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  1. Manipulation, Responsibility and Rights.David Alm - 2013 - Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (1-2):1-15.
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  2. A Legal Right to Do Legal Wrong.Ori J. Herstein - 2013 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1):gqt022.
    The literature, as are the intuitions of many, is sceptical as to the coherence of ‘legal rights to do legal wrong’. A right to do wrong is a right against interference with wrongdoing. A legal right to do legal wrong is, therefore, a right against legal enforcement of legal duty. It is, in other words, a right that shields the right holder’s legal wrongdoing. The sceptics notwithstanding, the category of ‘legal right to do legal wrong’ coheres with the concepts of (...)
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  3. Defending the Right To Do Wrong.Ori J. Herstein - 2012 - Law and Philosophy 31 (3):343-365.
    Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition (...)
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  4. Review of Hauke Brunkhorst, Habermas. [REVIEW]Marco Solinas - 2009 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica (56):253-254.
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  5. Mercy, Retributivism, and Harsh Punishment.Stephen Kershnar - 2000 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (2):209-224.
    In this article I argue that mercy does not prevent the imposition of harsh punishment from being morally permissible. This article has two parts. In the first part, I argue that mercy is an imperfect duty, because only such a duty-type explains the attributes that are commonly ascribed to mercy. In the second part, I argue that mercy does not present a sufficient moral reason against the regular imposition of harsh punishment because it neither undermines nor systematically overrides or weakens (...)
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