic (...)
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  15. Aristotle's Eudemus and the Propaedeutic Use of the Dialogue Form.Matthew D. Walker - 2021 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (3):399-427.
    By scholarly consensus, extant fragments from, and testimony about, Aristotle’s lost dialogue Eudemus provide strong evidence for thinking that Aristotle at some point defended the human soul’s unqualified immortality (either in whole or in part). I reject this consensus and develop an alternative, deflationary, speculative, but textually supported proposal to explain why Aristotle might have written a dialogue featuring arguments for the soul’s unqualified immortality. Instead of defending unqualified immortality as a doctrine, I argue, the Eudemus was most likely offering (...)
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  16. Aristotle on the Unity of the Nutritive and Reproductive Functions.Cameron F. Coates & James G. Lennox - 2020 - Phronesis 65 (4):414-466.
    In De Anima 2.4, Aristotle claims that nutritive soul encompasses two distinct biological functions: nutrition and reproduction. We challenge a pervasive interpretation which posits ‘nutrients’ as the correlative object of the nutritive capacity. Instead, the shared object of nutrition and reproduction is that which is nourished and reproduced: the ensouled body, qua ensouled. Both functions aim at preserving this object, and thus at preserving the form, life, and being of the individual organism. In each case, we show how Aristotle’s detailed (...)
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  17. Living without a Soul: Why God and the Heavenly Movers Fall Outside of Aristotle’s Psychology.Caleb Cohoe - 2020 - Phronesis 65 (3):281-323.
    I argue that the science of the soul only covers sublunary living things. Aristotle cannot properly ascribe ψυχή to unmoved movers since they do not have any capacities that are distinct from their activities or any matter to be structured. Heavenly bodies do not have souls in the way that mortal living things do, because their matter is not subject to alteration or generation. These beings do not fit into the hierarchy of soul powers that Aristotle relies on to provide (...)
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  18. Aristotle on Motion in Incomplete Animals.Daniel Coren - 2020 - Apeiron 53 (3):285-314.
    I explain what Aristotle means when, after puzzling about the matter of motion in incomplete animals (those without sight, smell, hearing), he suggests in De Anima III 11.433b31–434a5 that just as incomplete animals are moved indeterminately, desire and phantasia are present in those animals, but present indeterminately. I argue that self-motion and its directing faculties in incomplete animals differ in degree but not in kind from those of complete animals. I examine how an object of desire differs for an incomplete (...)
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  19. When Life Imitates Art: Vital Locomotion and Aristotle’s Craft Analogy.Patricio A. Fernandez & Jorge Mittelmann - 2020 - In Colin Guthrie King & Hynek Bartoš (eds.), Heat, Pneuma and Soul in Ancient Philosophy and Science. Cambridge: pp. 260-287.
  20. Why De Anima Needs III.12-13.Robert Howton - 2020 - In Gweltaz Guyomarc'H., Claire Louguet & Charlotte Murgier (eds.), Aristote et l'âme humaine. Lectures de 'De anima' III offertes à Michel Crubellier. Leuven: pp. 329-350.
    The soul is an explanatory principle of Aristotle’s natural science, accounting both for the fact that living things are alive as well as for the diverse natural attributes that belong to them by virtue of being alive. I argue that the explanatory role of the soul in Aristotle’s natural science must be understood in light of his view, stated in a controversial passage from Parts of Animals (645b14–20), that the soul of a living thing is a “complex activity” of its (...)
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  21. Soma kai Psuche: a Relação entre Corpo e Alma em Aristóteles.Lucas Pereira De Araújo Pedrosa - 2020 - Pandora Brasil 105:1-50.
  22. Aristotle on Divine and Human Contemplation.Bryan Reece - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:131–160.
    Aristotle’s theory of human happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics explicitly depends on the claim that contemplation (theôria) is peculiar to human beings, whether it is our function or only part of it. But there is a notorious problem: Aristotle says that divine beings also contemplate. Various solutions have been proposed, but each has difficulties. Drawing on an analysis of what divine contemplation involves according to Aristotle, I identify an assumption common to all of these proposals and argue for rejecting it. (...)
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  23. Mind and body in ancient greek thought - (e.N.) Ostenfeld ancient greek psychology and the modern mind–body debate. Second edition. Pp. 179. Baden-Baden: Academia verlag, 2018 (first edition 1987). Paper, €32.50. Isbn: 978-3-89665-759-6. [REVIEW]David G. Welch - 2020 - The Classical Review 70 (1):36-37.
  24. The Sleep of Reason: Sleep and the Philosophical Soul in Ancient Greece.Victoria Wohl - 2020 - Classical Antiquity 39 (1):126-151.
    Freud tracked the psyche along the paths of sleep, following the “royal road” of dreams. For the ancient Greeks, too, the psyche was revealed in sleep, not through the semiotics of dreams but through the peculiar state of being we occupy while asleep. As a “borderland between living and not living”, sleep offered unique access to the psukhē, that element within the self unassimilable to waking consciousness. This paper examines how Greek philosophers theorized the sleep state and the somnolent psukhē, (...)
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  25. Aristotle’s Concept of Mind by Erick Raphael Jiménez. [REVIEW]Noell Birondo - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (1):162-163.
    In this ambitious first book, Erick Raphael Jiménez argues that a good model for understanding Aristotle’s concept of mind (nous) lies in Aristotle’s account of the perception of time. This “time-perception model” of mind and its activity, thinking, bridges a gap between Jiménez’s unorthodox readings of Aristotelian mind and its objects. The book will attract the interest of specialists in Aristotle’s psychology, as well as other scholars interested in Aristotle’s concept of mind and its influence, for instance, theologians interested in (...)
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  26. Aristotle's Peculiarly Human Psychology.Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi - 2019 - In Nora Kreft & Geert Keil (eds.), Aristotle's Anthropology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 60-76.
    For Aristotle, human cognition has a lot in common both with non-human animal cognition and with divine cognition. With non-human animals, humans share a non-rational part of the soul and non-rational cognitive faculties (DA 427b6–14, NE 1102b29 and EE 1219b24–6). With gods, humans share a rational part of the soul and rational cognitive faculties (NE 1177b17– 1178a8). The rational part and the non-rational part of the soul, however, coexist and cooperate only in human souls (NE 1102b26–9, EE 1219b28–31). In this (...)
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  27. Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology: The Science of Soul.Jason W. Carter - 2019 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
    This volume is the first in English to provide a full, systematic investigation into Aristotle's criticisms of earlier Greek theories of the soul from the perspective of his theory of scientific explanation. Some interpreters of the De Anima have seen Aristotle's criticisms of Presocratic, Platonic, and other views about the soul as unfair or dialectical, but Jason W. Carter argues that Aristotle's criticisms are in fact a justified attempt to test the adequacy of earlier theories in terms of the theory (...)
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  28. Review of Jason W. Carter, Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology: The Science of the Soul. [REVIEW]Jerry Green - 2019 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2019.
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  29. Aristotle's Anthropology.Nora Kreft & Geert Keil (eds.) - 2019 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is the first collection of essays devoted specifically to the nature and significance of Aristotle's anthropological philosophy, covering the full range of his ethical, metaphysical and biological works. The book is organised into four parts, two of which deal with the metaphysics and biology of human nature and two of which discuss the anthropological foundations and implications of Aristotle's ethico-political works. The essay topics range from human nature and morality to friendship and politics, including original discussion and fresh perspectives (...)
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  30. El poder de visualizar. La "phantasia" según Aristóteles.Emmanuel Alloa - 2018 - Anuario Filosófico 51 (2):243-274.
    When translating phantasia as ‘imagination’, one commits a dangerous anachronism: interpreting the Greek concept from the vantage point of a modern, post-Kantian framework which sees imagination as a faculty mediating between sensibility and reasoning. A close reading of the Aristotelian sources shows why phantasia cannot be identifi ed as a distinct faculty, but rather designates a transversal power common to all psychic acts. The article argues that a more adequate translation of phantasia would be ‘visualization’.
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  31. On the Soul: And Other Psychological Works. Aristotle - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Aristotle's De Anima is one of the great classics of philosophy. Aristotle examines the nature of the soul-sense-perception, imagination, cognition, emotion, and desire, including, memory, dreams, and processes such as nutrition, growth, and death.
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  32. Soul and Mind in Greek Thought. Psychologial Issues in Plato and Aristotle.Marcelo D. Boeri, Yasuhira Y. Kanayama & Jorge Mittelmann (eds.) - 2018 - Cham: Springer.
    This book offers new insights into the workings of the human soul and the philosophical conception of the mind in Ancient Greece. It collects essays that deal with different but interconnected aspects of that unified picture of our mental life shared by all Ancient philosophers who thought of the soul as an immaterial substance. The papers present theoretical discussions on moral and psychological issues ranging from Socrates to Aristotle, and beyond, in connection with modern psychology. Coverage includes moral learning and (...)
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  33. Does the Soul Weave? Reconsidering De Anima 1.4, 408a29-b18.Jason W. Carter - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (1):25-63.
    In De Anima 1.4, Aristotle asks whether the soul can be moved by its own affections. His conclusion—that to say the soul grows angry is like saying that it weaves and builds—has traditionally been read on the assumption that it is false to credit the soul with weaving and building; I argue that Aristotle’s analysis of psychological motions implies his belief that the soul does in fact weave and build.
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  34. Aristotle, On the Soul and Other Psychological Works, Trans. Fred D. Miller, Jr. [REVIEW]Jason W. Carter - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 10.
    Fred D. Miller, Jr.'s stated goal for his new translation for the Oxford World's Classics series is, 'to provide a clear and accessible translation of Aristotle's psychological works while . . . conveying something of his distinctive style'. Not only does Miller achieve these goals in spades, but he also provides something more. His translation of Aristotle's De Anima and Parva Naturalia (the 'short works concerning nature'), along with twenty-three selected fragments from Aristotle's lost works and his 'Hymn to Hermias', (...)
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  35. Why the View of Intellect in De Anima I 4 Isn’t Aristotle’s Own.Caleb Cohoe - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (2):241-254.
    In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incorruptible. Myles Burnyeat and Lloyd Gerson take this as proof that, for Aristotle, the intellect is a separate eternal entity, not a power belonging to individual humans. Against this reading, I show that this passage does not express Aristotle’s own views, but dialectically examines a reputable position (endoxon) about the intellect that seems to show that it can be subject to change. The passage’s (...)
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  36. Review of Aristotle, De Anima: Translation, Introduction, and Notes, C.D.C. Reeve. [REVIEW]Caleb Cohoe - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:1.
    This is an excellent translation of Aristotle's De Anima or On the Soul, part of C.D.C. Reeve's impressive ongoing project of translating Aristotle's works for the New Hackett Aristotle. Reeve's translation is careful and accurate, committed to faithfully rendering Aristotle into English while making him as readable as possible. This edition features excellent notes that will greatly assist readers (especially in their inclusion of related passages that illuminate the sections they annotate) and an introduction that situates the work within Aristotle's (...)
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  37. The Interaction of Noetic and Psychosomatic Operations in a Thomist Hylomorphic Anthropology.Daniel De Haan - 2018 - Scientia et Fides 6 (2):55-83.
    This article, the second of a two-part essay, outlines a solution to certain tensions in Thomist philosophical anthropology concerning the interaction of the human person’s immaterial intellectual or noetic operations with the psychosomatic sensory operations that are constituted from the formal organization of the nervous system. Continuing with where the first part left off, I argue that Thomists should not be tempted by strong emergentist accounts of mental operations that act directly on the brain, but should maintain, with Aquinas, that (...)
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  38. Aristotle on the Intellect and Limits of Natural Science.Christopher Frey - 2018 - In John E. Sisko (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 1. New York: Routledge. pp. 160-174.
    To which science, if any, does the intellect’s study belong? Though the student of nature studies every other vital capacity, most interpreters maintain that Aristotle excludes the intellect from natural science’s domain. I survey the three main reasons that lead to this interpretation: the intellect (i) is not realized physiologically in a proprietary organ, (ii) its naturalistic study would corrupt natural science’s boundaries and leave no room for other forms of inquiry, and (iii) it is not, as all other vital (...)
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  39. The Evolution Concept: The Concept Evolution.Agustin Ostachuk - 2018 - Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 14 (3):354-378.
    This is an epistemologically-driven history of the concept of evolution. Starting from its inception, this work will follow the development of this pregnant concept. However, in contradistinction to previous attempts, the objective will not be the identification of the different meanings it adopted through history, but conversely, it will let the concept to be unfolded, to be explicated and to express its own inner potentialities. The underlying thesis of the present work is, therefore, that the path that leads to the (...)
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  40. The Causal Structure of Emotions in Aristotle: Hylomorphism, Causal Interaction between Mind and Body, and Intentionality.Gabriela Rossi - 2018 - In Marcelo D. Boeri, Yasuhira Y. Kanayama & Jorge Mittelmann (eds.), Soul and Mind in Greek Thought. Psychologial Issues in Plato and Aristotle. Springer. pp. 177-198.
    Recently, a strong hylomorphic reading of Aristotelian emotions has been put forward, one that allegedly eliminates the problem of causal interaction between soul and body. Taking the presentation of emotions in de An. I 1 as a starting point and basic thread, but relying also on the discussion of Rh. II, I will argue that this reading only takes into account two of the four causes of emotions, and that, if all four of them are included into the picture, then (...)
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  41. Review of Erick Raphael Jiménez, Aristotle's Concept of Mind. [REVIEW]Matthew D. Walker - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  42. Soul or Mind? Some Remarks on Explanation in Cognitive Science.Józef Bremer - 2017 - Scientia et Fides 5 (2):39-70.
    In the article author analyses the extent to which it is possible to regard the Aristotelian conception of the soul as actually necessary and applicable for modern neuroscience. The framework in which this objective is going to be accomplished is provided by the idea of the coexistence of the “manifest” and “scientific” images of the world and persons, as introduced by Wilfrid Sellars. In subsequent sections, author initially formulates an answer to the questions of what it is that Aristotle sought (...)
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  43. Aristotle’s Critique of Timaean Psychology.Jason W. Carter - 2017 - Rhizomata 5 (1):51-78.
    Of all the criticisms that Aristotle gives of his predecessors’ theories of soul in De anima I.3–5, none seems more unmotivated than the ones directed against the world soul of Plato’s Timaeus. Against the current scholarly consensus, I claim that the status of Aristotle’s criticisms is philosophical rather than eristical, and that they provide important philosophical reasons, independent of Phys. VIII.10 and Metaph. Λ.6, for believing that νοῦς is without spatial extension, and that its thinking is not a physical motion.
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  44. Aristotle De Anima. [REVIEW]Liliana Carolina Sánchez Castro - 2017 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 11 (1):144-158.
    Christopher Shields. Aristotle De Anima. Oxford University Press : Oxford, 2016, 415 p. US $ 32.00. ISBN 978-0-19-924345-7.
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  45. Aristotle’s harmony with Plato on separable and immortal soul.W. M. Coombs - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):541-552.
    The possibility of a harmony between the psychological doctrine of Aristotle and that of Plato marks a significant issue within the context of the debate surrounding Aristotle’s putative opposition to or harmony with Plato’s philosophy. The standard interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of the soul being purely hylomorphic leaves no room for harmonisation with Plato, nor does a functionalist interpretation that reduces Aristotle’s psychological doctrine to physicalist terms. However, these interpretations have serious drawbacks, both in terms of ad-hoc explanations formulated in (...)
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  46. De Anima by Aristotle.Klaus Corcilius - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (1):155-156.
    This is the overdue replacement of D. W. Hamlyn’s somewhat dismissive 1968 translation and commentary of the first two books of Aristotle’s De Anima. Hamlyn hardly did justice to this foundational treatise of Aristotle’s science of living beings: not only did he mistake it for a treatise on “the” philosophy of mind, he also did not bother to translate the first book apart from two snippets. Shields’s replacement is entirely free from such vices. It provides a new translation and commentary (...)
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  47. ἡ κίνησις τῆς τέχνης: Crafts and Souls as Principles of Change.Patricio A. Fernandez & Jorge Mittelmann - 2017 - Phronesis 62 (2):136-169.
    Aristotle’s soul is a first principle of every vital change in an animal, in the way that a craft is a cause of its product’s coming-to-be. We argue that the soul’s causal efficacy cannot therefore be reduced to the formal constitution of vital phenomena, or to discrete interventions into independently constituted processes, but involves the exercise of vital powers. This reading does better justice to Aristotle’s conception of craft as a rational productive disposition; and it captures the soul’s continuous causal (...)
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  48. Aristotle's Case for Perceptual Knowledge.Robert Howton - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    Sense experience, naïvely conceived, is a way of knowing perceptible properties: the colors, sounds, smells, flavors, and textures in our perceptual environment. So conceived, ordinary experience presents the perceiver with the essential nature of a property like Sky Blue or Middle C, such that how the property appears in experience is identical to how it essentially is. In antiquity, as today, it was controversial whether sense experience could meet the conditions for knowledge implicit in this naïve conception. Aristotle was a (...)
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  49. A Noção de Alma no De Anima de Aristóteles.Douglas Vieira Ramalho - 2017 - Dissertation, Ufrj, Brazil
  50. Aristotle, De Anima: Translation, Introduction, and Notes.C. D. C. Reeve & Aristotle - 2017 - Indianapolis, USA: Hackett.
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