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  1. The Problem of Negligent Omissions: Medieval Action Theories to the Rescue.Michael Barnwell - 2010 - Brill.
    Introduction : what's the problem? -- The problem may lurk in Aristotle's ethics -- Aristotle's akratic : foreshadowing a solution -- A negligent omission at the root of all sinfulness : Anselm and the Devil -- Negligent vs. non-negligent : a Thomistic distinction directing us toward a solution -- Can I have your divided attention? : Scotus, indistinct intellections, and type-1 negligent omissions almost solved -- I can't get you out of my mind : Scotus, lingering indistinct intellections, and type-2 (...)
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  2. Can Reason Establish the Goals of Action? Assessing Interpretations of Aristotle’s Theory of Agency.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - forthcoming - Discusiones Filosóficas.
    Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for (...)
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  3. Aristotle on Blaming Animals: Taking the Hardline Approach on Voluntary Action in the Nicomachean Ethics III.1-5.Paul E. Carron - forthcoming - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (2).
    This essay offers a reconstruction of Aristotle’s account of the voluntary in the Nicomachean Ethics, arguing that the voluntary grounds one notion of responsibility with two levels, and therefore rational and non-rational animals are responsible for voluntary actions. Aristotle makes no distinction between causal and moral responsibility in the NE; rather, voluntariness and prohairesis form different bases for responsibility and make possible different levels of responsibility, but both levels of responsibility fall within the ethical sphere and are aptly appraised. However, (...)
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  4. Aristotle and the Problem of Forgiveness.Jason W. Carter - 2018 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):49-71.
    In recent decades, it has been argued that the modern concept of forgiveness is absent from Aristotle’s conception of συγγνώμη as it appears in his Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle’s view is more modern than it might appear. I defend the idea that Aristotle’s treatment of συγγνώμη, when seen in conjunction with his theory of ethical decision, involuntary action, and character alteration, commits him to a cognitive and emotional theory of forgiveness that is both (...)
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  5. Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action, and Akrasia.T. D. J. Chappell - 1995 - St. Martin's Press.
  6. ‘Aristotle on Voluntariness and Choice’.Ursula Coope - 2010 - In C. Sandis (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Action. Blackwell.
  7. Aristotle on Necessity and Voluntariness.Dennis Klimchuk - 2002 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 19 (1):1 - 19.
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  8. O agir voluntário como característica distintiva das ações na Ética Nicomaquéia de Aristóteles.Luiz Francisco Garcia Lavanholi - 2015` - Filosofia Grega E Helenística (Coleção XVI Encontro Anpof).
  9. Aristotle's Notion of the Voluntary.J. McGinley - 1980 - Apeiron 14 (2):125 - 133.
  10. A ação no livro III da ética a nicômaco.Diego Ramos Mileli - 2015 - Cadernos Do Pet Filosofia 6 (11):34-42.
    Este trabalho tem por objetivo a compreensão da ação em Aristóteles. Para este fim será utilizado o livro III da Ética a Nicômaco, passando antes por uma breve definição da virtude, tal como aparece no livro II, a qual, pode-se dizer ser o bem para a ação, na medida em que é aquilo que se deve alcançar com ela. No campo específico da ação será visto como ela pode ser distinguida entre voluntária, involuntária e não-voluntária. Neste espectro insere-se igualmente a (...)
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  11. What Aristotelian Decisions Cannot Be.Jozef Müller - 2016 - Ancient Philosophy 36 (1):173-195.
    I argue that Aristotelian decisions (προαιρέσεις) cannot be conceived of as based solely on wish (βούλησις) and deliberation (βούλευσις), as the standard picture (most influentially argued for in Anscombe's "Thought and Action in Aristotle", in R. Bambrough ed. New Essays on Plato and Aristotle. London: Routledge, 1965) suggests. Although some features of the standard view are correct (such as that decisions have essential connection to deliberation and that wish always plays a crucial role in the formation of a decision), Aristotelian (...)
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  12. Agency and Responsibility in Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics.Jozef Müller - 2015 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 60 (2):206-251.
    I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (i.e. qua (...)
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  13. Aristotle on Actions From Lack of Control.Jozef Müller - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7.3. First, I argue that the first part of NE 7.3 contains the description of the overall state of mind of the agent while she acts without control. Aristotle’s solution to the problem of uncontrolled action lies in the analogy between the uncontrolled agent and people who are drunk, mad, or asleep. This analogy is interpreted as meaning that the uncontrolled agent, while acting without control, is (...)
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  14. Necessidade e contigencia a partir da potencia racional em Aristoteles.Reinaldo Sampaio Pereira - 2006 - Dissertation, University of Campinas
    Advertimos que não temos como propósito a releitura de algum ponto específico de alguma parte da obra de Aristóteles ou uma nova interpretação acerca de alguma passagem, conceito ou ‘doutrina’ do corpus. Pretendemos tão somente estabelecer certo percurso de análise de um dos importantes conceitos da sua filosofia, a saber, o lógos, a partir da investigação de outro conceito de fundamental importância nos seus textos, a potência, percurso esse que conduz a um aparente paradoxo (o qual constituir-se-á no objeto norteador (...)
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  15. Sungnōmē in Aristotle.Carissa Phillips-Garrett - 2017 - Apeiron 50 (3):311-333.
    Aristotle claims that in some extenuating circumstances, the correct response to the wrongdoer is sungnōmē rather than blame. Sungnōmē has a wide spectrum of meanings that include aspects of sympathy, pity, fellow-feeling, pardon, and excuse, but the dominant interpretation among scholars takes Aristotle’s meaning to correspond most closely to forgiveness. Thus, it is commonly held that the virtuous Aristotelian agent ought to forgive wrongdoers in specific extenuating circumstances. Against the more popular forgiveness interpretation, I begin by defending a positive account (...)
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  16. Los tratamientos de lo involuntario en las Éticas de Aristóteles: una cuestión de métodos.Gabriela Rossi - 2012 - Ideas Y Valores 61 (150):203-228.
    The article examines Aristotle’s two attempts to explain the phenomena of voluntary and involuntary actions: Eudemian Ethics (EE) II 6-9 and Nicomachean Ethics (EN) III 1. Though there are notorious coincidences, there are also substantial differences between them in the characterization of involuntary actions, in the general argumentative strategy, and in the definition of voluntary actions. The paper endeavors to account for these material differences on the basis of the general methodological strategy used by Aristotle in each case.
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  17. Aristotle's Discussions of Involuntary Actions in the Ethics: A Question of Methods.Gabriela Rossi - 2012 - Ideas Y Valores 61 (150):203-228.
    En el artículo se examinan los dos intentos de Aristóteles por explicar el fenómeno de las acciones voluntarias e involuntarias: Ética Eudemia (EE) II 6-9 y Ética Nicomaquea (EN) III 1. Entre ambos tratamientos hay muchas coincidencias, pero también diferencias sustantivas, tanto en la caracterización de las acciones involuntarias como en la estrategia argumentativa general y la definición de lo voluntario. El artículo procura dar cuenta de dichas diferencias de contenido en función de la estrategia metodológica general por la que (...)
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  18. A noção do que está em nosso poder “to eph’ hēmin” e os futuros contingentes: questionamentos sobre a responsabilidade do agente na ética aristotélica.Rosely de Fátima Silva - 2015 - Filosofia Grega E Helenística (Coleção XVI Encontro Anpof).