Aristotle's Works: The Metaphysics

Stephen Makin presents a clear and accurate new translation of an influential and much-discussed part of Aristotle's philosophical system, accompanied by an analytical and critical commentary focusing on philosophical issues. In Book Theta of the Metaphysics Aristotle introduces the concepts of actuality and potentiality---which were to remain central to philosophical analysis into the modern era---and explores the distinction between the actual and the potential.

I review Michael T. Ferejohn's "Formal Causes: Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in Socratic and Aristotelian Thought".

This paper advances an account of truth that has as its starting point Aristotle’s comments about truth at Metaphysics 1011b1. It argues that there are two key ideas in the Aristotelian account: that truth belongs to ‘sayings that’; and that truth involves both what is said and what is. Beginning with the second of these apparent truisms, the paper argues for the crucial role of the distinction between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is’ in the understanding of truth, on the (...) grounds that it is essential to the distinction between truth and falsity and, indeed, to the very possibility of any critical assessment of statements. However, this distinction cannot be used to ground any account of truth in terms that refer to anything other than truth—there is thus no relation that underlies truth even though truth may be construed relationally. Returning to the first point, it is argued that while truth should indeed be understood as belonging to statements, it should not be construed as attaching to ‘propositions’, but to uttered sentences. The account of truth advanced is minimalist, and yet not deflationist; objectivist, and yet not independent of actual linguistic practice. (shrink)

Review of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Books Zeta, Eta, Theta, and Iota, translation and commentary by Montgomery Furth (Hackett: 1985).

A central part of academic inquiry and scholarly education, metaphysics was regarded as "the Queen of Sciences" even before the age of Aristotle. This multipart essay by the prominent philosopher examines the nature of existence, along with issues related to causation, form and matter, mathematics, and God.

Arthur Madigan presents a clear, accurate new translation of the third book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, together with two related chapters from the eleventh book. Madigan's accompanying introduction and commentary give detailed guidance to these texts, in which Aristotle sets out the main questions of metaphysics and assesses the main answers to them, and which serve as a useful introduction not just to Aristotle's own work on metaphysics but to classical metaphysics in general.

M and N, the last two books of the Metaphysics, are Aristotle's only sustained venture into the philosophy of mathematics. In them, he criticizes Plato's theories and suggests alternatives of his own. This commentary concentrates on the continuing philosophical interest of these books rather than on scholarly controversies, and will provide a clear introduction for students, including those without Greek, to an unjustly neglected part of Aristotle's work. This paperback edition replaces the outstandingly successful hardback. 'Dr Annas's translation is clear, (...) readable, and accurate...an enjoyable volume, stimulating both as intellectual history and as philosophical argument.' Times Literary Supplement. (shrink)

This volume contains a close translation., suitable for students without a knowlegde of Greek, of the seventh and eigth books of Aristotle's Metaphysics, together with a philosophical commentary. In these difficult books, which are central to his metaphysical system, Aristotle discusses the nature of perceptible reality.

When the works began being translated into English, those abstract Latin words or their cognates were used, thus suggesting a level of jargon and abstraction, and in some cases misleading interpretation, which was not Aristotle's language ...

This volume contains a close translation, suitable for students without a knowledge of Greek, of the seventh and eighth books of Aristotle's Metaphysics, together with a thorough and careful philosophical commentary. In these difficult books, which are central to his metaphysical system, Aristotle discusses the nature of perceptible reality. In particular, he discusses which of matter and form might be the basic reality of things, and he frequently contrasts his own view of form with the Platonic view. Several other topics (...) are treated which are of central importance to his metaphysics, such as the notions of essence and definition, the status of universals, and the concept of a unity. (shrink)

Stephen Makin presents a clear and accurate new translation of an influential and much-discussed part of Aristotle's philosophical system, accompanied by an analytical and critical commentary focusing on philosophical issues. In Book Theta of the Metaphysics Aristotle introduces the concepts of actuality and potentiality--which were to remain central to philosophical analysis into the modern era--and explores the distinction between the actual and the potential.

The first major work in the history of philosophy to bear the title "Metaphysics" was the treatise by Aristotle that we have come to know by that name. But Aristotle himself did not use that title or even describe his field of study as 'metaphysics'; the name was evidently coined by the first century C.E. editor who assembled the treatise we know as Aristotle's Metaphysics out of various smaller selections of Aristotle's works. The title 'metaphysics' -- literally, 'after the Physics' (...) -- very likely indicated the place the topics discussed therein were intended to occupy in the philosophical curriculum. They were to be studied after the treatises dealing with nature (ta phusika). In this entry, we discuss the ideas that are developed in Aristotle's treatise. (shrink)

I discuss Aristotle’s opening argument against Platonic Forms in _Metaphysics_ A.9, ‘the Razor’, which criticizes the introduction of Forms on the basis of an analogy with a hypothetical case of counting things. I argue for a new interpretation of this argument, and show that it involves two interesting objections against the introduction of Forms as formal causes: one concerns the completeness and the other the adequacy of such an explanatory project.

Based on the notion of proem as exposed in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, we examine in detail Metaph. A1. Our goal is to understand the argument contained in this chapter, as we also endeavour to show how the Stagirite introduces with uttermost caution the theme of wisdom [σοφία], that which is the incarnation of the preeminent science in the first book of the Metaphysics. The attention we devote to the proem of this work is explained by the importance we attribute, unlike much (...) of contemporary scholars, to σοφία, that is, the science of first causes and principles, which we consider to be, ultimately, the pivotal formulation of the supreme science in the Metaphysics. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics I-III into Portuguese, with a few notes and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2007, is preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

The article deals with the question of the value of the history of philosophy for philosophical research. In the first part, it proposes a classification of possible functions realized by references to the philosophical tradition in a philosophical treatise. The proposed typology is meant as a practical tool for identifying and comparing the usage of the past in philosophical texts of any historical period. The second part of the paper illustrates how the classification can be employed by applying it to (...) determine the functions of Aristotle’s discussions of the pre-Socratic doctrines in Metaphysics A. (shrink)

This paper discusses Aristotle’s statement (Metaph. A 9, 991a8-9) that both Anaxagoras and Eudoxus claimed that things are the result of a mixture of original elements, in relation to Plato’s metaphysics. Eudoxus used this immanentistic thesis to reform one central component of Plato’s Theory of Form, that is the “participation”. The first part of the paper analyzes some Anaxagorean aspects in Plato’s metaphysics, showing that Plato shares with Anaxagoras the “Transmission Theory of Causality” (as called by Dancy), but he refuses (...) its immanentistic version. The second part interprets Hip. Maj. 301b2-301c2 as a refusal of a immantestic interpretation of verbs like prosgivgnomai and kosmei'tai. It is also rejected Morgan’s thesis according to which Hippias supports an aware mereological metaphysical theory. The third part contests that Phaed. 100-106 is a defense of an immanentistic metaphysics abandoned by Plato in his later works. The meaning of the expression to; ejn hJmi'n does not include a mereological approach to the causality. In Plato’s metaphysics there is no strong contradiction between transcendence and immanence. The fourth part shows that the Parmenides refuses any immanentistic version of the relationship between Forms and things. Lastly, I will argue that from a Platonic point of view the only acceptable version is the separated interpretation of Transmission Theory of Causality. (shrink)

Do Ideas exist and can we prove it ? Do proofs of their existence have all the same value or not ? Aristotle addresses these issues in two famous documents of the controversy that pitted supporters of the theory of Forms against its opponents within Plato’s Academy : his lost work, quoted by Alexander of Aphrodisias by the title of Peri Ideon, and the lengthy thrust against Ideas that can be read, with some minor variations, in books A, chapter 9, (...) and M, chapter 4, of his Metaphysics. As we only have fragments of the first, the second being laconic and little more than a summary, there has been much speculation about the exact number and nature of the arguments for and against the Forms. Since the pioneering works of Léon Robin, Paul Wilpert et Harold Cherniss, one problem in particular has attracted the attention of specialists : what arguments does Aristotle accuse of either producing Ideas on relatives for one or of dragging in the « Third Man » for another ? Why does he consider these arguments to be more rigorous than the others ? If we are not dealing with the same arguments, how can these be more or better argued than those mentioned by Aristotle in the same breath, namely the arguments Plato’s followers took from the sciences, the one over many and the thought about things that have perished ? Through detailed analysis of texts from the Corpus Aristotelicum and Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Rationes ex machina develops a new interpretation of the controversial file of the akribesteroi tôn logôn as well as a micrological solution to the puzzle that has come to be a sort of compulsory figure of the exegesis of the Aristotelian criticism of « Plato’s Ideas ». (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics I-III into Portuguese, with a few notes and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2007, is preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

Some of Aristotle’s statements about the indemonstrability of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics Γ 4 merit more attention. The consensus seems to be that Aristotle provides two arguments against the demonstrability of the PNC, with one located in Γ 3 and the other found in the first paragraph of Γ 4. In this article, I argue that Aristotle also relies upon a third argument for the same conclusion: the argument from truth. Although Aristotle does not explicitly state this (...) argument, it is the best argument that he could use to defend some of his statements in the second paragraph of Γ 4. Since the argument relies on only a few of Aristotle’s core views about truth, I propose that it is faithful to his considered position throughout his corpus, and it may be the strongest argument he could offer for the indemonstrability of the PNC. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics IV and VI, with notes. The translation is preliminary and intended as a provisional teaching tool to be also used in seminars and discussions with peers in order to reach a more elaborated version.

The topic of degrees of being in Aristotle is almost universally ignored. A very few scholars do discuss the topic or make use of it in passing. This situation mightbe explained by a scholarly consensus that Aristotle did have a doctrine ofdegrees of being, but this doctrine is too uninteresting to be worth much discussion. But a rather different consensus lies behind the current silence. Many experts in the subject deny that Aristotle believed in degrees of being.No one, to my (...) knowledge, has defended this denial in print. But our contemporary metaphysical prejudices are so opposed to degrees of being that people find themselves unable to make any sense of such a doctrine. This paper argues that there is strong textual evidence that Aristotle does employ the concept of degrees of being. (shrink)

My object is Aristotle's discussion of principle of non-contradiction in the first stretch of Metaphysics IV.4. My main focus rests on the connections between Aristotle's discussion of the principle and some key notions of his (explicit or implied) semantics.

This paper deals with the strategy of defence that Aristotle dedicates to the principle of contradiction; the analysis is concentrated on passages of Metaphysics Gamma 4. The main thesis of the paper is that Aristotle’s strategy is an ontological, and therefore not only a logical, one: the principle is defended on the basis of the, from an ontological point of view, unacceptable consequences which would arise in case of the absence of the principle itself. These consequences are, for instance, the (...) disappearance of properties, of essences, of individual entities and of the plurality of essentially distinguishable entities, since the contents of the properties, the role of properties as essences and the constitution of the individual entities cannot hold, if the principle of contradiction does not hold. The principle of contradiction is, therefore, not only a logical principle: it is the ontological presupposition of the whole reality; without it there is no entity. (shrink)

Tradução dos livros Z e H da Metafísica de Aristóteles, com introdução e notas. Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Books VII and VIII into Portuguese, with Introduction and Notes.

This paper is my first effort to revaluate the disagreement between two central texts for Aristotle's the conception of ousia: Categories and Metaphysics VII. Scholars have taken chapter Zeta-3 as a payment of the debt with the Categories, so that the hylomorphic analysis of the composite substance would require a revision of the subject-criterion, now improved by the addition of the “a this” and “separate” criterion. This paper, however, downgrades the importance of the Categories for understanding Aristotle's Metaphysics Z. The (...) two texts are dealing with different arguments and are not incompatible with one another. I myself consider this paper somehow obsolete, for I have returned to the same subject more than once: in my 2003 paper on Z-3 and, most importantly, on my Book 'As Noções Aristotélicas de Substância e Essência' (2008). (shrink)

In a difficult but fascinating passage in Metaphysics Z.17, Aristotle puts forward a proposal, by means of a regress argument, according to which a whole or matter/form-compound is one or unified, in contrast to a heap, due to the presence of form or essence. This proposal gives rise to two central questions: (i) the question of whether form itself is to be viewed, literally and strictly speaking, as part of the matter/form-compound; and (ii) the question of whether form is to (...) be regarded as itself having parts. It is argued that both questions may be answered affirmatively, without giving rise to a regress worry. (shrink)

Where does Aristotle stand in the debate between rationalism and empiricism? The locus classicus on this question, Posterior Analytics II. 19, seems clearly empiricist. Yet many commentators have resisted this conclusion. Here, I review their arguments and conclude that they rest in part on expectations for this text that go unfulfilled. I argue that this is because his views about norms of empirical inquiry are in the rich methodological passages in his scientific treatises. In support of this claim, I explore (...) such passages in On Parts of Animals and De anima. I argue that they reach distinct, though complementary, conclusions about the norms governing zoological and psychological inquiries. (shrink)

In almost every handbook and in almost every history of philosophy you will find the thesis that Aristotle in Metaphysics Z has developed a theory about substance – an imperfect one unfortunately. From the Middle Ages until now this has been the most widely accepted claim about this book. Because the basis for this claim is not so easy to find in the text, there is a dispute about the question what a substance really is and ”which things“ are substances. (...) But the theory itself remains. If you engage to clear the field of problems in which this book has its roots, you will see apories developed by Plato in his dialogue Sophistes, mainly the apory in the middle of the dialogue. Here the guest from Elea is led to the question ”What in the world do we have to understand by the term ’to be’?“ ”...For you evidently understood the matter long ago; we, on the contrary, before thought we understood, but now are in trouble about it.“ Aristotle repeats this question, the question about being, on a new level and with new conceptual tools. In the Topics he develops what I call the ”topical approach.“ The use of it is suppported by a new type of concepts, the quotations (e. g. to ti estin: ”Say what you mean, if you ask 'What is this?'“ The standard translation ”essence“ makes impossible to see the genuine meaning of the term.) In Metaphysics Z he puts in concrete terms what in Metaphysics Λ was just a sketch of his speculation about ”to be.“ Seeing this background, it becomes clear that Metaphysics Z never contains the expected theory, which many allege that Aristotle is defending. This is no more than the remains of the pastristic and medieval interpretation. The German translation with commentary which I submit with this book, and an extensive introduction to these questions, should contribute to the destruction of this part of metaphysics. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics IV and VI, with notes. The translation is preliminary and intended as a provisional teaching tool to be also used in seminars and discussions with peers in order to reach a more elaborated version.