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  1. Der Mensch als Lebewesen. Zum zoologischen Denken des Aristoteles.Sergiusz Kazmierski - manuscript
    Vortrag, gehalten am 11. November 2020 im Rahmen einer Ringvorlesung am Regensburger Zentrum für Klassikstudien zum Thema "Entfernte Verwandte - Mensch und Tier". Die aristotelische Bestimmung des Menschen ist ein Rätsel. Daher soll sie im Folgenden auch als ein Rätsel behandelt werden. Ziel ist es, hier nicht das bei Aristoteles finden zu wollen, was wir heute ohnehin schon über den Menschen als ein Lebewesen wissen oder zu wissen glauben, sondern es gilt im Folgenden von Aristoteles ahnen zu lernen, was wir (...)
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  2. Knowing in Aristotle part 2: Technē, phronēsis, sophia, and divine cognitive activities.Caleb Murray Cohoe - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 17 (1):e12799.
    In this second of a 2-part survey of Aristotle’s epistemology, I present an overview of Aristotle’s views on technē (craft or excellent productive reason) and phronēsis (practical wisdom or excellent practical reason). For Aristotle, attaining the truth in practical matters involves actually doing the right action. While technē and phronēsis are rational excellences, for Aristotle they are not as excellent or true as epistēmē or nous because the kinds of truth that they grasp are imperfect and because they are excellent (...)
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  3. When and Why Understanding Needs Phantasmata: A Moderate Interpretation of Aristotle’s De Memoria and De Anima on the Role of Images in Intellectual Activities.Caleb Cohoe - 2016 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 61 (3):337-372.
    I examine the passages where Aristotle maintains that intellectual activity employs φαντάσματα (images) and argue that he requires awareness of the relevant images. This, together with Aristotle’s claims about the universality of understanding, gives us reason to reject the interpretation of Michael Wedin and Victor Caston, on which φαντάσματα serve as the material basis for thinking. I develop a new interpretation by unpacking the comparison Aristotle makes to the role of diagrams in doing geometry. In theoretical understanding of mathematical and (...)
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  4. Empty Words.Sean Kelsey - 2015 - In David Ebrey (ed.), Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 199-216.
  5. Why the Intellect Cannot Have a Bodily Organ: De Anima 3.4.Caleb Cohoe - 2013 - Phronesis 58 (4):347-377.
    I reconstruct Aristotle’s reasons for thinking that the intellect cannot have a bodily organ. I present Aristotle’s account of the aboutness or intentionality of cognitive states, both perceptual and intellectual. On my interpretation, Aristotle’s account is based around the notion of cognitive powers taking on forms in a special preservative way. Based on this account, Aristotle argues that no physical structure could enable a bodily part or combination of bodily parts to produce or determine the full range of forms that (...)
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