About this topic
Summary One of the central debates in the philosophy of time is between the A-theorists and the B-theorists. These unhelpful labels can be traced back to John McTaggart's distinction between the A-series and the B-series.  According to the B-theory of time, the present is not metaphysically distinguished in any way from past and future times. Just as there is nothing metaphysically special about, say, London as opposed to Sydney, the B-theorist maintains that there is nothing metaphysically special about the present moment as opposed to, say, the year 1847 or 2157. Some B-theorists deny that time really flows or passes, while others argue that passage can be accommodated within a framework where all times are metaphysically on par. The A-theory of time, in contrast, maintains that the present is metaphysically privileged in some way and the properties of being past, being present and being future are fundamental to the nature of time.
Key works Two classic papers presenting and defending the B-theory of time are Williams 1951 and Smart 1963. D. H. Mellor is one of the most influential defenders of the B-theory. See his Mellor 1981 and Mellor 1998.  An important collection of papers defending the B-theory is Oaklander & Smith 1994.
Introductions For good introductions to the B-theory of time, see Markosian 2010 and Smart 2008.
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  1. added 2020-04-14
    The Situationalist Account of Change.Martin Pickup - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.
    In this paper I propose a new solution to the problem of change: situationalism. According to this view, parts of reality fundamentally disagree about what is the case and reality as a whole is unsettled (i.e. metaphysically indeterminate). When something changes, parts of the world irreconcilably disagree about what properties it has. From this irreconcilable disagreement, indeterminacy arises. I develop this picture using situations, which are parts of possible worlds; this gives it the name situationalism. It allows a B-theory endurance (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-03
    Comments on Zimmerman.Elisa Paganini - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):459-462.
    Dean Zimmerman focuses on the debate between a serious‐tenser B‐theorist and an eternalist A‐theorist concerning truth and truth‐conditions of tensed propositions. According to Zimmerman, the only way for the A‐theorist to distinguish herself from the B‐theorist is to argue for the non‐relative truth of tensed propositions denying some aspects of the doctrine of temporal parts. I claim instead that the A‐theorist can argue for the non‐relative truth of tensed propositions adopting tensed truth‐conditions incompatible with the B‐theorist's hypotheses.
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  3. added 2020-03-15
    On the Plurality of Times: Disunified Time and the A-Series.Ryan Nefdt - 2013 - South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):249-260.
    In this paper, I investigate the nature of the metaphysical possibility of disunified time. A possibility that I argue presents unique problems for those who adhere to a strict A-theory of time, particularly those A-theorists who propose a presentist view. The first part of the paper discusses various arguments against the coherence of the concept of disunified time. I attempt to discount each of these objections and show that disunified time is indeed a possible and consistent topology of time. Then, (...)
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  4. added 2020-03-13
    Causation and Time Reversal.Matt Farr - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (1):177-204.
    What would it be for a process to happen backwards in time? Would such a process involve different causal relations? It is common to understand the time-reversal invariance of a physical theory in causal terms, such that whatever can happen forwards in time can also happen backwards in time. This has led many to hold that time-reversal symmetry is incompatible with the asymmetry of cause and effect. This article critiques the causal reading of time reversal. First, I argue that the (...)
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  5. added 2020-01-18
    Temporal Phenomena, Ontology and the R-Theory.L. Nathan Oaklander - 2015 - Metaphysica 16 (2):253–269.
    One of the more serious criticisms of the B-theory is that by denying the passage of time or maintaining that passage is a mind-dependent illusion or appearance, the B-theory gives rise to a static, block universe and thereby removes what is most distinctively timelike about time. The aim of this paper is to discuss the R-theory of time, after Russell, who Richard Gale calls “the father of the B-theory,” and explain how the R-theory can respond to the criticisms just raised, (...)
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  6. added 2019-12-15
    Two Fundamentally Different Perspectives on Time.Jesse Mulder - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (3):295-320.
    Frege taught us how to understand one form of predication: an atemporal one. There is also a different, temporal form of predication, which I briefly introduce. Accordingly, there are two fundamentally different approaches to time: a reductive one, aiming to account for time in terms of Frege’s atemporal predication, and a non-reductive one, insisting that the temporal form of predication is sui generis, and that time is to be understood in its terms. I do not directly argue for or against (...)
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  7. added 2019-12-08
    McTaggart Saves Schrodinger's Cat?Paul Merriam - manuscript
    This paper proposes an interpretation of time that is an 'A-theory' in that it incorporates both McTaggart's A-series and his B-series. The A-series characteristics are supposed to be 'ontologically private' analogous to qualia in the Inverted Spectrum thought experiment and is given a definition. The main idea is that the experimenter and the cat do not share the same A-series characteristics. So there is no single time at which the cat gets ascribed different states. It is proposed one may define (...)
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  8. added 2019-12-05
    From Spacetime to Space and Time: A Reply to Markosian.Baptiste Le Bihan - forthcoming - Analysis.
    In a recent article, Ned Markosian gives an argument against four-dimensionalism understood as the view that time is one of four identical dimensions that constitute a single four-dimensional manifold. In this paper, I show that Markosian attacks a straw man as his argument targets a theory known to be false on empirical grounds. Four-dimensionalism rightly conceived in no way entails that time is identical to space. I then address two objections raised by Markosian against four-dimensionalism rightly conceived.
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  9. added 2019-11-15
    Time, Physics, and Philosophy: It's All Relative.Sam Baron - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (1).
    This article provides a non-technical overview of the conflict between the special theory of relativity and the dynamic theories of time. The chief argument against dynamic theories of time from relativistic mechanics is presented. The space of current responses to that argument is subsequently mapped.
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  10. added 2019-11-06
    Time Series and Non-Reductive Physicalism.Matias Kimi Slavov - 2019 - KronoScope: Journal for the Study of Time 19 (1):25-38.
    McTaggart famously introduced the A- and B-series as rival metaphysical accounts of time. This paper shall reorient the debate over the original distinction. Instead of treating the series as competing theories about the nature of time, it will be argued that they are different viewpoints on a world that is fundamentally physical. To that end, non-reductive physicalism is proposed to reconcile the series.
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  11. added 2019-10-19
    Does the Temporal Asymmetry of Value Support a Tensed Metaphysics?Alison Fernandes - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    There are temporal asymmetries in our attitudes towards the past and future. For example, we judge that a given amount of work is worth twice as much if it is described as taking place in the future, compared to the past :796–801, 2008). Does this temporal value asymmetry support a tensed metaphysics? By getting clear on the asymmetry’s features, I’ll argue that it doesn’t. To support a tensed metaphysics, the value asymmetry would need to not vary with temporal distance, apply (...)
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  12. added 2019-09-26
    The Delusive Illusion of Passage.Emiliano Boccardi & Federico Perelda - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):387-396.
    We argue that the view that we misperceive time as passing is self-undermining.
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  13. added 2019-09-09
    Qu'est-ce que le temps ?Baptiste Le Bihan - 2019 - Paris: Vrin.
    La philosophie contemporaine du temps voit s’affronter deux conceptions du temps : celle du devenir qui identifie la réalité naturelle à un présent en constant renouvellement et celle de l’univers-bloc qui assimile la réalité naturelle à un espace-temps étendu dans quatre dimensions. Cette dernière approche implique notamment que les événements qui nous semblent passés et futurs sont tout aussi réels que les événements présents et que les êtres humains, bien que mortels, sont des êtres éternels. L’auteur défend cette théorie de (...)
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  14. added 2019-08-10
    Primitive Directionality and Diachronic Grounding.Naoyuki Kajimoto, Kristie Miller & James Norton - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-17.
    Eternalists believe that there is no ontological difference between the past, present and future. Thus, a challenge arises: in virtue of what does time have a direction? Some eternalists (including Maudlin (2007), Oaklander (2012) and Tegtmeier (1996; 2009; 2014; 2016)) argue that the direction of time is primitive. A natural response to positing primitive directionality is the suspicion that said posit is too mysterious to do any explanatory work. The aim of this paper is to relieve primitive directionality of some (...)
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  15. added 2019-07-28
    Do the Folk Represent Time as Essentially Dynamical?Andrew James Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - manuscript
    Recent research (Latham, Miller and Norton, forthcoming) reveals that a majority of people represent actual time as dynamical. But do they, as suggested by McTaggart and Gödel, represent time as essentially dynamical? This paper distinguishes three interrelated questions. We ask (a) whether the folk representation of time is sensitive or insensitive: i.e., does what satisfies the folk representation of time in counterfactual worlds depend on what satisfies it actually—sensitive—or does is not depend on what satisfies it actually—insensitive, and (b) do (...)
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  16. added 2019-07-09
    An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time.Sam Baron & Kristie Miller - 2018 - Cambridge: Polity Press.
    Time is woven into the fabric of our lives. Everything we do, we do in and across time. It is not just that our lives are stretched out in time, from the moment of birth to the moment of our death. It is that our lives are stories. We make sense of ourselves, today, by understanding who we were yesterday, and the day before, and the day before that; by understanding what we did and why we did it. Our memories (...)
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  17. added 2019-07-09
    Feel the Flow.Sam Baron - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):609-630.
    The experience of temporal flow is, for many, the central—if not the only—reason for believing an A-theory of time. Recently, however, B-theorists have argued that experience does not, in fact, favor the A-theory. Call such an argument: a debunking argument. The goal of the present paper is to defend the A-theory against two prominent versions of the debunking argument.
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  18. added 2019-07-09
    Time, Language, and Ontology: The World From the B-Theoretic Perspective.M. Joshua Mozersky - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    This book brings together an account of the structure of time with an account of our language and thought about time. It is a wide-ranging examination of recent issues in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science and presents a compelling picture of the relationship of human beings to the spatiotemporal world.
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  19. added 2019-07-09
    Are There ‘Tensed’ Facts ?Edmund Runggaldier - 2006 - In Michael Stöltzner & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), Time and History: Proceedings of the 28. International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 2005. De Gruyter. pp. 77-84.
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  20. added 2019-07-09
    Real Time.David H. Sanford - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):289.
  21. added 2019-06-16
    One Thing After Another: Why the Passage of Time Is Not an Illusion.Natalja Deng - 2019 - In Adrian Bardon, Valtteri Arstila, Sean Power & Argiro Vatakis (eds.), The Illusions of Time: Philosophical and Psychological Essays on Timing and Time Perception. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Does time seem to pass, even though it doesn’t, really? Many philosophers think the answer is ‘Yes’—at least when ‘time’s passing’ is understood in a particular way. They take time’s passing to be a process by which each time in turn acquires a special status, such as the status of being the only time that exists, or being the only time that is present. This chapter suggests that, on the contrary, all we perceive is temporal succession, one thing after another, (...)
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  22. added 2019-06-06
    Should a B‐Theoretic Atheist Fear Death?Mikel Burley - 2008 - Ratio 21 (3):260-272.
    This article discusses Robin Le Poidevin's proposal that a commitment to the B‐theory of time provides atheists with a reason to relinquish the fear of death. For the purposes of the article, I grant Le Poidevin's assertion that the B‐theory gives us a sense in which our lives are ‘eternally real’; but I deny that the B‐theorist is entitled to regard this as sufficient to furnish a reason to cease fearing death. This is because, according to the most prevalent B‐theoretic (...)
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  23. added 2019-06-06
    Heidegger’s B-Theoretic Phenomenology.David J. Schenk - 2006 - International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):219-233.
    In this paper I explain the basics of Heidegger’s early Daseinanalytik, an account that contains promising insights for the phenomenology of time. I then draw out some of the relevant lessons from his phenomenology for the debate between A-theorists andB-theorists in contemporary analytic philosophy of time, and I show how it is that he gives a more philosophically satisfying account of the phenomenological features of becoming than one generally finds in the analytic debate. In Heidegger’s theory, becoming is not some (...)
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  24. added 2019-06-06
    The A‐Theory of Time, The B‐Theory of Time, and ‘Taking Tense Seriously’.Dean W. Zimmerman - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):401-457.
    The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosophy of propositional attitudes, worthy of the name ‘taking tense seriously’; and I distinguish it from a family of views in the metaphysics of time, namely, the A‐theories. Once the distinction is in focus, a skeptical worry arises. Some A‐theorists maintain that the difference between past, present, and future, is to be drawn in terms of what exists: growing‐block theorists eschew ontological commitment to future entities; presentists, (...)
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  25. added 2019-06-06
    Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future. [REVIEW]Alexander R. Pruss - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (1):199-201.
    There is a basic dividing line in the philosophy of time. According to the B-theory, we can describe the temporal reality of the world with freely repeatable sentences, using designators of fixed times and relations such as "earlier" and "later." The A-theory contends that there is an ontological feature of the world which is described by explicitly tensed statements such as "I am now writing this review," and which is not captured by any B-theoretic statements such as "I write this (...)
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  26. added 2019-06-06
    Philosophy and Scientific Realism.J. J. C. Smart - 1963 - Routledge.
    Originally published in 1963. In an introductory chapter the author argues that philosophy ought to be more than the art of clarifying thought and that it should concern itself with outlining a scientifically plausible world view. Early chapters deal with phenomenalism and the reality of theoretical entities, and with the relation between the physical and biological sciences. Free will, issues of time and space and man’s place in nature are covered in later chapters.
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  27. added 2019-06-03
    What Experience Cannot Teach Us About Time.Akiko M. Frischhut - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):143-155.
    Does the A-theory have an intuitive advantage over the B-theory? Many A-theorists have claimed so, arguing that their theory has a much better explanation for the fact that we all experience the passage of time: we experience time as passing because time really does pass. In this paper I expose and reject the argument behind the A-theorist’s claim. I argue that all parties have conceded far too easily that there is an experience that needs explaining in the first place. For (...)
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  28. added 2019-03-18
    Towards a C Theory of Time: An Appraisal of the Physics and Metaphysics of Time Direction.Matt Farr - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Bristol
    This thesis introduces and defends a ‘C theory’ of time. The metaphysics of time literature is primarily concerned with the distinction between the A and B theories of time, with the disagreement concerning whether the passage of time is an objective feature of reality. I argue that the distinction between the B and C theories—in terms of whether time has a ‘privileged’ direction—is of more obvious relevance to the philosophy of physics than is the distinction between the A and B (...)
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  29. added 2019-01-26
    On Whether B-Theoretic Atheists Should Fear Death.Natalja Deng - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1011-1021.
    In this paper I revisit a dispute between Mikel Burley and Robin Le Poidevin about whether or not the B-theory of time can give its adherents any reason to be less afraid of death. In ‘Should a B-theoretic atheist fear death?’, Burley argues that even on Le Poidevin’s understanding of the B-theory, atheists shouldn’t be comforted. His reason is that the prevalent B-theoretic account of our attitudes towards the past and future precludes treating our fear of death as unwarranted. I (...)
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  30. added 2018-12-08
    The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts.John Cusbert & Kristie Miller - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):410-432.
    The A-theory and the B-theory advance competing claims about how time is grounded. The A-theory says that A-facts are more fundamental in grounding time than are B-facts, and the B-theory says the reverse. We argue that whichever theory is true of the actual world is also true of all possible worlds containing time. We do this by arguing that time is uniquely groundable: however time is actually grounded, it is necessarily grounded in that way. It follows that if either the (...)
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  31. added 2018-11-28
    Eternal God: Divine Atemporality in Thomas Aquinas.John H. Boyer - 2014 - In Darci N. Hill (ed.), News from the Raven: Essays from Sam Houston State University on Medieval and Renaissance Thought. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: pp. 262-285.
    The recent trend among many philosophers of religion has been to interpret divine eternity as an everlasting temporality in which an omnitemporal God exists in and throughout the whole of time. This is in contrast to the classical account of divine eternity as atemporal, immutable existence. In this paper, Aquinas' use of Boethius's definition of eternity as “the whole, perfect, and simultaneous possession of endless life” is analyzed and explained in contradistinction to Aristotle's definition of time. This analysis is then (...)
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  32. added 2018-11-22
    The Elusive Appearance of Time.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rognvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. pp. 304–316.
    In this paper I explain why philosophers have thought that the primary feature of our experience of time is that it is tensed and transitory, offer some reasons to doubt that time appears to us primarily in that way, and suggest instead that the main component of our experience of a temporal reality is of enduring objects in flux.
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  33. added 2018-09-26
    The Elements and Patterns of Being: Essays in Metaphysics.A. R. J. Fisher (ed.) - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Donald C. Williams was a key figure in the development of analytic philosophy. This book will be the definitive source for his highly original work, which did much to bring metaphysics back into fashion. It presents six classic papers and six previously unpublished, revealing his full philosophical vision for the first time.
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  34. added 2018-07-29
    Too Many Conceptions of Time? McTaggart's Views Revisited.Gregor Schiemann & Brigitte Falkenburg - 2016 - In Stamatios Gerogiorgaki (ed.), Time and Tense (Basic Philosophical Concepts).
    John Ellis McTaggart defended an idealistic view of time in the tradition of Hegel and Bradley. His famous paper makes two independent claims (McTaggart1908): First, time is a complex conception with two different logical roots. Second, time is unreal. To reject the second claim seems to commit to the first one, i.e., to a pluralistic account of time. We compare McTaggarts views to the most important concepts of time investigated in physics, neurobiology, and philosophical phenomenology. They indicate that a unique, (...)
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  35. added 2018-06-29
    Time, Metaphysics Of.Natalja Deng - forthcoming - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Metaphysics is the part of philosophy that asks questions about the nature of reality – about what there is, and what it is like. The metaphysics of time is the part of the philosophy of time that asks questions about the nature of temporal reality. One central such question is that of whether time passes or flows, or whether it has a dynamic aspect.
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  36. added 2018-06-04
    Gibt es eine objektive Gegenwart?: Zur Metaphysik der Zeit.Dietmar Hübner - 2009 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 116 (2):269-293.
    Since J. McTaggart’s paper on “The Unreality of Time” the opposition of “A-theorists” and “B-theorists” establishes a focal point in the modern debate on the metaphysics of time: While “A-theorists” claim the existence of an objective present, moving along time positions, “B-theorists” maintain that time is just a set of ontologically equivalent coordinates, “now” being merely the indexical of the speaker’s position. Contemporary attempts to resolve the issue by resorting to the analysis of language or to the theory of science (...)
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  37. added 2018-05-23
    Turning the Tables on McTaggart.Emiliano Boccardi - 2018 - Philosophy (3):1-16.
    According to A-theories of time, the metaphysical ground of change and dynamicity is provided by a continuous shifting in which events are past, present and future (A-determinations). It is often claimed that these theories make better sense of our experience of dynamicity than their rival, the B-theories; according to the latter, dynamicity is grounded solely in the irreducible earlier-than relations (B-relations) which obtain between events or states of affairs. In this paper, I argue that the experience of time's dynamicity, on (...)
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  38. added 2018-04-09
    Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2009 - SATS 10 (1):79-99.
    It has been argued that the tenseless view of time is incompatible with endurantism. This has been disputed, perhaps most famously by Hugh Mellor and Peter Simons. They argue that things can endure in tenseless time, and indeed must endure if tenseless time is to contain change. In this paper I will point out some difficulties with Mellor’s and Simons’ claims that in tenseless time a particular can be ‘wholly present’ at various times, and therefore endure, as well as have (...)
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  39. added 2018-03-28
    The Temporal Knowledge Argument 2.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    How does the temporal knowledge argument fair when exposed to Chalmers' 2-dimensional analysis of the knowledge argument?
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  40. added 2018-03-27
    Time as Motion.Emiliano Boccardi - 2018 - Metaphysica 19 (1):1-31.
    The arena of the philosophy of time has been largely concerned with deciding whether tense distinctions reflect absolute metaphysical distinctions or not. After bringing the debate over the metaphysical status of instantaneous velocity to bear on the debate over the nature of temporal passage, I argue that we should further investigate whether aspectual distinctions reflect objective and absolute metaphysical distinctions too. I conclude that those who think that being realist about tense uniquely makes room for the idea that time passes (...)
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  41. added 2018-03-21
    Time Flows at 1 B-Second Per A-Second.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    I suggest time flows at 1 B-series second per A-series second.
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  42. added 2018-03-05
    Replies to Deng, Lee, and Skow.Simon Prosser - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):328-350.
    This paper is a contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time. I reply to comments on the book by Natalja Deng, Geoffrey Lee and Bradford Skow. Although several chapters of the book are discussed, the main focus of my reply is on Chapters 2 and 6. In Chapter 2 I argue that the putative mind-independent passage of time could not be experienced, and from this I develop an argument against the A-theory of time. In Chapter 6 I (...)
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  43. added 2018-02-18
    Can Beliefs Be Caused by Their Truth-Makers?Robin Le Poidevin - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):148-156.
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  44. added 2018-02-17
    B-Time: A Reply to Tallant.L. Nathan Oaklander & V. Alan White - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):332-340.
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  45. added 2018-02-16
    Smith On Times And Tokens.Joshua M. Mozersky - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):405-411.
    In this essay I respond to Quentin Smith's charge that 'the date-analysis version of the tenseless theory of time cannot give adequate accounts of the truth conditions of the statements made by tensed sentence-tokens'. His argument is based on an analysis of certain counterfactual situations that is at odds with the date-analysis account of language and hence succeeds only in begging the question against that theory. To anticipate: his argument fails if one allows that temporal indexicals such as 'now' rigidly (...)
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  46. added 2018-02-14
    The Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time (Or: What Henri Bergson Would Say to B-Theorists).Sonja Deppe - 2016 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):107-124.
    Tenseless theorists assert that the relational structure of earlier/later is the essential structure of time. Using B-notions, so they think, we speak about time ‘as it is’ in a metaphysical sense and hence from the outside of our subjective perspective on it. I suggest on the contrary that the relational structure of earlier/later is part of our own intellectual structuring within the access to temporal phenomena. Furthermore it is essentially characterized by the structure of juxtaposition which originates in spatial experience (...)
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  47. added 2018-02-14
    Carnap’s Logic of Science and Reference to the Present Moment.Florian Fischer - 2016 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):61-90.
    The important switch from the so-called old B-theory to the new tenseless theory of time (NTT), which had significant implications for the field of tense and indexicals, occurred after Carnap’s era. Against this new background, Carnap’s original inter-translatability thesis can no longer be upheld. The most natural way out would be to modify Carnap’s position according to the NTT; but this is not compatible with Carnap’s metaphysical neutrality thesis. Even worse, Carnap’s work on measurement theory can be used to develop (...)
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  48. added 2018-02-12
    On ‘Experiencing Time’: A Response to Simon Prosser.Natalja Deng - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):281-301.
    In his recent book ‘Experiencing time’, Simon Prosser discusses a wide variety of topics relating to temporal experience, in a way that is accessible both to those steeped in the philosophy of mind, and to those more familiar with the philosophy of time. He forcefully argues for the conclusion that the B-theorist of time can account for the temporal appearances. In this article, I offer a chapter by chapter response.
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  49. added 2018-01-09
    Thank Goodness That’s Newcomb: The Practical Relevance of the Temporal Value Asymmetry.Christian Tarsney - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):750-759.
    I describe a thought experiment in which an agent must choose between suffering a greater pain in the past or a lesser pain in the future. This case demonstrates that the ‘temporal value asymmetry’ – our disposition to attribute greater significance to future pleasures and pains than to past – can have consequences for the rationality of actions as well as attitudes. This fact, I argue, blocks attempts to vindicate the temporal value asymmetry as a useful heuristic tied to the (...)
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  50. added 2017-12-30
    Experiencing Time. [REVIEW]Kourken Michaelian - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):642-644.
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