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Attention
Edited by Sebastian Watzl (University of Oslo)
About this topic
| Summary | Attention is a central aspect of the mind. Like for other aspects of the mind, philosophers disagree on how to precisely characterize that aspect. Very generally speaking, attention concerns the current selective direction of the mind. Philosophy studies, for example: (a) The nature of attention. What exactly is attention? How are the various theories of attention in psychology and the neurosciences related to metaphysical nature of attention? (b) The explanatory role of attention. What is metaphysical or explanatory relationship between attention and other philosophically interesting aspects of our lives, such as consciousness, demonstrative reference, salience, agency and intentional action, mindfulness, or emotion, (c) The epistemological, aesthetic, ethical and political role of attention. What is the role of attention in the acquisition and exchange of knowledge, for rationality, or epistemic justification? Are certain forms of attention important for aesthetic appreciation? Does ethical virtue require a certain distribution of attention? Is there something problematic about the contemporary ‘attention economy’? |
| Key works | The treatment of attention in James 1890 is widely considered the classic in psychology. One of the most cited neuroscience works is Posner & Petersen 1990. Monograph length treatments of attention in contemporary philosophy include Mole 2011, Watzl 2017 and Jennings 2020. For a specific focus on attention and consciousness, consider e.g. Block 2007, Prinz 2012, and Watzl 2017. For connections to demonstrative reference see Campbell 2002, Smithies 2011, and Dickie 2015. The role of attention for aesthetic experience is the topic of Nanay 2014. For attention and ethics see especially Murdoch 1970. For a popular treatment connecting attention with political issues see Williams 2018. Collections of works in the philosophy of attention and related issues are Mole et al 2011 and Archer 2022. |
| Introductions | Wu 2014 for a book length introduction. For a shorter overview see the updated version of Mole 2010 and the somewhat older articles Watzl 2011a and Watzl 2011b. |
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Related
Subcategories
The Nature of Attention (152)
Joint Attention (165)
Salience (205)
Attention and Action (106)
Attention, Misc (197)
See also
- Mental Actions (302)
- Perception (16,815 | 1,749)
- Science of Perception (2,032 | 663)
Contents
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| 1 — 50 / 1193 |
Material to categorize
- Curiosity and Zetetic Style in ADHD.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Somogy Varga - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.While research on Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) has traditionally focused on cognitive and behavioral deficits, there is increasing interest in exploring possible resources associated with the disorder. In this paper, we argue that the attention-patterns associated with ADHD can be understood as expressing an alternative style of inquiry, or “zetetic” style, characterized mainly by a lower barrier for becoming curious and engaging in inquiry, and a weaker disposition to regulate curiosity in response to the cognitive and practical costs associated (...)
- In search of boredom: beyond a functional account.James Danckert & Andreas Elpidorou - 2023 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 27 (5):494-507.Boredom has been characterized as a crisis of meaning, a failure of attention, and a call to action. Yet as a self-regulatory signal writ-large, we are still left with the question of what makes any given boredom episode meaningless, disengaging, or a prompt to act. We propose that boredom is an affective signal that we have deviated from an optimal (‘Goldilocks’) zone of cognitive engagement. Such deviations may be due to a perceived lack of meaning, arise as a consequence of (...)
- Imagination, Endogenous Attention, and Mental Agency.Tom Cochrane - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1:1-21.This paper develops a mechanistic account of basic mental agency by identifying similarities between two of its major exemplars: endogenous attention and imagination. Five key similarities are identified: i) that both capacities are driven by currently prioritised goals that are either person-level or apt to become person-level. ii) that both deliver their outputs to the working memory iii) that both range across all and only conceptual contents; iv) that both proceed under the guidance of norms and/or habits; and v) that (...)
- Unfitting Absent Emotion.James Fritz - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 18. Oxford: Oxford University Press.The world provides us with an ocean of opportunities for fitting emotion. But we are beings with limited emotional resources, so missed opportunities are common. This chapter argues that these failures to take up fitting emotions are very frequently unfitting in their own right—so frequently, in fact, that most of us lead lives replete with unfitting absences of emotion. It begins by showing that, whenever an emotion can be unfitting in virtue of being too weak, the absence of that emotion (...)
- Moving and Looking.Jacob Stump - 2022 - American Association of Philosophy Teachers Studies in Pedagogy 6:74-79.There is a way of teaching philosophy as a way of life that is focused on delivering content. In this paper, I consider a different way. It is focused on giving students the experience of philosophy as a way of life—in particular, the experience of being in love with wisdom. The main question of my paper is what it might be to teach philosophy in a way that prioritizes giving students the chance to fall in love with wisdom. I do (...)
- Learning in the Open Air.Amanda Corris - 2022 - Public Philosophy Journal 4.The typical college lecture hall is a highly artificial environment: windowless, fluorescent-lit, and technology-heavy. It all but necessitates treating students as mental receptacles, where learning is a matter of passive absorption of knowledge, and where it is increasingly difficult to hold students’ attention. Natural environments, such as forests and public parks, provide a striking comparison—they free us from technological distractions, invigorate our senses, and encourage physical in addition to mental exploration. What’s more, research in environmental psychology suggests that natural environments (...)
- Seeing Circles: Inattentive Response-Coupling.Denis Buehler - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.What is attention? On one influential position, attention constitutively is the selection of some stimulus for coupling with a response. Wayne Wu has proposed a master argument for this position that relies on the claim that cognitive science commits to an empirical sufficient condition (ESC), according to which, if a subject S perceptually selects (or response-couples) X to guide performance of some experimental task T, she therein attends to X. In this paper I show that this claim about cognitive science (...)
- Concept of Attention in Bergson’s and Husserl’s Philosoph.Mark Losoncz - 2020 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 40 (4):829-839.The paper comparatively deals with the concept of attention in Bergson’s and Husserl’s philosophy. Special attention is devoted to their confrontation with psychological interpretations, as well as to methodological aspects of their theories. Analysed are the vitality, intentionality and temporality of attention by keeping in mind the complex terminological background in both Bergson and Husserl. The author holds that what connects them is that they both define attention as an inherent dynamic modification, with the different dimensions of presence, past and (...)
- Stupefying.Michael Deigan - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1).Assertions are often accepted without being understood, a phenomenon I call stupefying. I argue that stupefying can be a means for conversational manipulation that works through at-issue content, in contrast with the not-at-issue and back-door speech act routes identified by others. This shows that we should reject a widely assumed connection between attention and at-issue content. In exploring why stupefying happens, it also emerges that stupefying has important cooperative uses, in addition to its manipulative ones, and so should not be (...)
- Explicating Agency: The Case of Visual Attention.Denis Buehler - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):379-413.How do individuals guide their activities towards some goal? Harry Frankfurt once identified the task of explaining guidance as the central problem in action theory. An explanation has proved to be elusive, however. In this paper, I show how we can marshal empirical research to make explanatory progress. I contend that human agents have a primitive capacity to guide visual attention, and that this capacity is actually constituted by a sub-individual psychological control-system: the executive system. I thus illustrate how we (...)
Attention and Consciousness
- Notas sobre o conceito de atenção em Descartes.Lia Levy - 2017 - Modernos E Contemporâneos 1 (2):46-56.O artigo busca evidenciar as vantagens exegéticas de um estudo mais amplo sobre o conceito de atenção na filosofia de Descartes e avançar preliminarmente algumas hipóteses sobre seu sentido e função. Mais precisamente, sugere-se uma aproximação dos conceitos de atenção e tempo, de modo que a primeira se definiria - não como uma experiência subjetiva incomunicável, ou como uma qualidade dessa experiência-, mas em relação ao conceito cartesiano de duração, tanto em sua conexão com a mente humana quanto independentemente dessa (...)Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - Mindmelding, Chapter 11: Disentangling self and consciousness.William Hirstein - 2012 - In Mindmelding: Consciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind's Privacy. Oxford University Press.This chapter shows that mindmelding is metaphysically possible, i.e., that it does not violate any laws governing the metaphysical nature of reality. Metaphysical issues are fundamental and lie at the core of the most difficult parts of the problems of privacy and the mind-body problem itself. There is nothing stopping us from placing the idea of mindmelding on clear, unproblematic, and plausible metaphysical foundations. It is argued that the position of privacy is the one on shaky metaphysical grounds. Two metaphysical (...)$115.00 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark
- Emotion and Attention.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-27.This paper first demonstrates that recognition of the diversity of ways that emotional responses modulate ongoing attention generates what I call the puzzle of emotional attention, which turns on recognising that distinct emotions (e.g., fear, happiness, disgust, admiration etc.) have different attentional profiles. The puzzle concerns why this is the case, such that a solution consists in explaining why distinct emotions have the distinct attentional profiles they do. It then provides an account of the functional roles of different emotions, as (...)
- The why of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness: Its main functions and the mechanisms underpinning it.Giorgio Marchetti - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 913309 (13):1-20.What distinguishes conscious information processing from other kinds of information processing is its phenomenal aspect (PAC), the-what-it-is-like for an agent to experience something. The PAC supplies the agent with a sense of self, and informs the agent on how its self is affected by the agent’s own operations. The PAC originates from the activity that attention performs to detect the state of what I define “the self” (S). S is centered and develops on a hierarchy of innate and acquired values, (...)
- Psychedelic Expansion of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Study in Terms of Attention.Jason K. Day & Susanne Schmetkamp - 2022 - InCircolo 13:111-135.Induced by intake of the psychedelic substances LSD, psilocybin, DMT and mescaline, psychedelic experiences have been extensively described by subjects as entailing a most unusual increase in the scope and quality of their consciousness. Accordingly, psychedelic experiences have been widely characterised as an “expansion of consciousness.” This article poses the following question, as yet unaddressed in contemporary philosophy and the tradition of phenomenology: to what exactly does “expansion of consciousness” refer as a general characterisation of psychedelic experiences, and what role (...)
- Proactive control and agency.René Baston - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.Can agents overcome unconscious psychological influences without being aware of them? Some philosophers and psychologists assume that agents need to be aware of psychological influences to successfully control behavior. The aim of this text is to argue that when agents engage in a proactive control strategy, they can successfully shield their behavior from some unconscious influences. If agents actively check for conflicts between their actions and mental states, they engage in reactive control. For engaging in reactive control, agents need awareness (...)
- The Phenomenal Contribution of Attention.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is exhaustively determined by its intentional content. Contrastingly, impure intentionalism holds that there are also non content-based aspects or features which contribute to phenomenal character. Conscious attention is one such feature: arguably its contribution to the phenomenal character of a given conscious experience are not exhaustively captured in terms of what that experience represents, that is in terms of properties of its intentional object. This paper (...)
- Dal corpo oggetto alla mente incarnata - From the object body to the embodied mind.Francesca Brencio - 2021 - InCircolo – Rivista di Filosofia E Culture 11.F. Brencio (2021) [in Italian and English] (ed.), Dal corpo oggetto alla mente incarnata - From the object body to the embodied mind, in “InCircolo – Rivista di Filosofia e Culture”, 11, ISSN 2531-4092.
- Attention and Perception.Ronald A. Rensink - 2015 - In R. A. Scott, S. M. Kosslyn & M. C. Buchmann (eds.), Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisicplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource. Wiley. pp. 1-14.This article discusses several key issues concerning the study of attention and its relation to visual perception, with an emphasis on behavioral and experiential aspects. It begins with an overview of several classical works carried out in the latter half of the 20th century, such as the development of early filter and spotlight models of attention. This is followed by a survey of subsequent research that extended or modified these results in significant ways. It covers current work on various forms (...)
- Perception and Attention.Ronald A. Rensink - 2013 - In Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Psychology. pp. 97-116.Our visual experience of the world is one of diverse objects and events, each with particular colors, shapes, and motions. This experience is so coherent, so immediate, and so effortless that it seems to result from a single system that lets us experience everything in our field of view. But however appealing, this belief is mistaken: there are severe limits on what can be visually experienced. -/- For example, in a display for air-traffic control it is important to track all (...)
- Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry.Sophie Archer (ed.) - 2022 - New York, NY: Routledge.What is salience? This collection addresses this neglected question by considering the role of salience in a wide variety of areas. All 13 chapters are specially commissioned, and written by an international team of contributors.
- The Many Faces of Attention: why precision optimization is not attention.Madeleine Ransom & Sina Fazelpour - 2020 - In Dina Mendonça, José Manuel Robalo Curado & Steven Gouveia (eds.), The Philosophy and Science of Predictive Processing. London, UK: pp. 119-139.The predictive coding (PC) theory of attention identifies attention with the optimization of the precision weighting of prediction error. Here we provide some challenges for this identification. On the one hand, the precision weighting of prediction error is too broad a phenomenon to be identified with attention because such weighting plays a central role in multimodal integration. Cases of crossmodal illusions such as the rubber hand illusion and the McGurk effect involve the differential precision weighting of prediction error, yet attention (...)$19.77 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark
- Does Loudness Represent Sound Intensity? (Preprint).Kim Soland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-27.In this paper I challenge the widely held assumption that loudness is the perceptual correlate of sound intensity. Drawing on psychological and neuroscientific evidence, I argue that loudness is best understood not as a representation of any feature of a sound wave, but rather as a reflection of the salience of a sound wave representation; loudness is determined by how much attention a sound receives. Loudness is what I call a quantitative character, a species of phenomenal character that is determined (...)
- An Agent of Attention: An Inquiry into the Source of Our Control.Aaron Henry - 2019 - Dissertation, University of TorontoWhen performing a skilled action—whether something impressive like a double somersault or something mundane like reaching for a glass of water—you exercise control over your bodily movements. Specifically, you guide their course. In what does that control consist? In this dissertation, I argue that it consists in attending to what you are doing. More specifically, in attending, agents harness their perceptual and perceptuomotor states directly and practically in service of their goals and, in doing so, settle the fine-grained manner in (...)
- How Judgments of Visual Resemblance are Induced by Visual Experience.Alon Chasid & Alik Pelman - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (11-12):54-76.Judgments of visual resemblance (‘A looks like B’), unlike other judgments of resemblance, are often induced directly by visual experience. What is the nature of this experience? We argue that the visual experience that prompts a subject looking at A to judge that A looks like B is a visual experience of B. After elucidating this thesis, we defend it, using the ‘phenomenal contrast’ method. Comparing our account to competing accounts, we show that the phenomenal contrast between a visual experience (...)
- Attention, Not Self, by Jonardon Ganeri. [REVIEW]Sebastian Watzl - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.In this review of Ganeri's book I focus specifically on the metaphysical issues about attention raised by it. On the one hand, there is a distinction between essence and constitutive explanation. On the other hand, there is a puzzle how a phenomenon like attention could (as it appears to be on Ganeri's position) be both explanatorily central and also disunified ('not a single psychological kind', as Ganeri puts it). I discuss several possible solutions to this puzzle.
- Quantitative Character and the Composite Account of Phenomenal Content.Kim Soland - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, AmherstI advance an account of quantitative character, a species of phenomenal character that presents as an intensity (cf. a quality) and includes experience dimensions such as loudness, pain intensity, and visual pop-out. I employ psychological and neuroscientific evidence to demonstrate that quantitative characters are best explained by attentional processing, and hence that they do not represent external qualities. Nonetheless, the proposed account of quantitative character is conceived as a compliment to the reductive intentionalist strategy toward qualitative states; I argue that (...)
- Attentional Structuring, Subjectivity, and the Ubiquity of Reflexive Inner Awareness.Amit Chaturvedi - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.Some have argued that a subject has an inner awareness of its conscious mental states by virtue of the non-introspective, reflexive awareness that any conscious state has of itself. But, what exactly is it like to have a ubiquitous and reflexive inner awareness of one’s conscious states, as distinct from one’s outer awareness of the apparent world? This essay derives a model of ubiquitous inner awareness (UIA) from Sebastian Watzl’s recent theory of attention as the activity of structuring consciousness into (...)
- Relative priming of temporal local-global levels in auditory hierarchical stimuli.Alexandra List & Timothy Justus - 2010 - Attention, Perception, and Psychophysics 72 (1):193–208.Priming is a useful tool for ascertaining the circumstances under which previous experiences influence behavior. Previously, using hierarchical stimuli, we demonstrated (Justus & List, 2005) that selectively attending to one temporal scale of an auditory stimulus improved subsequent attention to a repeated (vs. changed) temporal scale; that is, we demonstrated intertrial auditory temporal level priming. Here, we have extended those results to address whether level priming relied on absolute or relative temporal information. Both relative and absolute temporal information are important (...)
- Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness are Empirically False.N. Greely - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (11-12):30-54.Higher-order theories of consciousness come in many varieties, but all adopt the 'transitivity principle' as a central, explanatory premise. The transitivity principle states that a mental state of a subject is conscious if and only if the subject is aware of it. This higher-order awareness is realized in different ways in different forms of higher-order theory. I argue that empirical studies of metacognition have falsified the transitivity principle by showing that there can be awareness of a mental state without that (...)
- Bodily feelings and psychological defence. A specification of Gendlin’s concept of felt sense.Jan Puc - 2020 - Ceskoslovenska Psychologie 64 (2):129-142.The paper aims to define the concept of “felt sense”, introduced in psychology and psychotherapy by E. T. Gendlin, in order to clarify its relation to bodily sensations and its difference from emotions. Gendlin’s own definition, according to which the felt sense is a conceptually vague bodily feeling with implicit meaning, is too general for this task. Gendlin’s definition is specified by pointing out, first, the different layers of awareness of bodily feelings and, second, the difference between bodily readiness for (...)
- Too much attention, too little self. [REVIEW]Carolyn Dicey Jennings - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):475-480.This is a good time for such a substantial book on Buddhaghosa. His ideas may be more difficult to digest than those of contemporary authors, but Ganeri convincingly argues for their relevance. Together with Ganeri’s considerable interpretive and philosophical work, Buddhaghosa’s view helps to fill out a perspective that is popular in cognitive science, in which the self is replaced by systems. In this case, the self is replaced by systems of attention, a view that Ganeri calls ‘Attentionalism.’ In this (...)
- Perceiving indeterminately.Bence Nanay - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):160-166.It has been argued recently that perception is indeterminate. But there are more than one ways of spelling out what this means. The standard line is that perceptual states attribute different probabilities to different propositions. I provide an alternative to this view, where it is not the attitude, but the content of perceptual states that is indeterminate, inasmuch as it consists of the representation of determinable properties. This view does justice to the more general claim that perception is indeterminate without (...)
- A puzzle about seeing for representationalism.James Openshaw & Assaf Weksler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2625-2646.When characterizing the content of a subject’s perceptual experience, does their seeing an object entail that their visual experience represents it as being a certain way? If it does, are they thereby in a position to have perceptually-based thoughts about it? On one hand, representationalists are under pressure to answer these questions in the affirmative. On the other hand, it seems they cannot. This paper presents a puzzle to illustrate this tension within orthodox representationalism. We identify several interesting morals which (...)
- Attentional Weighting in Perceptual Learning.Madeleine Ransom - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):236-248.Perceptual learning is an enduring change in the perceptual system – and our resulting perceptions – due to practice or repeated exposure to a perceptual stimulus. It is involved in the acquisition of perceptual expertise: the ability to make rapid and reliable high-level categorizations of objects unavailable to novices. Attentional weighting is one process by which perceptual learning occurs. Advancing our understanding of this process is of particular importance for understanding what is learned in perceptual learning. Attentional weighting seems to (...)
- Consciousness and Attention.Christopher Mole - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford, UK:As a tactic for preventing an enquiry into attention’s relationship to consciousness from lapsing into ill-definition, this chapter treats ‘attention’ as a term defined by the role that is assigned to it in our explanations of empirically established psychological phenomena (especially those involving the modulation of reaction times). It reviews evidence showing that such modulations are associated with processing that stands in various relations to consciousness. The psychological phenomena that explain these modulations cannot be identified with the causes of consciousness. (...)$111.51 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this listExport citation Bookmark 1 citation
- In Praise of Poise.Daniel Stoljar - 2019 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA, USA:
- The Place of the Trace: Negligence and Responsibility.Samuel Murray - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):39-52.One popular theory of moral responsibility locates responsible agency in exercises of control. These control-based theories often appeal to tracing to explain responsibility in cases where some agent is intuitively responsible for bringing about some outcome despite lacking direct control over that outcome’s obtaining. Some question whether control-based theories are committed to utilizing tracing to explain responsibility in certain cases. I argue that reflecting on certain kinds of negligence shows that tracing plays an ineliminable role in any adequate control-based theory (...)
- Self-Realization- A spiritual and modern scientific insight.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - manuscriptThe concept of evolution as envisaged and developed by modern scientists will be reviewed. The concept of consciousness and its evolution in humans as enlightenment and self-realization as experienced and expressed in the Upanishads, Vedanta, Yoga Sutras, Bhakti Sutras and in the experiences and expressions of modern spiritual seers will be critically analyzed. And self-realization in individual leading one to and getting established in jeevanmukta state will be discussed. The possible irreversible physicochemical nature and implications of such consciousness evolution in (...)
- Higher-Order Memory Schema and Conscious Experience.Richard Brown & Joseph LeDoux - 2020 - Cognitive Neuropsychology 37 (3-4):213-215.In the interesting and thought-provoking article Grazziano and colleagues argue for their Attention Schema Theory (AST) of consciousness. They present AST as a unification of Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Illusionism, and the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory. We argue it is a mistake to equate 'subjective experience,' ad related terms, with dualism. They simply denote experience. Also, as presented, AST does not accurately capture the essence of HOT for two reasons. HOT is presented as a version of strong illusionism, which it (...)
- Fore- and Background in Conscious Non-Demonstrative Inference.Anders Nes - 2020 - In Anders Nes & Timothy Chan (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. London: Routledge. pp. 199-228.It is often supposed one can draw a distinction, among the assumptions on which an inference rests, between certain background assumptions and certain more salient, or foregrounded, assumptions. Yet what may such a fore-v-background structure, or such structures, consist it? In particular, how do they relate to consciousness? According to a ‘Boring View’, such structures can be captured by specifying, for the various assumptions of the inference, whether they are phenomenally conscious, or access conscious, or else how easily available they (...)$52.95 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark
- Consciousness.Tony Cheng - 2019 - In Heather Salazar (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind. Quebec: Rebus Foundation Publishing. pp. 41-48.The term “consciousness” is very often, though not always, interchangeable with the term “awareness,” which is more colloquial to many ears. We say things like “are you aware that ...” often. Sometimes we say “have you noticed that ... ?” to express similar thoughts, and this indicates a close connection between consciousness (awareness) and attention (noticing), which we will come back to later in this chapter. Ned Block, one of the key figures in this area, provides a useful characterization of (...)
- Interés, atención, verdad. Una aproximación fenomenológica a la atención.Jorge Montesó Ventura - 2019 - Sevilla: Thémata.El conocimiento es un bien necesario para el desarrollo de todo ser humano, deseamos comprender el funcionamiento de todo aquello que, de algún modo, nos afecta e implica. Nos es tan propio que llegamos a definir al ser del hombre como un ser preocupado y ocupado en y con el mundo, interesado por él, abierto mediante un gesto de arrojo cognoscitivo que no se da sino mediante nuestra capacidad de atenderlo, de verter nuestra vida de consciencia en él y alcanzar, (...)
- In Defence of Bare Attention: A Phenomenological Interpretation of Mindfulness.J. Puc - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):170-190.'Mindfulness' is arguably the most important concept to have transplanted from Buddhist thought to contemporary Western psychology. However, whilst mindfulness was already an ambiguous term in the original context, specified more by a set of practices than by a clear definition, its cross-cultural transmission has blurred its content even further. In this paper, I assess the recent criticism of the widespread definition of mindfulness as non-elaborative, purely receptive 'bare attention'. According to the critics of bare attention, what can be characterized (...)
- Bayesian Frugality and the Representation of Attention.K. Dolega & J. Dewhurst - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (3-4):38-63.This paper spells out the attention schema theory of consciousness in terms of the predictive processing framework. As it stands, the attention schema theory lacks a plausible computational formalization that could be used for developing possible mechanistic models of how it is realized in the brain. The predictive processing framework, on the other hand, fails to provide a plausible explanation of the subjective quality or the phenomenal aspect of conscious experience. The aim of this work is to apply the formal (...)
- Attention in the Predictive Processing Framework and the Phenomenology of Zen Meditation.P. F. Velasco - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12):71-93.In this paper I will use the phenomenology of Zen meditation to look at the role of attention within the predictive processing framework. Section 1 introduces PP, according to which the brain is a dynamical, hierarchical, hypothesis-testing mechanism. Section 2 discusses the current proposal that attention is the process of precision optimization and presents some of the challenges for this theory. Section 3 introduces zazen and uses some of the emerging patterns of its phenomenology to clarify the workings of attention, (...)
- Cracking the Buddhist Code: A Contemporary Theory of First-Stage Awakening.R. P. Boyle - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (9-10):156-180.The theory proposes that what Buddhists call 'awakening' is equivalent to 'pure perceptual experience' or the awareness our perceptual systems would present to us if they acted without interference from our symbol-processing systems. Two forms of interference are particularly apt to interfere: uncontrolled inner speech and the distortion of perception to fit reified conceptual structures. Uncontrolled inner speech has been linked with hyperactivity in the default mode network, which occurs when attentional demands are low. Reification occurs universally as children construct (...)
- Paying Attention to Consciousness.R. Hine - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (5-6):52-69.Investigations into the relationship between attention and awareness appear to agree on one thing; the former is neither necessary nor sufficient for the latter. I argue that this might be a mistake. I look at a series of blindsight experiments, which conclude that attention occurs in the absence of awareness. By combining these cases with a widely accepted neurophysiological model of attention, I claim that the experiments are not nearly as compelling as they initially appear. I conclude by showing that (...)
- Is Attention Necessary and Sufficient for Phenomenal Consciousness?John Taylor - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12):173-194.There has recently been a flurry of interest over how attention and phenomenal consciousness interact. Felipe De Brigard and Jesse Prinz have made the bold claim that attention is necessary and sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. If this turns out to be true, then we will have taken significant steps toward naturalizing the mind, which is a particularly exciting prospect. Against this position, several thinkers have presented empirical data which apparently show that consciousness is possible in the absence of attention, and (...)
- Nota Del traductor.Rafael Stockebrand Gomez - 2018 - Ideas Y Valores 67 (168):345-353.RESUMEN Se interroga la atencionalidad propia del amor en cuanto que experiencia privilegiada y primordial del cuidado. En busca de un acceso al fenómeno del amor, se propone interrogarlo conforme al tipo de atención que promueve, asumiendo y discutiendo los recursos aportados por la fenomenología husserliana, así como por las fenomenologías contraintencionales, en particular la de Waldenfels. De este modo, si para describir este fenómeno es preciso dar cuenta del fundamento afectivo de la atención, también hay que reconocer que el (...)
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