Belief

Edited by Rima Basu (Claremont McKenna College)
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  1. Delusions and Theories of Belief.Michael H. Connors & Peter W. Halligan - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 81:102935.
  2. Transparent Delusion.Vladimir Krstić - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):183-201.
    In this paper, I examine a kind of delusion in which the patients judge that their occurrent thoughts are false and try to abandon them precisely because they are false, but fail to do so. I call this delusion transparent, since it is transparent to the sufferer that their thought is false. In explaining this phenomenon, I defend a particular two-factor theory of delusion that takes the proper integration of relevant reasoning processes as vital for thought-evaluation. On this proposal, which (...)
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  3. Reflections on Knowledge and Belief.Simon Wimmer - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
    This thesis defends egalitarianism about knowledge and belief, on which neither is understood in terms of the other, from what I call the abductive argument. This argument is meant to favour views opposed to egalitarianism: doxasticism, on which knowledge is understood in terms of belief, and epistemicism, on which belief is understood in terms of knowledge. The abductive argument turns on the idea that doxasticism and epistemicism, by contrast with egalitarianism, explain certain data about knowledge and belief. I argue, however, (...)
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  4. Unstable Knowledge, Unstable Belief.Hans Rott - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (4):395-407.
    An idea going back to Plato’s Meno is that knowledge is stable. Recently, a seemingly stronger and more exciting thesis has been advanced, namely that rational belief is stable. I sketch two stability theories of knowledge and rational belief, and present an example intended to show that knowledge need not be stable and rational belief need not be stable either. The second claim does not follow from the first, even if we take knowledge to be a special kind of rational (...)
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  5. Minimal Rationality and the Web of Questions.Daniel Hoek - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk & Andy Egan (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.
    This paper proposes a new account of bounded or minimal doxastic rationality (in the sense of Cherniak 1986), based on the notion that beliefs are answers to questions (à la Yalcin 2018). The core idea is that minimally rational beliefs are linked through thematic connections, rather than entailment relations. Consequently, such beliefs are not deductively closed, but they are closed under parthood (where a part is an entailment that answers a smaller question). And instead of avoiding all inconsistency, minimally rational (...)
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  6. What is Special About De Se Attitudes?Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - forthcoming - In The Routledge Handbook on Linguistic Reference.
    De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.
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  7. Weighing Aims in Doxastic Deliberation.C. J. Atkinson - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper, I defend teleological theories of belief against the exclusivity objection. I argue that despite the exclusive influence of truth in doxastic deliberation, multiple epistemic aims interact when we consider what to believe. This is apparent when we focus on the processes involved in specific instances (or concrete cases) of doxastic deliberation, such that the propositions under consideration are specified. First, I out- line a general schema for weighing aims. Second, I discuss recent attempts to defend the teleological (...)
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  8. Probability, Coherent Belief and Coherent Belief Changes.John Cantwell & Hans Rott - 2019 - Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 87 (3):259-291.
    This paper is about the statics and dynamics of belief states that are represented by pairs consisting of an agent's credences (represented by a subjective probability measure) and her categorical beliefs (represented by a set of possible worlds). Regarding the static side, we argue that the latter proposition should be coherent with respect to the probability measure and that its probability should reach a certain threshold value. On the dynamic side, we advocate Jeffrey conditionalisation as the principal mode of changing (...)
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  9. Knowledge-First Believing the Unknowable.Simon Wimmer - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    I develop a challenge for a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief that turns, primarily, on unknowable propositions. I consider and reject several responses to my challenge and sketch a new knowledge-first account of belief that avoids it.
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  10. What Does Emotion Teach Us About Self-Deception? Affective Neuroscience in Support of Non-Intentionalism.Federico Lauria & Delphine Preissmann - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (2):70-94.
    Intuitively, affect plays an indispensable role in self-deception’s dynamic. Call this view “affectivism.” Investigating affectivism matters, as affectivists argue that this conception favours the non-intentionalist approach to self-deception and offers a unified account of straight and twisted self-deception. However, this line of argument has not been scrutinized in detail, and there are reasons to doubt it. Does affectivism fulfill its promises of non-intentionalism and unity? We argue that it does, as long as affect’s role in self-deception lies in affective filters—that (...)
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  11. Faith.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2014 - In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy , 3rd edition. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    A brief article on faith as a psychological attitude.
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  12. Les attitudes russelliennes.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Cahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 54:149-168.
    Russell prétend qu’un examen des croyances est indispensable pour définir nos raisonnements quotidiens et comprendre ce que les philosophes entendent par la notion de vérité. Cela étant, l’auteur considère qu’une étude de ces croyances n’a aucun rapport avec la logique, laquelle concerne uniquement le vrai et le faux. En d’autres termes, Russell associe croyance et psychologie tout en réservant le domaine de la logique au thème de la proposition, vraie ou fausse par définition. Une certaine théorie de la vérité sous-tend (...)
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  13. Functionalist Interrelations Amongst Human Psychological States Inter Se, Ditto for Martians.Nicholas Shea - forthcoming - In Joulia Smortchkova, Tobias Schlicht & Krzysztof Dolega (eds.), What Are Mental Representations? Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    One job for theories of mental representation is to distinguish between different kinds of mental representation: beliefs, desires, intentions, perceptual states, etc. What makes a mental state a belief that p rather than a desire that p or a visual representation that p? Functionalism is a leading approach for doing so: for individuating mental states. Functionalism is designed to allow that psychological states can be multiply realized. Mark Sprevak has argued that, for a functionalist account of psychological states to apply (...)
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  14. Knowledge and Belief in the Letter of Paul the Persian.Said Hayati - 2016 - In Dietmar W. Winkler (ed.), Syrische Studien. LIT Verlag. pp. 63-73.
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  15. From Probabilities to Categorical Beliefs: Going Beyond Toy Models.Igor Douven & Hans Rott - 2018 - Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (6):1099-1124.
    According to the Lockean thesis, a proposition is believed just in case it is highly probable. While this thesis enjoys strong intuitive support, it is known to conflict with seemingly plausible logical constraints on our beliefs. One way out of this conflict is to make probability 1 a requirement for belief, but most have rejected this option for entailing what they see as an untenable skepticism. Recently, two new solutions to the conflict have been proposed that are alleged to be (...)
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  16. Marcus on Belief and Belief in the Impossible.Mark Richard - 2013 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 28 (3):407-420.
    I review but don’t endorse Marcus’ arguments that impossible beliefs are impossible. I defend her claim that belief’s objects are, in some important sense, not the bearers of truth and falsity, discuss her disposition- alism about belief, and argue it’s a good fit with the idea that belief’s objects are Russellian states of affairs.
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  17. Unvergleichbarkeit und unabhängige Bedeutung.Hans Rott - 2014 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 68 (2):237–241.
    This is a short discussion review of Wolfgang Spohn, The Laws of Belief, Oxford UP 2012. I argue, first, that it is important to account for incomparabilities in the plausibilities of possible worlds or propositions, and second, that the meaning of input parameters specifying the degree to which a proposition is to be accepted should be independent of the agent's belief state.
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  18. Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs.Hans Rott - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):167-197.
    There are two prominent ways of formally modelling human belief. One is in terms of plain beliefs, i.e., sets of propositions. The second one is in terms of degrees of beliefs, which are commonly taken to be representable by subjective probability functions. In relating these two ways of modelling human belief, the most natural idea is a thesis frequently attributed to John Locke: a proposition is or ought to be believed just in case its subjective probability exceeds a contextually fixed (...)
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  19. Thoughts, Oughts and the Conceptual Primacy of Belief.Alexander Miller - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):234-238.
  20. An Essay on Belief and Acceptance.Louis P. Pojman - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):496-498.
  21. Sometimes a Great Notion: A Critical Notice of Mark Crimmins' Talk About Beliefs.Kent Bach - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):431-441.
    Anyone weary of endless philosophical debate on belief reports will find welcome relief in this book. Talking not just about belief talk but about belief itself, it offers much that is new, interesting, and subtle. The central thesis, though interestingly and subtly developed, is not exactly new. It is a version of the “hidden indexical theory” (HIT) of..
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  22. “On an Argument for the Relational View of Belief”.Eric Stiffler - 1981 - Dialectica 35 (3):351-355.
    The view that belief is a dyadic relation between a believer and some other object, e.g., a proposition, appears to receive support from the fact that we can infer ‘There is something that Jones believes' from ordinary belief ascriptions such as ‘Jones believes that the tallest man is wise’. On consideration, however, it turns out that even a crude nonrelational view of belief can accommodate this inference. In order to permit the inference the nonrelationalist must read‘ There is something that (...)
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  23. VII &Ast;—‘BELIEF IS UP TO US’.Jonathan Barnes - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Paperback) 106 (2):187-204.
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  24. Provocation on Belief: Part 3.Steve Fuller - 1987 - Social Epistemology 1 (1):102-105.
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  25. Provocation on Belief: Part 1.David Gorman - 1987 - Social Epistemology 1 (1):97-99.
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  26. Provocation on Belief: Part 6.Hugh Wilder - 1987 - Social Epistemology 1 (2):195-201.
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  27. Scott-Kakures on Believing at Will.Dana Radcliffe - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):145-151.
    Many philosophers hold that it is conceptually impossible to form a belief simply by willing it. Noting the failure of previous attempts to locate the presumed incoherence, Dion Scott-Kakures offers a version of the general line that voluntary believing is conceptually impossible becuse it could not qualify as a basic intentional actions. This discussion analyzes his central argument, explaining how it turns on the assumption that a prospective voluntary believer must regard the desired belief as not justified, given her other (...)
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  28. The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Steglich-Petersen: Discussions.Kathrin Glüer & åsa Wikforss - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):757-761.
    We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.
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  29. The Deflation of Belief States.Robert J. Stainton - 1997 - Critica 29 (85):95-119.
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  30. Pragmatic Believing and its Explanation.Ward E. Jones - 2004 - Critica 36 (108):3-36.
    Most explanations of beliefs are epistemically or pragmatically rationalizing. The distinction between these two types involves the explainer's differing expectations of how the believer will behave in the face of counter-evidence. This feature suggests that rationalizing explanations portray beliefs as either a consequence of the believer's following a norm, or part of a sub-intentional goal-oriented system. Which properly characterizes pragmatic believing? If there were pragmatic norms for believing, I argue, they would not be consciously followable. Yet an unallowable norm is (...)
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  31. Between Belief and Unbelief. [REVIEW]A. D. H. - 1976 - Review of Metaphysics 29 (3):557-558.
    A leading psychologist at the Menninger Foundation analyzes the current cultural situation where deep unbelief alienates itself from classical belief. He recognizes that unbelief is not just a simple negation of belief but is itself pluralistic, and the varieties of unbelief have now become the attitudes of masses of modern men. The author makes extensive use of recent philosophical reflection. He is also well aware of how social policy may tend to replace what had once been religious goals and institutions, (...)
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  32. The Varieties of Belief. [REVIEW]A. C. C. - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (2):390-390.
    Helm criticizes contemporary—largely analytic—work in philosophy of religion which closes off dispute or objection by a simple appeal to "the grammar of religious language" or to "what the believer would say." "The argument of this book is that such approaches involve an important error in philosophical method, for they rest on the mistaken assumption that the ‘religious believer’ has an unmistakable identity, and that ‘religious language’ is a distinct, homogeneous form of language". The issue is methodological because it focuses on (...)
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  33. Legitimation of Belief. [REVIEW]O. B. T. - 1976 - Review of Metaphysics 29 (4):734-735.
    In the past 300 years philosophy has been preoccupied with the problem of knowledge. Since Descartes, traditional, prescientific culture has eroded under the sceptical attack and has been replaced by a new culture characterized by an unprecedented growth in scientific knowledge and its powerful models of explanation. Gellner seeks to understand "the differences between its two shores, the nature of the reasons and causes which explain or justify our firm location on one side of it." His concern is with relativism, (...)
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  34. Epistemic Supervenience and the Circle of Belief.James Van Cleve - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):90-104.
    I shall begin with a series of quotations to illustrate how widespread are the views I wish to challenge.
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  35. Suppressed Belief.Komarine Romdenh-Romluc - 2007 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):17-24.
    Moran conceives of conscious belief as a conscious activity, rather than awareness of a mental state. Once conscious belief is understood in this way, the notion of suppressed belief becomes problematic. In this paper, I draw on the work of Merleau-Ponty to sketch an account of suppressed belief. I suggest that suppressed beliefs should not be understood as attitudes towards propositions. Instead, they should be conceived as ways of perceiving and interacting with the world that are out of keeping with (...)
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  36. The Structure of Cognitive Agency.Daniel Breyer - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):285-296.
    Credit theories of knowledge have to explain the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to cognitive agents. The most promising way to explain these conditions is to offer an account of cognitive agency that is a plausible development of the uncontroversial notion that we are believing subjects. This article develops and defends a Structuralist model of cognitive agency.
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  37. The Hysteresis Effect: Theorizing Mismatch in Action.Michael Strand & Omar Lizardo - 2016 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 46 (4).
    Widespread reliance on representationalist understandings commit social scientists to either partially or totally decouple belief from reality, limiting the domain of phenomena that can be treated by belief as an analytic concept. Developing the contrastive notion of practical belief, we introduce the hysteresis effect as a situational phenomenon involving the systematic production of agent-environment mismatches and argue for its placement as a central problem for the theory of action. Revealing the dynamic, embodied conservation of belief in the temporality of practice, (...)
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  38. Is Truth a Norm?Pascal Engel - unknown
    This paper tries to say in what sense truth is a norm, a thesis that Donald Davidson, whose view are examined, denies. After skteching his conception of rationality, it is argued that truth is a norm in only the sense that we ought to believe what we believe is true, not that we all to believe everything which is true. This minimal norm of truth is isolated and defended.
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  39. Peut-on Parler de Croyances Délirantes?Pascal Engel - unknown
    This paper examines the status of delusive beliefs as beliefs. I argue that there is no reason not to call them beliefs, and suggest some strategies to cope with them.
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  40. In the Wake of Aum: The Formation and Transformation of a Universe of Belief.Susumu Shimazono - 1995 - Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 22 (3-4):381-415.
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  41. Do Unconscious Beliefs Yield Knowledge?Luís G. Augusto - 2009 - Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 18 (35):161-175.
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  42. Belief, Reason & Logic.Scott Sturgeon - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:89-100.
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  43. Fear Without Belief.John Morreall - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (7):359-366.
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  44. Rational Belief. An Introduction to Logic.E. N., Albert Myrton Frye & Albert William Levi - 1941 - Journal of Philosophy 38 (7):188.
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  45. Comment: Beyond Belief.Fergus Kerr - 2007 - New Blackfriars 88 (1017):505-506.
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  46. The Question of Believing.Luce Giard - 1996 - New Blackfriars 77 (909):478-478.
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  47. When Belief Fails.Eamon Duffy - 1985 - New Blackfriars 66 (779):208-216.
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  48. The Future of Belief.Brian Wicker - 1967 - New Blackfriars 48 (565):468-478.
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  49. Conscious Belief and Deliberation.Christopher Hookway & K. V. Wilkes - 1981 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 55 (1):75-108.
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  50. XIII.—Some Considerations About Belief.H. H. Price - 1935 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 35 (1):229-252.
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