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Subcategories:See also:History/traditions: Belief
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  1. &Na (1999). Case Reports. Jona's Healthcare Law, Ethics, and Regulation 1 (4):3.
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  2. Robert P. Abelson (1986). Beliefs Are Like Possessions. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 16 (3):223–250.
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  3. Robert Ackermann (1972). Opacity in Actual Belief Structures. Journal of Philosophy 69 (3):55.
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  4. Robert Ackermann (1972). Opacity In Belief Structures. Journal of Philosophy 69 (February):55-67.
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  5. Robert John Ackermann (1972). Belief and Knowledge. Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Books.
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  6. Sarah Adams (2006). Be Cool to the Pizza Dude. In Jay Allison, Dan Gediman, John Gregory & Viki Merrick (eds.), This I Believe: The Personal Philosophies of Remarkable Men and Women. H. Holt.
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  7. Jonathan E. Adler (1997). Constrained Belief and the Reactive Attitudes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):891-905.
    Evidentialism implies that, for epistemic purposes, belief should be responsive only to evidence. Focusing on our reactive attitude such as resentment or indignation, I construct an argument that the beliefs or judgments accompanying those attitudes are constrained in advance by circumstances to be full, rather than being open to the whole range of partial beliefs. These judgments or beliefs imply strong claims to justification. But the circumstances in which those attitudes are formed allow only very limited evidence. Nevertheless, we cannot (...)
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  8. Jonathan Eric Adler (2006). Confidence in Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):225-257.
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  9. James Alcock (2003). Belief and Survival. World Futures 59 (3 & 4):189 – 200.
    Our ability to survive in a world beset by looming global perils depends ultimately on our collective will to harness our intellects and change our behaviors. In order to respond appropriately, people must first believe that serious problems exist, that there are potential solutions, and that they have a role to play in finding and implementing them. Without such beliefs, individual change is unlikely. In order to promote belief change, it is important to understand how beliefs are learned, what their (...)
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  10. Phyllis Allen (2006). Leaving Identity Issues to Other Folks. In Jay Allison, Dan Gediman, John Gregory & Viki Merrick (eds.), This I Believe: The Personal Philosophies of Remarkable Men and Women. H. Holt.
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  11. Isabel Allende (2006). In Giving I Connect with Others. In Jay Allison, Dan Gediman, John Gregory & Viki Merrick (eds.), This I Believe: The Personal Philosophies of Remarkable Men and Women. H. Holt.
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  12. Jay Allison (2006). Introduction. In Jay Allison, Dan Gediman, John Gregory & Viki Merrick (eds.), This I Believe: The Personal Philosophies of Remarkable Men and Women. H. Holt.
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  13. Jay Allison & Dan Gediman (eds.) (2008). This I Believe Ii: More Personal Philosophies of Remarkable Men and Women. Henry Holt.
    A new collection of inspiring personal philosophies from another noteworthy group of people This second collection of This I Believe essays gathers seventyfive essayists—ranging from famous to previously unknown—completing the thought that begins the book’s title. With contributors who run the gamut from cellist Yo-Yo Ma to ordinary folks like a diner waitress, an Iraq War veteran, a farmer, a new husband, and many others, This I Believe II , like the first New York Times bestselling collection, showcases moving and (...)
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  14. Jay Allison, Dan Gediman, John Gregory & Viki Merrick (eds.) (2006). This I Believe: The Personal Philosophies of Remarkable Men and Women. H. Holt.
    An inspiring collection of the personal philosophies of a fascinating group of individuals Based on the NPR series of the same name, This I Believe features eighty essays penned by the famous and the unknown—completing the thought that the book’s title begins. Each piece compels readers to rethink not only how they have arrived at their own personal beliefs but also the extent to which they share them with others. Featuring a star-studded list of contributors—including Isabel Allende, John Updike, William (...)
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  15. A. H. Almaas (1986). The Void: A Psychodynamic Investigation of the Relationship Between Mind and Space. Almaas Publications.
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  16. Peter Alward, Comments on Erin Eaker's.
    Eaker argues that there is no genuine ambiguity to be found between de re and de dicto readings or interpretations of belief sentences. She considers two ways characterizing the distinction: 1. Psychological characterization (a) De re belief sentences attribute de re belief to subjects (b) De dicto belief sentences attribute de dicto belief to subjects 2. Truth-conditional characterization (a) The preservation of subjects’ “ways of thinking” of objects is not required for the truth of de re belief sentences (b) The (...)
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  17. Mikkel Birkegaard Andersen, Thomas Bolander, Hans van Ditmarsch & Martin Holm Jensen (forthcoming). Bisimulation and Expressivity for Conditional Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Safe Belief. Synthese:1-41.
    Plausibility models are Kripke models that agents use to reason about knowledge and belief, both of themselves and of each other. Such models are used to interpret the notions of conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief. The logic of conditional belief contains that modality and also the knowledge modality, and similarly for the logic of degrees of belief and the logic of safe belief. With respect to these logics, plausibility models may contain too much information. A proper notion (...)
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  18. David James Anderson (2012). Knowledge and Conviction. Synthese 187 (2):377-392.
    Much philosophical effort has been exerted over problems having to do with the correct analysis and application of the concept of epistemic justification. While I do not wish to dispute the central place of this problem in contemporary epistemology, it seems to me that there is a general neglect of the belief condition for knowledge. In this paper I offer an analysis of 'degrees of belief' in terms of a quality I label 'conviction', go on to argue that one requires (...)
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  19. David Annis (1969). A Note on Lehrer's Proof That Knowledge Entails Belief. Analysis 29 (6):207 - 208.
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  20. John Appleby (2008). Speculating Against Belief. The Philosophers' Magazine 43:119-120.
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  21. Sophie Archer (2015). Defending Exclusivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3).
    ‘Exclusivity’ is the claim that when deliberating about whether to believe that p one can only be consciously motivated to reach one's conclusion by considerations one takes to pertain to the truth of p. The pragmatist tradition has long offered inspiration to those who doubt this claim. Recently, a neo-pragmatist movement, Keith Frankish (), and Conor McHugh ()) has given rise to a serious challenge to exclusivity. In this article, I defend exclusivity in the face of this challenge. First, I (...)
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  22. Horacio Arlo-Costa (2010). Review of Franz Huber, Christoph Schmidt-Petri (Eds.), Degrees of Belief. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1).
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  23. D. M. Armstrong (1969). Does Knowledge Entail Belief? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70:21 - 36.
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  24. Nicholas Asher (1989). Belief, Acceptance and Belief Reports. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):327 - 361.
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  25. Philip Atkins (forthcoming). A Russellian Account of Suspended Judgment. Synthese:1-26.
    Suspended judgment poses a serious problem for Russellianism. In this paper I examine several possible solutions to this problem and argue that none of them is satisfactory. Then I sketch a new solution. According to this solution, suspended judgment should be understood as a sui generis propositional attitude. By this I mean that it cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, other propositional attitudes, such as belief. Since suspended judgment is sui generis in this sense, sentences that ascribe (...)
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  26. Robert Audi (2002). The Sources of Belief. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  27. Robert Audi (1972). The Concept of 'Believing'. Personalist 53 (1):43-52.
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  28. Iep Author (2015). Belief, Aim Of. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  29. Britta Baas & Bettina Röder (eds.) (2008). Der Himmel in Uns: Reisen Durchs Leben: 13 Gespräche. Publik-Forum.
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  30. Kent Bach, Review Article Sometimes a Great Notion: A Critical Notice of Mark Crimmins'.
    Anyone weary of endless philosophical debate on belief reports will find welcome relief in this book. Talking not just about belief talk but about belief itself, it offers much that is new, interesting, and subtle. The central thesis, though interestingly and subtly developed, is not exactly new. It is a version of the “hidden indexical theory” (HIT) of..
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  31. Kent Bach (1993). Sometimes a Great Notion: A Critical Notice of Mark Crimmins' Talk About Beliefs. Mind and Language 8 (3):431-441.
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  32. Ibn Badr & ʻAbduh ʻAbd Allāh (2005). .
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  33. K. Baier (1954). Contradiction and Absurdity. Analysis 15 (2):31 - 40.
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  34. LR Baker, Judgment and Justification - Lycan,Wg.
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  35. Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). Belief Ascription and the Illusion of Depth. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):183-201.
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  36. Lynne Rudder Baker (2001). Are Beliefs Brain States? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. CSLI Publications (Stanford).
    During the past couple of decades, philosophy of mind--with its siblings, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science--has been one of the most exciting areas of philosophy. Yet, in that time, I have come to think that there is a deep flaw in the basic conception of its object of study--a deep flaw in its conception of the so-called propositional attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention. Taking belief as the fundamental propositional attitude, scientifically-minded philosophers hold that beliefs, if there are any, (...)
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  37. Lynne Rudder Baker (2001). Practical Realism Defended: Replies to Critics. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. CSLI Publications (Stanford).
    The topics that I shall consider are these: (1) Causal Explanatoriness of the Attitudes (Dretske, Elugardo); (2) The “Brain-Explain” Thesis and Metaphysical Constraints on Explanation (Antony, Elugardo); (3) Causal Powers of Beliefs (Meyering); (4) Microreduction (Beckermann); (5) Non-Emergent, Non-Reductive Materialism (Antony); (6) The Master Argument Against the Standard View (Dretske, Antony, Elugardo); (7) Practical Realism Extended (Meijers); (8) Alternative to Both the Standard View and Practical Realism (Newen).
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  38. Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    Explaining Attitudes offers an important challenge to the dominant conception of belief found in the work of such philosophers as Dretske and Fodor. According to this dominant view beliefs, if they exist at all, are constituted by states of the brain. Lynne Rudder Baker rejects this view and replaces it with a quite different approach - practical realism. Seen from the perspective of practical realism, any argument that interprets beliefs as either brain states or states of immaterial souls is a (...)
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  39. Lynne Rudder Baker (1994). Reply to Van Gulick. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):217-221.
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  40. Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). What Beliefs Are Not. In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press (Notre Dame).
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  41. Lynne Rudder Baker (1987). Saving Belief. Princeton University Press.
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  42. Arthur James Balfour (1902). The Foundations of Belief. Philosophical Review 11 (2):213-214.
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  43. William G. Ballantine (1931). The Basis of Belief. Journal of Philosophy 28 (25):696-698.
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  44. John A. Barker (1975). A Note on Knowledge and Belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):143 - 144.
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  45. Jonathan Barnes (2006). VII &Ast;—‘BELIEF IS UP TO US’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):187-204.
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  46. Jonathan Barnes (2006). Vii-'Belief is Up to Us'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):189-206.
    Augustine has an argument which goes like this: Belief is assent; Assent is up to us: therefore Belief is up to us. The conclusion is-or was thought to be-a doctrine essential to Christian eschatology. The two premisses come from pagan philosophy. Sections I-II set out the argument and its background. Section III is theological. Section IV looks at the conclusion, with the help of Aristotle, while section V and VI look at the premisses. The last three sections of the paper (...)
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  47. Jonathan Barnes (2006). Vii*-'Belief is Up to Us'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):187-204.
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  48. Naomi S. Baron (1987). When Seeing's Not Believing. American Journal of Semiotics 5 (3/4):321-339.
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  49. R. Bartsch (1985). Concept Formation, Truth, and Norm. In G. A. J. Hoppenbrouwers, Pieter A. M. Seuren & A. J. M. M. Weijters (eds.), Meaning and the Lexicon. Foris Publications.
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  50. J. D. Bastable (1958). The Nature of Belief. Philosophical Studies 8:195-197.
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