Axiomatic Truth

The conventional notion of a formal system is adapted to conform to the sound deductive inference model operating on finite strings. Finite strings stipulated to have the semantic value of Boolean true provide the sound deductive premises. Truth preserving finite string transformation rules provide the valid deductive inference. Sound deductive conclusions are the result of these finite string transformation rules.

William Boos (1943–2014) was a mathematician, set theorist, and philosopher. His work is at the intersection of these fields. In particular, Boos looks at the classic problems of epistemology through the lens of the axiomatic method in mathematics and physics, or something resembling that method.

En ' Godel’s Way ', tres eminentes científicos discuten temas como la indecisión, la incompleta, la aleatoriedad, la computabilidad y la paraconsistencia. Me acerco a estas cuestiones desde el punto de vista de Wittgensteinian de que hay dos cuestiones básicas que tienen soluciones completamente diferentes. Existen las cuestiones científicas o empíricas, que son hechos sobre el mundo que necesitan ser investigados observacionalmente y cuestiones filosóficas en cuanto a cómo el lenguaje se puede utilizar inteligiblemente (que incluyen ciertas preguntas en matemáticas (...) y lógica), que necesitan decidirse por unt cómo realmente usar palabras en contextos concretos. Cuando tenemos claro sobre qué juego de idiomas estamos jugando, estos temas son vistos como preguntas científicas y matemáticas ordinarias como cualquier otra. Las percepciones de Wittgenstein rara vez se han igualado y nunca superado y son tan pertinentes hoy como lo fueron hace 80 años cuando dictó los libros azul y marrón. A pesar de sus fallas — realmente una serie de notas en lugar de un libro terminado —, esta es una fuente única de la obra de estos tres eruditos famosos que han estado trabajando en los bordes sangrantes de la física, las matemáticas y la filosofía durante más de medio siglo. Da Costa y Doria son citados por Wolpert (ver abajo o mis artículos sobre Wolpert y mi reseña de ' los límites de la razón ' de Yanofsky) desde que escribieron en el cómputo universal, y entre sus muchos logros, da Costa es pionera en paraconsistencia. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019, Entender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política y Economía y Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein,. (shrink)

Sets are central to mathematics and its foundations, but what are they? In this book Luca Incurvati provides a detailed examination of all the major conceptions of set and discusses their virtues and shortcomings, as well as introducing the fundamentals of the alternative set theories with which these conceptions are associated. He shows that the conceptual landscape includes not only the naïve and iterative conceptions but also the limitation of size conception, the definite conception, the stratified conception and the graph (...) conception. In addition, he presents a novel, minimalist account of the iterative conception which does not require the existence of a relation of metaphysical dependence between a set and its members. His book will be of interest to researchers and advanced students in logic and the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

The conventional notion of a formal system is adapted to conform to the sound deductive inference model operating on finite strings. Finite strings stipulated to have the semantic property of Boolean true provide the sound deductive premises. Truth preserving finite string transformation rules provide valid the deductive inference. Conclusions of sound arguments are derived from truth preserving finite string transformations applied to true premises.

Could the intersection of [formal proofs of mathematical logic] and [sound deductive inference] specify formal systems having [deductively sound formal proofs of mathematical logic]? -/- All that we have to do to provide [deductively sound formal proofs of mathematical logic] is select the subset of conventional [formal proofs of mathematical logic] having true premises and now we have [deductively sound formal proofs of mathematical logic].

Both Tarski and Gödel “prove” that provability can diverge from Truth. When we boil their claim down to its simplest possible essence it is really claiming that valid inference from true premises might not always derive a true consequence. This is obviously impossible.

To eliminate incompleteness, undecidability and inconsistency from formal systems we only need to convert the formal proofs to theorem consequences of symbolic logic to conform to the sound deductive inference model. -/- Within the sound deductive inference model there is a (connected sequence of valid deductions from true premises to a true conclusion) thus unlike the formal proofs of symbolic logic provability cannot diverge from truth.

This paper investigates a set of issues connected with the so-called conservativeness argument against deflationism. Although I do not defend that argument, I think the discussion of it has raised some interesting questions about whether what I call “compositional principles,” such as “a conjunction is true iff its conjuncts are true,” have substantial content or are in some sense logically trivial. The paper presents a series of results that purport to show that the compositional principles for a first-order language, taken (...) together, have substantial logical strength, amounting to a kind of abstract consistency statement. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that a deflationist theory of truth must conservatively extend any base theory to which it is added. But when applied to arithmetic, it's argued, the imposition of a conservativeness requirement leads to a serious objection to deflationism: for the Gödel sentence for Peano Arithmetic is not a theorem of PA, but becomes one when PA is extended by adding plausible principles governing truth. This paper argues that no such objection succeeds. The issue turns on how we understand (...) the notion of logical consequence implicit in any conservativeness requirement, and whether we possess a categorical conception of the natural numbers. I offer a disjunctive response: if we possess a categorical conception of arithmetic, then deflationists have principled reason to accept a rich notion of logical consequence according to which the Gödel sentence follows from PA. But if we do not, then the reasons for requiring the derivation of the Gödel sentence lapse, and deflationists are free to accept a conservativeness requirement stated proof-theoretically. Either way, deflationism is in the clear. (shrink)

Deflationists argue that ‘true’ is merely a logico-linguistic device for expressing blind ascriptions and infinite generalisations. For this reason, some authors have argued that deflationary truth must be conservative, i.e. that a deflationary theory of truth for a theory S must not entail sentences in S’s language that are not already entailed by S. However, it has been forcefully argued that any adequate theory of truth for S must be non-conservative and that, for this reason, truth cannot be deflationary :493–521, (...) 1998; Ketland in Mind 108:69–94, 1999). We consider two defences of conservative deflationism, respectively proposed by Waxman :429–463, 2017) and Tennant :551–582, 2002), and argue that they are both unsuccessful. In Waxman’s hands, deflationists are committed either to a non-purely expressive notion of truth, or to a conception of mathematics that does not allow them to justifiably exclude non-conservative theories of truth. Tennant’s conservative deflationism fares no better: if deflationist truth must be conservative over arithmetic, it can be shown to collapse into a non-conservative variety of deflationism. (shrink)

Contextualist approaches to the Liar Paradox postulate the occurrence of a context shift in the course of the Liar reasoning. In particular, according to the contextualist proposal advanced by Charles Parsons and Michael Glanzberg, the Liar sentence L doesn’t express a true proposition in the initial context of reasoning c, but expresses a true one in a new, richer context c', where more propositions are available for expression. On the further assumption that Liar sentences involve propositional quantifiers whose domains may (...) vary with context, the Liar reasoning is blocked. But why should context shift? We argue that the paradox involves principles of contextualist reflection that explain, by analogy with well-known reflection principles for arithmetic, why context must shift from c to c' in the course of the Liar reasoning. This provides a diagnosis of the Liar Paradox—one that equally applies to two revenge arguments against contextualist approaches, one recently advanced by Andrew Bacon, the other mentioned by Charles Parsons and more recently revived by Cory Juhl. (shrink)

This paper gives a definition of self-reference on the basis of the dependence relation given by Leitgeb (2005), and the dependence digraph by Beringer & Schindler (2015). Unlike the usual discussion about self-reference of paradoxes centering around Yablo's paradox and its variants, I focus on the paradoxes of finitary characteristic, which are given again by use of Leitgeb's dependence relation. They are called 'locally finite paradoxes', satisfying that any sentence in these paradoxes can depend on finitely many sentences. I prove (...) that all locally finite paradoxes are self-referential in the sense that there is a directed cycle in their dependence digraphs. This paper also studies the 'circularity dependence' of paradoxes, which was introduced by Hsiung (2014). I prove that the locally finite paradoxes have circularity dependence in the sense that they are paradoxical only in the digraph containing a proper cycle. The proofs of the two results are based directly on König's infinity lemma. In contrast, this paper also shows that Yablo's paradox and its nested variant are non-self-referential, and neither McGee's paradox nor the omega-cycle liar paradox has circularity dependence. (shrink)

Abstract The Theory of Computation in its existed form is based on Church –Turing Thesis. Throughout this paper, we show that the Turing computation model of this theory leads us to a contradiction. In brief, by applying a well-known paradox (Unexpected hanging paradox) we show a contradiction in the Theory when we consider the Turing model as our Computation model.

This chapter describes Kurt Gödel's paper on the incompleteness theorems. Gödel's incompleteness results are two of the most fundamental and important contributions to logic and the foundations of mathematics. It had been assumed that first-order number theory is complete in the sense that any sentence in the language of number theory would be either provable from the axioms or refutable. Gödel's first incompleteness theorem showed that this assumption was false: it states that there are sentences of number theory that are (...) neither provable nor refutable. The first theorem is general in the sense that it applies to any axiomatic theory, which is ω-consistent, has an effective proof procedure, and is strong enough to represent basic arithmetic. Their importance lies in their generality: although proved specifically for extensions of system, the method Gödel used is applicable in a wide variety of circumstances. Gödel's results had a profound influence on the further development of the foundations of mathematics. It pointed the way to a reconceptualization of the view of axiomatic foundations. (shrink)

Internal Logic brings together several threads of Yvon Gauthier's work on the foundations of mathematics and revisits his attempt to, as he puts it, radicalize Hilbert's Program. A radicalization of Hilbert's Program, I take it, is supposed to take Hilberts' finitary viewpoint more seriously than other attempts to salvage Hilbert's Program have. Such a return to the "roots of Hilbert's metamathematical idea" will, so claims Gauthier, enable him to save Hilbert's Program.

Hilbert’s program was an ambitious and wide-ranging project in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In order to “dispose of the foundational questions in mathematics once and for all,” Hilbert proposed a two-pronged approach in 1921: first, classical mathematics should be formalized in axiomatic systems; second, using only restricted, “finitary” means, one should give proofs of the consistency of these axiomatic systems. Although Gödel’s incompleteness theorems show that the program as originally conceived cannot be carried out, it had many partial (...) successes, and generated important advances in logical theory and metatheory, both at the time and since. The article discusses the historical background and development of Hilbert’s program, its philosophical underpinnings and consequences, and its subsequent development and influences since the 1930s. (shrink)

David Hilbert's finitistic standpoint is a conception of elementary number theory designed to answer the intuitionist doubts regarding the security and certainty of mathematics. Hilbert was unfortunately not exact in delineating what that viewpoint was, and Hilbert himself changed his usage of the term through the 1920s and 30s. The purpose of this paper is to outline what the main problems are in understanding Hilbert and Bernays on this issue, based on some publications by them which have so far received (...) little attention, and on a number of philosophical reconstructions of the viewpoint (in particular, by Hand, Kitcher, and Tait). (shrink)

We study the relationships between two clusters of axiomatizations of Kripke’s fixed-point models for languages containing a self-applicable truth predicate. The first cluster is represented by what we will call ‘\-like’ theories, originating in recent work by Halbach and Horsten, whose axioms and rules are all valid in fixed-point models; the second by ‘\-like’ theories first introduced by Solomon Feferman, that lose this property but reflect the classicality of the metatheory in which Kripke’s construction is carried out. We show that (...) to any natural system in one cluster—corresponding to natural variations on induction schemata—there is a corresponding system in the other proving the same sentences true, addressing a problem left open by Halbach and Horsten and accomplishing a suitably modified version of the project sketched by Reinhardt aiming at an instrumental reading of classical theories of self-applicable truth. (shrink)

This book analyses and defends the deflationist claim that there is nothing deep about our notion of truth. According to this view, truth is a 'light' and innocent concept, devoid of any essence which could be revealed by scientific inquiry. Cezary Cieśliński considers this claim in light of recent formal results on axiomatic truth theories, which are crucial for understanding and evaluating the philosophical thesis of the innocence of truth. Providing an up-to-date discussion and original perspectives on this central and (...) controversial issue, his book will be important for those with a background in logic who are interested in formal truth theories and in current philosophical debates about the deflationary conception of truth. (shrink)

Deductionism assimilates nature to conceptual artifacts (models, equations), and tacitly holds that real physical systems are such artifacts. Some physical concepts represent properties of deductive systems rather than of nature. Properties of mathematical or deductive systems can thereby sometimes falsely be ascribed to natural systems.

Minimal Type Theory (MTT) is based on type theory in that it is agnostic about Predicate Logic level and expressly disallows the evaluation of incompatible types. It is called Minimal because it has the fewest possible number of fundamental types, and has all of its syntax expressed entirely as the connections in a directed acyclic graph.

Proof by refutation of a geometry theorem that is not universally true produces a Gröbner basis whose elements, called side polynomials, may be used to give inequations that can be added to the hypotheses to give a valid theorem. We show that (in a certain sense) all possible subsidiary conditions are implied by those obtained from the basis; that what we call the kind of truth of the theorem may be derived from the basis; and that the side polynomials may (...) be classified in a useful way. We analyse the relationship between side polynomials and kinds of truth, and we give a unified algorithmic treatment of side polynomials, with examples generated by an implementation. (shrink)

Disquotational theories of truth are often criticised for being too weak to prove interesting generalisations about truth. In this paper we will propose a certain formal theory to serve as a framework for a solution of the generalisation problem. In contrast with Horwich’s original proposal, our framework will eschew psychological notions altogether, replacing them with the epistemic notion of believability. The aim will be to explain why someone who accepts a given disquotational truth theory Th, should also accept various generalisations (...) not provable in Th. The strategy will consist of the development of an axiomatic theory of believability, one permitting us to show how to derive the believability of generalisations from basic axioms that characterise the believability predicate, together with the information that Th is a theory of truth that we accept. (shrink)

This paper makes two claims. Firstly, it shows that thinking the truth of any particular concept (such as politics) is founded upon an instrumental logic that betrays the truth of a situation. Truth cannot be thought ‘of something’, for this would fall back into a theory of correspondence. Instead, truth is a function of thought. In order to make this move to a functional concept of truth, I outline Dewey’s criticism, and two important repercussions, of dogmatically instrumental philosophy. I then (...) show how Badiou’s philosophy is indeed guilty of instrumentalisation, but emphasise that his prioritisation of truth is nevertheless important to maintain. The second claim this paper makes is that the criticism of Deleuze’s conception of truth as circular is misplaced, as it is founded on the assumption that Deleuze conceptualises the truth of objects. Instead, I show that, for Deleuze, truth is not a property of an object but of its production. To reach this conclusion, I develop what I call Dewey’s account of pragmatic instrumentalisation (as opposed to the dogmatic instrumentalisation he criticises) into Deleuze’s conceptualisation of truth as the process of making sense of our precarious world. I conclude by making some provisional remarks that Deleuze’s pragmatic account of truth paves the way for an ethics that is not founded on truths it cannot explain (i.e. God or mathematics), but as an ongoing, subversive practice. (shrink)

By a classical result of Kotlarski, Krajewski and Lachlan, pathological satisfaction classes can be constructed for countable, recursively saturated models of Peano arithmetic. In this paper we consider the question of whether the pathology can be eliminated; we ask in effect what generalities involving the notion of truth can be obtained in a deflationary truth theory (a theory of truth which is conservative over its base). It is shown that the answer depends on the notion of pathology we adopt. It (...) turns out in particular that a certain natural closure condition imposed on a satisfaction class—namely, closure of truth under sentential proofs—generates a nonconservative extension of a syntactic base theory (Peano arithmetic). (shrink)

We present an overview of typed and untyped disquotational truth theories with the emphasis on their (non)conservativity over the base theory of syntax. Two types of conservativity are discussed: syntactic and semantic. We observe in particular that TB—one of the most basic disquotational theories—is not semantically conservative over its base; we show also that an untyped disquotational theory PTB is a syntactically conservative extension of Peano Arithmetic.

One of the popular explications of the deflationary tenet of ‘thinness’ of truth is the conservativeness demand: the declaration that a deflationary truth theory should be conservative over its base. This paper contains a critical discussion and assessment of this demand. We ask and answer the question of whether conservativity forms a part of deflationary doctrines.

This paper expands upon a way in which we might rationally doubt that there are multiple sizes of infinity. The argument draws its inspiration from recent work in the philosophy of truth and philosophy of set theory. More specifically, elements of contextualist theories of truth and multiverse accounts of set theory are brought together in an effort to make sense of Cantor’s troubling theorem. The resultant theory provides an alternative philosophical perspective on the transfinite, but has limited impact on everyday (...) mathematical practice. (shrink)

Mathematical realists have long invoked the categoricity of axiomatizations of arithmetic and analysis to explain how we manage to fix the intended meaning of their respective vocabulary. Can this strategy be extended to set theory? Although traditional wisdom recommends a negative answer to this question, Vann McGee (1997) has offered a proof that purports to show otherwise. I argue that one of the two key assumptions on which the proof rests deprives McGee's result of the significance he and the realist (...) want to attribute to it. I consider two strategies to deal with the problem --- one of which is outlined by McGee himself (2000) --- and argue that both of them fail. I end with some remarks on the prospects for mathematical realism in the light of my discussion. (shrink)

The paper undertakes to characterize Hao Wang's style, convictions, and method as a philosopher, centering on his most important philosophical work From Mathematics to Philosophy, 1974. The descriptive character of Wang's characteristic method is emphasized. Some specific achievements are discussed: his analyses of the concept of set, his discussion, in connection with setting forth Gödel's views, of minds and machines, and his concept of ‘analytic empiricism’ used to criticize Carnap and Quine. Wang's work as interpreter of Gödel's thought and the (...) importance of his writings as a source are also discussed. (shrink)

I discuss a difficulty concerning the justification of the Axiom of Choice in terms of such informal notions such as that of iterative set. A recent attempt to solve the difficulty is by S. Lavine, who claims in his Understanding the Infinite that the axioms of set theory receive intuitive justification from their being self-evidently true in Fin(ZFC), a finite counterpart of set theory. I argue that Lavine's explanatory attempt fails when it comes to AC: in this respect Fin(ZFC) is (...) no better off than the iterative notion. (shrink)

There is no preferred reduction of number theory to set theory. Nonetheless, we confidently accept axioms obtained by substituting formulas from the language of set theory into the induction axiom schema. This is only possible, it is argued, because our acceptance of the induction axioms depends solely on the meanings of aritlunetical and logical terms, which is only possible if our 'intended models' of number theory are standard. Similarly, our acceptance of the second-order natural deduction rules depends solely on the (...) meanings of the logical terms, which implies, it is argued, that our second-order quantifiers have to be standard. (shrink)

Detlefsen (1986) reads Hilbert's program as a sophisticated defense of instrumentalism, but Feferman (1998) has it that Hilbert's program leaves significant ontological questions unanswered. One such question is of the reference of individual number terms. Hilbert's use of admittedly "meaningless" signs for numbers and formulae appears to impair his ability to establish the reference of mathematical terms and the content of mathematical propositions (Weyl (1949); Kitcher (1976)). The paper traces the history and context of Hilbert's reasoning about signs, which illuminates (...) Hilbert's account of mathematical objectivity, axiomatics, idealization, and consistency. (shrink)

This paper puts forward and defends an account of mathematical truth, and in particular an account of the truth of mathematical axioms. The proposal attempts to be completely nonrevisionist. In this connection, it seeks to satisfy simultaneously both horns of Benacerrafs work on informal rigour. Kreisel defends the view that axioms are arrived at by a rigorous examination of our informal notions, as opposed to being stipulated or arrived at by trial and error. This view is then supplemented by a (...) Fregean account of the objectivity and our knowledge of abstract objects. It is then argued that the resulting view faces no insurmountable metaphysical or epistemic obstacles. (shrink)

An interpretation of Wittgenstein’s much criticized remarks on Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem is provided in the light of paraconsistent arithmetic: in taking Gödel’s proof as a paradoxical derivation, Wittgenstein was drawing the consequences of his deliberate rejection of the standard distinction between theory and metatheory. The reasoning behind the proof of the truth of the Gödel sentence is then performed within the formal system itself, which turns out to be inconsistent. It is shown that the features of paraconsistent arithmetics match (...) with some intuitions underlying Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics, such as its strict finitism and the insistence on the decidability of any mathematical question. (shrink)

The present paper suggests relative truth definability as a tool for comparing conceptual aspects of axiomatic theories of truth and gives an overview of recent developments of axiomatic theories of truth in the light of it. We also show several new proof-theoretic results via relative truth definability including a complete answer to the conjecture raised by Feferman in [13].

What counts as an intuitively plausible set theoretic content (notion, axiom or theorem) has been a matter of much debate in contemporary philosophy of mathematics. In this paper I develop a critical appraisal of the issue. I analyze first R. B. Jensen's positions on the epistemic status of the axiom of constructibility. I then formulate and discuss a view of intuitiveness in set theory that assumes it to hinge basically on mathematical success. At the same time, I present accounts of (...) set theoretic axioms and theorems formulated in non-strictly mathematical terms, e.g., by appealing to the iterative concept of set and/or to overall methodological principles, like unify and maximize, and investigate the relation of the latter to success in mathematics. (shrink)

Answering a question formulated by Halbach (2009), I show that a disquotational truth theory, which takes as axioms all positive substitutions of the sentential T-schema, together with all instances of induction in the language with the truth predicate, is conservative over its syntactical base.

A disagrees with B with respect to a proposition, p, flawlessly just in case A believes p and B believes not-p, or vice versa, though neither A nor B is guilty of a cognitive shortcoming – i.e. roughly, neither A nor B is being irrational, lacking evidence relevant to p, conceptually incompetent, insufficiently imaginative, etc.

On the basis of a wide range of historical examples various features of axioms are discussed in relation to their use in mathematical practice. A very general framework for this discussion is provided, and it is argued that axioms can play many roles in mathematics and that viewing them as self-evident truths does not do justice to the ways in which mathematicians employ axioms. Possible origins of axioms and criteria for choosing axioms are also examined. The distinctions introduced aim at (...) clarifying discussions in philosophy of mathematics and contributing towards a more refined view of mathematical practice. (shrink)