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  1. Fodor's Asymmetrical Causal Dependency Theory of Meaning.Frederick R. Adams - unknown
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  2. Disjunction and Distality: The Hard Problem for Purely Probabilistic Causal Theories of Mental Content.William Roche & Elliott Sober - forthcoming - Synthese:1-34.
    The disjunction problem and the distality problem each presents a challenge that any theory of mental content must address. Here we consider their bearing on purely probabilistic causal theories. In addition to considering these problems separately, we consider a third challenge—that a theory must solve both. We call this “the hard problem.” We consider 8 basic ppc theories along with 240 hybrids of them, and show that some can handle the disjunction problem and some can handle the distality problem, but (...)
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  3. Foundation for a Realist Ontology of Cognitive Processes.David Kasmier, David Limbaugh & Barry Smith - 2019 - In Proceedings of the International Conference on Biomedical Ontology (ICBO), University at Buffalo, NY.
    What follows is a first step towards an ontology of conscious mental processes. We provide a theoretical foundation and characterization of conscious mental processes based on a realist theory of intentionality and using BFO as our top-level ontology. We distinguish three components of intentional mental process: character, directedness, and objective referent, and describe several features of the process character and directedness significant to defining and classifying mental processes. We arrive at the definition of representational mental process as a process that (...)
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  4. Perceptual Particularity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):25-54.
    Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? I address this question by exploring the fundamental nature of perceptual experience. I argue that perceptual states are constituted by particulars and discuss epistemic, ontological, psychologistic, and semantic approaches to account for perceptual particularity.
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  5. Liberal Naturalism and Second-Personal Space: A Neo-Pragmatist Response to “The Natural Origins of Content”.David Macarthur - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):565-578.
    Reviewing the state of play in the attempt to naturalise content a quarter of a century after John Haugeland’s survey paper “The Intentionality All-Stars”, Dan Hutto and Glenda Satne propose a new naturalistic account of content that supposedly synthesizes what is best in the three failed programs of neo-Cartesianism, neo-Behaviourism and neo-Pragmatism. They propose to appeal to a Relaxed Naturalism, a non-reductive genealogical form of explanation and a primitive notion of contentless ur-intentionality. In this paper I argue that the authors’ (...)
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  6. Placement, Grounding, and Mental Content.Kelly Trogdon - 2015 - In C. Daly (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on Philosophical Methods. New York, NY, USA: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 481-496.
    Grounding-theoretic reformulation of Fodor's theory of content that addresses recalcitrant Quinean concerns.
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  7. Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.
    This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories over tracking theories.
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  8. Two Notions of Mental Representation.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 161-179.
    The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.
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  9. Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.
    It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.
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  10. Fodor on Causes of Mentalese Symbols.Erdinç Sayan & Tevfik Aytekin - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):3-15.
    Jerry Fodor’s causal theory of content is a well-known naturalistic attempt purporting to show that Brentano was wrong in supposing that physical states cannot possess meaning and reference. Fodor’s theory contains two crucial elements: one is a notion of “asymmetric dependence between nomic relations,” and the other is an assumption about the nature of the “causally operative properties” involved in the causation of mental tokens. Having dealt elsewhere with the problems Fodor’s notion of asymmetric dependence poses, we show in this (...)
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  11. Fodor on Causes of Mentalese Symbols.Tevfik Aytekin–Erdinç Sayan - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):3-15.
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  12. Has Mentalese Earned Its Keep? On Jerry Fodor's LOT 2. [REVIEW]Jesse Prinz - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):485-501.
  13. Misrepresentation and Robustness of Meaning.Erdinç Sayan & Tevfik Aytekin - 2010 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (1):21-38.
    According to Fodor, robustness of meaning is an essential aspect of intentionality, and his causal theory of content can account for it. Robustness of meaning refers to the fact that tokenings of a symbol are occasionally caused by instantiations of properties which are not expressed by the symbol. This, according to Fodor, is the source of the phenomenon of misrepresentation. We claim that Fodor’s treatment of content and misrepresentation is infected with a couple of flaws. After criticizing Fodor’s theory of (...)
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  14. Why Fodor’s Theory of Concepts Fails.Jussi Jylkkä - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):25-46.
    Fodor’s theory of concepts holds that the psychological capacities, beliefs or intentions which determine how we use concepts do not determine reference. Instead, causal relations of a specific kind between properties and our dispositions to token a concept are claimed to do so. Fodor does admit that there needs to be some psychological mechanisms mediating the property–concept tokening relations, but argues that they are purely accidental for reference. In contrast, I argue that the actual mechanisms that sustain the reference determining (...)
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  15. Problems of Representation II: Naturalizing Content.Dan Ryder - 2009 - In Francisco Garzon & John Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
    John is currently thinking that the sun is bright. Consider his occurrent belief or judgement that the sun is bright. Its content is that the sun is bright. This is a truth- evaluable content (which shall be our main concern) because it is capable of being true or false. In virtue of what natural, scientifically accessible facts does John’s judgement have this content? To give the correct answer to that question, and to explain why John’s judgement and other contentful mental (...)
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  16. Consuelo Preti–Victor Velarde-Mayol: Fodor.Přeložil Martin - 2007 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (3):399-402.
  17. La crítica de Putnam a la noción de "referencia" en Fodor.Lisardo San Bruno de la Cruz - 2006 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 39 (2):93-109.
    El presente artículo expone la crítica de Putnam sobre la noción de "referencia" en Fodor. Tal noción supone analizar el uso de condicionales contrafácticos y el uso de relaciones de dependencia asimétrica que realiza Fodor en Psico-semántica. De acuerdo con la concepción de Putnam, lo que se propone Fodor es naturalizar el discurso semántico-intencional; esto es, de lo que se trata es de ofrecer una reducción de la relación de referencia que no recurra a términos semántico-intencionales. Putnam concluye que no (...)
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  18. From Metaphysical to Substantive Naturalism: A Case Study.J. L. Dowell - 2004 - Synthese 138 (2):149-173.
    This paper addresses two related questions. First, what is involved in giving a distinctively realist and naturalist construal of an area of discourse, that is, in so much as stating a distinctively realist and naturalist position about, for example, content or value? I defend a condition that guarantees the realism and naturalism of any position satisfying it, at least in the case of positions on content, but perhaps in other cases as well. Second, what sorts of considerations render a distinctively (...)
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  19. Mentalese Semantics and the Naturalized Mind.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):77-94.
    In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, (...)
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  20. A Dilemma for Asymmetric Dependence.Joseph Mendola - 2003 - Noûs 37 (2):232-257.
    Accounts of mental content rooted in asymmetric dependence hold, crudely speaking, that the content of a mental representation is the cause of that representation on which all its other causes depend.1 To speak somewhat less crudely, such accounts, hereafter.
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  21. Locking on to the Language of Thought.Christopher D. Viger - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):203-215.
    I demonstrate that locking on, a key notion in Jerry Fodor's most recent theory of content, supplemented informational atomism (SIA), is cashed out in terms of asymmetric dependence, the central notion in his earlier theory of content. I use this result to argue that SIA is incompatible with the language of thought hypothesis because the constraints on the causal relations into which symbols can enter imposed by the theory of content preclude the causal relations needed between symbols for them to (...)
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  22. Asymmetry in Action.William Fish - 2000 - Ratio 13 (2):138-145.
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  23. Dispositions Indisposed: Semantic Atomism and Fodor’s Theory of Content.Robert D. Rupert - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):325-349.
    According to Jerry Fodor’s atomistic theory of content, subjects’ dispositions to token mentalese terms in counterfactual circumstances fix the contents of those terms. I argue that the pattern of counterfactual tokenings alone does not satisfactorily fix content; if Fodor’s appeal to patterns of counterfactual tokenings has any chance of assigning correct extensions, Fodor must take into account the contents of subjects’ various mental states at the times of those tokenings. However, to do so, Fodor must abandon his semantic atomism. And (...)
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  24. Fodor's Attempt to Naturalize Mental Content.M. J. Cain - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):520-526.
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  25. Content Naturalized.Luciano B. Mariano - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 96 (2):205-238.
  26. A Process Model of the Emergence of Representation.Mark H. Bickhard - 1998 - In G. L. Farre & T. Oksala (eds.), Emergence, Complexity, Hierarchy, Organization, Selected and Edited Papers From the Echo Iii Conference. Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica. pp. 3-7.
    Two challenges to the very possibility of emergence are addressed, one metaphysical and one logical. The resolution of the metaphysical challenge requires a shift to a process metaphysics, while the logical challenge highlights normative emergence, and requires a shift to more powerful logical tools -- in particular, that of implicit definition. Within the framework of a process metaphysics, two levels of normative emergence are outlined: that of function and that of representation.
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  27. The Referential and the Logical Component in Fodor's Semantics.Paolo Casalegno - 1998 - Dialectica 52 (4):339–363.
  28. Emergence, Complexity, Hierarchy, Organization, Selected and Edited Papers From the ECHO III Conference.G. L. Farre & T. Oksala (eds.) - 1998 - Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica.
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  29. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
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  30. Asymmetrical Dependence Between Causal Laws Does Not Account for Meaning.Alberto Voltolini - 1998 - In V. Abrusci (ed.), Prospettive della Logica e della Filosofia della scienza. ETS. pp. 307-316.
    In (1990), Jerry Fodor has defended a naturalized conception of meaning for Mentalese expressions which relies on the notion of asymmetric dependence. According to this conception, any naturalized theory of meaning must be able to account for the fact that meaning is robust, namely that any token of a certain Mentalese expression “x” retains the expression’s meaning, X, for any Y (≠ X) which happens to cause it. Now, this robustness of “x”‘s meaning can precisely be explained in terms of (...)
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  31. Fodor’s Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
    In “A Theory of Content, 11: The Theory,” Jerry Fodor presents two reasons why his asymmetric causal dependency theory does not lead to the conclusion that syntactic items “X” mean proximal sensory stimulations, rather than distal environmental objects. Here we challenge Fodor’s reasoning.
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  32. Fodor’s Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
    In “A Theory of Content, 11: The Theory,” Jerry Fodor presents two reasons why his asymmetric causal dependency theory does not lead to the conclusion that syntactic items “X” mean proximal sensory stimulations, rather than distal environmental objects. Here we challenge Fodor’s reasoning.
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  33. Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content?Murat Aydede - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-458.
    In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself has previously never appealed to (...)
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  34. Fodor's New Theory of Content and Computation.Andrew Brook & Robert J. Stainton - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):459-474.
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  35. Fodor's Information Semantics Between Naturalism and Mentalism.Theo C. Meyering - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):187-207.
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  36. Adams, Frederick and Kenneth Aizawa Fodor's Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections Allen, Robert F.Moral Obligation, Projecting Political Correctness & Is Smith Obligated That She - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35.
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  37. Content and Computation: Chasing the Arrows A Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's The Elm and the Expert.Gabriel M. A. Segal - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):490-501.
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  38. Content and Computation: Chasing the Arrows A Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's The Elm and the Expert.Gabriel M. A. Segal - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):490–501.
  39. Asymmetric Dependencies, Ideal Conditions, and Meaning.Martha Gibson - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):235-59.
    Jerry Fodor has proposed a causal theory of meaning based on the notion of a certain asymmetric dependency between the causes of a symbol's tokens. This theory is held to be an improvement on Dennis Stampe's causal theory of meaning and Fred Dretske's information theoretic account, because it allegedly solves what Fodor calls the “disjunction problem”, and does so without recourse to the kind of optimal (ideal) conditions to which Stampe and Dretske appeal. A series of counterexamples is proposed to (...)
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  40. The Elm and the Expert. Mentalese and its Semantics By Jerry A. Fodor MIT Press, 1994, Pp. Xiv+129, £15.95.Samuel Guttenplan - 1995 - Philosophy 70 (272):293-.
  41. Is Meaning Without Actually Existing Reference Naturalizable?Alberto Voltolini - 1995 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 50 (1):397-414.
    According to Jerry Fodor, meaningful expressions denoting no actual entity, like „unicom", do not constitute an exception to his project of semantic naturalization based on the notion of asymmetrical dependence between causal relations. But Fodor does not give any principled reason in order to show that, say, a non-unicom caused "unicom"-token means UNICORN, as he on the contrary does regarding a non-X caused "X"-token for any existing X. Nevertheless, his claim that one such expression has a mere denotational meaning can (...)
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  42. Asymmetric Dependence, Representation, and Cognitive Science.Charles Wallis - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):373-401.
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  43. 'X' Means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics. [REVIEW]Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-31.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield (...)
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  44. Fodorian Semantics. Adams, Frederick & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - In Steven Stich & Ted Warfield (eds.), Mental Representation. Blackwell.
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  45. L'impossible naturalisme de la psychosémantique de Fodor.De Stefaan E. Cuypers - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3‐4):231-248.
    RésuméDans A Theory of Content Jerry Fodor fait déboucher sa théorie représentationnelle de l'esprit sur une psychosémantique physicaliste et atomiste. Cette théorie externaliste de la signification –the Asymmetric Dependency Theory– fournit une solution entièrement naturalisée au second problème de Brentano, c'est‐à‐dire celui de l'objet référentiel. En m'appuyant sur le réalisme interne de Hilary Putnam, je critique deux éléments essentiels de la solution proposée par Fodor, à savoir la relation de dépendance asymétrique et l'individuation des objets de la référence. Cette critique (...)
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  46. The Impossibility of Fodor Naturalized Psychosemantics.Se Cuypers - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3-4):231-248.
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  47. Analyomen 1.Antoni Gomila - 1994 - Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  48. Punctuate Minds and Fodor's Theory of Content.Antoni Gomila - 1994 - In Ulla Wessels & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyomen 1. Hawthorne: De Gruyter. pp. 605-611.
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  49. Mental Representation.Steven Stich & Ted Warfield (eds.) - 1994 - Blackwell.
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  50. Fodorian Semantics: A Reply to Adams and Aizawa. [REVIEW]Ted A. Warfield - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):205-14.
    In a recent article in this journal (Adams and Aizawa 1992), Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa argued that Jerry Fodor's proposed naturalistic sufficient condition for meaning is unsatisfactory. In this paper, I respond to Adams and Aizawa, noting that (1) they have overestimated the importance of their “pathologies” objection, perhaps as a consequence of misunderstanding Fodor's asymmetric dependency condition, (2) they have misunderstood Fodor's asymmetric dependency condition in formulating their Twin Earth objection, and (3) they have, in addition to under (...)
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