Aristotle: Soul

Edited by Caleb Cohoe (Metropolitan State University of Denver, University of Colorado Denver)
About this topic
Summary One of the most disputed recent questions on this area concerns how Aristotle's conception of the soul relates to contemporary philosophy of mind. Is Aristotle a precursor of functionalism and a committed naturalist? Does his conception of soul rest on his antiquated and indefensible physics? Is Aristotle, instead, a sort of dualist? Is his position only fully articulable in terms of his own metaphysics of potentiality and actuality, matter and form? Another area of discussion has been whether Aristotle's understanding of soul and body fits with his general account of form and matter, given that the matter of the living thing, the body, does not seem able to persist in the way that the matter of other hylomorphic compounds persists. A related debate concerns whether we should think that the soul is the form of "an organic body" because the bodies of living things have parts that serve as tools or instruments or because the body as a whole is an instrument of the soul. Further important areas of research in this category include how Aristotle's general account of the soul relates to his specific accounts of soul and whether Aristotle thinks that any kind of soul could be separable from its body.
Key works Here I provide references to some of the debates mentioned above: A number of authors have interpreted Aristotle as, in some sense, a precursor of functionalism (e.g. Barnes 1972, Nussbaum & Putnam 1992) and as a committed naturalist (e.g. Frede 1992). Burnyeat has argued that Aristotle's conception of soul rests on his antiquated and indefensible physics (Burnyeat 1992). Aristotle has also been claimed by some as a sort of dualist (Robinson 1983). Some have drawn attention to the risk of misinterpreting Aristotle by fitting him into contemporary categories. Shields has drawn attention to such misreadings in the case of the unity of soul and body by laying out the importance of Aristotle's own account of form and matter for understanding his position on body-soul unity (Shields 2007). Ackrill (Ackrill 1973) introduced the problem of the sense in which body counts as matter to the contemporary discussion and it is often referred to as Ackrill's problem. Whiting provides an influential response (Whiting 1992). Menn defends the idea that the the body as a whole is an instrument of the soul (Menn 2002). Bolton discusses Aristotle's definitions of soul and how they relate (Bolton 1978).
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  1. Place of the Soul in the Philosophies of Aristotle and Mulla Sadra.Reza Akbabrian & Abulhassan Ghaffari - unknown - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 56.
    Aristotle discusses the soul in itself in metaphysics, and as its relation to the body in physics. This issue originates in the division of sciences in Aristotle's works. The same trend continues in the works of the philosophers following him. Although Farabi presented a new classification of sciences, he maintained the main form of Aristotle's divisions and posed the related problems like him. Based on his fundamental theories, including the principiality of existence, gradation of being, and the trans-substantial motion, Mulla (...)
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  2. El hysteron/proteron del tiempo - The hysteron/proteron of time.Diana Acevedo - forthcoming - Ideas y Valores. Revista Colombiana de Filosofía 65 (159).
    Aristotle's Physics 218b21-219a has been interpreted as proof that the concept of time is determined by the perceptive (or perceptual) conditions of the mind (psyche). In this paper I will criticize such an interpretation in order to argue that the mind's conditions for the perception and experience of time are just a starting point for the investigation: what is prior and nearer to sense, and better known to man (Anal. Post. I, 2). The arrival point of Aristotle's investigation about the (...)
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  3. Distributed Cognition, Neuroprostheses and Their Implications to Non-Physicalist Theories of Mind.Jean Gové - forthcoming - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy.
    This paper investigates the notion of ‘distributed cognition’—the idea that entities external to one’s organic brain participate in one’s overall cognitive functioning—and the challenges it poses to the notion of personhood. Related to this is also a consideration of the ever-increasing ways in which neuroprostheses replace and functionally replicate organic parts of the brain. However, the literature surrounding such issues has tended to take an almost exclusively physicalist approach. The common assumption is that, given that non-physicalist theories (chiefly, dualism, and (...)
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  4. Aristotle on the Unity of the Nutritive and Reproductive Functions.Cameron F. Coates & James G. Lennox - 2020 - Phronesis 65 (4):414-466.
    In De Anima 2.4, Aristotle claims that nutritive soul encompasses two distinct biological functions: nutrition and reproduction. We challenge a pervasive interpretation which posits ‘nutrients’ as the correlative object of the nutritive capacity. Instead, the shared object of nutrition and reproduction is that which is nourished and reproduced: the ensouled body, qua ensouled. Both functions aim at preserving this object, and thus at preserving the form, life, and being of the individual organism. In each case, we show how Aristotle’s detailed (...)
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  5. Living Without a Soul: Why God and the Heavenly Movers Fall Outside of Aristotle’s Psychology.Caleb Cohoe - 2020 - Phronesis 65 (3):281-323.
    I argue that the science of the soul only covers sublunary living things. Aristotle cannot properly ascribe ψυχή to unmoved movers since they do not have any capacities that are distinct from their activities or any matter to be structured. Heavenly bodies do not have souls in the way that mortal living things do, because their matter is not subject to alteration or generation. These beings do not fit into the hierarchy of soul powers that Aristotle relies on to provide (...)
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  6. Why De Anima Needs III.12-13.Robert Howton - 2020 - In Gweltaz Guyomarc'H., Claire Louguet & Charlotte Murgier (eds.), Aristote et l'âme humaine. Lectures de 'De anima' III offertes à Michel Crubellier. Leuven: pp. 329-350.
    The soul is an explanatory principle of Aristotle’s natural science, accounting both for the fact that living things are alive as well as for the diverse natural attributes that belong to them by virtue of being alive. I argue that the explanatory role of the soul in Aristotle’s natural science must be understood in light of his view, stated in a controversial passage from Parts of Animals (645b14–20), that the soul of a living thing is a “complex activity” of its (...)
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  7. Soma kai Psuche: a Relação entre Corpo e Alma em Aristóteles.Lucas Pereira De Araújo Pedrosa - 2020 - Pandora Brasil 105:1-50.
  8. Aristotle on Divine and Human Contemplation.Bryan Reece - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):131–160.
    Aristotle’s theory of human happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics explicitly depends on the claim that contemplation (theôria) is peculiar to human beings, whether it is our function or only part of it. But there is a notorious problem: Aristotle says that divine beings also contemplate. Various solutions have been proposed, but each has difficulties. Drawing on an analysis of what divine contemplation involves according to Aristotle, I identify an assumption common to all of these proposals and argue for rejecting it. (...)
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  9. Review of Erick Raphael Jiménez, Aristotle's Concept of Mind[REVIEW]Noell Birondo - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (1):162-163.
    In this ambitious first book, Erick Raphael Jiménez argues that a good model for understanding Aristotle’s concept of mind (nous) lies in Aristotle’s account of the perception of time. This “time-perception model” of mind and its activity, thinking, bridges a gap between Jiménez’s unorthodox readings of Aristotelian mind and its objects. The book will attract the interest of specialists in Aristotle’s psychology, as well as other scholars interested in Aristotle’s concept of mind and its influence, for instance, theologians interested in (...)
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  10. Aristotle's Peculiarly Human Psychology.Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi - 2019 - In Nora Kreft & Geert Keil (eds.), Aristotle's Anthropology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 60-76.
    For Aristotle, human cognition has a lot in common both with non-human animal cognition and with divine cognition. With non-human animals, humans share a non-rational part of the soul and non-rational cognitive faculties (DA 427b6–14, NE 1102b29 and EE 1219b24–6). With gods, humans share a rational part of the soul and rational cognitive faculties (NE 1177b17– 1178a8). The rational part and the non-rational part of the soul, however, coexist and cooperate only in human souls (NE 1102b26–9, EE 1219b28–31). In this (...)
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  11. Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology: The Science of Soul.Jason W. Carter - 2019 - Cambridge University Press.
    This volume is the first in English to provide a full, systematic investigation into Aristotle's criticisms of earlier Greek theories of the soul from the perspective of his theory of scientific explanation. Some interpreters of the De Anima have seen Aristotle's criticisms of Presocratic, Platonic, and other views about the soul as unfair or dialectical, but Jason W. Carter argues that Aristotle's criticisms are in fact a justified attempt to test the adequacy of earlier theories in terms of the theory (...)
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  12. On the Soul: And Other Psychological Works. Aristotle - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Aristotle's De Anima is one of the great classics of philosophy. Aristotle examines the nature of the soul-sense-perception, imagination, cognition, emotion, and desire, including, memory, dreams, and processes such as nutrition, growth, and death.
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  13. Does the Soul Weave? Reconsidering De Anima 1.4, 408a29-B18.Jason W. Carter - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (1):25-63.
    In De Anima 1.4, Aristotle asks whether the soul can be moved by its own affections. His conclusion—that to say the soul grows angry is like saying that it weaves and builds—has traditionally been read on the assumption that it is false to credit the soul with weaving and building; I argue that Aristotle’s analysis of psychological motions implies his belief that the soul does in fact weave and build.
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  14. Aristotle, On the Soul and Other Psychological Works, Trans. Fred D. Miller, Jr. [REVIEW]Jason W. Carter - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 10.
    Fred D. Miller, Jr.'s stated goal for his new translation for the Oxford World's Classics series is, 'to provide a clear and accessible translation of Aristotle's psychological works while . . . conveying something of his distinctive style'. Not only does Miller achieve these goals in spades, but he also provides something more. His translation of Aristotle's De Anima and Parva Naturalia (the 'short works concerning nature'), along with twenty-three selected fragments from Aristotle's lost works and his 'Hymn to Hermias', (...)
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  15. Why the View of Intellect in De Anima I 4 Isn’T Aristotle’s Own.Caleb Cohoe - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (2):241-254.
    In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incorruptible. Myles Burnyeat and Lloyd Gerson take this as proof that, for Aristotle, the intellect is a separate eternal entity, not a power belonging to individual humans. Against this reading, I show that this passage does not express Aristotle’s own views, but dialectically examines a reputable position (endoxon) about the intellect that seems to show that it can be subject to change. The passage’s (...)
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  16. Review of Aristotle, De Anima: Translation, Introduction, and Notes, C.D.C. Reeve. [REVIEW]Caleb Cohoe - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:1.
    This is an excellent translation of Aristotle's De Anima or On the Soul, part of C.D.C. Reeve's impressive ongoing project of translating Aristotle's works for the New Hackett Aristotle. Reeve's translation is careful and accurate, committed to faithfully rendering Aristotle into English while making him as readable as possible. This edition features excellent notes that will greatly assist readers (especially in their inclusion of related passages that illuminate the sections they annotate) and an introduction that situates the work within Aristotle's (...)
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  17. Aristotle on the Intellect and Limits of Natural Science.Christopher Frey - 2018 - In John E. Sisko (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 1. New York: Routledge. pp. 160-174.
    To which science, if any, does the intellect’s study belong? Though the student of nature studies every other vital capacity, most interpreters maintain that Aristotle excludes the intellect from natural science’s domain. I survey the three main reasons that lead to this interpretation: the intellect (i) is not realized physiologically in a proprietary organ, (ii) its naturalistic study would corrupt natural science’s boundaries and leave no room for other forms of inquiry, and (iii) it is not, as all other vital (...)
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  18. The Evolution Concept: The Concept Evolution.Agustin Ostachuk - 2018 - Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 14 (3):354-378.
    This is an epistemologically-driven history of the concept of evolution. Starting from its inception, this work will follow the development of this pregnant concept. However, in contradistinction to previous attempts, the objective will not be the identification of the different meanings it adopted through history, but conversely, it will let the concept to be unfolded, to be explicated and to express its own inner potentialities. The underlying thesis of the present work is, therefore, that the path that leads to the (...)
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  19. Soul or Mind? Some Remarks on Explanation in Cognitive Science.Jósef Bremer - 2017 - Scientia et Fides 5 (2):39-70.
    In the article author analyses the extent to which it is possible to regard the Aristotelian conception of the soul as actually necessary and applicable for modern neuroscience. The framework in which this objective is going to be accomplished is provided by the idea of the coexistence of the “manifest” and “scientific” images of the world and persons, as introduced by Wilfrid Sellars. In subsequent sections, author initially formulates an answer to the questions of what it is that Aristotle sought (...)
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  20. Aristotle’s Critique of Timaean Psychology.Jason W. Carter - 2017 - Rhizomata 5 (1):51-78.
    Of all the criticisms that Aristotle gives of his predecessors’ theories of soul in De anima I.3–5, none seems more unmotivated than the ones directed against the world soul of Plato’s Timaeus. Against the current scholarly consensus, I claim that the status of Aristotle’s criticisms is philosophical rather than eristical, and that they provide important philosophical reasons, independent of Phys. VIII.10 and Metaph. Λ.6, for believing that νοῦς is without spatial extension, and that its thinking is not a physical motion.
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  21. Aristotle De Anima. [REVIEW]Liliana Carolina Sánchez Castro - 2017 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 11 (1):144-158.
    Christopher Shields. Aristotle De Anima. Oxford University Press : Oxford, 2016, 415 p. US $ 32.00. ISBN 978-0-19-924345-7.
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  22. Aristotle’s Harmony with Plato on Separable and Immortal Soul.W. M. Coombs - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):541-552.
    The possibility of a harmony between the psychological doctrine of Aristotle and that of Plato marks a significant issue within the context of the debate surrounding Aristotle’s putative opposition to or harmony with Plato’s philosophy. The standard interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of the soul being purely hylomorphic leaves no room for harmonisation with Plato, nor does a functionalist interpretation that reduces Aristotle’s psychological doctrine to physicalist terms. However, these interpretations have serious drawbacks, both in terms of ad-hoc explanations formulated in (...)
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  23. De Anima by Aristotle.Klaus Corcilius - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (1):155-156.
    This is the overdue replacement of D. W. Hamlyn’s somewhat dismissive 1968 translation and commentary of the first two books of Aristotle’s De Anima. Hamlyn hardly did justice to this foundational treatise of Aristotle’s science of living beings: not only did he mistake it for a treatise on “the” philosophy of mind, he also did not bother to translate the first book apart from two snippets. Shields’s replacement is entirely free from such vices. It provides a new translation and commentary (...)
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  24. Aristotle's Case for Perceptual Knowledge.Robert Howton - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    Sense experience, naïvely conceived, is a way of knowing perceptible properties: the colors, sounds, smells, flavors, and textures in our perceptual environment. So conceived, ordinary experience presents the perceiver with the essential nature of a property like Sky Blue or Middle C, such that how the property appears in experience is identical to how it essentially is. In antiquity, as today, it was controversial whether sense experience could meet the conditions for knowledge implicit in this naïve conception. Aristotle was a (...)
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  25. A Noção de Alma no De Anima de Aristóteles.Douglas Vieira Ramalho - 2017 - Dissertation, UFRJ, Brazil
  26. Aristotle, De Anima: Translation, Introduction, and Notes.C. D. C. Reeve & Aristotle - 2017 - Indianapolis, USA: Hackett.
  27. Sánchez, Liliana Carolina. Traditio animae: la recepción aristotélica de las teorías presocráticas del alma. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2016. 348 pp. [REVIEW]Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2016 - Ideas Y Valores 65 (162):391-395.
    El ser en su riqueza se expresa en el lenguaje que emana también del ser. El lenguaje emergió de su olvido en la filosofía griega, gracias a las ideas cristianas de encarnación y trinidad que le hicieron más justicia. El mayor milagro del lenguaje no estriba en que la palabra aparezca en su ser externo, sino en el hecho de que lo que emerge y se manifiesta sea siempre palabra. La vuelta de Gadamer al final de Verdad y método, en (...)
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  28. When and Why Understanding Needs Phantasmata: A Moderate Interpretation of Aristotle’s De Memoria and De Anima on the Role of Images in Intellectual Activities.Caleb Cohoe - 2016 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 61 (3):337-372.
    I examine the passages where Aristotle maintains that intellectual activity employs φαντάσματα (images) and argue that he requires awareness of the relevant images. This, together with Aristotle’s claims about the universality of understanding, gives us reason to reject the interpretation of Michael Wedin and Victor Caston, on which φαντάσματα serve as the material basis for thinking. I develop a new interpretation by unpacking the comparison Aristotle makes to the role of diagrams in doing geometry. In theoretical understanding of mathematical and (...)
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  29. Sobre o Hílemorfismo: corpo e alma como condição de possibilidade do viver.Suelen Pereira da Cunha - 2016 - Clareira: Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica 3 (2):22-34.
    O presente trabalho visa demonstrar como a relação entre corpo e alma são indispensáveis para o viver. Para tanto, considera a tese de que o ser animado é uma substância composta de matéria e forma, que também pode ser analisada sob a perspectiva de potência e ato. Neste sentido, o trabalho inicia com a compreensão sobre o que é uma substância, qual tipo de substância é o ser vivo para, em seguida, mediante as definições de alma presentes no livro Β (...)
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  30. O Problema do Pensamento no De Anima de Aristóteles.Fernanda Pereira Augusto da Silva - 2016 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal da Paraíba, Brazil
  31. Mortal Imitations of Divine Life: The Nature of the Soul in Aristotle’s De Anima.Joseph Suk-Hwan Dowd - 2016 - Ancient Philosophy 36 (1):230-234.
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  32. The Powers of Aristotle's Soul. [REVIEW]Robert Howton - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (1):135-138.
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  33. The Principle of Life: from Aristotelian Psyche to Drieschian Entelechy.Agustin Ostachuk - 2016 - Ludus Vitalis 24 (45):37-59.
    Is life a simple result of a conjunction of physico-chemical processes? Can be reduced to a mere juxtaposition of spatially determined events? What epistemology or world-view allows us to comprehend it? Aristotle built a novel philosophical system in which nature is a dynamical totality which is in constant movement. Life is a manifestation of it, and is formed and governed by the psyche. Psyche is the organizational principle of the different biological levels: nutritive, perceptive and intelective. Driesch's crucial experiment provided (...)
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  34. De Anima.Christopher Shields (ed.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Christopher Shields presents a new translation and commentary of Aristotle's De Anima, a work of interest to philosophers at all levels, as well as psychologists and students interested in the nature of life and living systems. The volume provides a full translation of the complete work, together with a comprehensive commentary. While sensitive to philological and textual matters, the commentary addresses itself to the philosophical reader who wishes to understand and assess Aristotle's accounts of the soul and body; perception; thinking; (...)
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  35. O CONCEITO DE NOUS E SUA RELAÇÃO COM O CONCEITO DE DIANÓIA NA FILOSOFIA DE ARISTÓTELES.Alexandre Guedes Barbosa - 2015 - Inquietude 6 (2):52-74.
    Aristóteles, em sua obra De anima, além de apresentar uma intrigante teoria sobre intelecto (nous), que dá margem a uma compreensão bipartida do mesmo em ativo (nous poiētikos) e passivo (nous pathetikon), afirma que as afecções do intelecto são distintas das afecções de quem o possui. Uma das afecções deste que possui o intelecto, segundo o filósofo, é o raciocínio. Ademais, diz que este é perecível, ao passo que aquele é impassível e eterno. Desta maneira, longe de aclarar, acaba por (...)
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  36. Heavenly Soul in Aristotle.Dougal Blyth - 2015 - Apeiron 48 (4):1-39.
  37. Faculties in Ancient Philosophy.Klaus Corcilius - 2015 - In Dominik Perler (ed.), The Faculties: A History. Oxford University Press. pp. 19-58.
  38. Mortal Imitations of Divine Life: The Nature of the Soul in Aristotle's De Anima.Eli Diamond - 2015 - Northwestern University Press.
    In Mortal Imitations of Divine Life, Diamond offers an interpretation of De Anima, which explains how and why Aristotle places souls in a hierarchy of value. Aristotle’s central intention in De Anima is to discover the nature and essence of soul—the prin­ciple of living beings. He does so by identifying the common structures underlying every living activity, whether it be eating, perceiving, thinking, or moving through space. As Diamond demonstrates through close readings of De Anima, the nature of the soul (...)
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  39. Aristotle's de Anima in Focus.Michael Durrant (ed.) - 2015 - Routledge.
    Originally published in 1993. This book presents an amended version of R.D. Hick's classic translation of Aristotle's "De Anima" Books 2 and 3, with pertinent extracts from Book 1, together with an introduction and six papers by prominent international Aristotelian scholars. The editor brings together up-to-date discussions of Aristotle's "De Anima", examining central topics such as the nature of perception, perception and thought, thinking and the intellect, the nature of the soul and the relation between body and soul. These papers (...)
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  40. Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Natural Science.David Ebrey (ed.) - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    Aristotle argued that in theory one could acquire knowledge of the natural world. But he did not stop there; he put his theories into practice. This volume of new essays shows how Aristotle's natural science and philosophical theories shed light on one another. The contributors engage with both biological and non-biological scientific works and with a wide variety of theoretical works, including Physics, Generation and Corruption, On the Soul, and Posterior Analytics. The essays focus on a number of themes, including (...)
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  41. Two Conceptions of Soul in Aristotle.Christopher Frey - 2015 - In David Ebrey (ed.), Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 137-160.
    Aristotle outlines two methods in De Anima that one can employ when one investigates the soul. The first focuses on the exercises of a living organism’s vital capacities and the proper objects upon which these activities are directed. The second focuses on a living organism’s nature, its internal principle of movement and rest, and the single end for the sake of which this principle is exercised. I argue that these two methods yield importantly different, and prima facie incompatible, views about (...)
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  42. Johansen The Powers of Aristotle's Soul . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. X + 302. £45/$85. 9780199658435.Corinne Gartner - 2015 - Journal of Hellenic Studies 135:292-293.
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  43. Merely Living Animals in Aristotle.Refik Güremen - 2015 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 9 (1):115.
    : In Parts of Animals II.10, 655b37-656a8, Aristotle tacitly identifies a group of animals which partake of “ living only”. This paper is an attempt to understand the nature of this group. It is argued that it is possible to make sense of this designation if we consider that some animals, which are solely endowed with the contact senses, do nothing more than mere immediate nutrition by their perceptive nature and have no other action. It is concluded that some of (...)
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  44. Aristotle de Anima: With Translation, Introduction and Notes.R. D. Hicks (ed.) - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    Originally published in 1907, this book contains the ancient Greek text of Aristotle's De Anima, his treatise on the differing souls of living things. An English translation is provided on each facing page, and Hicks supplies a very detailed commentary on each line at the end of the book, as well as a summary of each section. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in Greek philosophy and the history of classical scholarship.
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  45. Aristotle and Alexander on Perceptual Error.Mark A. Johnstone - 2015 - Phronesis 60 (3):310-338.
    Aristotle sometimes claims that the perception of special perceptibles by their proper sense is unerring. This claim is striking, since it might seem that we quite often misperceive things like colours, sounds and smells. Aristotle also claims that the perception of common perceptibles is more prone to error than the perception of special perceptibles. This is puzzling in its own right, and also places constraints on the interpretation of. I argue that reading Alexander of Aphrodisias on perceptual error can help (...)
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  46. The Powers of Aristotle’s Soul, by Thomas Kjeller Johansen. [REVIEW]Mark A. Johnstone - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1303-1305.
    A review of Thomas Johansen's book: The Powers of Aristotle's Soul.
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  47. Rational and Non-Rational Perception in Aristotle's De Anima.Eve Rabinoff - 2015 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (2):297-309.
    The bulk of the account of perception that Aristotle offers in De Anima focuses on analyzing the operation of the five senses and the reception of their respective objects. On Aristotle’s own terms, this analysis is an incomplete account of perception, for it does not explain how perception operates in the life of an animal, with the aim of supporting a certain kind of life. This paper aims to supplement the account of the five senses by considering perception in the (...)
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  48. Immortal «Part» of the Soul in Aristotle’s Teaching, in Spinoza’s Ethics, and in Peripatetic Maimonides’ Reception of the Rabbinic Doctrine of Man’s “Share in the World-to-Come”.Igor Tantlevskij - 2015 - Schole 9 (1):137-141.
    The author compares the ideas of Aristotle and Spinoza on the «immortality»/«eternity» of the wise one’s “mind”/“soul”, not excluding the Stagirite’s immediate influence on Spinoza in this aspect. The paper also deals with the possible influence of the rab­binic doctrine of one’s “share in the World-to-Come” in its Maimonides’ interpretation on Spinoza’s teaching concerning the eternal “part” of the wise one’s soul.
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  49. Review of "Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Soul, Part I,” Trans. Victor Caston". [REVIEW]Caleb Cohoe - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (1):163-164.
  50. Nous in Aristotle's De Anima.Caleb Murray Cohoe - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (9):594-604.
    I lay out and examine two sharply conflicting interpretations of Aristotle's claims about nous in the De Anima (DA). On the human separability approach, Aristotle is taken to have identified reasons for thinking that the intellect can, in some way, exist on its own. On the naturalist approach, the soul, including intellectual soul, is inseparable from the body of which it is the form. I discuss how proponents of each approach deal with the key texts from the DA, focusing on (...)
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