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  1. added 2018-02-17
    Content Naturalized.Luciano B. Mariano - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 96 (2):205-238.
  2. added 2018-02-16
    Why Fodor’s Theory of Concepts Fails.Jussi Jylkkä - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):25-46.
    Fodor’s theory of concepts holds that the psychological capacities, beliefs or intentions which determine how we use concepts do not determine reference. Instead, causal relations of a specific kind between properties and our dispositions to token a concept are claimed to do so. Fodor does admit that there needs to be some psychological mechanisms mediating the property–concept tokening relations, but argues that they are purely accidental for reference. In contrast, I argue that the actual mechanisms that sustain the reference determining (...)
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  3. added 2017-02-12
    Fodor on Causes of Mentalese Symbols.Tevfik Aytekin–Erdinç Sayan - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):3-15.
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  4. added 2017-02-12
    Consuelo Preti–Victor Velarde-Mayol: Fodor.Přeložil Martin - 2007 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (3):399-402.
  5. added 2017-02-08
    Has Mentalese Earned Its Keep? On Jerry Fodor's LOT 2. [REVIEW]Jesse Prinz - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):485-501.
  6. added 2017-02-07
    The Elm and the Expert. Mentalese and its Semantics By Jerry A. Fodor MIT Press, 1994, Pp. Xiv+129, £15.95.Samuel Guttenplan - 1995 - Philosophy 70 (272):293-.
  7. added 2017-02-01
    The Referential and the Logical Component in Fodor's Semantics.Paolo Casalegno - 1998 - Dialectica 52 (4):339–363.
  8. added 2017-01-28
    Naturalizing Semantics: Fodor and Dretske on the Content of Psychological States.Carol Winifred Slater - 1990 - Dissertation, Michigan State University
    Both Jerry Fodor and Fred Dretske have proposed that representational states of systems can have intrinsic content by virtue of their participation in law-governed or otherwise reliable relations with the world. Fodor suggests that the relevant relations are synchronic--asymmetric causal dependencies; Dretske invokes instead a genetic account of information-processing functions. I argue that neither proposal lives up to its author's hopes. Dretske's notion of functional meaning does not succeed in carrying us from purely objective or "natural" relations to the kind (...)
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  9. added 2017-01-27
    Fodor on Causes of Mentalese Symbols.Erdinç Sayan & Tevfik Aytekin - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):3-15.
    Jerry Fodor’s causal theory of content is a well-known naturalistic attempt purporting to show that Brentano was wrong in supposing that physical states cannot possess meaning and reference. Fodor’s theory contains two crucial elements: one is a notion of “asymmetric dependence between nomic relations,” and the other is an assumption about the nature of the “causally operative properties” involved in the causation of mental tokens. Having dealt elsewhere with the problems Fodor’s notion of asymmetric dependence poses, we show in this (...)
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  10. added 2017-01-19
    Content and Computation: Chasing the Arrowsa Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's the Elm and the Expert.Gabriel M. A. Segal - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):490–501.
  11. added 2017-01-15
    Content and Computation: Chasing the Arrows A Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's The Elm and the Expert.Gabriel M. A. Segal - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):490-501.
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  12. added 2017-01-15
    Fodor's New Theory of Content and Computation.Andrew Brook & Robert J. Stainton - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):459-474.
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  13. added 2016-12-08
    Perceptual Particularity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):25-54.
    Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? I address this question by exploring the fundamental nature of perceptual experience. I argue that perceptual states are constituted by particulars and discuss epistemic, ontological, psychologistic, and semantic approaches to account for perceptual particularity.
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  14. added 2016-07-19
    Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content?Murat Aydede - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-458.
    In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself has previously never appealed to (...)
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  15. added 2016-05-05
    From Metaphysical to Substantive Naturalism: A Case Study.Janice Dowell, J. L. - 2004 - Synthese 138 (2):149-173.
    This paper addresses two related questions. First, what is involved in giving a distinctively realist and naturalist construal of an area of discourse, that is, in so much as stating a distinctively realist and naturalist position about, for example, content or value? I defend a condition that guarantees the realism and naturalism of any position satisfying it, at least in the case of positions on content, but perhaps in other cases as well. Second, what sorts of considerations render a distinctively (...)
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  16. added 2015-09-08
    Liberal Naturalism and Second-Personal Space: A Neo-Pragmatist Response to “The Natural Origins of Content”.David Macarthur - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):565-578.
    Reviewing the state of play in the attempt to naturalise content a quarter of a century after John Haugeland’s survey paper “The Intentionality All-Stars”, Dan Hutto and Glenda Satne propose a new naturalistic account of content that supposedly synthesizes what is best in the three failed programs of neo-Cartesianism, neo-Behaviourism and neo-Pragmatism. They propose to appeal to a Relaxed Naturalism, a non-reductive genealogical form of explanation and a primitive notion of contentless ur-intentionality. In this paper I argue that the authors’ (...)
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  17. added 2015-04-05
    Jerry Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays. [REVIEW]William Seager - 1991 - Philosophy in Review 11:316-318.
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  18. added 2015-03-27
    Misrepresentation and Robustness of Meaning.Erdinç Sayan & Tevfik Aytekin - 2010 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (1):21-38.
    According to Fodor, robustness of meaning is an essential aspect of intentionality, and his causal theory of content can account for it. Robustness of meaning refers to the fact that tokenings of a symbol are occasionally caused by instantiations of properties which are not expressed by the symbol. This, according to Fodor, is the source of the phenomenon of misrepresentation. We claim that Fodor’s treatment of content and misrepresentation is infected with a couple of flaws. After criticizing Fodor’s theory of (...)
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  19. added 2015-03-24
    Adams, Frederick and Kenneth Aizawa Fodor's Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections Allen, Robert F.Moral Obligation, Projecting Political Correctness & Is Smith Obligated That She - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35.
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  20. added 2015-03-24
    The Impossibility of Fodor Naturalized Psychosemantics.Se Cuypers - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3-4):231-248.
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  21. added 2015-03-23
    Is Meaning Without Actually Existing Reference Naturalizable?Alberto Voltolini - 1995 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 50:397-414.
    According to Jerry Fodor, meaningful expressions denoting no actual entity, like „unicom", do not constitute an exception to his project of semantic naturalization based on the notion of asymmetrical dependence between causal relations. But Fodor does not give any principled reason in order to show that, say, a non-unicom caused "unicom"-token means UNICORN, as he on the contrary does regarding a non-X caused "X"-token for any existing X. Nevertheless, his claim that one such expression has a mere denotational meaning can (...)
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  22. added 2015-03-23
    Jerry Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays Reviewed By.William Seager - 1991 - Philosophy in Review 11 (5):316-318.
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  23. added 2015-03-22
    Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics.Harold Noonan - 1992 - Philosophical Books 33 (4):232-234.
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  24. added 2015-03-21
    La crítica de Putnam a la noción de "referencia" en Fodor.Lisardo San Bruno de la Cruz - 2006 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 39 (2):93-109.
    El presente artículo expone la crítica de Putnam sobre la noción de "referencia" en Fodor. Tal noción supone analizar el uso de condicionales contrafácticos y el uso de relaciones de dependencia asimétrica que realiza Fodor en Psico-semántica. De acuerdo con la concepción de Putnam, lo que se propone Fodor es naturalizar el discurso semántico-intencional; esto es, de lo que se trata es de ofrecer una reducción de la relación de referencia que no recurra a términos semántico-intencionales. Putnam concluye que no (...)
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  25. added 2015-03-21
    L'impossible naturalisme de la psychosémantique de Fodor.De Stefaan E. Cuypers - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3‐4):231-248.
    RésuméDans A Theory of Content Jerry Fodor fait déboucher sa théorie représentationnelle de l'esprit sur une psychosémantique physicaliste et atomiste. Cette théorie externaliste de la signification –the Asymmetric Dependency Theory– fournit une solution entièrement naturalisée au second problème de Brentano, c'est‐à‐dire celui de l'objet référentiel. En m'appuyant sur le réalisme interne de Hilary Putnam, je critique deux éléments essentiels de la solution proposée par Fodor, à savoir la relation de dépendance asymétrique et l'individuation des objets de la référence. Cette critique (...)
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  26. added 2015-03-20
    Fodor's Causal Theory of Representation.Hans-Robert Cram - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):56 - 70.
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  27. added 2014-10-31
    Placement, Grounding, and Mental Content.Kelly Trogdon - 2015 - In C. Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook on Philosophical Methods. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 481-496.
    One central issue concerning philosophical methodology is this: what concepts should go into our philosophical toolbox? That is to say, what notions are appropriate to rely on in doing philosophy? This issue is relevant not only to how we should go about addressing philosophical problems but also how we’re to formulate those problems in the first place. There is a burgeoning literature on the notion of grounding. I’m a proponent of grounding – I think the notion of grounding is coherent (...)
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  28. added 2014-04-02
    Asymmetric Dependence, Representation, and Cognitive Science.Charles Wallis - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):373-401.
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  29. added 2014-04-02
    Narrow Content, Context of Thought, and Asymmetric Dependence.Paul Bernier - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):327-42.
  30. added 2014-04-02
    Some Problems for Fodor's Theory of Content.Erik Myin - 1992 - Philosophica 50 (2):101-122.
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  31. added 2014-03-31
    Fodor's Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
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  32. added 2014-03-31
    Robustness Without Asymmetry: A Flaw in Fodor's Theory of Content. [REVIEW]Pat A. Manfredi & Donna M. Summerfield - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 66 (3):261-83.
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  33. added 2014-03-30
    Fodor's Theory of Content: Problems and Objections.William E. Seager - 1993 - Phiosophy of Science 60 (2):262-77.
    Jerry Fodor has recently proposed a new entry into the list of information based approaches to semantic content aimed at explicating the general notion of representation for both mental states and linguistic tokens. The basic idea is that a token means what causes its production. The burden of the theory is to select the proper cause from the sea of causal influences which aid in generating any token while at the same time avoiding the absurdity of everything's being literally meaningful (...)
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  34. added 2014-03-29
    Asymmetric Dependencies, Ideal Conditions, and Meaning.Martha Gibson - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):235-59.
    Jerry Fodor has proposed a causal theory of meaning based on the notion of a certain asymmetric dependency between the causes of a symbol's tokens. This theory is held to be an improvement on Dennis Stampe's causal theory of meaning and Fred Dretske's information theoretic account, because it allegedly solves what Fodor calls the “disjunction problem”, and does so without recourse to the kind of optimal (ideal) conditions to which Stampe and Dretske appeal. A series of counterexamples is proposed to (...)
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  35. added 2014-03-27
    Dispositions Indisposed: Semantic Atomism and Fodor’s Theory of Content.Robert D. Rupert - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):325-349.
    According to Jerry Fodor’s atomistic theory of content, subjects’ dispositions to token mentalese terms in counterfactual circumstances fix the contents of those terms. I argue that the pattern of counterfactual tokenings alone does not satisfactorily fix content; if Fodor’s appeal to patterns of counterfactual tokenings has any chance of assigning correct extensions, Fodor must take into account the contents of subjects’ various mental states at the times of those tokenings. However, to do so, Fodor must abandon his semantic atomism. And (...)
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  36. added 2014-03-22
    Locking on to the Language of Thought.Christopher D. Viger - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):203-215.
    I demonstrate that locking on, a key notion in Jerry Fodor's most recent theory of content, supplemented informational atomism (SIA), is cashed out in terms of asymmetric dependence, the central notion in his earlier theory of content. I use this result to argue that SIA is incompatible with the language of thought hypothesis because the constraints on the causal relations into which symbols can enter imposed by the theory of content preclude the causal relations needed between symbols for them to (...)
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  37. added 2014-03-18
    Mentalese Semantics and the Naturalized Mind.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):77-94.
    In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, (...)
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  38. added 2014-02-27
    'X' Means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics. [REVIEW]Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-31.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield (...)
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  39. added 2014-02-27
    Fodorian Semantics, Pathologies, and "Block's Problem".Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):97-104.
    In two recent books, Jerry Fodor has developed a set of sufficient conditions for an object “X” to non-naturally and non-derivatively mean X. In an earlier paper we presented three reasons for thinking Fodor's theory to be inadequate. One of these problems we have dubbed the “Pathologies Problem”. In response to queries concerning the relationship between the Pathologies Problem and what Fodor calls “Block's Problem”, we argue that, while Block's Problem does not threatenFodor's view, the Pathologies Problem does.
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  40. added 2014-02-27
    'X' Means X: Semantics Fodor-Style. [REVIEW]Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (2):175-83.
    InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his (...)
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  41. added 2014-02-10
    Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning In the Philosophy of Mind, by J. Fodor.Jay L. Garfield - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):235-240.
  42. added 2013-12-17
    Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.
    This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories over tracking theories.
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  43. added 2013-07-04
    Pieces of a Theory.Barry Smith & Kevin Mulligan - 1982 - In Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. pp. 15-109.
    A survey of theories of part, whole and dependence from Aristotle to the Gestalt psychologists, with special attention to Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation “On the Theory of Parts and Wholes”.
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  44. added 2012-05-08
    Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.
    It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.
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  45. added 2012-04-23
    Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. [REVIEW]H. G. Callaway - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):251-59..
    This is my expository and critical review of Jerry Fodor's Psychosemantics. See also Callaway 1992, Meaning Holism and Semantic Realism.
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  46. added 2012-04-23
    Psychosemantics.William S. Robinson - 1989 - Review of Metaphysics 42 (3):619-620.
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  47. added 2012-04-23
    Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - unknown
    In Word and Object, Quine acknowledged the "practical indispensability" in daily life of the intentional idioms of belief and desire but disparaged such talk as an "essentially dramatic idiom" rather than something from which real science could be made in any straightforward way.Endnote 1 Many who agree on little else have agreed with Quine about this, and have gone on to suggest one or another indirect way for science to accommodate folk psychology: Sellars, Davidson, Putnam, Rorty, Stich, the Churchlands, Schiffer (...)
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  48. added 2012-03-17
    Setting Asymmetric Dependence Straight.Mark Greenberg - manuscript
    Fodor’s asymmetric-dependence theory of content is probably the best known and most developed causal or informational theory of mental content. Many writers have attempted to provide counterexamples to Fodor’s theory. In this paper, I offer a more fundamental critique. I begin by attacking Fodor’s view of the dialectical situation. Fodor’s theory is cast in terms of laws covering the occurrence of an individual thinker’s mental symbols. I show that, contrary to Fodor’s view, we cannot restrict consideration to hypothetical cases in (...)
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  49. added 2012-03-17
    Asymmetrical Dependence Between Causal Laws Does Not Account for Meaning.Alberto Voltolini - 1998 - In V. Abrusci (ed.), Prospettive della Logica e della Filosofia della scienza. ETS. pp. 307-316.
    In (1990), Jerry Fodor has defended a naturalized conception of meaning for Mentalese expressions which relies on the notion of asymmetric dependence. According to this conception, any naturalized theory of meaning must be able to account for the fact that meaning is robust, namely that any token of a certain Mentalese expression “x” retains the expression’s meaning, X, for any Y (≠ X) which happens to cause it. Now, this robustness of “x”‘s meaning can precisely be explained in terms of (...)
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  50. added 2012-01-24
    Two Notions of Mental Representation.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 161-179.
    The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.
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