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1836 found
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1 — 50 / 1836
  1. added 2019-01-09
    Twierdzenie Bayesa w projektowaniu strategii diagnostycznych w medycynie.Tomasz Rzepiński - 2018 - Diametros 57:39-60.
    The paper will compare two methods used in the design of diagnostic strategies. The first one is a method that precises predictive value of diagnostic tests. The second one is based on the use of Bayes’ theorem. The main aim of this article is to identify the epistemological assumptions underlying both of these methods. For the purpose of this objective, example projects of one and multi-stage diagnostic strategy developed using both methods will be considered.
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  2. added 2019-01-03
    The Dutch Book Arguments.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    (This is for the series Elements of Decision Theory published by Cambridge University Press and edited by Martin Peterson) -/- Our beliefs come in degrees. I believe some things more strongly than I believe others. I believe very strongly that global temperatures will continue to rise during the coming century; I believe slightly less strongly that the European Union will still exist in 2029; and I believe much less strongly that Cardiff is east of Edinburgh. My credence in something is (...)
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  3. added 2018-09-29
    Modeling Creative Abduction Bayesian Style.Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla & Alexander Gebharter - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1).
    Schurz proposed a justification of creative abduction on the basis of the Reichenbachian principle of the common cause. In this paper we take up the idea of combining creative abduction with causal principles and model instances of successful creative abduction within a Bayes net framework. We identify necessary conditions for such inferences and investigate their unificatory power. We also sketch several interesting applications of modeling creative abduction Bayesian style. In particular, we discuss use-novel predictions, confirmation, and the problem of underdetermination (...)
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  4. added 2018-09-27
    A Modest Proposal – a Review of John Earman’s Hume’s Abject Failure – the Miracles Argument. [REVIEW]Elliott Sober - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):487 - 494.
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  5. added 2018-09-26
    Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?Marcello Di Bello - forthcoming - Mind:fzy026.
    Suppose one hundred prisoners are in a yard under the supervision of a guard, and at some point, ninety-nine of them collectively kill the guard. If, after the fact, a prisoner is picked at random and tried, the probability of his guilt is 99%. But despite the high probability, the statistical chances, by themselves, seem insufficient to justify a conviction. The question is why. Two arguments are offered. The first, decision-theoretic argument shows that a conviction solely based on the statistics (...)
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  6. added 2018-09-17
    Permissivism and the Value of Rationality A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In recent years, permissivism—the claim that a body of evidence can rationalize more than one response—has enjoyed somewhat of a revival. But it is once again being threatened, this time by a host of new and interesting arguments that, at their core, are challenging the permissivist to explain why rationality matters. A version of the challenge that I am especially interested in is this: if permissivism is true, why should we expect the rational credences to be more accurate than the (...)
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  7. added 2018-09-07
    Rational Credence Through Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    Whereas Bayesians have proposed norms such as probabilism, which requires immediate and permanent certainty in all logical truths, I propose a framework on which credences, including credences in logical truths, are rational because they are based on reasoning that follows plausible rules for the adoption of credences. I argue that my proposed framework has many virtues. In particular, it resolves the problem of logical omniscience.
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  8. added 2018-09-06
    Précis of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):749-754.
  9. added 2018-08-14
    Troubles with Bayesianism: An Introduction to the Psychological Immune System.Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    A Bayesian mind is, at its core, a rational mind. Bayesianism is thus well-suited to predict and explain mental processes that best exemplify our ability to be rational. However, evidence from belief acquisition and change appears to show that we do not acquire and update information in a Bayesian way. Instead, the principles of belief acquisition and updating seem grounded in maintaining a psychological immune system rather than in approximating a Bayesian processor.
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  10. added 2018-07-28
    An Impossibility Result for Coherence Rankings.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):77-91.
    If we receive information from multiple independent and partially reliable information sources, then whether we are justified to believe these information items is affected by how reliable the sources are, by how well the information coheres with our background beliefs and by how internally coherent the information is. We consider the following question. Is coherence a separable determinant of our degree of belief, i.e. is it the case that the more coherent the new information is, the more justified we are (...)
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  11. added 2018-07-28
    Solving the Riddle of Coherence.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):601-634.
    A coherent story is a story that fits together well. This notion plays a central role in the coherence theory of justification and has been proposed as a criterion for scientific theory choice. Many attempts have been made to give a probabilistic account of this notion. A proper account of coherence must not start from some partial intuitions, but should pay attention to the role that this notion is supposed to play within a particular context. Coherence is a property of (...)
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  12. added 2018-07-28
    The Epistemology of Social Facts: The Evidential Value of Personal Experience Versus Testimony.Luc Bovens & Stephen Leeds - 2002 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research. Frankfurt A. M.: Dr. Haensel-Hohenhausen. pp. 43-51.
    "The Personal is Political": This was an often-heard slogan of feminist groups in the late sixties and early seventies. The slogan is no doubt open to many interpretations. There is one interpretation which touches on the epistemology of social facts, viz. the slogan claims that in assessing the features of a political system, personal experiences have privileged evidentiary value. For instancte, in the face of third person reports about political corruption, I may remain unmoved in my belief that the political (...)
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  13. added 2018-07-28
    Believing More, Risking Less: On Coherence, Truth and Non-Trivial Extensions.Luc Bovens & Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):137 - 150.
    If you believe more things you thereby run a greater risk of being in error than if you believe fewer things. From the point of view of avoiding error, it is best not to believe anything at all, or to have very uncommitted beliefs. But considering the fact that we all in fact do entertain many specific beliefs, this recommendation is obviously in flagrant dissonance with our actual epistemic practice. Let us call the problem raised by this apparent conflict the (...)
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  14. added 2018-07-23
    Kevin McCain and Ted Poston (Eds.), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. [REVIEW]Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:N/A.
  15. added 2018-07-09
    Influence of Conditionals on Belief Updating.Borut Trpin - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Ljubljana
    This doctoral dissertation investigates what influence indicative conditionals have on belief updating and how learning from conditionals may be modelled in a probabilistic framework. Because the problem is related to the interpretation of conditionals, we first assess different semantics of indicative conditionals. We propose that conditionals should be taken as primary concepts. This allows us to defend a claim that learning a conditional is equivalent to learning that the relevant conditional probability is 1. This implies that learning a conditional can (...)
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  16. added 2018-07-04
    Robustness and Independent Evidence.Jacob Stegenga & Tarun Menon - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (3):414-435.
    Robustness arguments hold that hypotheses are more likely to be true when they are confirmed by diverse kinds of evidence. Robustness arguments require the confirming evidence to be independent. We identify two kinds of independence appealed to in robustness arguments: ontic independence —when the multiple lines of evidence depend on different materials, assumptions, or theories—and probabilistic independence. Many assume that OI is sufficient for a robustness argument to be warranted. However, we argue that, as typically construed, OI is not a (...)
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  17. added 2018-07-04
    Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures.Jan Sprenger & Jacob Stegenga - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):840-852.
    Data from medical research are typically summarized with various types of outcome measures. We present three arguments in favor of absolute over relative outcome measures. The first argument is from cognitive bias: relative measures promote the reference class fallacy and the overestimation of treatment effectiveness. The second argument is decision-theoretic: absolute measures are superior to relative measures for making a decision between interventions. The third argument is causal: interpreted as measures of causal strength, absolute measures satisfy a set of desirable (...)
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  18. added 2018-06-05
    Probability.Antony Eagle - 2016 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science,. USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 417-439.
    Rather than entailing that a particular outcome will occur, many scientific theories only entail that an outcome will occur with a certain probability. Because scientific evidence inevitably falls short of conclusive proof, when choosing between different theories it is standard to make reference to how probable the various options are in light of the evidence. A full understanding of probability in science needs to address both the role of probabilities in theories, or chances, as well as the role of probabilistic (...)
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  19. added 2018-05-31
    Semantic Possibility.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2018 - In Derek Ball & Brian Rabern (eds.), The Science of Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 361-380.
    This paper starts out from the idea that semantics is a “special science” whose aim, like that of chemistry or ecology, is to identify systematic, high-level patterns in a fundamentally physical world. I defend an approach to this task on which sentences are associated with with sets of possible worlds (of some kind). These sets of worlds, however, are not postulated for the compositional treatment of intensional contexts; they are not meant to capture what is intuitively asserted or communicated by (...)
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  20. added 2018-05-31
    Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality.Julia Staffel - manuscript
    In this book project, I explain how Bayesian theories of ideal rationality can be used to account for the idea that rationality comes in degrees. Imperfect reasoners can approximate ideal rationality more or less. The guiding questions for my investigation are: Why should imperfect reasoners approximate ideal rationality if they can never fully reach the ideal? Why is it better to be closer to being ideally rational than farther away from it? How exactly should we characterize approximations to ideal rationality?
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  21. added 2018-05-30
    Review of David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg’s Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem (2017, Springer). [REVIEW]William Roche - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69:212-215.
  22. added 2018-05-29
    Learning and Value Change.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    Accuracy-first accounts of rational learning attempt to vindicate the intuitive idea that, while rationally-formed belief need not be true, it is nevertheless likely to be true. To this end, they attempt to show that the Bayesian's rational learning norms are a consequence of the rational pursuit of accuracy. Existing accounts fall short of this goal, for they presuppose evidential norms which are not and cannot be vindicated in terms of the single-minded pursuit of accuracy. I propose an alternative account, according (...)
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  23. added 2018-05-11
    Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers.David Christensen - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):450-479.
    The most immediately appealing model for formal constraints on degrees of belief is provided by probability theory, which tells us, for instance, that the probability of P can never be greater than that of (P v Q). But while this model has much intuitive appeal, many have been concerned to provide arguments showing that ideally rational degrees of belief would conform to the calculus of probabilities. The arguments most frequently used to make this claim plausible are the so-called "Dutch Book" (...)
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  24. added 2018-05-07
    Jeffrey Olen, Moral Freedom Reviewed By.Jan Narveson - 1990 - Philosophy in Review 10 (4):152-154.
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  25. added 2018-04-29
    An Automatic Ockham’s Razor for Bayesians?Gordon Belot - 2018 - Erkenntnis:1-7.
    It is sometimes claimed that the Bayesian framework automatically implements Ockham's razor---that conditionalizing on data consistent with both a simple theory and a complex theory more or less inevitably favours the simpler theory. It is shown here that the automatic razor doesn't in fact cut it for certain mundane curve-fitting problems.
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  26. added 2018-04-23
    Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Scepticism.Luca Moretti - manuscript
    Crispin Wright maintains that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this fact doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright’s contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don’t actually enable us to acquire justification for these beliefs. In this paper (...)
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  27. added 2018-03-11
    A Critical Introduction to Formal Epistemology.Darren Bradley - 2015 - London: Bllomsbury.
  28. added 2018-02-17
    Two Conceptions of Weight of Evidence in Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science.Jeff Kasser - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):629-648.
    Weight of evidence continues to be a powerful metaphor within formal approaches to epistemology. But attempts to construe the metaphor in precise and useful ways have encountered formidable obstacles. This paper shows that two quite different understandings of evidential weight can be traced back to one 1878 article by C.S. Peirce. One conception, often associated with I.J. Good, measures the balance or net weight of evidence, while the other, generally associated with J.M. Keynes, measures the gross weight of evidence. Conflations (...)
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  29. added 2018-02-17
    From Bayesian Epistemology to Inductive Logic.Jon Williamson - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):468-486.
    Inductive logic admits a variety of semantics (Haenni et al., 2011, Part 1). This paper develops semantics based on the norms of Bayesian epistemology (Williamson, 2010, Chapter 7). §1 introduces the semantics and then, in §2, the paper explores methods for drawing inferences in the resulting logic and compares the methods of this paper with the methods of Barnett and Paris (2008). §3 then evaluates this Bayesian inductive logic in the light of four traditional critiques of inductive logic, arguing (i) (...)
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  30. added 2018-02-17
    Science Without (Parametric) Models: The Case of Bootstrap Resampling.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Synthese 180 (1):65-76.
    Scientific and statistical inferences build heavily on explicit, parametric models, and often with good reasons. However, the limited scope of parametric models and the increasing complexity of the studied systems in modern science raise the risk of model misspecification. Therefore, I examine alternative, data-based inference techniques, such as bootstrap resampling. I argue that their neglect in the philosophical literature is unjustified: they suit some contexts of inquiry much better and use a more direct approach to scientific inference. Moreover, they make (...)
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  31. added 2018-02-17
    Reply to Crupi Et Al.'s ‘Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence’.Franz Huber - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):213-215.
    Crupi et al. propose a generalization of Bayesian confirmation theory that they claim to adequately deal with confirmation by uncertain evidence. Consider a series of points of time t0, . . . , ti, . . . , tn such that the agent’s subjective probability for an atomic proposition E changes from Pr0 at t0 to . . . to Pri at ti to . . . to Prn at tn. It is understood that the agent’s subjective probabilities change for (...)
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  32. added 2018-02-17
    Bayesians Sometimes Cannot Ignore Even Very Implausible Theories.Branden Fitelson & Neil Thomason - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Logic 6:25-36.
    In applying Bayes’s theorem to the history of science, Bayesians sometimes assume – often without argument – that they can safely ignore very implausible theories. This assumption is false, both in that it can seriously distort the history of science as well as the mathematics and the applicability of Bayes’s theorem. There are intuitively very plausible counter-examples. In fact, one can ignore very implausible or unknown theories only if at least one of two conditions is satisfied: one is certain that (...)
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  33. added 2018-02-17
    The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185.
    Dogmatism is sometimes thought to be incompatible with Bayesian models of rational learning. I show that the best model for updating imprecise credences is compatible with dogmatism.
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  34. added 2018-02-17
    Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine-Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens.Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):333-338.
    By and large, we think is a useful reply to our original critique of his article on the Quine–Duhem problem. But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply. Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens's approach to QD.
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  35. added 2018-02-17
    A Note on the Irrelevance of Probabilistic Irrelevance.Neil Tennant - 2006 - Analysis 66 (1):32-35.
    In his book Bayes or Bust?, John Earman (1992: 63–65) seeks to set out the Bayesian reasoning that would vindicate the pre-theoretic intuition that a theory receives confirmation from having its observational predictions borne out by experience.
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  36. added 2018-02-17
    Philosophical Theories of Probability.Donald Gillies - 2000 - Routledge.
    The Twentieth Century has seen a dramatic rise in the use of probability and statistics in almost all fields of research. This has stimulated many new philosophical ideas on probability. _Philosophical Theories of Probability_ is the first book to present a clear, comprehensive and systematic account of these various theories and to explain how they relate to one another. Gillies also offers a distinctive version of the propensity theory of probability, and the intersubjective interpretation, which develops the subjective theory.
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  37. added 2018-02-16
    Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings.Antony Eagle (ed.) - 2010 - Routledge.
    _Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings_ is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...)
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  38. added 2018-02-16
    On the Proximity of the Logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ Interpretations of Probability.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):335-349.
    In his Bayesian Nets and Causality, Jon Williamson presents an ‘Objective Bayesian’ interpretation of probability, which he endeavours to distance from the logical interpretation yet associate with the subjective interpretation. In doing so, he suggests that the logical interpretation suffers from severe epistemological problems that do not affect his alternative. In this paper, I present a challenge to his analysis. First, I closely examine the relationship between the logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ views, and show how, and why, they are highly (...)
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  39. added 2018-02-16
    A Remark on Fuchs’ Bayesian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.Veiko Palge & Thomas Konrad - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39 (2):273-287.
  40. added 2018-02-12
    The Imprecise Impermissivist’s Dilemma.Clinton Castro & Casey Hart - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    Impermissivists hold that an agent with a given body of evidence has at most one rationally permitted attitude that she should adopt towards any particular proposition. Permissivists deny this, often motivating permissivism by describing scenarios that pump our intuitions that the agent could reasonably take one of several attitudes toward some proposition. We criticize the following impermissivist response: while it seems like any of that range of attitudes is permissible, what is actually required is the single broad attitude that encompasses (...)
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  41. added 2018-02-12
    Ideal Counterpart Theorizing and the Accuracy Argument for Probabilism.Clinton Castro & Olav Vassend - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):207-216.
    One of the main goals of Bayesian epistemology is to justify the rational norms credence functions ought to obey. Accuracy arguments attempt to justify these norms from the assumption that the source of value for credences relevant to their epistemic status is their accuracy. This assumption and some standard decision-theoretic principles are used to argue for norms like Probabilism, the thesis that an agent’s credence function is rational only if it obeys the probability axioms. We introduce an example that shows (...)
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  42. added 2018-02-01
    Why Be Coherent?Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):405-415.
    Bayesians defend norms of ideal rationality such as probabilism, which they claim should be approximated by non-ideal thinkers. Yet, it is not often discussed exactly in what sense it is beneficial for an agent’s credence function to approximate probabilistic coherence. Some existing research indicates that approximating coherence leads to improvements in accuracy, whereas other research suggests that it decreases Dutch book vulnerability. Yet, the existing results don’t settle whether there is a way of approximating coherence that delivers both benefits at (...)
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  43. added 2018-01-13
    Basing for the Bayesian.Cameron Gibbs - forthcoming - Synthese.
    There is a distinction between merely having the right belief, and further basing that belief on the right reasons. Any adequate epistemology needs to be able to accommodate the basing relation that marks this distinction. However, trouble arises for Bayesianism. I argue that when we combine Bayesianism with the standard approaches to the basing relation, we get the result that no agent forms their credences in the right way; indeed, no agent even gets close. This is a serious problem, for (...)
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  44. added 2018-01-05
    The Problem of Evaluating Automated Large-Scale Evidence Aggregators.Nicolas Wüthrich & Katie Steele - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
    In the biomedical context, policy makers face a large amount of potentially discordant evidence from different sources. This prompts the question of how this evidence should be aggregated in the interests of best-informed policy recommendations. The starting point of our discussion is Hunter and Williams’ recent work on an automated aggregation method for medical evidence. Our negative claim is that it is far from clear what the relevant criteria for evaluating an evidence aggregator of this sort are. What is the (...)
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  45. added 2017-12-29
    Inference to the Best Explanation in Uncertain Evidential Situations.Borut Trpin & Max Pellert - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    It has recently been argued that a non-Bayesian probabilistic version of inference to the best explanation (IBE*) has a number of advantages over Bayesian conditionalization (Douven [2013]; Douven and Wenmackers [2017]). We investigate how IBE* could be generalized to uncertain evidential situations and formulate a novel updating rule IBE**. We then inspect how it performs in comparison to its Bayesian counterpart, Jeffrey conditionalization (JC), in a number of simulations where two agents, each updating by IBE** and JC, respectively, try to (...)
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  46. added 2017-12-11
    "Utilité de la théologie naturelle pour la connaissance de Dieu aujourd’hui" [Usefulness of Natural Theology for God's Knowledge Today].Philippe Gagnon - 2017 - Connaître : Cahiers de l'Association Foi Et Culture Scientifique (48):83-92.
    In this public debate with Philippe Deterre (research director in immunology at the CNRS) – held at l'Enclos Rey in Paris' 15th district during the biennial Conference of the Réseau Blaise Pascal in March 2017 –, I defended the usefulness of natural theology. I first clarify theology's nature and understanding, then I speak about a tradition that upheld the public and exterior knowledge of God, and make an effort to show the presence of a theme reminiscent of natural theology behind (...)
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  47. added 2017-11-28
    On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    to appear in Szabó Gendler, T. & J. Hawthorne (eds.) Oxford Studies in Epistemology volume 6 -/- We often ask for the opinion of a group of individuals. How strongly does the scientific community believe that the rate at which sea levels are rising increased over the last 200 years? How likely does the UK Treasury think it is that there will be a recession if the country leaves the European Union? What are these group credences that such questions request? (...)
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  48. added 2017-11-14
    Methodology.Richard J. Harris - unknown
    Despite publication of many well-argued critiques of null hypothesis testing (NHT), behavioral science researchers continue to rely heavily on this set of practices. Although we agree with most critics' catalogs of NHT's flaws, this article also takes the unusual stance of identifying virtues that may explain why NHT continues to be so extensively used. These virtues include providing results in the form of a dichotomous (yes/no) hypothesis evaluation and providing an index (p value) that has a justifiable mapping onto confidence (...)
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  49. added 2017-11-14
    Classification and Filtering of Spectra: A Case Study in Mineralogy.Clark Glymour - unknown
    The ability to identify the mineral composition of rocks and soils is an important tool for the exploration of geological sites. Even though expert knowledge is commonly used for this task, it is desirable to create automated systems with similar or better performance. For instance, NASA intends to design robots that are sufficiently autonomous to perform this task on planetary missions. Spectrometer readings provide one important source of data for identifying sites with minerals of interest. Reflectance spectrometers measure intensities of (...)
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  50. added 2017-11-14
    Adding Geologic Prior Knowledge to Bayesian Lithofluid Facies Estimation From Seismic Data.Ezequiel F. Gonzalez, Stephane Gesbert & Ronny Hofmann - 2016 - Interpretation: SEG 4 (3):SL1-SL8.
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