Austrian Philosophy

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_The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche_ first appeared in the _Collected Works_ in 1960. In this new edition bibliographical citations and entries have been revised in the light of subsequent publications in the _Collected Works_, and essential corrections have been made. The book traces an important line of development in Jung's thought from 1912 onwards. The earliest of the papers elaborates Freud's concept of sexual libido into that of psychic energy. In those that follow we see how, Jung, discarding (...) one by one the traditional 'philosophical' hypotheses, gradually arrived at a concept which is even more controversial than psychic energy was in its day ^DDL namely, psychic reality. The book contains the first mention of the archetype in Jung's writings as well as his later views on its nature. There is also a valuable account of the therapeutic uses of 'active imagination' first described in an essay written in 1916. (shrink)

In 1911 Jung published a book of which he says: '...it laid down a programme to be followed for the next few decades of my life.' It was vastly erudite and covered innumerable fields of study: psychiatry, psychoanalysis, ethnology and comparitive religion amongst others. In due course it became a standard work and was translated into French, Dutch and Italian as well as English, in which language it was given the well-known but somewhat misleading title of _The Psychology of the (...) Unconscious_. In the Foreword to the present revised edition which first appeared in 1956, Jung says: '...it was the explosion of all those psychic contents which could find no room, no breathing space, in the constricting atmosphere of Freudian psychology... It was an attempt, only partially successful, to create a wider setting for medical psychology and to bring the whole of the psychic phenomena within its purview.' For this edition, appearing ten years after the first, bibliographical citations and entries have been revised in the light of subsequent publications in the _Collected Works_ and in the standard edition of Freud's works, some translations have been substituted in quotations, and other essential corrections have been made, but there have been no changes of substance in the text. (shrink)

Approximationism — science approximates the truth as an ideal — is the view of science implicit in all of Einstein's major works, heralded by Hugo Bergman in Hebrew in 1940 and expressed by Karl Popper in 1954 and 1956. Yet Bergman was not sufficiently clear about it, and even Popper is not - as shown by their not giving up certain remnants of the older views which approximationism replaces, even when these remnants are inconsistent with approximationism. Norare the approximationist theories (...) of these authors satisfactory solutions to all the problems which traditional epistemologies purported to solve. Approxiamtionism still is a program rather than a fully blown theory. (shrink)

The present studies on relation focuses mainly in the logical structure of the concept, under and analytical approach. But paradoxically, even if the mind can’t work without the relation, it is not able to justify the meaning of relation only through self-reflection. It is absolutely necessary to follow the metaphysical approach, in which the problem of negation plays a central role.

Many attempts have been made to define analytic philosophy in a nonhistorical or otherwise deictic way, and to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a piece of philosophical work to be part of analytic philosophy. This is more difficult than might appear, for the conditions appealed to are normative and must be claimed by non-analytic philosophers to apply to their production as well. In fact, no such set of conditions has been forthcoming, and it is unlikely that (...) it ever will. Instead, I offer a holistic characterization of analytic philosophy as a mode of organization of philosophical work modeled on science. This accounts for analytic philosophy’s success in the academic world, its pedagogic virtues, and its ability to expand beyond its initial boundaries. Two related questions remain: one about the indirect justification analytic philosophy might be granted from outside of philosophy, the other about its ability to make contact with cultural realms other than those with which it has until now established a fruitful exchange. The answers are crucial for the potential renewal of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

This study examines the history of the psychoanalytic theory of mysticism, starting with the seminal correspondence between Freud and Romain Rolland concerning the concept of "oceanic feeling." Providing a corrective to current views which frame psychoanalysis as pathologizing mysticism, Parsons reveals the existence of three models entertained by Freud and Rolland: the classical reductive, ego-adaptive, and transformational. Then, reconstructing Rolland's personal mysticism through texts and letters unavailable to Freud, Parsons argues that Freud misinterpreted the oceanic feeling. In offering a fresh (...) interpretation of Rolland's mysticism, Parsons constructs a new dialogical approach for psychoanalytic theory of mysticism which integrates culture studies, developmental perspectives, and the deep epistemological and transcendent claims of the mystics. (shrink)

During the first half of the twentieth century philosophy took a ‘linguistic turn’. The first clear signal of this development was Ludwig Wittgenstein's remark in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that ‘All philosophy is “Critique of Language”‘ and this work by Wittgenstein remains a classic presentation of the thesis that philosophy can only be undertaken through the critical study of language. Thus during the twentieth century philosophical approaches to language, the kinds of theorizing now known as ‘philosophy of language’, have been developed (...) in a context in which language has been taken to be a primary resource for philosophy, and as a result there has been a two-way relationship in which conceptions of language and of philosophy have been developed together. (shrink)

Two stages are discernible in S.H. Bergman's philosophical development. The early Bergman differs from the later Bergman as much in the philosophical method as in the choice of the fields of research and problems to deal with. The early Bergman acted predominantly as a philosopher of science, focussing his attention on the ultimate presuppositions of scientific thinking. In the second stage this gave way to speculations of a rather anthropological character. The laterBergman sought to solve the riddle of human existence (...) by a theory centering on the social nature of human rationality and claiming a theological explanation of its emergence. (shrink)

How do we know our mental life, and how is our mental life altered by our efforts to know it better? Originally published in 1984, this title attempts an epistemological and ontological discourse concerning the understanding of human mental processes, and it aims toward a definitive thesis on the dialectics of knowing and being in this work of psychological understanding. What this work reconfronts are questions pertaining to all psychology and to all human sciences. Yet much of its focus is (...) on the understanding of unconscious mental contents, on the question of knowing and being in Freud’s psychology. (shrink)

En este ensayo se contrasta el modo tradicional de encarar y tratar los enredos filosóficos con el enfoque disolvente propio del pensar wittgensteiniano. Se considera un caso particular de problemas de filosofía de la mente, a saber, el caso de la comprensión. El objetivo es hacer ver que, mientras el primero representa una respuesta que se va complicando en forma exponencial, el segundo desemboca en posiciones simples, pero efectivamente aclaratorias. Se refuerza así la aseveración inicial de que hay un sentido (...) en el que Wittgenstein pertenece y no pertenece a la tradición filosófica occidental. (shrink)

In philosophy, or in philosophy of the continental kind, “1968” has come to represent a specific type of thinking. Or, rather, it has come to mark the decline of one type of theorizing in favor of another, namely, the kind that is suspicious of all-embracing theories.1 Though the philosophers associated with the Paris upheavals are figures like Jean-Paul Sartre and Herbert Marcuse, around the same time several thinkers entered onto the stage (such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Jean-François Lyotard) (...) who were to make an entire career out of undermining the theoretical constructions of their predecessors. These then up-and-coming…. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 24 This article has three main interconnected aims. First, I illustrate the historiographical conceptions of three early analytic philosophers: Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Second, I consider some of the historiographical debates that have been generated by the recent historical turn in analytic philosophy, looking at the work of Scott Soames and Hans-Johann Glock, in particular. Third, I discuss Arthur Danto’s _Analytic Philosophy of History_, published 50 years ago, and argue for a reinvigorated analytic philosophy of history.

_ Source: _Page Count 24 This article has three main interconnected aims. First, I illustrate the historiographical conceptions of three early analytic philosophers: Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Second, I consider some of the historiographical debates that have been generated by the recent historical turn in analytic philosophy, looking at the work of Scott Soames and Hans-Johann Glock, in particular. Third, I discuss Arthur Danto’s _Analytic Philosophy of History_, published 50 years ago, and argue for a reinvigorated analytic philosophy of history.

_ Source: _Page Count 24 This article has three main interconnected aims. First, I illustrate the historiographical conceptions of three early analytic philosophers: Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Second, I consider some of the historiographical debates that have been generated by the recent historical turn in analytic philosophy, looking at the work of Scott Soames and Hans-Johann Glock, in particular. Third, I discuss Arthur Danto’s _Analytic Philosophy of History_, published 50 years ago, and argue for a reinvigorated analytic philosophy of history.