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1 — 50 / 71
  1. added 2020-04-24
    From Degrees of Belief to Binary Beliefs: Lessons From Judgment-Aggregation Theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (5):225-270.
    What is the relationship between degrees of belief and binary beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former—a so-called “belief-binarization rule”—without running into difficulties such as the lottery paradox? We show that this problem can be usefully analyzed from the perspective of judgment-aggregation theory. Although some formal similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation have been noted before, the connection between the two problems has not yet been studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-24
    Majority Voting on Restricted Domains.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2010 - Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):512-543.
    In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments su¢ - cient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition generalizes Sen’s triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove a (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-24
    Judgment Aggregation with Consistency Alone.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Maastricht University.
    All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation require individual and collective judgment sets to be consistent and complete, arguably a demanding rationality requirement. They do not carry over to aggregation functions mapping profiles of consistent individual judgment sets to consistent collective ones. We prove that, whenever the agenda of propositions under consideration exhibits mild interconnections, any such aggregation function that is "neutral" between the acceptance and rejection of each proposition is dictatorial. We relate this theorem to the literature.
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  4. added 2020-04-24
    Judgment Aggregation: (Im)Possibility Theorems.Franz Dietrich - 2006 - Journal of Economic Theory 1 (126):286-298.
    The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising field of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a specific type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the main result here holds for any (non-trivial) agenda. However, independence conditions arguably undermine the logical structure of judgment aggregation. I therefore (...)
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  5. added 2020-04-23
    The Impossibility of Unbiased Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (3):281-299.
    Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without requiring systematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness is dictatorial (or effectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions). Our agenda conditions are tight. (...)
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  6. added 2020-04-19
    Aggregation Theory and the Relevance of Some Issues to Others.Franz Dietrich - 2015 - Journal of Economic Theory 160:463-493.
    I propose a relevance-based independence axiom on how to aggregate individual yes/no judgments on given propositions into collective judgments: the collective judgment on a proposition depends only on people’s judgments on propositions which are relevant to that proposition. This axiom contrasts with the classical independence axiom: the collective judgment on a proposition depends only on people’s judgments on the same proposition. I generalize the premise-based rule and the sequential-priority rule to an arbitrary priority order of the propositions, instead of a (...)
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  7. added 2020-01-15
    A Note on Murakami’s Theorems and Incomplete Social Choice Without the Pareto Principle.Wesley H. Holliday & Mikayla Kelley - forthcoming - Social Choice and Welfare.
    In Arrovian social choice theory assuming the independence of irrelevant alternatives, Murakami (1968) proved two theorems about complete and transitive collective choice rules that satisfy strict non-imposition (citizens’ sovereignty), one being a dichotomy theorem about Paretian or anti-Paretian rules and the other a dictator-or-inverse-dictator impossibility theorem without the Pareto principle. It has been claimed in the later literature that a theorem of Malawski and Zhou (1994) is a generalization of Murakami’s dichotomy theorem and that Wilson’s (1972) impossibility theorem is stronger (...)
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  8. added 2019-11-10
    Arrow's Decisive Coalitions.Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit - forthcoming - Social Choice and Welfare.
    In his classic monograph, Social Choice and Individual Values, Arrow introduced the notion of a decisive coalition of voters as part of his mathematical framework for social choice theory. The subsequent literature on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem has shown the importance for social choice theory of reasoning about coalitions of voters with different grades of decisiveness. The goal of this paper is a fine-grained analysis of reasoning about decisive coalitions, formalizing how the concept of a decisive coalition gives rise to a (...)
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  9. added 2019-10-22
    Intelligence Via Ultrafilters: Structural Properties of Some Intelligence Comparators of Deterministic Legg-Hutter Agents.Samuel Alexander - 2019 - Journal of Artificial General Intelligence 10 (1):24-45.
    Legg and Hutter, as well as subsequent authors, considered intelligent agents through the lens of interaction with reward-giving environments, attempting to assign numeric intelligence measures to such agents, with the guiding principle that a more intelligent agent should gain higher rewards from environments in some aggregate sense. In this paper, we consider a related question: rather than measure numeric intelligence of one Legg- Hutter agent, how can we compare the relative intelligence of two Legg-Hutter agents? We propose an elegant answer (...)
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  10. added 2019-07-20
    Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method.Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:252–272.
    Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting method. A growing body of literature explores strategic voting when there is uncertainty about how others will vote. In this paper, we study strategic voting when there is uncertainty about the voting method. We introduce three notions of manipulability for a (...)
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  11. added 2019-05-04
    Rule by Multiple Majorities: A New Theory of Popular Control.Sean Ingham - 2019 - Cambridge University Press.
    In a democracy, citizens should have some control over how they are governed. If they do not participate directly in making policy, they ought to maintain control over the public officials who design policy on their behalf. Rule by Multiple Majorities develops a novel theory of popular control: an account of what it is, why democracy's promise of popular control is compatible with what we know about actual democracies, and why it matters. While social choice theory suggests there is no (...)
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  12. added 2018-09-13
    A Proof-Theoretical View of Collective Rationality.Daniele Porello - 2013 - In Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference of Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2013).
    The impossibility results in judgement aggregation show a clash between fair aggregation procedures and rational collective outcomes. In this paper, we are interested in analysing the notion of rational outcome by proposing a proof-theoretical understanding of collective rationality. In particular, we use the analysis of proofs and inferences provided by linear logic in order to define a fine-grained notion of group reasoning that allows for studying collective rationality with respect to a number of logics. We analyse the well-known paradoxes in (...)
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  13. added 2018-09-11
    Why Arrow's Theorem Matters for Political Theory Even If Preference Cycles Never Occur.Sean Ingham - forthcoming - Public Choice.
    Riker (1982) famously argued that Arrow’s impossibility theorem undermined the logical foundations of “populism”, the view that in a democracy, laws and policies ought to express “the will of the people”. In response, his critics have questioned the use of Arrow’s theorem on the grounds that not all configurations of preferences are likely to occur in practice; the critics allege, in particular, that majority preference cycles, whose possibility the theorem exploits, rarely happen. In this essay, I argue that the critics’ (...)
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  14. added 2018-07-24
    Single-Peakedness and Semantic Dimensions of Preferences.Daniele Porello - 2016 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 24 (4).
    Among the possible solutions to the paradoxes of collective preferences, single-peakedness is significant because it has been associated to a suggestive conceptual interpretation: a single-peaked preference profile entails that, although individuals may disagree on which option is the best, they conceptualize the choice along a shared unique dimension, i.e. they agree on the rationale of the collective decision. In this article, we discuss the relationship between the structural property of singlepeakedness and its suggested interpretation as uni-dimensionality of a social choice. (...)
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  15. added 2018-07-24
    On the Elusive Notion of Meta-Agreement.Valeria Ottonelli & Daniele Porello - 2013 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 12 (1):68-92.
    Public deliberation has been defended as a rational and noncoercive way to overcome paradoxical results from democratic voting, by promoting consensus on the available alternatives on the political agenda. Some critics have argued that full consensus is too demanding and inimical to pluralism and have pointed out that single-peakedness, a much less stringent condition, is sufficient to overcome voting paradoxes. According to these accounts, deliberation can induce single-peakedness through the creation of a ‘meta-agreement’, that is, agreement on the dimension according (...)
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  16. added 2018-02-17
    The Set Theoretic Ambit Of Arrow's Theorem.Louis M. Guenin - 2001 - Synthese 126 (3):443-472.
    Set theoretic formulation of Arrow's theorem, viewed in light of a taxonomy of transitive relations, serves to unmask the theorem's understated generality. Under the impress of the independence of irrelevant alternatives, the antipode of ceteris paribus reasoning, a purported compiler function either breaches some other rationality premise or produces the "effet Condorcet". Types of cycles, each the seeming handiwork of a virtual voter disdaining transitivity, are rigorously defined. Arrow's theorem erects a dilemma between cyclic indecision and dictatorship. Maneuvers responsive thereto (...)
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  17. added 2017-12-06
    The Wisdom of Collective Grading and the Effects of Epistemic and Semantic Diversity.Aidan Lyon & Michael Morreau - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):99-116.
    A computer simulation is used to study collective judgements that an expert panel reaches on the basis of qualitative probability judgements contributed by individual members. The simulated panel displays a strong and robust crowd wisdom effect. The panel's performance is better when members contribute precise probability estimates instead of qualitative judgements, but not by much. Surprisingly, it doesn't always hurt for panel members to interpret the probability expressions differently. Indeed, coordinating their understandings can be much worse.
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  18. added 2017-10-21
    Teoría fenomenológica general del bienestar y la elección social.Rodrigo Lopez-Pablos - 2013 - Revista de Economía Política de Buenos Aires 12 (7):105-133.
    By introducing elements of phenomenological philosophy to the analysis of human needs in economics; from Sartrean postulates as well as the nature and essence of individual’s needs, has been revealed a theorethical framework that serves to ponder human being’s existential behavior by means of their phenomenologic social choices and welfare. Defining a planning agent under strong assumptions of rationality and projective efficacious capabilities, the Arrow’s theorem has been proved for the economic agent aware of its finitude in this world.
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  19. added 2017-10-07
    Ranking Judgments in Arrow’s Setting.Daniele Porello - 2010 - Synthese 173 (2):199-210.
    In this paper, I investigate the relationship between preference and judgment aggregation, using the notion of ranking judgment introduced in List and Pettit. Ranking judgments were introduced in order to state the logical connections between the impossibility theorem of aggregating sets of judgments and Arrow’s theorem. I present a proof of the theorem concerning ranking judgments as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem, extending the translation between preferences and judgments defined in List and Pettit to the conditions on the aggregation procedure.
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  20. added 2017-02-12
    Social Choice, the Strong Pareto Principle, and Conditional Decisiveness.Susumu Cato - 2013 - Theory and Decision 75 (4):563-579.
    This paper examines social choice theory with the strong Pareto principle. The notion of conditional decisiveness is introduced to clarify the underlying power structure behind strongly Paretian aggregation rules satisfying binary independence. We discuss the various degrees of social rationality: transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity.
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  21. added 2017-02-07
    Book Review:Social Choice and Individual Values. Kenneth J. Arrow. [REVIEW]Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Ethics 62 (3):220-.
  22. added 2017-02-07
    Book Review:Time's Arrow in Society. Anderson Woods. [REVIEW]Albert William Levi - 1936 - Ethics 47 (1):128-.
  23. added 2017-02-02
    Sen's Theorem: Geometric Proof, New Interpretations.Lingfang Li & Donald G. Saari - manuscript
    Sen's classic social choice result supposedly demonstrates a conflict between Pareto and even minimal forms of liberalism. By providing the first direct mathematical proof of this seminal result, we underscore a significantly different interpretation: rather than conflicts among rights, Sen's result occurs because the liberalism assumption negates the assumption that voters have transitive preferences. This explanation enriches interpretations of Sen's conclusion by including radically new kinds of societal conflicts, it suggests ways to sidestep these difficulties, and it explains earlier approaches (...)
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  24. added 2017-02-02
    On Psychological Impossibility.A. MacC Armstrong - 1971 - Journal of Value Inquiry 5 (2):81-89.
  25. added 2017-02-01
    Altruism and Commerce: A Defense of Titmuss Against Arrow.Peter Singer - 1973 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (3):312-320.
  26. added 2017-01-29
    ACKAY, A. F.: "Arrow's Theorem: The Paradox of Social Choice". [REVIEW]Peter Urbach - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32:425.
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  27. added 2017-01-24
    Agency, History and the Impossibility Theorem: Lessons From Yugoslav Self-Management. [REVIEW]Diane Flaherty - 2009 - Science and Society 73 (1):118 - 130.
  28. added 2017-01-23
    On the Impossibility of Amalgamating Evidence.Aki Lehtinen - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):101-110.
    It is argued in this paper that amalgamating confirmation from various sources is relevantly different from social-choice contexts, and that proving an impossibility theorem for aggregating confirmation measures directs attention to irrelevant issues.
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  29. added 2017-01-21
    Why Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is Invalid.Sidney Gendin - 1994 - Journal of Social Philosophy 25 (1):144-159.
    In 1951, Kenneth Arrow published his now celebrated book Social Choice and Individual Values. Although not the first book to be written on social choice, Arrow's work ushered in a voluminous literature mostly produced by economists but by philosophers and political scientists as well. Arrow's chief result was a proof of the impossibility of a social welfare function . He showed that there could be no decision procedure for aggregating individual preference orderings into a grand, overall social preference ordering. The (...)
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  30. added 2017-01-19
    Arrow's Proof and the Logic of Preference.Frederic Schick - 1969 - Philosophy of Science 36 (2):127-144.
    This paper is a critique of Kenneth Arrow's thesis concerning the logical impossibility of a constitution. I argue that one of the premises of Arrow's proof, that of the transitivity of indifference, is untenable. Several concepts of preference are introduced and counter-instances are offered to the transitivity of indifference defined along the standard lines in terms of these concepts. Alternate analyses of indifference in terms of preference are considered, and it is shown that these do not serve Arrow's purposes either. (...)
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  31. added 2017-01-18
    A Simplified Proof of an Impossibility Theorem.Alfred F. Mackay - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (2):175-177.
    In this paper I prove a theorem which is similar to Arrow's famous impossibility theorem. I show that no social welfare function can be both minimally majoritarian and also independent of irrelevant alternatives. My condition of minimal majoritarianism is substantially weaker than simple majority rule.
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  32. added 2017-01-17
    Time's Arrow in Society. Anderson Woods.Albert William Levi - 1936 - International Journal of Ethics 47 (1):128-131.
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  33. added 2017-01-16
    Preference, Rational Choice, and Arrow's Theorem.Tal Scriven - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (12):778-785.
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  34. added 2017-01-14
    Social Choice and the Arrow Conditions.Allan F. Gibbard - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):269-284.
  35. added 2016-08-30
    Propositionwise Judgment Aggregation: The General Case.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - Social Choice and Welfare 40 (4):1067-1095.
    In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or implication preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there (...)
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  36. added 2016-06-08
    Grading in Groups.Michael Morreau - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):323-352.
    Juries, committees and experts panels commonly appraise things of one kind or another on the basis of grades awarded by several people. When everybody's grading thresholds are known to be the same, the results sometimes can be counted on to reflect the graders’ opinion. Otherwise, they often cannot. Under certain conditions, Arrow's ‘impossibility’ theorem entails that judgements reached by aggregating grades do not reliably track any collective sense of better and worse at all. These claims are made by adapting the (...)
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  37. added 2015-09-07
    A Problem in the Justification of Democracy.J. L. Gorman - 1978 - Analysis 38 (1):46 - 50.
  38. added 2015-08-15
    Judgement Aggregation Under Constraints.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2008 - In T. Boylan & R. Gekker (eds.), Economics, Rational Choice and Normative Philosophy. London, UK: Routledge.
    In solving judgment aggregation problems, groups often face constraints. Many decision problems can be modelled in terms the acceptance or rejection of certain propositions in a language, and constraints as propositions that the decisions should be consistent with. For example, court judgments in breach-of-contract cases should be consistent with the constraint that action and obligation are necessary and sufficient for liability; judgments on how to rank several options in an order of preference with the constraint of transitivity; and judgments on (...)
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  39. added 2015-08-15
    A Possibility Theorem on Aggregation Over Multiple Interconnected Propositions.Christian List - 2003 - Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (1):1-13.
    Drawing on the so-called “doctrinal paradox”, List and Pettit (2002) have shown that, given an unrestricted domain condition, there exists no procedure for aggregating individual sets of judgments over multiple interconnected propositions into corresponding collective ones, where the procedure satisfies some minimal conditions similar to the conditions of Arrow’s theorem. I prove that we can avoid the paradox and the associated impossibility result by introducing an appropriate domain restriction: a structure condition, called unidimensional alignment, is shown to open up a (...)
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  40. added 2015-04-04
    MACKAY, A. F. "Arrow's Theorem: The Paradox of Social Choice". [REVIEW]W. D. Hart - 1983 - Mind 92:471.
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  41. added 2015-03-22
    Arrow's Theorem: The Paradox of Social Choice.Lanning Sowden & Alfred F. Mackay - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (130):104.
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  42. added 2014-12-19
    Social Choice Theory.Christian List - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Social choice theory is the study of collective decision processes and procedures. It is not a single theory, but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual inputs (e.g., votes, preferences, judgments, welfare) into collective outputs (e.g., collective decisions, preferences, judgments, welfare). Central questions are: How can a group of individuals choose a winning outcome (e.g., policy, electoral candidate) from a given set of options? What are the properties of different voting systems? When is a voting system (...)
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  43. added 2014-11-13
    Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and the National Security State.S. M. Amadae - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):734-743.
    This paper critically engages Philip Mirowki's essay, "The scientific dimensions of social knowledge and their distant echoes in 20th-century American philosophy of science." It argues that although the cold war context of anti-democratic elitism best suited for making decisions about engaging in nuclear war may seem to be politically and ideologically motivated, in fact we need to carefully consider the arguments underlying the new rational choice based political philosophies of the post-WWII era typified by Arrow's impossibility theorem. A distrust of (...)
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  44. added 2014-10-14
    Arrow's Theorem.Michael Morreau - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: N/A.
    Kenneth Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem—or “general possibility” theorem, as he called it—answers a very basic question in the theory of collective decision-making. Say there are some alternatives to choose among. They could be policies, public projects, candidates in an election, distributions of income and labour requirements among the members of a society, or just about anything else. There are some people whose preferences will inform this choice, and the question is: which procedures are there for deriving, from what is known or (...)
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  45. added 2014-04-02
    Teaching Arrow’s Theorem.Greg Fried - 2010 - Teaching Philosophy 33 (2):173-186.
    Amartya Sen has recently urged that political philosophers pay attention to social choice theory in their deliberations about justice. However, despite its merits, social choice theory is not standardly part of undergraduate political philosophy. One difficulty is that it involves symbolic logic and difficult concepts. We can reduce this challenge by making the material no harder than it needs to be. I consider the standard proof of Arrow’s Theorem, a seminal result. Kenneth Arrow does not explicate the role of the (...)
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  46. added 2014-04-01
    The Logical Space of Democracy.Christian List - 2011 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (3):262-297.
    Can we design a perfect democratic decision procedure? Condorcet famously observed that majority rule, our paradigmatic democratic procedure, has some desirable properties, but sometimes produces inconsistent outcomes. Revisiting Condorcet’s insights in light of recent work on the aggregation of judgments, I show that there is a conflict between three initially plausible requirements of democracy: “robustness to pluralism”, “basic majoritarianism”, and “collective rationality”. For all but the simplest collective decision problems, no decision procedure meets these three requirements at once; at most (...)
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  47. added 2014-03-25
    Arrow's Theorem, Indeterminacy, and Multiplicity Reconsidered.Mathias Risse - 2001 - Ethics 111 (4):706-734.
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  48. added 2014-03-24
    Intradimensional Single-Peakedness and the Multidimensional Arrow Problem.Christian List - 2002 - Theory and Decision 52 (3):287-301.
    Arrow's account (1951/1963) of the problem of social choice is based upon the assumption that the preferences of each individual in the relevant group are expressible by a single ordering. This paper lifts that assumption and develops a multidimensional generalization of Arrow's framework. I show that, like Arrow's original framework, the multidimensional generalization is affected by an impossibility theorem, highlighting not only the threat of dictatorship of a single individual, but also the threat of dominance of a single dimension. In (...)
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  49. added 2014-03-24
    Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.
    Suppose that the members of a group each hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions, and imagine that the group itself has to form a collective, rational set of judgments on those questions. How should it go about dealing with this task? We argue that the question raised is subject to a difficulty that has recently been noticed in discussion of the doctrinal paradox in jurisprudence. And we show that there is a general impossibility theorem that that (...)
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  50. added 2014-03-24
    Street-Level Epistemology and Democratic Participation.Russell Hardin - 2002 - Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (2):212–229.
1 — 50 / 71