Avicenna

There are a number of people in Islamic communities, including ours, who have a superficial judgment of current philosophical discussions in the world of Islam and consider them as having been originated from Greek philosophy. One of these discussions is related to the issue of emanation or effusion with which Farabi and Ibn Sina agreed. Unfortunately, in spite of all the innovations brought about by these two philosophers concerning the above issue, a great number of teachers of philosophy agree with (...) a Greek origin for the theory of emanation rather than an Islamic one.In this article, the writer firstly deals with the criticisms directed toward the Ibn Sinan theory of emanation, which the llluminationist school of philosophy considers as being justified from the two perspectives of religion and intellect. Secondly, he explores Suhrawardi's theory of emanation and the plan he presents for the spiritual world on the basis of this theory.The innovations of Ibn-Sina were not satisfactory and justified in Suhrawardi's eyes since he believed that the Ibn-Sinan model of emanation could not provide a comprehensive explanation for the world. He also emphasized that Ibn Sina's theory of emanation, in spite of its novelty, led to the spiritual world which possesses ten intellects, each having three intellectual modes. From the view point of Suhrawardi and his followers, the intellectual model designed by Ibn Sina for the spiritual world was not capable of justifying the revealed knowledge. Ibn Sina conjoined his model of the world of intellects in philosophy with the spiritual world in religion and the sacred law through conjoining the "intellect" with the "angel". Nevertheless, the llluminationists hold that there is no conformity or agreement between the picture of the world of invisible as presented by religion and the one presented by the simple Ibn-Sinan model which rightly suits his theory of emanation.Lastly, the writer expounds the llluminationists' theory of emanation, which is discussed at different levels as follows:1. The vertical emanation of lights2. Contemplation, bliss, and illumination3. The combination of accidental lights with directions4. The spiritual participations and new originations5. Suhrawardi's innovations concerning the theory of emanation. (shrink)

This article introduces one of Ibn-Sina's unpublished and handwritten manuscripts called "al-majalis al-saba'h". This treatise consists of fourty one questions and answers between Abulhasan Amiri and Ibn-Sina . The writer has extensively explored the content validity of this work and presented a rather comprehensive analysis of it.

The Present paper, in addition to discussing the indebtedness of Scholastic philosophy to Islamic thought in the 12th and 13th centuries, provides a short account of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd's metaphysics along with their influence over the medieval philosophy. When discussing Ibn Sina, the author explicitly emphasizes his originality of thoughts with reference to his philosophical sources, such as Aristotle, neo-Platonists, Kindi, and Farabi. The author believes that this originality lies in Ibn Sina's discussions of existence, the relation of (...) existence to reality and necessity, the distinction between existence and quiddity and its importance for the issue of creation in Scholasticism, as well as in posing Ibn Sina's argument for the demonstration of the Creator and explaining its difference from Arsitotle's argument of motion.Later, through referring to the issue of the soul and its argument of disengagement in the suspended man, and, finally, by resorting to the Avicennan-Augustinian school concerning the issue of knowledge, the writer discusses Ibn Rushd's ideas and his influence in the 13th and 14th centuries and even in the Renaissance period. He restates Ibn Rushd's view of the mission of religion and philosophy and their common ultimate end, poses the issue of the laymen, theologians, and philosophers and their various levels of perception in Ibn Rushd's eyes, and, finally, refers to his influence on his Latin followers, as well as to his opponents such as Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

Some people consider Ibn-Sina a Peripatetic philosopher and merely a comentator of Aristotle's works.However even a facile study of the works of this eminent philosopher reveals that this is absolutely wrong.In fact, the differences between Ibn-Sina's theories and those of Aristotle are so great in number that we cannot even enumerate them in this paper.Nevertheless, it seems that towards the end of his short life, Ibn-Sina intended to found a new philosophical system, called "Oriental Wisdom" , but he couldn't achieve (...) this purpose due to his untimely death. Today the only available part of the book of "Oriental Wisdom" is the chapter on oriental logic.Therefore, the purpose of the wirter in this paper is to explore those issues which play a central role in Ibn-Sina's oriental thought and stand in opposition to the views of the Peripatetic philosophers, particularly Aristotle. Such issues include:1. Ibn-Sina and Aristotle's disagreement concerming the relationship between the soul and the body.2. Ibn-Sina and Aristotle's disagreement concerning the active intellect.3. The conjectural intellect and the sacred intellect, which are among Ibn-Sina's innovations.4. Ibn-Sina's gnostic disposition which is based on emananation and illumination from the outside and is in contradiction Aristotle's intellectual and senseless paganism. (shrink)

Peripatetics use the terms "necessary existent" and "first principle" to define God on the basis of dividing existents into necessary and possible. They also state that the chain of the possible existents leads up to a non-caused cause. According to Peripatetics, there is no way to learn about the nature of God and the most which can be done is to perceive God via terms such as "necessary existent" and "first principle".Still, they emphasize, that this very perception cannot and should (...) not make us think of a quiddity in this connection for all quiddities need a cause.Avicenna says that existence in God cannot be the same as existence in other beings for the latter is much less in intensity; God's necessity of existence, he maintains, is the same as its intensity and that forms the reality of the Almighty's nature.On the use of demonstrations to prove God's existence, Avicenna believes that demonstrations as such are either a priori or a posteriori; since God has no cause, the a priori demon stration which begins with a cause to find an effect does not work here.As for the a posteriori demonstrations, he can be credited with one that expounds on essence to prove the existence of God.Based on Avicenna's demonstration, an existent if necessary is self subsistent and if possible ends up in the necessary existent, and any other option leads to a vicious circle which is out of the question. (shrink)

This book sets out in a new way how Avicenna uses the modal distinction to defend God’s eternal creation of the cosmos is the central purpose of this work. To do this, I set out how Avicenna uses the modal distinction to interpret four Aristotelian arguments in four un-Aristotelian ways. These arguments include the argument for the finitude of efficient causes in Metaphysics 2; the proof for the prime mover in the Physics and Metaphysics 12; the argument against the Megarians (...) in Metaphysics 9; and the argument for the mutual entailment between the necessary and the eternal in De Caelo 1.12. When these arguments are reinterpreted in the light of the modal distinction, Avicenna argues that they show that God is the efficient and final cause of the eternal existence of the cosmos and that metaphysics is the only science that can establish this. Some of these arguments, such as Avicenna’s version of the argument in De Caelo 1.12, have not received any scholarly attention. Indeed, no modern language version of this argument has been published. Most, however, have received some treatment, but these treatments, I contend, misinterpret Avicenna’s reasoning and do so because they misunderstand the role that the modal distinction plays in them. Moreover, scholars have presented these arguments as question-begging due to this misunderstanding. Thus, this work’s secondary aim is to show that when the modal distinction’s role in each is properly understood, the standard objections against them fail. (shrink)

Shahāb ad-Dīn" Yahya ibn Habash ibn Amirak as-Suhrawardī, (also Shaikh al-Ishraq, Shaikh al-Maqtul) was founder of the illuminationist school (Ar. Hikmat al-ishraq; Pers. falsafaye ešrāqi ). Derived from “illumination,” a conventional translation of the Arabic term ishraq (lit. radiance, shining of the rising sun), “illuminationism” refers to the doctrine of the Ishraqiyyun, a school of philosophical and mystical thought of various Graeco-Oriental roots whose principles were propounded as an ancient “science of lights” (‘ilm al-anwar) . He chose this title to (...) distinguish his philosophical theory from mashshaī's philosophy; and he is one of the first philosophers to elaborate on an old tradition. His approach Adopted from Zoroastrian and Platonic ideas. In fact, he associates his science of lights principally with the names of Plato, Hermes, Empedokles, Pythagoras, and the ‘Oriental principle concerning light and darkness’ of the sages of ancient Iran. (shrink)

Why would God create a world at all? Further, why would God create a world like this one? The Neoplatonic framework of classical philosophical theology answers that God’s willing is an affirmation of God’s own goodness, and God creates to show forth God’s glory. Mark Johnston has recently argued that, in addition to explaining why God would create at all, this framework gives extremely wide scope to divine freedom. Timothy O’Connor objects that divine freedom, on this view, cannot be so (...) wide as Johnston supposes: the creation of a fundamentally unjust world, for instance, could not be a way of affirming the divine goodness. I argue that O’Connor does not go far enough. While the Neoplatonic framework helps to explain why God would create at all, it does nothing to secure God’s freedom to create less than the best. (shrink)

There is a remarkable coincidence in Augustine and Avicenna’s investigations into the nature of time. Despite the fact that Avicenna wrote in Arabic and Persian, was born in Central Asia more than five hundred years after the death of Augustine, and had no access to Augustine’s philosophical works, both consider a strikingly similar objection to the ontological dependence of time on the motion of the heavens.

This article discusses Ibn Sīnā’s reasons for upholding the eternity of the world in his major philosophical writings and the ensuing heated debate between his detractors (al-Ghazālī, al-Shahrastānī and al-Rāzī) and supporters (al-Ṭūsī and al-Āmidī). I argue that notwithstanding the responses and surrejoinders it had elicited, Ibn Sīnā’s position on the issue is indeed coherent and irrefutable, since he distinguishes three modes of eternity, corresponding to the hierarchy of beings which he introduced, namely, (i) absolutely eternal (by virtue of itself); (...) (ii) relatively eternal (by virtue of something else); and (iii) not eternal both considered per se as well per aliud. With this distinction he evades both horns of the dilemma: either the universe is eternal or it is not eternal. On Ibn Sīnā’s account, therefore, the universe is both eternal and not eternal. It is eternal because the efficient cause that necessitates and sustains its existence is eternal, but also not eternal in view of its essential contingency. (shrink)

In Necessary Existence and the Doctrine of Being in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing Daniel De Haan explicates the central argument of Avicenna’s metaphysical masterpiece. De Haan argues that the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s metaphysics is neither being nor thing but is the necessary ( wājib), which Avicenna employs to demonstrate the existence and true-nature of the divine necessary existence in itself. This conclusion is established through a systematic investigation of how Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science is (...) employed in the organization of his metaphysical science into its subject, first principles, and objects of enquiry. The book examines the essential role the first principles as primary notions and primary hypotheses play in the central argument of Avicenna’s metaphysics. (shrink)

I seek to explicate the ways in which the soul is deemed immaterial in two main strands of Islamic philosophy, and then consider some arguments for the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I first overview Avicenna’s theory of the spiritual incipience (al-ḥudūth al-rūḥānī) of the soul and his version of substance dualism. I will then discuss Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the physical incipience (al-ḥudūth al-jismānī) of the soul and how the soul emerges and develops towards immateriality on his (...) account. I then overview and discuss five of the most important arguments presented by these two great Muslim philosophers in favor of the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I will also point out some of the main contemporary physicalistic views of the nature of mind and mental states. I will then argue that arguments for the immateriality of the soul – dealt with here – do not indeed target or challenge any significant versions of contemporary physicalism. Moreover, these arguments involve conflations of epistemological or ontological issues. (shrink)

In late Renaissance medicine, the example of digestion was frequently invoked to prove the elemental composition of the human body. Food was considered as being decomposed in its first elements by the stomach, and digested into a thick juice, which was assimilated by the liver and the body parts. Such a process points to the structure of the human body into four elements that are transformed into different types of humors during several stages of “concoction”. This chapter examines the Galenic (...) interpretation of digestion expounded by the French physician Jean Fernel (1497–1558) in his Physiologia (1567). In this treatise, Fernel states the body composition into elemental portions, while stressing the role of the “innate heat” as the physiological counterpart of the body’s essence or “substantial form”. He applies this view in his account of digestion, where he states that the conversion of food follows the rule of “mixture”. This chapter aims to explore how Fernel applies his interpretation of elements and innate heat to the process of digestion, as well as his sources in Galen’s De facultatibus naturalibus, Avicenna’s Canon and Aristotle’s Meteorologica. It first examines the role of the natural soul and its “nourishing” faculties in nutrition as a physiological function. It then considers the role of elements, humors and innate heat during the “concoction” of food in the stomach, liver and veins. (shrink)

In this article, three concepts that constitute the pillars of sciences, namely the subject, principle and problem, will be examined relying on Avicenna’s (d. 428/1037) book of Burhān. These three concepts, which generally determine the scope of scientific research and the principles on which it should be based, were introduced systematically for the first time by Aristotle (d. 322 BC) in the history of thought. Through these concepts, philosophical sciences could be distinguished from one another and it became possible for (...) each science to examine specific parts of existence. This distinction, which was also adopted by the scholars of Islamic thought, has presented such an integrity that neither philosophical disciplines nor religious sciences could remain indifferent. As a matter of fact, especially in the later period of theologicians, the information was considered as science only if it was based on these three concepts. Therefore, it can be asserted that these three concepts were considered as the measure of scientific activity, first by peripatetic philosophy and later by other disciplines. (shrink)

Avicenna's proof for the existence of God (the Necessary Existent) in the Metaphysics of the Salvation relies on the claim that every possible existent shares a common cause. I argue that Avicenna has good reason to hold this claim given that he thinks that (1) every essentially ordered causal series originates in a first, common cause and that (2) every possible existent belongs to an essentially ordered series. Showing Avicenna's commitment to 1 and 2 allows me to respond to Herbert (...) Davidson's and Richard Swinburne's claim that Avicenna's proof for the Necessary Existent is incomplete and fallacious -/- . (shrink)

Avicenna, beside his theoretical discussions about experimentation, practically applied his experimental method to natural sciences studies such as medicine, biology, and meteorology. His theoretical discussions subsume propositions concerning the conditions under which experimental knowledge is attained, the components of this knowledge and its functions. Some of these propositions are as follows: necessity of recurrent observations for acquiring experimental knowledge, certainty plus conditional universality of such knowledge, and its role as demonstrative premises. Investigating the application of his theory in natural sciences (...) propound two new features which were not elaborated in the theoretical discussions: fallibility of experimental knowledge and necessity of systematic observation. This research, using the analytic method and referring to both philosophical and scientific works of Avicenna, clarifies that a comprehensive definition of experimentation is dependent on considering extracted points from practical application of experimental knowledge, beside its theoretical components. (shrink)

We reconstruct as much as we can the part of al-Fārābī's treatment of modal logic that is missing from the surviving pages of his Long Commentary on the Prior Analytics. We use as a basis the quotations from this work in Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd and Maimonides, together with relevant material from al-Fārābī's other writings. We present a case that al-Fārābī's treatment of the dictum de omni had a decisive effect on the development and presentation of Ibn Sīnā's modal logic. (...) We give further evidence that the Harmonisation of the Opinions of Plato and Aristotle was not written by al-Fārābī. (shrink)

In this study, lexical and terminological meanings of the term “nature” were analyzed and some Peripatetical Islamic philosophers’ opinions about this term were included. A comparison was made between the words “tabiat” and “doğa” which are used in Turkish language to meet the term “nature”. The realm of existence which Peripatetical Islamic philosophers have used “nature” in as a noun was explained. Debate between Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) about the necessity of proving the term “nature” was mentioned. Ibn (...) Sīnā's views on what “nature” portends in terms of being a source of motion and duration in objects were presented in comparison with Aristotle. Later definitions which are made by philosophers for “nature” as a term were presented. Peripatetical Islamic philosophers’ definition of the term “nature” which has a critical role in Islamic philosophy and the way they use it differentiates from that of Aristotle’s. The term “nature” which they especially use to explain every kind of becoming and motion enables to connect all reason to Allah in aspects of etymology. And it is also known that the term “nature” serves as a basis for differentiation between physics and metaphysics. The purpose of this article is to clarify the possible usages of the term “nature” in relation to new theories. (shrink)

This paper discusses the question of an Ismaʿili influence within the cosmology of al-Ghazālī and argues that al-Ghazālī appropriated certain features of the Ismaʿili cosmology from the Persian Ismaʿili thought of Nāṣir-i Khusraw. After introducing Nāṣir-i Khusraw and his Ismaʿili Neoplatonic cosmology, the paper first examines some of the Ismaʿili doctrinal material presented in al-Ghazālī’s anti-Ismaʿili polemical work Faḍāʾiḥ al-bāṭiniyya—concerning cosmology, revelation, and taʾwīl—and traces this content back to Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s works, arguing that Nāṣir-i Khusraw was one of the sources (...) for al-Ghazālī’s knowledge of Ismaʿili doctrines. Secondly, the paper highlights a number of commonalities and shared terminology between the cosmology, epistemology, and doctrine of prophecy in al-Ghazālī’s Mishkāt al-anwār and the Ismaʿili doctrines of Nāṣir-i Khusraw, revealing how the two thinkers understand the cosmos as containing precisely ‘two worlds’, emphasize the correspondence between the spiritual and physical realms, and conceive the faculty of prophecy as a higher supra-intellectual spirit or ‘eye’ of perception. Thirdly, the paper revisits the scholarly debate concerning al-Ghazālī’s higher theology and cosmology in the Veils section of the Mishkāt. It demonstrates that al-Ghazālī’s worldview, which places the transcendent God above the First Mover of the Aristotelians and the Necessary Existent of the falāsifa using the Qurʾānic symbolism of Moon and Sun worship, has been appropriated from Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s Ismaʿili Neoplatonic cosmology. (shrink)

In this study, I expound Avicenna's doctrine of truth as it is presented in his Metaphysics of the Healing. My aim is to establish two theses. First, that Avicenna has a rich and systematic metaphysical doctrine of truth that is worked out within the epistemological, ontological, aitiological, and theological investigations of the Ilāhiyyāt. Second, that his doctrine of truth draws upon the accounts of truth he found in his predecessors, and that he amplifies these accounts in light of his own (...) innovative account of the first principles of metaphysics, which he articulates at the outset of his Ilāhiyyāt. I show that these first principles, along with Avicenna's... (shrink)

This paper traces the reception of the Aristotelian definition of time from its earliest to its most authoritative interpretations, and describes how their readings pave the way for a sophisticated amalgamation of divergent Aristotelian and Platonic elements in the temporal theory of Avicenna. The focus of attention lies on specific perceptions of the relation between time and motion, more precisely on the contrary descriptions of time as the measure of motion and motion as the measure of time. The latter leads (...) to a conception of time as a universal self-subsisting substance beyond all measure, and the former to an understanding of time as an accident providing all motion with its particular measure. It is the antagonism between these two conceptions, both inherent in the Arabic term miqdār at the heart of Avicenna’s definition of time, which arguably informs the Latin tradition and thereby also shapes the early modern contrast between objective and subjective theories of time. (shrink)

I will argue that Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s faith-based virtue ethics are crucially different from Aristotle’s virtue ethics, in that their ethics hinges on the theological notion of heaven, which is constitutively independent of the ethical life of the agent. As a result, their faith-based virtue ethics is objectionable. Moreover, I will also argue that the notion of heaven that Avicenna and Aquinas deploy in their moral philosophy is problematic; for it can rationally permit believers to commit morally horrendous actions. Finally, (...) I will present a Kantian notion of heaven which is immune to the aforementioned moral objection. The Kantian notion of heaven, nevertheless, cannot ground any view of ethics as it is constitutively dependent on the ethical life of the agent. (shrink)

In thirteenth-century philosophical psychology, it is commonly held that the powers of the soul, responsible for a living being’s various operations, “flow” from the soul’s essence. The phrase is used systematically by Albert the Great, who imports it from Avicenna. It suggests that the soul, considered as a separate substance, is ontologically distinct from its powers. This is how Albert understands Avicenna, and how modern interpreters understand both Avicenna and Albert. The aim of this paper is to call into question (...) such an understanding, as a reading of Avicenna and as a philosophical doctrine. It argues that an ontological distinction between the soul and its powers isn’t intended in Avicenna, and isn’t successfully established in Albert. It further argues that psychological emanation yields such a distinction only in Aquinas, where the soul is no longer considered a separate substance, but a material form. (shrink)

I reconstruct and analyze al-Ghazali’s arguments defending a plurality of real divine attributes in The Incoherence of the Philosophers. I show that one of these arguments can be made to engage with and defend Jeffrey E. Brower and Michael C. Rea’s “Numerical Sameness Without Identity” model of the Trinity. To that end, I provide some background on the metaphysical commitments at play in al-Ghazali’s arguments.

‘[A] valid concept of “Islam” must denote and connote all possible “Islams,” whether abstract or “real,” mental or social’ (104)... Ahmed seeks to avoid two major pitfalls: (1) making Islam into a static essence or a category within an essentialist framework – such as proscription/prescription, ‘religion’,‘civilization’, ‘culture’, ‘orthodoxy’, etc., and (2) rendering Islam into a totally incoherent concept by conceding that there are as many islams as there are communities or individuals. Ahmed’s thesis (presented in Chapter 5) is that Islam (...) is best conceptualized as a process of meaning-making or hermeneutical engagement in which the human agent engages with the Divine Revelation granted to Muhammad in one or more of this Revelation’s hierarchical dimensions – Pre-Text, Text, and Con-Text – in order to constitute meaning for himself.". (shrink)

This study examines a number of different answers to the question: wheredoes Avicenna demonstrate the existence of God within the Metaphysics of the Healing? Many interpreters have contended that there is an argument for God’s existence in Metaphysics of the Healing I.6–7. In this study I show that such views are incorrect and that the only argument for God’s existence in the Metaphysics of the Healing is found in VIII.1–3. My own interpretation relies upon a careful consideration of the scientific (...) order and first principles of the Metaphysics of the Healing, paying attention to Avicenna’s own explicit statements concerning the goals andintentions of different books and chapters, and a close analysis of the structure ofthe different arguments found in the relevant texts of the Metaphysics of the Healing. I conclude that Avicenna’s explicit goal in I.6–7 is to establish the properties that belong to necessary existence and possible existence, which consists, not in ademonstration of God’s existence, but in a dialectical treatment of the first principlesof metaphysics. (shrink)

This study is the first comprehensive analysis of the physical theory of the Islamic philosopher Avicenna (d. 1037). It seeks to understand his contribution against the developments within the preceding Greek and Arabic intellectual milieus, and to appreciate his philosophy as such by emphasising his independence as a critical and systematic thinker. Exploring Avicenna’s method of "teaching and learning," it investigates the implications of his account of the natural body as a three-dimensionally extended composite of matter and form, and examines (...) his views on nature as a principle of motion and his analysis of its relation to soul. Moreover, it demonstrates how Avicenna defends the Aristotelian conception of place against the strident criticism of his predecessors, among other things, by disproving the existence of void and space. Finally, it sheds new light on Avicenna’s account of the essence and the existence of time. For the first time taking into account the entire range of Avicenna’s major writings, this study fills a gap in our understanding both of the history of natural philosophy in general and of the philosophy of Avicenna in particular. (shrink)

Avicenna : Logic Avicenna is one of the most important philosophers and logicians in the Arabic world. His logical works are presented in several treatises. Some of them are commentaries on Aristotle's Organon, and are presented in al-Shifa al-Mantiq, the logical part of … Continue reading Avicenna : Logic →.

The author presents a critical edition of the Latin treatise De mineralibus, which was generally attributed to Aristotle in the Middle Ages, but is in fact an abridgement of two chapters from Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifā’ compiled and translated from Arabic by Alfred of Sareshill, who put them at the end of the Liber metheororum, the first Latin version of Aristotle’s Meteorology. De mineralibus is transmitted by more than a hundred manuscripts. The edition is based on the complete collation of ten (...) witnesses of the text, selected according the stemma codicum proposed in vol. X.1 of Aristoteles Latinus, in which part IV of the Liber metheororum has been published. In addition to the editorial criteria, the author presents and discusses some peculiarities of Alfred’s Arabic-Latin translation. The edition is accompanied by Latin-Arabic and Arabic-Latin glossaries. (shrink)

In his Kitāb al-Burhān, Avicenna discusses a theoretical framework broadly inspired by Aristotle's Posterior Analytics which brings together logic, epistemology and metaphysics. One of the central questions explored in the book is the problem of the relation between knowledge, certainty and causal explanation. Burhān 1.8, in particular, is devoted to the analysis of how certainty comes about in causal as opposed to non-causal contexts. The distinction is understood in Avicenna's system as one between cases in which the conclusion of an (...) argument is warranted only in virtue of an appropriate middle term, and cases in which there is no such intermediary because the predicative link between subject and predicate of the conclusion is immediate. In this context, Avicenna makes use of the case of relative terms to clarify certain crucial aspects of his theory. The paper explores this discussion and shows how Avicenna's account of the relatively marginal role of relatives in the context of demonstration depends on insights that are central to his metaphysics and epistemology. (shrink)

Some authors have proposed that Avicenna considers mathematical objects, i.e., geometric shapes and numbers, to be mental existents completely separated from matter. In this paper, I will show that this description, though not completely wrong, is misleading. Avicenna endorses, I will argue, some sort of literalism, potentialism, and finitism.

In his article on the foundations of Ficino’s ideas on magic, James Hankins observes that, where Ficino justifies non-material causation in the universe, he is heavily indebted to Avicenna. As Hankins also points out, this Avicennan idea clearly violates the Aristotelian maxim that ‘physical causation requires contact’. Because Avicenna holds the view that the soul is neither a physical entity nor simply the form of body, Avicenna’s consent to the soul to manipulate material objects means assignment of the soul to (...) perform actions upon physical nature. According to Hankins, this consent resorts to a vertical connectivity between physical objects and the human soul. However, we do not see in Hankins’s argument how this connection can occur according to Avicenna and on what grounds Avicenna lets the soul cause changes on material objects. How does this non-material causation take place? (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that Thomas Aquinas offers an alternative model of abstraction (the Active Principle Model) that overcomes the standard objections to abstractionism and expands our view of what an abstractionist theory might look like. I contend that this alternative model of abstraction has been invisible in plain sight, in Aquinas’s references to the mind’s abstractive mechanism as an “intellectual light.” Such language is not metaphorical but rather technical, signaling that intellectual abstraction is to be modeled on (...) the activity of physical light as he understood it from theories proposed by Avicenna and Averroes. The Active Principle Model requires us to rethink Aquinas’s account of how we come to know essences—a process that turns out to be much more tentative and incremental than previously thought. (shrink)

This essay expounds Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of being and examine the function it plays in his Metaphysics of the Healing. In the first part addresses the question: What is Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of being? The essay begins by situating Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of being within the epistemological framework of his account of metaphysics as an Aristotelian science. It then explicates Avicenna’s own presentation of analogy within his account of names of univocity, analogy, resemblance, and (...) equivocity, and elucidates his division of absolute and relational analogies. The second part probes the question: Is Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of being consistent with his account of the subject of metaphysics as being qua being? This part shows why Avicenna rejects that being is univocal and presents two ways for interpreting consistently his doctrine of the analogical character of being qua being. (shrink)

In his Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna presents his ideas about the destiny of the human soul in the afterlife. Considered philosophically, the afterlife is intellectual. The human soul achieves perfection by becoming an intellectual world in which the whole of reality may be reflected. Analysing the meaning of this statement helps to elucidate not only how Avicenna conceives intellectual pleasure in the afterlife, but also how he characterizes the very process of knowledge. Intertwined therewith are at least two important (...) subjects, richly illuminated by recent medieval historiographical research: ‘intellectual’ or ‘mental felicity’ and knowledge as conjunction with the agent intellect. (shrink)

Avicenna develops a highly original account of memory as one of the five internal senses. In this paper, I briefly reconstruct this conception and evaluate its influence on the faculty psychology which emerged in the Latin West from the 12th century onwards. Particular attention is paid to Thomas Aquinas’s harsh criticism of Avicenna’s denial of intellectual memory, which touches on several epistemological, anthropological and theological issues.

After having developed his theory of being, the causes and theology, Avicenna studies in chapter 7 of book IX of Philosophia prima the end of human beings. In this paper I analyze Avicenna’s considerations from a metaphysical perspective, and the importance that metaphysics has in the education of human desire. This education must be developed on metaphysical grounds because human being’s most proper desire does not match that of our sensitive desires. This kind of desire is not immediate to our (...) sensory experience, but is known through the arguments placed at the end of the Metaphysics. Thus, metaphysics as an essential feature of the education of human desire might allow us to distinguish different kinds of men. This attitude leads to the classification between ordinary souls and holy souls, i.e. those which enjoy the pleasure of knowledge and those which not. (shrink)

In _Doubts on Avicenna_, Ayman Shihadeh offers an extended study and critical edition of Sharaf al-Dīn al-Masʿūdī’s _al-Mabāḥith wa-l-Shukūk_, a key and hitherto unstudied source for twelfth-century Arabic philosophy. This text inaugurates the long commentarial tradition on Avicenna’s _Ishārāt_.