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  1. What is Reliance?Facundo M. Alonso - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):163-183.
    In this article I attempt to provide a conceptual framework for thinking about reliance in a systematic way. I argue that reliance is a cognitive attitude that has a tighter connection to the guidance of our thought and action than ordinary belief does. My main thesis is that reliance has a ‘constitutive aim’: namely, it aims at guiding our thought and action in a way that is sensible from the standpoint of practical or theoretical ends. This helps explain why reliance (...)
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  2. Reconceiving Direction of Fit.Avery Archer - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):171-180.
    I argue that the concept of direction of fit is best seen as picking out a certain inferential property of a psychological attitude. The property in question is one that believing shares with assuming and fantasizing and fails to share with desire. Unfortunately, the standard analysis of DOF obscures this fact because it conflates two very different properties of an attitude: that in virtue of which it displays a certain DOF, and that in virtue of which it displays certain revision (...)
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  3. Psychological Concept Acquisition.Theodore Bach - 2013 - In N. Payette (ed.), Connected Minds: Cognition and Interaction in the Social World. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    This essay adjudicates between theoretical models of psychological concept acquisition. I provide new reasons to be skeptical about both simulationist and modularist models. I then defend the scientific-theory-theory account against familiar objections. I conclude by arguing that the scientific-theory-theory account must be supplemented by an account of hypothesis discovery.
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  4. Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. [REVIEW]Emily Barrett & Cory Wright - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):600-603.
  5. Linguistic Knowledge and Cognitive Integration.Edison Barrios - 2012 - Critica 44 (130):35-67.
    Según la Propositional Attitude View (PAV), un hablante es competente en su idioma en virtud de poseer actitudes proposicionales cuyo contenido es su gramática interna. En este artículo desarrollo una objeción a PAV, llamada �el reto de la integración�, originalmente propuesto por Stich (1978) y Evans (1981), y que está constituido por dos premisas: (1) las actitudes proposicionales se caracterizan por su integración inferencial, y (2) los estados que contienen información gramatical no están inferencialmente integrados. En este artículo considero y (...)
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  6. Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism.Arvid Båve - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.
    It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type of (...)
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  7. Why We Can Still Believe the Error Theory.Bergamaschi Ganapini Marianna - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):523-536.
    The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible to fully believe the error theory. Surprisingly, he claims that this is not a problem for the error theorist: even if we can’t fully believe the error theory, the good news is that we can still come close to believing the error theory. In this (...)
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  8. The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving.Lisa Bortolotti - 2009 - Theory and Psychology 19 (5):1-22.
    There is an apparent tension in current accounts of the relationship between reason giving and self knowledge. On the one hand, philosophers like Richard Moran (2001) claim that deliberation and justification can give rise to first-person authority over the attitudes that subjects form or defend on the basis of what they take to be their best reasons. On the other hand, the psychological evidence on the introspection effects and the literature on elusive reasons suggest that engaging in explicit deliberation or (...)
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  9. Review of Evnine, Simon J.,Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, Pp. Viii + 176, £32.50 (Cloth). [REVIEW]Lisa Bortolotti - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):349-352.
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  10. What Does Fido Believe?Lisa Bortolotti - 2008 - Think 7 (19):7-15.
    Lisa Bortolotti introduces the arguments about whether dogs can have beliefs.
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  11. Intentionality Without Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392.
    It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description.
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  12. Intentionality Without Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):369 - 376.
    It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description.
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  13. Inconsistency and Interpretation.Lisa Bortolotti - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.
    Abstract In this paper I discuss one apparent counterexample to the rationality constraint on belief ascription. The fact that there are inconsistent believers does not seem compatible with the idea that only rational creatures can be ascribed beliefs. I consider Davidson's explanation of the possibility of inconsistent believers and claim that it involves a reformulation of the rationality constraint in terms of the believers' subscription to norms of rationality. I shall argue that Davidson's strategy is partially successful, but that the (...)
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  14. Faultless Ignorance: Strengths and Limitations of Epistemic Definitions of Confabulation.Lisa Bortolotti & Rochelle Cox - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):952-965.
    There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However, existing epistemic accounts are unable to offer sufficient (...)
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  15. The Ethics of Delusional Belief.Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):275-296.
    In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can (...)
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  16. Costs and Benefits of Imperfect Cognitions.Lisa Bortolotti & Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:487-489.
    Introduction to a special issue of Consciousness and Cognition on the costs and benefits of imperfect cognitions.
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  17. Nikolaj Nottelmann (Ed.), New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, Xii + 258 Pp., GBP 55 (Hardback), ISBN 9781137026514. [REVIEW]Lisa Bortolotti & Ema Sullivan‐Bissett - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):141-146.
  18. Review of New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure by Nikolaj Nottelmann. [REVIEW]Lisa Botolotti & Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):141-146.
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  19. Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time.Darren Bradley - 2013 - In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago.
    How should our beliefs change over time? Much has been written about how our beliefs should change in the light of new evidence. But that is not the question I’m asking. Sometimes our beliefs change without new evidence. I previously believed it was Sunday. I now believe it’s Monday. In this paper I discuss the implications of such beliefs for philosophy of language. I will argue that we need to allow for ‘dynamic’ beliefs, that we need new norms of belief (...)
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  20. Brentano's Theory of Judgement.Johannes Brandl - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  21. Believing the Impossible.Curtis Brown - 1991 - Synthese 89 (3):353-364.
    Ruth Barcan Marcus has argued that, just as we cannot know what is false, we cannot believe what is impossible.1 I will offer an interpretation of her defense of this view. I will then argue, first, that if the defense succeeded it would also justify rejecting many, perhaps most, of our ordinary belief ascriptions; and second, that, luckily, the defense does not succeed. Finally, I suggest that despite its failure there is something correct and important in Marcus's argument.
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  22. John Dewey's Pragmatist Alternative to the Belief-Acceptance Dichotomy.Matthew J. Brown - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:62-70.
    Defenders of value-free science appeal to cognitive attitudes as part of a wedge strategy, to mark a distinction between science proper and the uses of science for decision-making, policy, etc. Distinctions between attitudes like belief and acceptance have played an important role in defending the value-free ideal. In this paper, I will explore John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy of science as an alternative to the philosophical framework the wedge strategy rests on. Dewey does draw significant and useful distinctions between different sorts (...)
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  23. The Normativity of Automaticity.Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.
    While the causal contributions of so-called ‘automatic’ processes to behavior are now widely acknowledged, less attention has been given to their normative role in the guidance of action. We develop an account of the normativity of automaticity that responds to and builds upon Tamar Szabó Gendler's account of ‘alief’, an associative and arational mental state more primitive than belief. Alief represents a promising tool for integrating psychological research on automaticity with philosophical work on mind and action, but Gendler errs in (...)
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  24. Acceptance Does Not Entail Belief.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):255-261.
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  25. An Essay on Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Rochester
    The problem of doxastic agency concerns what sort of agency humans can exercise with regard to forming doxastic attitudes such as belief. In this essay I defend a version of what James Montmarquet calls "The Asymmetry Thesis": Coming to believe and action are asymmetrical with respect to direct voluntary control. I argue that normal adult human agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over the acquisition of any of their doxastic attitudes in the same way that they exercise such control over (...)
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  26. Chalmers on Epistemic Content.Alex Byrne - manuscript
    1. Let us say that a thought is _about an object _o just in case the truth value of the thought at any possible world W depends on how things are with _o_ in W. Thus the thought that the first Chancellor of the German Empire was an astute diplomatist is not about Bismark, because that thought is true in a world W iff, in W, whoever happens to be the first Chancellor was an astute diplomatist, and that may well (...)
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  27. Brentano's Theory of Judgment.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1982 - In Brentano and Meinong Studies. Rodopi.
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  28. Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2017 - Synthese:1-27.
    This paper argues for a treatment of belief as essentially sensitive to certain features of context. The first part gives an argument that we must take belief to be context-sensitive in the same way that assertion is, if we are to preserve appealing principles tying belief to sincere assertion. In particular, whether an agent counts as believing that p in a context depends on the space of alternative possibilities the agent is considering in that context. One and the same doxastic (...)
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  29. Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13 (11):1-18.
    This paper argues for two theses: that degrees of belief are context sensitive; that outright belief is belief to degree 1. The latter thesis is rejected quickly in most discussions of the relationship between credence and belief, but the former thesis undermines the usual reasons for doing so. Furthermore, identifying belief with credence 1 allows nice solutions to a number of problems for the most widely-held view of the relationship between credence and belief, the threshold view. I provide a sketch (...)
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  30. Warrant and Epistemic Virtues: Toward and Agent Reliabilist Account of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge.Stewart Clem - 2008 - Dissertation, Oklahoma State University
    Alvin Plantinga’s theory of knowledge, as developed in his Warrant trilogy, has shaped the debates surrounding many areas in epistemology in profound ways. Plantinga has received his share of criticism, however, particularly in his treatment of belief in God as being “properly basic”. There has also been much confusion surrounding his notions of warrant and proper function, to which Plantinga has responded numerous times. Many critics remain unsatisfied, while others have developed alternative understandings of warrant in order to rescue Plantinga’s (...)
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  31. Theorizing and Empirical Belief.F. John Clendinnen - 1996 - In P. Riggs (ed.), Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 63--92.
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  32. Review: Epistemic Supervenience Revisited. [REVIEW]James Van Cleve - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1049 - 1055.
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  33. At the Threshold of Knowledge.Rothschild Daniel & Spectre Levi - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    We explore consequences of the view that to know a proposition your rational credence in the proposition must exceed a certain threshold. In other words, to know something you must have evidence that makes rational a high credence in it. We relate such a threshold view to Dorr et al.’s :277–287, 2014) argument against the principle they call fair coins: “If you know a coin won’t land tails, then you know it won’t be flipped.” They argue for rejecting fair coins (...)
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  34. Understanding Without Justification or Belief.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):239-254.
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest among epistemologists in the nature of understanding, with some authors arguing that understanding should replace knowledge as the primary focus of epistemology. But what is understanding? According to what is often called the standard view, understanding is a species of knowledge. Although this view has recently been challenged in various ways, even the critics of the standard view have assumed that understanding requires justification and belief. I argue that it requires (...)
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  35. Reasons for (Prior) Belief in Bayesian Epistemology.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):781-786.
    Bayesian epistemology tells us with great precision how we should move from prior to posterior beliefs in light of new evidence or information, but says little about where our prior beliefs come from. It offers few resources to describe some prior beliefs as rational or well-justified, and others as irrational or unreasonable. A different strand of epistemology takes the central epistemological question to be not how to change one’s beliefs in light of new evidence, but what reasons justify a given (...)
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  36. Know-Wh Does Not Reduce to Know That.Katalin Farkas - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):109-122.
    Know -wh ascriptions are ubiquitous in many languages. One standard analysis of know -wh is this: someone knows-wh just in case she knows that p, where p is an answer to the question included in the wh-clause. Additional conditions have also been proposed, but virtually all analyses assume that propositional knowledge of an answer is at least a necessary condition for knowledge-wh. This paper challenges this assumption, by arguing that there are cases where we have knowledge-wh without knowledge- that of (...)
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  37. Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis.Katalin Farkas - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):435-447.
    According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions—including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers—fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially outside the body. Once we (...)
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  38. How to Change People’s Beliefs? Doxastic Coercion Vs. Evidential Persuasion.Gheorghe-Ilie Farte - 2016 - Argumentum. Journal of the Seminar of Discursive Logic, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric 14 (2):47-76.
    The very existence of society depends on the ability of its members to influence formatively the beliefs, desires, and actions of their fellows. In every sphere of social life, powerful human agents (whether individuals or institutions) tend to use coercion as a favorite shortcut to achieving their aims without taking into consideration the non-violent alternatives or the negative (unintended) consequences of their actions. This propensity for coercion is manifested in the doxastic sphere by attempts to shape people’s beliefs (and doubts) (...)
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  39. Self-Ascription and Belief de Re.Neil Feit - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (1):35-49.
  40. From Degrees of Belief to Beliefs: Lessons From Judgment-Aggregation Theory.Dietrich Franz & Christian List - manuscript
    What is the relationship between degrees of belief and all-or-nothing beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former, without running into paradoxes? We reassess this “belief-binarization” problem from the perspective of judgment-aggregation theory. Although some similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation have been noted before, the literature contains no general study of the implications of aggregation-theoretic impossibility and possibility results for belief binarization. We seek to fill this gap. This paper is organized around a “baseline” (...)
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  41. Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:57.
    There has been much discussion about whether traditional epistemology's doxastic attitudes are reducible to degrees of belief. In this paper I argue that what I call the Straightforward Reduction - the reduction of all three of believing p, disbelieving p, and suspending judgment about p, not-p to precise degrees of belief for p and not-p that ought to obey the standard axioms of the probability calculus - cannot succeed. By focusing on suspension of judgment (agnosticism) rather than belief, we can (...)
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  42. Suspended Judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
    Abstract In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a “yes or no” picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third option should (...)
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  43. Belief is Weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.
    It is tempting to posit an intimate relationship between belief and assertion. The speech act of assertion seems like a way of transferring the speaker’s belief to his or her audience. If this is right, then you might think that the evidential warrant required for asserting a proposition is just the same as the warrant for believing it. We call this thesis entitlement equality. We argue here that entitlement equality is false, because our everyday notion of belief is unambiguously a (...)
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  44. The Normativity of Doxastic Correctness.Tsung-Hsing Ho - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    It is widely maintained that doxastic norms that govern how people should believe can be explained by the truism that belief is governed by the correctness norm: believing p is correct if and only if p. This approach fails because it confuses two kinds of correctness norm: (1) It is correct for S to believe p if and only p; and (2) believing p is correct qua belief if and only if p. Only can (2) be said to be a (...)
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  45. Propositional Faith: What It is and What It is Not.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):357-372.
    Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Wadsworth 2015, 6th edition, eds Michael Rea and Louis Pojman. What is propositional faith? At a first approximation, we might answer that it is the psychological attitude picked out by standard uses of the English locution “S has faith that p,” where p takes declarative sentences as instances, as in “He has faith that they’ll win”. Although correct, this answer is not nearly as informative as we might like. Many people say that there (...)
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  46. Troubles with Stereotypes for Spinozan Minds.Bryce Huebner - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):63-92.
    Some people succeed in adopting feminist ideals in spite of the prevalence of asymmetric power relations. However, those who adopt such ideals face a number of psychological difficulties in inhibiting stereotype-based judgments. I argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers a more complete understanding of the mechanisms that underwrite our intuitive stereotype-based judgments. I also argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers resources for avoiding stereotype-based judgments where they are antecedently recognized to be pernicious and insidious. (...)
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  47. Demonstrative Belief and Dispositions.David Hunter - manuscript
    forthcoming in Journal of Philosophical Research. This paper argues against David Armstrong’s view that singular beliefs are not dispositions. It also begins to develop the view that self-conscious belief is a matter of belief revision.
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  48. Alienated Belief.David Hunter - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):221-240.
    This paper argues that it is possible to knowingly believe something while judging that one ought not to believe it and (so) viewing the belief as manifesting a sort of failure. I offer examples showing that such ‘alienated belief’ has several potential sources. I contrast alienated belief with self-deception, incontinent (or akratic) belief and half-belief. I argue that the possibility of alienated belief is compatible with the so-called ‘transparency’ of first-person reflection on belief, and that the descriptive and expressive difficulties (...)
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  49. Belief Ascription and Context Dependence.David Hunter - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):902-911.
    This article considers the question whether belief ascriptions exhibit context dependence. I first distinguish two potential forms of context dependence in belief ascription. Propositional context dependence concerns what the subject believes, whereas attitudinal context dependence concerns what it is to believe a proposition. I then discuss three potential sources of PCD and two potential sources of ACD. Given the nature of this article, my discussion will provide only an overview of these various forms and sources of context dependence. Along the (...)
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  50. Belief and Self-Consciousness.David Hunter - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):673 – 693.
    This paper is about what is distinctive about first-person beliefs. I discuss several sets of puzzling cases of first-person belief. The first focus on the relation between belief and action, while the second focus on the relation of belief to subjectivity. I argue that in the absence of an explanation of the dispositional difference, individuating such beliefs more finely than truth conditions merely marks the difference. I argue that the puzzles reveal a difference in the ways that I am disposed (...)
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