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  1. Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2012 - In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 6. ATINER. pp. 83-91.
    Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: they are representational, (...)
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  2. The Unity of Emotion: An Unlikely Aristotelian Solution.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):101-114.
    Most researchers of emotions agree that although cognitive evaluations such as beliefs, thoughts, etc. are essential for emotion, bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions are also required. Yet, only a few explain how all these diverse aspects of emotion are related to form the unity or oneness of emotion. The most prevalent account of unity is the causal view, which, however, has been shown to be inadequate because it sees the relations between the different parts of emotion as external and (...)
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  3. Emotions as Unities of Form and Matter.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2006 - The Emotion Researcher 22 (1-2):09-10.
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  4. How Are the Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Aspects of Emotion Related?Maria Magoula Adamos - 2002 - Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):183-195.
    Most scholars of emotions concede that although cognitive evaluations are essential for emotion, they are not sufficient for it, and that other elements, such as bodily feelings, physiological sensations and behavioral expressions are also required. However, only a few discuss how these diverse aspects of emotion are related in order to form the unity of emotion. In this essay I examine the co-presence and the causal views, and I argue that neither view can account for the unity of emotions. In (...)
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  5. The Arousal of Emotion in Plato's Dialogues.David L. Blank - 1993 - Classical Quarterly 43 (02):428-.
    In Aeschines' dialogue Alcibiades, Socrates sees his brilliant young partner's haughty attitude towards the great Themistocles. Thereupon he gives an encomium of Themistocles, a man whose wisdom and arete, great as they were, could not save him from ostracism by his own people. This encomium has an extraordinary effect on Alcibiades: he cries and in his despair places his head upon Socrates' knee, realizing that he is nowhere near as good a man as Themistocles . Aeschines later has Socrates say (...)
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  6. The Self and Its Emotions.Frances Bottenberg - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):480-484.
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  7. The Elements of Emotion.Chad Brockman - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):163-186.
    I join the growing ranks of theorists who reject the terms of traditional debates about the nature of emotion, debates that have long focused on the question of whether emotions should be understood as either cognitive or somatic kinds of states. Here, I propose and defend a way of incorporating both into a single theory, which I label the “Integrated Representational Theory” of emotion. In Section 2 I begin to construct the theory, defining and explaining emotions in terms of three (...)
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  8. Wittgenstein and Peirce on Inner Experience.Rosa M. Calcaterra - 2005 - The Commens Encyclopedia: The Digital Encyclopedia of Peirce Studies.
    This essay surveys and critically discusses the anti-cartesian approach of both Peirce and Wittgenstein to the problem of private experiences, bringing to light the affinity of their own usage of the notion of “outward criteria”, that both introduce as alternative to the traditional logical principle of introspection. In particular, are taken in consideration the treatment of sensation language in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and Peirce’s critique of introspective method as a means for knowledge of so called “inner world”, in an attempt (...)
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  9. How Emotions Do Not Provide Reasons to Act.Mary Carman - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-20.
    If emotions provide reasons for action through their intentional content, as is often argued, where does this leave the role of the affective element of an emotion? Can it be more than a motivator and have significant bearing of its own on our emotional actions, as actions done for reasons? One way it can is through reinforcing other reasons that we might have, as Greenspan argues. Central to Greenspan’s account is the claim that the affective discomfort of an emotion, as (...)
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  10. Emotionally Guiding Our Actions.Mary Carman - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):43-64.
    If emotions have a rational role in action, then one challenge for accounting for how we can act rationally when acting emotionally is to show how we can guide our actions by our emotional considerations, seen as reasons. In this paper, I put forward a novel proposal for how this can be so. Drawing on the interconnection between emotions, cares and caring, I argue that, as the emotional agent is a caring agent, she can be aware of the emotional consideration (...)
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  11. Appraising Valence.Giovanna Colombetti - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):8-10.
    ‘Valence’ is used in many different ways in emotion theory. It generally refers to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of an emotion, as well as to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of some aspect of emotion. After reviewing these different uses, I point to the conceptual problems that come with them. In particular, I dis- tinguish: problems that arise from conflating the valence of an emotion with the valence of its aspects, and problems that arise from the very idea that (...)
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  12. Scaffoldings of the Affective Mind.Giovanna Colombetti & Joel Krueger - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1157-1176.
    In this paper we adopt Sterelny's framework of the scaffolded mind, and his related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the extended-mind view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines, and develop phenomenological (...)
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  13. Is the Paradox of Fiction Soluble in Psychology?Florian Cova & Fabrice Teroni - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):930-942.
    If feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox of fiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more frequent for scholars to try (...)
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  14. Le paradoxe de la fiction: le retour.Florian Cova & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - L'expression des Émotions: Mélanges En l'Honneur de Patrizia Lombardo.
    Tullmann et Buckwalter (2014) ont récemment soutenu que le paradoxe de la fiction tenait plus de l’illusion que de la réalité. D’après eux, les théories contemporaines des émotions ne fourniraient aucune raison d’adopter une interprétation du terme « existence » qui rende les prémisses du paradoxe incompatibles entre elles. Notre discussion a pour but de contester cette manière de dissoudre le paradoxe de la fiction en montrant qu’il ne prend pas sa source dans les théories contemporaines des émotions. Bien plutôt, (...)
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  15. Great Anger.Anthony Cunningham - 2005 - The Dalhousie Review 85 (3).
    Anger has an undeniable hand in human suffering and horrific deeds. Various schools of thought call for eliminating or moderating the capacity for anger. I argue that the capacity for anger, like the capacity for grief, is at the heart of our humanity.
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  16. Once More with Feeling: The Role of Emotion in Self-Deception.Tim Dalgleish - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):110-111.
    In an analysis of the role of emotion in self-deception is presented. It is argued that instances of emotional self-deception unproblematically meet Mele's jointly sufficient criteria. It is further proposed that a consideration of different forms of mental representation allows the possibility of instances of self-deception in which contradictory beliefs (in the form p and ~p) are held simultaneously with full awareness.
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  17. Gefühle.Eva-Maria Engelen - 2007 - Reclam.
    Nach Erläuterung der wesentlichen Begriffe wie „Emotion“ und „Gefühl“ stellt Eva-Maria Engelen die wichtigsten theoretischen Ansätze vor. Dabei spielen sowohl Theorien aus der Philosophie, der Psychologie als auch aus den Neurowissenschaften eine wichtige Rolle. Geklärt wird in weiteren Kapiteln das Verhältnis von Gefühlen und Emotionen zum Verstand, zum Bewusstsein und zu Werten.
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  18. Facts and Values in Emotional Plasticity.Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet - 2008 - In Louis Charland & Peter Zachar (eds.), Fact and Value in Emotion; Consciousness and Emotion Book Series. John Benjamins. pp. 101--137.
    How much can we shape the emotions we experience? Or to put it another way, how plastic are our emotions? It is clear that the exercise of identifying the degree of plasticity of emotion is futile without a prior specification of what can be plastic, so we first propose an analysis of the components of emotions. We will then turn to empirical data that might be used to assess the degree of plasticity of emotions.
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  19. Cognitive Pleasure and Distress.Irwin Goldstein - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.
    Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".
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  20. The Passivity of Emotions.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (July):339-60.
  21. Proceedings of the Conference “Emotions, Others and the Self”.Y. Gustafsson, L. Hertzberg, T. Kettunen, C. Kronqvist & M. McEachrane (eds.) - 2005 - Åbo Akademi University.
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  22. Emotion and Memory: The Second Cognitive Revolution.Rom Harré - 1994 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 37:25-.
  23. Direction, Causation, and Appraisal Theories of Emotion.Larry A. Herzberg - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):167 – 186.
    Appraisal theories of emotion generally presuppose that emotions are “directed at” various items. They also hold that emotions have motivational properties. However, although it coheres well with their views, they have yet to seriously develop the idea that the function of emotional direction is to guide those properties. I argue that this “guidance hypothesis” can open up a promising new field of research in emotion theory. But I also argue that before appraisal theorists can take full advantage of it, they (...)
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  24. Looking Into Meta-Emotions.Christoph Jäger & Eva Bänninger-Huber - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):787-811.
    There are many psychic mechanisms by which people engage with their selves. We argue that an important yet hitherto neglected one is self-appraisal via meta-emotions. We discuss the intentional structure of meta-emotions and explore the phenomenology of a variety of examples. We then present a pilot study providing preliminary evidence that some facial displays may indicate the presence of meta-emotions. We conclude by arguing that meta-emotions have an important role to play in higher-order theories of psychic harmony.
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  25. Real Context and the Emotional A Priori.Adam Knowles - 2010 - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 31 (2):265-280.
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  26. Emotional Ambivalence.Philip J. Koch - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (2):257-279.
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  27. « Beau À Vomir »: L’Écœurement Devant la Beauté Physique.Anita Konzelmann Ziv - 2011 - In Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Les ombres de l’âme: Penser les émotions négatives. Haller.
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  28. Dewey's Rejection of the Emotion/Expression Distinction.Joel Krueger - 2014 - In Tibor Solymosi & John Shook (eds.), Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy and Pragmatism: Understanding Brains at Work in the World. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 140-161.
  29. Emotions and the Social Niche.Joel Krueger - 2014 - In Christian von Scheve & Mikko Salmela (eds.), Collective Emotions. Oxford University Press. pp. 156-171.
  30. Varieties of Extended Emotions.Joel Krueger - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):533-555.
    I offer a preliminary defense of the hypothesis of extended emotions (HEE). After discussing some taxonomic considerations, I specify two ways of parsing HEE: the hypothesis of bodily extended emotions (HEBE), and the hypothesis of environmentally extended emotions (HEEE). I argue that, while both HEBE and HEEE are empirically plausible, only HEEE covers instances of genuinely extended emotions. After introducing some further distinctions, I support one form of HEEE by appealing to different streams of empirical research—particularly work on music and (...)
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  31. Extended Emotions.Joel Krueger & Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):863-878.
    Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brain- and body-bound affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A rapidly growing body of work suggests that some emotions incorporate external resources and thus extend beyond the neurophysiological confines of organisms; some even argue that emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended emotions thesis. In this article, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in philosophy, psychology, and the (...)
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  32. Emotion Experience, Rational Action, and Self-Knowledge.John A. Lambie - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):272-280.
    This article examines the role of emotion experience in both rational action and self-knowledge. A key distinction is made between emotion experiences of which we are unaware, and those of which we are aware. The former motivate action and color our view of the world, but they do not do so in a rational way, and their nonreflective nature obscures self-understanding. The article provides arguments and evidence to support the view that emotion experiences contribute to rational action only if one (...)
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  33. Simulation, Theory, and Emotion.M. Lebar - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):423 – 434.
    It seems that in interpreting others we sometimes simulate, sometimes apply theory. Josef Perner has suggested that a fruitful line of inquiry in folk psychology would seek "criteria for problems where we have to use simulation from those where we do without or where it is even impossible to use." In this paper I follow Perner with a suggestion that our understanding of our interpretive processes may benefit from considering their physiological bases. In particular, I claim that it may be (...)
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  34. Nazism, Nationalism, and the Sociology of Emotions: Escape From Freedom Revisited.Neil McLaughlin - 1996 - Sociological Theory 14 (3):241-261.
    The recent worldwide resurgence of militant nationalism, fundamentalist intolerance and right-wing authoritarianism has again put the issues of violence and xenophobia at the center of social science research and theory. German psychoanalyst and sociologist Erich Fromm's work provides a useful theoretical microfoundation for contemporary work on nationalism, the politics of identity, and the roots of war and violence. Fromm's analysis of Nasism in Escape from Freedom (1941), in particular, outlines a compelling theory of irrationality, and his later writings on nationalism (...)
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  35. How to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.
    It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...)
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  36. Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion.Goldie Peter (ed.) - 2010
  37. The Sudden, the Sudded, and the Sidesplitting.Karl Pfeifer - 1995 - In Culture and Value: Philosophy and the Cultural Sciences (Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Vol. 3, 1995). Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 224-232.
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  38. Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, by Michael S. Brady.Carolyn Price - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1240-1244.
    A review of Michael Brady's book Emotional Insight.
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  39. Understanding the Dimensional Nature of Alexithymia.Jennifer Primmer - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (9-10):9-10.
    In this paper, I explore how best to conceptualize the nature of alexithymia. I argue that the condition is best understood as a dimensional construct; as such, it is likely that there exist various degrees of alexithymia. Moreover, I explore the merits of two analogies that others have used to try to understand the nature of alexithymia: one characterizes the condition as an analogue of associative visual object agnosia, and the other characterizes it as the emotional equivalent of blindsight. I (...)
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  40. Ambivalence: A Philosophical Exploration.Hili Razinsky - 2016 - Rowman & Littlefield International.
    Ambivalence (as in practical conflicts, moral dilemmas, conflicting beliefs, and mixed feelings) is a central phenomenon of human life. Yet ambivalence is incompatible with entrenched philosophical conceptions of personhood, judgement, and action, and is denied or marginalised by thinkers of diverse concerns. This book takes a radical new stance, bringing the study of core philosophical issues together with that of ambivalence. The book proposes new accounts in several areas – including subjectivity, consciousness, rationality, and value – while elucidating a wide (...)
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  41. What is a Definition of Emotion? And Are Emotions Mental-Behavioral Processes?Rainer Reisenzein - 2007 - Social Science Information 7 (3):26-29.
    [I argue that a precise definition of emotions is neither necessary nor possible prior to empirical research on emotions. It is not necessary because all that is needed for for fruitful research and successful communication is a working definition of emotions, a description that allows to roughly demarcate the class of emotions. It is not possible because precise emotion definitions are real definitions, empirical claims about the essence of emotions. These claims about the nature of emotion are always formulated against (...)
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  42. Language and Emotion From the Perspective of the Computational Belief-Desire Theory of Emotion.Rainer Reisenzein & Martin Junge - 2012 - In Emiliano Lorini & Andreas Herzig (eds.), Dynamicity in Emotion Concepts. Springer Verlag.
    The relationship between language and emotion is discussed from the perspective of CBDTE, a computational (C) explication of the belief-desire theory of emotion (BDTE). Three claims are defended: First, natural language, humans’ main medium of communication, plays a highly important role in the process of emotion generation; second, natural language is of central importance for the communication of emotions and emotion-related information; third, a language of thought (a language-like mental representation system) is required to explain human emotions.
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  43. Navigating The Social Sciences: A Theory For The Meta–History Of Emotions.James Smith Allen - 2003 - History and Theory 42 (1):82-93.
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  44. How Much Should We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?Aaron Smuts - manuscript
    It is widely assumed that we can meaningfully talk about emotional reactions as being appropriate or inappropriate. Much of the discussion has focused on one kind of appropriateness, that of fittingness. An emotional response is appropriate only if it fits its object. For instance, fear only fits dangerous things. There is another dimension of appropriateness that has been relatively ignored — proportionality. For an emotional reaction to be appropriate not only must the object fit, the reaction should be of the (...)
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  45. Emotional Truth.Ronald De Sousa & Adam Morton - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76:247-275.
    [Ronald de Sousa] Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like (...)
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  46. Existentielle Gefühle und Emotionen: Intentionalität und Regulierbarkeit.Achim Stephan - 2012 - In Sabine Marienberg & Jörg Fingerhut (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter. pp. 8--101.
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  47. La vertu.Christine Tappolet - forthcoming - In Emma Dayer-Tieffenbach & Julien Deonna (eds.), Dictionnaire des valeurs. Edition d’Ithaque.
    I argue on the basis of a discussion of Aristotelian and Humean accounts of virtue that virtue is fundamentally a disposition to undergo appropriate emotions.
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  48. Robert C. Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology.Christine Tappolet - 2006 - Ethics 117 (1):143-147.
    A critical review of Robert C. Roberts' "Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology", Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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  49. Emotionally Charged: The Puzzle of Affective Valence.Fabrice Teroni - forthcoming - In Fabrice Teroni, Christine Tappolet & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Shadows of the Souls: Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions. New York, USA: Routledge.
  50. Emotions, Me, Myself and I.Fabrice Teroni - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):433-451.
    We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a subject and her emotions. But how intimate is the relation between emotions and the self? I first explain why interesting claims about this relation must locate it at the level of emotional intentionality. Given that emotions have a complex intentional structure – they (...)
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