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  1. Plantinga, Proper Names and Propositions.Diana F. Ackerman - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (6):409 - 412.
    The view of names that plantinga advances in "the nature of necessity" seems to have unacceptable consequences for names in propositional attitude contexts. In this paper, I argue that he is unsuccessful in his attempt to avoid these consequences.
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  2. Object Dependent Thoughts, Perspectival Thoughts, and Psychological Generalization.Max F. Adams, R. Stecker & G. Fuller - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (1):47-59.
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  3. Proceedings of the 9th Esslli Student Session.Laura Alonso I. Alemany & Paul Égré (eds.) - 2004
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  4. A Formal Treatment of the Pragmatics of Questions and Attitudes.Maria Aloni - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (5):505 - 539.
    This article discusses pragmatic aspects of our interpretation of intensional constructions like questions and prepositional attitude reports. In the first part, it argues that our evaluation of these constructions may vary relative to the identification methods operative in the context of use. This insight is then given a precise formalization in a possible world semantics. In the second part, an account of actual evaluations of questions and attitudes is proposed in the framework of bi-directional optimality theory. Pragmatic meaning selections are (...)
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  5. Individual Concepts in Modal Predicate Logic.Maria Aloni - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):1-64.
    The article deals with the interpretation of propositional attitudes in the framework of modal predicate logic. The first part discusses the classical puzzles arising from the interplay between propositional attitudes, quantifiers and the notion of identity. After comparing different reactions to these puzzles it argues in favor of an analysis in which evaluations of de re attitudes may vary relative to the ways of identifying objects used in the context of use. The second part of the article gives this analysis (...)
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  6. A Neo-Hintikkan Theory of Attitude Ascriptions.Peter Alward - 2005 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):1-11.
    In the paper, I develop what I call the “Neo-Hintikkan theory” of belief sentences. What is characteristic of this approach is that the meaning of an ascription is analyzed in terms of the believer’s “epistemic alternatives”: the set of worlds compatible with how the believer takes the world to be. The Neo-Hintikkan approach proceeds by assuming that individuals in believers’ alternatives can share spatio-temporal parts with actual individuals, and ascribers can refer to individuals in believer’s alternatives in virtue of their (...)
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  7. Full Belief, Supposition, and Personal Probablility.Horacio Arlo-Costa - unknown
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  8. A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag's Puzzle.Philip Atkins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.
    Gary Ostertag has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not identified with sentences.
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  9. Fodor on Concepts and Frege Puzzles.Murat Aydede - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294.
    ABSTRACT. Fodor characterizes concepts as consisting of two dimensions: one is content, which is purely denotational/broad, the other the Mentalese vehicle bearing that content, which Fodor calls the Mode of Presentation (MOP), understood "syntactically." I argue that, so understood, concepts are not interpersonally sharable; so Fodor's own account violates what he calls the Publicity Constraint in his (1998) book. Furthermore, I argue that Fodor's non-semantic, or "syntactic," solution to Frege cases succumbs to the problem of providing interpersonally applicable functional roles (...)
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  10. How to Have Self-Directed Attitudes.Lynne Rudder Baker - unknown
    Self-directed and self-evaluative attitudes are often connected to one’s social position. Before investigating the dependence relations between individual self-evaluation and social positioning, however, there is a prior question to answer: What are the conditions under which an individual can have any self-directed attitudes at all? In order to be the subject of self-directed or selfevaluative attitudes, I shall argue, an individual must have linguistic and social relations. I’ll discuss the first-person perspective, self-concepts and their acquisition—all from a radically nonCartesian, externalist (...)
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  11. Attitudes Without Propositions.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.
    This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing `that'-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form `x believes that p' and `σ means that p'. Briefly, the view is that (a) platonists are right that `that'-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions, and hence, (c) `that'-clause-containing sentences (...)
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  12. A Pragmatic Treatment of Simple Sentences.Alex Barber - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):300–308.
    Semanticists face substitution challenges even outside of contexts commonly recognized as opaque. Jennifer M. Saul has drawn attention to pairs of simple sentences - her term for sentences lacking a that-clause operator - of which the following are typical: -/- (1) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out. (1*) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Clark Kent came out. -/- (2) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent. (2*) Superman is more successful (...)
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  13. Disquotation and Substitutivity, Bryan Frances.Yuri Barn - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3).
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  14. Proper Names, Possible Worlds, and Propositional Attitudes.Kenneth T. Barnes - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (1):29-38.
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  15. Singular Propositions and Modes of Presentations.João Barranquinho - 1996 - Disputatio (1):1-18.
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  16. Linsky on Substitutivity.Robert W. Beard - 1967 - Philosophical Studies 18 (1-2):17 - 19.
  17. On the Church Frege Analysis of Belief Sentences.Robert W. Beard - 1966 - Logique Et Analyse 9:252-262.
    The author attempts to show how an adequate theory of belief sentences can be formulated within the church-frege framework. it is argued that ordinary substitution of identicals is adequate within belief contexts provided that certain criteria for identity of senses are not adopted. a criterion that avoids these difficulties is then put forward.
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  18. The Importance of Being Erroneous: Prospects for Animal Intentionality.David Beisecker - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 27 (1):281-308.
    The question of animal belief (or animal intentionality) often degenerates into a frustrating and unproductive exchange. Foes of animal intentionality point out that non-linguistic animals couldn’t possibly possess the kinds of mental states we linguistic beings enjoy. They claim that linguistic ability enables us to become sensitive to intensional contexts or to the states of mind of others in a way that is unavailable to the non-linguistic, and that would be necessary for proper attributions of intentionality. To attribute mental states (...)
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  19. Recensioni/Reviews-Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta. An Essay on Metarepresentation.C. Bianchi - 2004 - Epistemologia 27 (2):337-339.
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  20. Believing in Sentences.John Bigelow - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):11 – 18.
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  21. Believing in Semantics.John C. Bigelow - 1978 - Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (1):101--144.
    This paper concerns the semantics of belief-sentences. I pass over ontologically lavish theories which appeal to impossible worlds, or other points of reference which contain more than possible worlds. I then refute ontologically stingy, quotational theories. My own theory employs the techniques of possible worlds semantics to elaborate a Fregean analysis of belief-sentences. In a belief-sentence, the embedded clause does not have its usual reference, but refers rather to its own semantic structure. I show how this theory can accommodate quantification (...)
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  22. Conditionals as Attitude Reports.Maria Bittner - manuscript
    Most theories of conditionals and attitudes do not analyze either phenomenon in terms of the other. A few view attitude reports as a species of conditionals (e.g. Stalnaker 1984, Heim 1992). Based on evidence from Kalaallisut, this paper argues for the opposite thesis: conditionals are a species of attitude reports. The argument builds on prior findings that conditionals are modal topic-comment structures (e.g. Haiman 1978, Bittner 2001), and that in mood-based Kalaallisut English future (e.g. Ole will win) translates into a (...)
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  23. Proceedings of Console Xiii.Sylvia Blaho, Luis Vicente & Erik Schoorlemmer (eds.) - 2005
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  24. Propositional Attitudes and Compositional Semantics.Steven E. Boer - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:341-380.
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  25. Propositional Attitudes and Formal Ontology.Steven E. Boër - 1994 - Synthese 98 (2):187 - 242.
    This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data.
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  26. Who, Me?Steven E. Boër & William G. Lycan - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (3):427 - 466.
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  27. Christopher S. LIGHTFOOT , Amorium Reports II. Research Papers and Technical Reports. BAR International Series, 1170.Beate Böhlendorf-Arslan - 2006 - Byzantinische Zeitschrift 98 (2).
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  28. Semantic Relationism, Belief Reports and Contradiction.Paolo Bonardi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):273-284.
    In his book Semantic Relationism, Kit Fine propounds an original and sophisticated semantic theory called ‘semantic relationism’ or ‘relational semantics’, whose peculiarity is the enrichment of Kaplan’s, Salmon’s and Soames’ Russellian semantics (more specifically, the semantic content of simple sentences and the truth-conditions of belief reports) with coordination, “the very strongest relation of synonymy or being semantically the same”. In this paper, my goal is to shed light on an undesirable result of semantic relationism: a report like “Tom believes that (...)
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  29. Understanding Reports of Nonvolition.Patricia G. Bowers - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (3):469.
  30. Proper Names, Cognitive Contents, and Beliefs.David M. Braun - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (3):289 - 305.
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  31. Kripke's Revenge. [REVIEW]David Braun & Theodore Sider - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):669 - 682.
    Millianism says that the semantic content of a name (or indexical) is simply its referent. This thesis arises within a general, powerful research program, the propositionalist approach to semantics, which sets as a goal for philosophical semantics an assignment of entities – semantic contents – to bits of language, culminating in the assignment of propositions to sentences. Communication, linguistic competence, truth conditions, and other semantic phenomena are ultimately explained in terms of semantic contents.
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  32. Belief de Re and de Dicto.Justin Broackes - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (144):374-383.
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  33. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):439 - 467.
    Reductionists about knowledge-wh hold that "s knows-wh" (e.g. "John knows who stole his car") is reducible to "there is a proposition p such that s knows that p, and p answers the indirect question of the wh-clause." Anti-reductionists hold that "s knows-wh" is reducible to "s knows that p, as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh-clause." I argue that both of these positions are defective. I then offer a new analysis of knowledge-wh as a special kind (...)
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  34. Knowledge-the and Propositional Attitude Ascriptions.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):147-190.
    Determiner phrases embedded under a propositional attitude verb have traditionally been taken to denote answers to implicit questions. For example, 'the capital of Vermont' as it occurs in 'John knows the capital of Vermont' has been thought to denote the proposition which answers the implicit question 'what is the capital of Vermont?' Thus, where 'know' is treated as a propositional attitude verb rather than an acquaintance verb, 'John knows the capital of Vermont' is true iff John knows that Montpelier is (...)
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  35. Belief States and Narrow Content.Curtis Brown - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.
    The first thesis is that beliefs play a role in explaining behavior. This is reasonably uncontroversial, though it has been controverted. Why did I raise my arm? Because I wanted to emphasize a point, and believed that I could do so by raising my arm. The belief that I could emphasize a point by raising my arm is central to the most natural explanation of my action.
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  36. Is Belief a Propositional Attitude?Ray Buchanan - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12.
    According to proponents of the face-value account, a beliefreport of the form ‘S believes that p’ is true just in case the agentbelieves a proposition referred to by the that-clause. As againstthis familiar view, I argue that there are cases of true beliefreports of the relevant form in which there is no proposition that thethat-clause, or the speaker using the that-clause, can plausibly betaken as referring to. Moreover, I argue that given the distinctiveway in which the face-value theory of belief-reports (...)
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  37. Kaplan, Quine, and Suspended Belief.Tyler Burge - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (3):197-203.
  38. Supervaluations and the Propositional Attitude Constraint.J. A. Burgess - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):103-119.
    For the sentences of languages that contain operators that express the concepts of definiteness and indefiniteness, there is an unavoidable tension between a truth-theoretic semantics that delivers truth conditions for those sentences that capture their propositional contents and any model-theoretic semantics that has a story to tell about how indetifiniteness in a constituent affects the semantic value of sentences which imbed it. But semantic theories of both kinds play essential roles, so the tension needs to be resolved. I argue that (...)
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  39. The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution.Delilah Caldwell - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):812 – 816.
  40. A New Source of Data About Singular Thought.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1159-1172.
    Philosophers have justified extant theories of singular thought in at least three ways: they have invoked wide-ranging theories motivated by data from other philosophical areas, they have elicited direct intuitions about which thoughts are singular, and they have subjected propositional attitude reports to tests such as Russellian substitution and Quinean exportation. In these ways, however, we haven’t yet been able to tell what it takes to have singular thoughts, nor have we been able to tell which of our thoughts they (...)
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  41. Identity and Substitutivity.Richard Cartwright - 1971 - In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press. pp. 119--133.
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  42. Substitutivity.Richard Cartwright - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (21):684-685.
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  43. `Obviously Propositions Are Nothing': Russell and the Logical Form of Belief Reports.Lenny Clapp & Robert J. Stainton - 2002 - In Georg Peter & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 409--420.
  44. Contextual Aspects of Belief Ascriptions: A Response to Buckareff.D. S. Clarke - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):263-267.
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  45. Is Kripke's Puzzle Really a Puzzle?J. Angelo Corlett - 1989 - Theoria 55 (2):95-113.
    In his famous essay, "A Puzzle About Belief," Saul Kripke poses a puzzle regarding belief. In this paper I shall first describe Kripke's puzzle. Second, I shall introduce and examine five positions one might take in attempting to solve Kripke's Puzzle. In so doing, I shall show why each of these attempts fails to solve Kripke's Puzzle. The significance of this analysis is that if Kripke's Puzzle remains unresolved, then (as Kripke himself claims) the normal apparatus for belief ascription needs (...)
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  46. Robin Jeshion, Ed. , New Essays on Singular Thought . Reviewed By.Sam Cowling - 2011 - Philosophy in Review 31 (6):434-437.
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  47. Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes?Sean Crawford - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.
    Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (2001) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate “propositional phenomena” without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien’s proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, such as the (...)
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  48. Arabic Numerals in Propositional Attitude Sentences.M. J. Cresswell - 2006 - Analysis 66 (1):92–93.
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  49. Quotational Theories of Propositional Attitudes.M. J. Cresswell - 1980 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (1):17 - 40.
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  50. A Model for Structural Changes of Belief.Eleonora Cresto - 2008 - Studia Logica 88 (3):431-451.
    The paper suggests a way of modeling belief changes within the tradition of formal belief revision theories. The present model extends the scope of traditional proposals, such as AGM, so as to take care of “structural belief changes” – a type of radical shifts that is best illustrated with, but not limited to, instances of scientific discovery; we obtain AGM expansions and contractions as limiting cases. The representation strategy relies on a non-standard use of a semantic machinery. More precisely, the (...)
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