Aspects of Consciousness, Misc

Phenomenality and accessibility are two aspects of conscious experience. “Phenomenality” refers to the felt, experiential aspect of experience, and “accessibility” to a cognitive aspect of it: its availability in general to thought processes, reasoning, decision making, etc. In this paper, I present a dilemma for theorizing about the connection between them. Either there is a conceptual connection linking phenomenality and accessibility (i.e., it is not possible to conceive of a phenomenal experience that is not cognitively accessible for the subject) or (...) there is none but then the empirical evidence will – for principled reasons – be unable to decide the exact nature of the relationship between the two. (shrink)

Basic self-awareness is the kind of self-awareness reflected in our standard use of the first-person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first-person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third-person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self-awareness. In this paper, (...) I argue that depersonalized patients indeed have an impaired basic self-awareness, and that their study allows us both to favor one specific theory of basic self-awareness and to understand what is wrong with its rivals. According to the favored theory, which I call Cartesian, we are basically self-aware in virtue of being acquainted with ourselves through introspection. (shrink)

This paper asks about the ways in which embodimentoriented cognitive science contributes to our understanding of phenomenal consciousness. It is first argued that central work in the field of embodied cognitive science does not solve the hard problem of consciousness head on. It is then argued that an embodied turn toward neurophenomenology makes no distinctive headway on the puzzle of consciousness; for neurophenomenology either concedes dualism in the face of the hard problem or represents only a slight methodological variation on (...) extant cognitive-scientific approaches to the easy problems of consciousness. The paper closes with the positive suggestion that embodied cognitive science supports a different approach to phenomenal consciousness, according to which the mind is massively representational, cognitive science has no use for the personal-level posits that tend to drive philosophical theorizing about consciousness and mind, and the hard problem is illusory. (shrink)

The phenomenal particularity thesis says that if a mind-independent particular is consciously perceived in a given perception, that particular is among the constituents of the perception’s phenomenology. Martin, Campbell, Gomes and French and others defend this thesis. Against them are Mehta, Montague, Schellenberg and others, who have produced strong arguments that the phenomenal particularity thesis is false. Unfortunately, neither side has persuaded the other, and it seems that the debate between them is now at an impasse. This paper aims to (...) break through this impasse. It argues that we have reached the impasse because two distinct conceptions of phenomenology—a “narrow” conception and a “broad” conception—are compatible with our what-it-is-like characterizations of phenomenology. It also suggests that each of these two conceptions has its own theoretical value and use. Therefore, the paper recommends a pluralistic position, on which we acknowledge that there are two kinds of phenomenology: narrow phenomenology and broad phenomenology. The phenomenal particularity thesis is true only with respect to the latter. (shrink)

Thomas Metzinger has diagnosed the need for a Bewusstseinskultur, a ‘consciousness culture’: a culturally implemented way in which a society as a whole engages with the dawning natural science of consciousness, with phenomenal experiences themselves, and with our increasing capability to manipulate them. A Bewusstseinskultur is an achievement, built by a society-wide orientation on empirical evidence, thorough scientific theorizing and rational deliberation. It affects a broad range of issues from animal ethics, drug policy, end-of-life-care, and robo-ethics to post-humanism. However, this (...) notion has not yet been presented in English, and is so far unconnected to other discussions in philosophy. Here, I remedy this: I present Metzinger's notion of a Bewusstseinskultur and connect it to discussion on transformative experiences, Parfit's meta-hedonic states, and the Access vs. Phenomenal Consciousness distinction. (shrink)

John Morrison has argued that confidences are assigned in perceptual experience. For example, when you perceive a figure in the distance, your experience might assign a 55-percent confidence to the figure’s being Isaac. Morrison’s argument leans on the phenomenon of ‘completely trusting your experience’. I argue that Morrison presupposes a problematic ‘importation model’ of this familiar phenomenon, and propose a very different way of thinking about it. While the article’s official topic is whether confidences are assigned in perceptual experience, it (...) is also about two more general issues: how we can determine which properties are assigned in perceptual experience; and how we transition from perception to belief. (shrink)

Heightened consciousness has become a common expression in daily conversations, but it expresses a number of different concepts depending on the meaning of the speaker and is related to other phrases or terms that have slightly different connotations. This entry explores the different meanings of the term heightened consciousness and similar phrases in regard to personal development.

Ulrich de Balbian Meta-Philosophy Research Center -/- MIND‭ & ‬CONSCIOUSNESS -/- THINKING,‭ ‬SENSATION,‭ ‬UNDERSTANDING,‭ ‬REASON,‭ ‬ARGUMENTATION,‭ ‬EMOTIONS,‭ ‬EXPERIENCE,‭ ‬WISDOM -/- Do not talk about or use the misleading,‭ ‬umbrella-word like mind and consciousness,‭ ‬or mental processes and phenomena.‭ ‬Even Hume realized this and emphasized the need for accurate definitions of those words and processes we wish to investigate.‭ ‬Talk about and investigate specific processes or‭ ‬‘notions and activities‭’‬ like thinking,‭ ‬reasoning,‭ ‬sensing and experience/ing,‭ ‬arguments and argumentation,‭ ‬etc‭ ‬.I intend to (...) explore the notions of thought‭ (‬thinking‭)‬,‭ ‬sensation,‭ ‬feeling,‭ ‬understanding and insight,‭ ‬reason/ing and argumentation,‭ ‬emotion and experience,‭ ‬as features of so-called‭ '‬consciousness‭'‬. Information about these things are collected as data collection,‭ ‬brain dumping or storming or one of the first or preliminary steps or stages of the process/‭ ‬es of theorizing.‭ ‬But each section itself is also a mini theorizing concerning the ideas‭ ‬dealt with in it.The aim of this writing is on the one hand dealing with these notions to show that they are not mental processes or indications of the existence of‭ ‬‘the mind‭’‬,‭ ‬but that they can be located in the brain.‭ ‬On the other hand each section and the entire piece are features of the doing of philosophy as steps or stages in the process/es of theorizing. -/- Philosophy‭ (‬philos Sophos,‭ ‬love for Sophia/wisdom‭) ‬begins with‭ (‬a passion,‭ ‬a desire and need for‭) ‬wisdom‭ (‬alone‭) And ends with‭ (‬a life filled,‭ ‬realized,‭ ‬experienced and lived for and by‭) ‬wisdom alone -/- 04/04/2017‭ ‬U. (shrink)

https://www.academia.edu/32135680/There_is_no_such_things_as_Mind_or_Consciousness -/- ABSTRACT The introduction presents merely roughly‭ (‬as they undergo change all the time‭) ‬the contemporary,‭ ‬insular,‭ ‬Anglo-Phone speculations‭ (‬supposedly by means of the discourse of philosophy and the socio-cultural practice of philosophizing‭) ‬about notions of consciousness and mind. -/- These,‭ ‬almost epistemological solipsistic,‭ ‬self-centered and anthropo-centered,‭ ‬restricted speculations about the notions of mind and consciousness are made by means of cognitively biased metaphysical,‭ ‬ontological,‭ ‬epistemological and methodological assumptions and selective interpretations of the nature and the doing of philosophy.‭ (...) ‬Individuals or groups of them uttering those speculations form part of the professional academe and subscribe to the principles,‭ ‬attitudes,‭ ‬values and norms of a particular school,‭ ‬movement and community of Western academic philosophers. -/- The next sections situate the individuals who utter these pronouncements and/‭ ‬or argue for them by reasoning,‭ ‬logic and argumentation in the wider context of the multiverse,‭ ‬the universe,‭ ‬planet earth and our species as merely one type of contingent,‭ ‬living organism inhabiting and restricted to a certain eon,‭ ‬era,‭ ‬period,‭ ‬epoch,‭ ‬civilization,‭ ‬historical period and culture‭ (‬or time and place‭) ‬of this planet.‭ ‬In spite of this absolute restriction by place and time individuals try to depict from this restricted point of view an all-inclusive,‭ ‬god-like explanation of the nature,‭ ‬origin,‭ ‬meaning and functioning of every thing.‭ -/- I suggest that because of conceptual misuse mental objects such as the mind and consciousness are imagined and thought to exist.‭ ‬Such misleading notions lead to the creation of unnecessary‭ ‘‬philosophical‭’ ‬problems such as the mind-body problem and notions about things such as‭ ‘‬qualia‭’‬.‭ ‬It is advisable to restrict any‭ ‬experiments to an investigation of particular senses and‭ ‘‬acts‭’ ‬of cognition and identify the areas in the body and brain that play a part in them‭ ‬-‭ ‬and to leave such research to experts of the specialized cognitive and‭ ‬neuroscientific fields and related disciplines,‭ ‬instead of trying to speculate about them or by the use of thought experiments,‭ ‬imaginary cases and simulations,‭ ‬fictional accounts and reasoning or arguments. (shrink)

In this article, I delineate seven aspects of the process of self-consciousness in order to demonstrate that when any of the aspects is compromised, self-consciousness goes away while consciousness persists. I then suggest that the psychological phenomenon of flow is characterized by a loss of self-consciousness. The seven aspects are: 1) implicit awareness that the person and the self are identical; 2) awareness of an event or circumstance in the world internal or external to the person; 3) awareness that this (...) event or circumstance is not isolated, that something will result from it; 4) inference that a result of the circumstance or event may have an impact on one's person; 5) inference that the impact on one's person may have a normative valence with respect to one's person; 6) inference that the normative valence with respect one's person may be significant to one's person; 7) implicit awareness that any event eventuating in a normative valence that is significant with respect to one's person will also be significant to one's self. (shrink)

Imagination is the art of exploring beyond the depths of one’s body. Imagination allows one to peek into the void to realize the true existence of its self and feel the existence of eternity. The experience of imagination is a subjective experience of one’s own consciousness and it is this experience makes the experiencer worthy. Creation and creativity are the end aspects of imagination and unfold the hidden mysteries of the cosmos. This essay is a trip across the cosmic energy (...) that creates the self for experiencing its self - a first-hand experience through the virtuosity of imagination. (shrink)

The alleged for-me-ness or mineness of conscious experience has been the topic of considerable debate in recent phenomenology and philosophy of mind. By considering a series of objections to the notion of for-me-ness, or to a properly robust construal of it, this paper attempts to clarify to what the notion is committed and to what it is not committed. This exercise results in the emergence of a relatively determinate and textured portrayal of for-me-ness as the authors conceive of it.

Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this article, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common condition known as depersonalisation. Even though they (...) are not delusional, depersonalised patients seem to have experiences that are quite similar to those of Cotard patients. I argue that these experiences are essentially characterised by a lack of subjective character and of two other structural features of experience, which I call ‘the present character’ and ‘the actual character’. Cotard's nihilistic delusions simply consist in taking these anomalous experiences at face value. (shrink)

I propose that there are two kind's of qualia realism, and that Harman's observations about the transparency of experience pose a threat to only one of these.

Many philosophers hold that the phenomenology of thinking (also known as cognitive phenomenology) reduces to the phenomenology of the speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings associated with it. But even if this reductionist claim is correct, there is still a properly cognitive dimension to the phenomenology of at least some thinking. Specifically, conceptual content makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenology of at least some thought episodes, in that it constitutes what I call their thematic unity. Often, when a thought (...) episode has a phenomenal character, the various associated speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings are often organized around a common theme, constituted by the conceptual content of one's thinking. (shrink)

(2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.

Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. I argue, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are not purely sensory. The second aim of this paper is (...) to defend cognitive phenomenology. I argue that reflection on intellectual gestalts provides a basis for developing a case for cognitive phenomenology that is immune to many of the worries that beset more familiar arguments for cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)

Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of (...) the second notion that is not touched by Block’s argument. (shrink)