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  1. From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism.Guy Axtell - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism as its leading proponents describe it has two distinct senses, these being evidentialism as a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification, and as a prescriptive ethics of belief—an account of what one ‘ought to believe’ under different epistemic circumstances. These two senses of evidentialism are related, but in the work of leading evidentialist philosophers, in ways that I think are deeply problematic. Although focusing on Richard Feldman’s ethics of belief, this chapter is critical of evidentialism in both senses. However, I (...)
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  2. Upping the Stakes and the Preface Paradox.Jonny Blamey - 2013 - In Frank Zenker (ed.), Bayesian Argumentation. Springer. pp. 195-210.
    Abstract The Preface Paradox, first introduced by David Makinson (1961), presents a plausible scenario where an agent is evidentially certain of each of a set of propositions without being evidentially certain of the conjunction of the set of propositions. Given reasonable assumptions about the nature of evidential certainty, this appears to be a straightforward contradiction. We solve the paradox by appeal to stake size sensitivity, which is the claim that evidential probability is sensitive to stake size. The argument is that (...)
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  3. Guest Editors' Introduction.Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande & Hans Rott - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):1-5.
    The contributions to the Special Issue on Multiple Belief Change, Iterated Belief Change and Preference Aggregation are divided into three parts. Four contributions are grouped under the heading "multiple belief change" (Part I, with authors M. Falappa, E. Fermé, G. Kern-Isberner, P. Peppas, M. Reis, and G. Simari), five contributions under the heading "iterated belief change" (Part II, with authors G. Bonanno, S.O. Hansson, A. Nayak, M. Orgun, R. Ramachandran, H. Rott, and E. Weydert). These papers do not only pick (...)
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  4. Interpreting Enthymematic Arguments Using Belief Revision.Georg Brun & Hans Rott - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4041-4063.
    This paper is about the situation in which an author (writer or speaker) presents a deductively invalid argument, but the addressee aims at a charitable interpretation and has reason to assume that the author intends to present a valid argument. How can he go about interpreting the author’s reasoning as enthymematically valid? We suggest replacing the usual find-the-missing-premise approaches by an approach based on systematic efforts to ascribe a belief state to the author against the background of which the argument (...)
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  5. Minimality Criteria in Spatial Belief Revision.Leandra Bucher & Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - In Paul Bello, Marcello Guarini, Marjorie McShane & Brian Scassellati (eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 1952-8.
    Agents typically revise their beliefs when confronted with evidence that contradicts those beliefs, selecting from a number of possible revisions sufficient to reestablish consistency. In cases where an individual’s beliefs concern spatial relations, belief revision has been fruitfully treated as a decision about which features of an initially constructed spatial mental model to modify. A normative claim about belief revision maintains that agents should prefer minimal belief revisions. Yet recent studies have rebutted the preceding claim, where minimality is understood to (...)
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  6. Truth Approximation, Belief Merging, and Peer Disagreement.Gustavo Cevolani - 2014 - Synthese 191 (11):2383-2401.
    In this paper, we investigate the problem of truth approximation via belief merging, i.e., we ask whether, and under what conditions, a group of inquirers merging together their beliefs makes progress toward the truth about the underlying domain. We answer this question by proving some formal results on how belief merging operators perform with respect to the task of truth approximation, construed as increasing verisimilitude or truthlikeness. Our results shed new light on the issue of how rational (dis)agreement affects the (...)
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  7. Truth Approximation Via Abductive Belief Change.Gustavo Cevolani - 2013 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 21 (6):999-1016.
    We investigate the logical and conceptual connections between abductive reasoning construed as a process of belief change, on the one hand, and truth approximation, construed as increasing (estimated) verisimilitude, on the other. We introduce the notion of ‘(verisimilitude-guided) abductive belief change’ and discuss under what conditions abductively changing our theories or beliefs does lead them closer to the truth, and hence tracks truth approximation conceived as the main aim of inquiry. The consequences of our analysis for some recent discussions concerning (...)
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  8. Approaching the Truth Via Belief Change in Propositional Languages.Gustavo Cevolani & Francesco Calandra - 2010 - In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Rèdei (eds.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. pp. 47--62.
    Starting from the sixties of the past century theory change has become a main concern of philosophy of science. Two of the best known formal accounts of theory change are the post-Popperian theories of verisimilitude (PPV for short) and the AGM theory of belief change (AGM for short). In this paper, we will investigate the conceptual relations between PPV and AGM and, in particular, we will ask whether the AGM rules for theory change are effective means for approaching the truth, (...)
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  9. Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Conjunctive Theories.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):183-202.
    Theory change is a central concern in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. In this paper, we investigate the relationships between two ongoing research programs providing formal treatments of theory change: the (post-Popperian) approach to verisimilitude and the AGM theory of belief change. We show that appropriately construed accounts emerging from those two lines of epistemological research do yield convergences relative to a specified kind of theories, here labeled “conjunctive”. In this domain, a set of plausible conditions are identified which (...)
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  10. "Merely a Logician's Toy?" Belief Revision Confronting Scientific Theory Change. [REVIEW]Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2012 - Metascience 21 (2):463-466.
    Review of Olsson, Erik J. and Enqvist, Sebastian , Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science.
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  11. Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Nomic Conjunctive Theories.Gustavo Cevolani, Roberto Festa & Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3307-3324.
    In this paper, we address the problem of truth approximation through theory change, asking whether revising our theories by newly acquired data leads us closer to the truth about a given domain. More particularly, we focus on “nomic conjunctive theories”, i.e., theories expressed as conjunctions of logically independent statements concerning the physical or, more generally, nomic possibilities and impossibilities of the domain under inquiry. We define both a comparative and a quantitative notion of the verisimilitude of such theories, and identify (...)
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  12. Relevance Sensitive Non-Monotonic Inference on Belief Sequences.Samir Chopra, Konstantinos Georgatos & Rohit Parikh - 2001 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 11 (1-2):131-150.
    We present a method for relevance sensitive non-monotonic inference from belief sequences which incorporates insights pertaining to prioritized inference and relevance sensitive, inconsistency tolerant belief revision. Our model uses a finite, logically open sequence of propositional formulas as a representation for beliefs and defines a notion of inference from maxiconsistent subsets of formulas guided by two orderings: a temporal sequencing and an ordering based on relevance relations between the putative conclusion and formulas in the sequence. The relevance relations are ternary (...)
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  13. Transformative Experience L. A. PAUL Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; 189 Pp.; £18.99. [REVIEW]Irena Cronin - forthcoming - Dialogue:1-2.
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  14. A Characterization of Imaging in Terms of Popper Functions.Charles B. Cross - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (2):316-338.
    Despite the results of David Lewis, Peter Gärdenfors, and others, showing that imaging and classical conditionalization coincide only in the most trivial probabilistic models of belief revision, it turns out that imaging on a proposition A can always be described via Popper function conditionalization on a proposition that entails A. This result generalizes to any method of belief revision meeting certain minimal requirements. The proof is illustrated by an application of imaging in the context of the Monty Hall Problem.
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  15. Why We Can't Agree.Howard Darmstadter - 2015 - Philosophy Now (107):26.
    We all have internal models (or maps) that represent the world. But all models/maps distort. Given the complexity of the world and the psychological limits to our representational ability, we must do with simplified models that work in those situations that are most important for us. But since our wants and situations differ, so will our models. When we encounter people with different models, we may try to convert them, but such conversion is unlikely if their models serve their wants (...)
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  16. Homeostatic Epistemology : Reliability, Coherence and Coordination in a Bayesian Virtue Epistemology.Susannah Kate Devitt - unknown
    How do agents with limited cognitive capacities flourish in informationally impoverished or unexpected circumstances? Aristotle argued that human flourishing emerged from knowing about the world and our place within it. If he is right, then the virtuous processes that produce knowledge, best explain flourishing. Influenced by Aristotle, virtue epistemology defends an analysis of knowledge where beliefs are evaluated for their truth and the intellectual virtue or competences relied on in their creation. However, human flourishing may emerge from how degrees of (...)
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  17. Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - Mind.
    The Lockean Thesis says that you must believe p iff you’re sufficiently confident of it. On some versions, the 'must' asserts a metaphysical connection; on others, it asserts a normative one. On some versions, 'sufficiently confident' refers to a fixed threshold of credence; on others, it varies with proposition and context. Claim: the Lockean Thesis follows from epistemic utility theory—the view that rational requirements are constrained by the norm to promote accuracy. Different versions of this theory generate different versions of (...)
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  18. A Theory of Knowledge and Belief Change: Formal and Experimental Perspectives, by Masaharu Mizumoto: Japan: Hokkaido University Press, 2011, Pp. V+ 298,¥ 7500 (Hardback). [REVIEW]Jeff Dunn - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):413-415.
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  19. Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic.Sebastian Enqvist - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):527-548.
    The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis , 65 , 165–183, 2006 ). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision . While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, so far interrogative belief revision has (...)
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  20. Logic, Action, and Information: Essays on Logic in Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence.A. Fuhrmann & Hans Rott (eds.) - 1996 - W. De Gruyter.
    Janusz Czelakowski Elements of Formal Action Theory 1. Elementary Action Systems 1.1 Introductory Remarks. In contemporary literature one may distinguish ...
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  21. The Best of All Possible Worlds.Emmanuel J. Genot - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer.
    Erik J. Olsson and David Westlund have recently argued that the standard belief revision representation of an epistemic state is defective. In order to adequately model an epistemic state one needs, in addition to a belief set K and an entrenchment relation E, a research agenda A, i.e. a set of questions satisfying certain corpus-relative preconditions the agent would like to have answers to. Informally, the preconditions guarantee that the set of potential answers represent a partition of possible expansions of (...)
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  22. Extensive Questions.Emmanuel J. Genot - 2009 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5378:131--145.
    Olsson and his collaborators have proposed an extension of Belief Revision Theory where an epistemic state is modeled as a triple S=⟨K_,E,A_⟩ , where A_ is a research agenda, i.e. a set of research questions. Contraction and expansion apply to states, and affect the agenda. We propose an alternative characterization of the problem of agenda updating, where research questions are viewed as blueprints for research strategies. We offer a unified solution to this problem, and prove it equivalent to Olsson’s own. (...)
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  23. Geodesic Merging.Konstantinos Georgatos - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    We pursue an account of merging through the use of geodesic semantics, the semantics based on the length of the shortest path on a graph. This approach has been fruitful in other areas of belief change such as revision and update. To this end, we introduce three binary merging operators of propositions defined on the graph of their valuations and we characterize them with a finite set of postulates.
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  24. Graph-Based Belief Merging.Konstantinos Georgatos - 2016 - In Wiebe van der Hoek, Wesley H. Holliday & Wen-Fang Wang (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. pp. 101-115.
    Graphs are employed to define a variety of distance-based binary merging operators. We provide logical characterization results for each class of merging operators introduced and discuss the extension of this approach to the merging of sequences and multisets.
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  25. Iterated Contraction Based on Indistinguishability.Konstantinos Georgatos - 2013 - In Sergei Artemov & Anil Nerode (eds.), LFCS 2013. Springer. pp. 194–205.
    We introduce a class of set-theoretic operators on a tolerance space that models the process of minimal belief contraction, and therefore a natural process of iterated contraction can be defined. We characterize the class of contraction operators and study the properties of the associated iterated belief contraction.
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  26. Geodesic Revision.Konstantinos Georgatos - 2009 - Journal of Logic and Computation 19 (3):447-459.
    The purpose of this article is to introduce a class of distance-based iterated revision operators generated by minimizing the geodesic distance on a graph. Such operators correspond bijectively to metrics and have a simple finite presentation. As distance is generated by distinguishability, our framework is appropriate for modelling contexts where distance is generated by threshold, and therefore, when measurement is erroneous.
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  27. Belief Update Using Graphs.Konstantinos Georgatos - 2008 - In David Wilson & Chad H. Lane (eds.), FLAIRS 21. AAAI Press. pp. 649-654.
    The purpose of this paper is to introduce a form of update based on the minimization of the geodesic distance on a graph. We provide a characterization of this class using set- theoretic operators and show that such operators bijectively correspond to geodesic metrics. As distance is generated by distinguishability, our framework is appropriate in contexts where distance is generated by threshold, and therefore, when measurement is erroneous.
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  28. Bridging Learning Theory and Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Nina Gierasimczuk - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):371-384.
    This paper discusses the possibility of modelling inductive inference (Gold 1967) in dynamic epistemic logic (see e.g. van Ditmarsch et al. 2007). The general purpose is to propose a semantic basis for designing a modal logic for learning in the limit. First, we analyze a variety of epistemological notions involved in identification in the limit and match it with traditional epistemic and doxastic logic approaches. Then, we provide a comparison of learning by erasing (Lange et al. 1996) and iterated epistemic (...)
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  29. Rethinking the Debriefing Paradigm: The Rationality of Belief Perseverance.David Godden - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):51-74.
    By examining particular cases of belief perseverance following the undermining of their original evidentiary grounds, this paper considers two theories of rational belief revision: foundation and coherence. Gilbert Harman has argued for coherence over foundationalism on the grounds that the foundations theory absurdly deems most of our beliefs to be not rationally held. A consequence of the unacceptability of foundationalism is that belief perseverance is rational. This paper defends the intuitive judgement that belief perseverance is irrational by offering a competing (...)
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  30. A Probabilistic Analysis of Argument Cogency.David Godden & Frank Zenker - forthcoming - Synthese.
    This paper offers a probabilistic treatment of the conditions for argument cogency as endorsed in informal logic: acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency (RSA). Treating a natural language argument as a reason-claim-complex, our analysis identifies content features of defeasible argument on which the RSA conditions depend, namely: (i) change in the commitment to the reason, (ii) the reason’s sensitivity and selectivity to the claim, (iii) one’s prior commitment to the claim, and (iv) the contextually determined thresholds of acceptability for reasons and for (...)
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  31. Implementation of Belief Change Operators Using BDDs.Nikos Gorogiannis & Mark D. Ryan - 2002 - Studia Logica 70 (1):131 - 156.
    While the theory of belief change has attracted a lot of interest from researchers, work on implementing belief change and actually putting it to use in real-world problems is still scarce. In this paper, we present an implementation of propositional belief change using Binary Decision Diagrams. Upper complexity bounds for the algorithm are presented and discussed. The approach is presented both in the general case, as well as on specific belief change operators from the literature. In an effort to gain (...)
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  32. Coherentist Contraction.SvenOve Hansson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (3):315-330.
    A model of coherentist belief contraction is constructed. The outcome of belief contraction is required to be one of the coherent subsets of the original belief set, and a set of plausible properties is proposed for this set of coherent subsets. The contraction operators obtained in this way are shown to coincide with well-known belief base operations. This connection between coherentist and foundationalist approaches to belief change has important implications for the philosophical interpretation of models of belief change.
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  33. Resource-Bounded Belief Revision and Contraction.Mark Jago - 2006 - In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer. pp. 141--154.
    Agents need to be able to change their beliefs; in particular, they should be able to contract or remove a certain belief in order to restore consistency to their set of beliefs, and revise their beliefs by incorporating a new belief which may be inconsistent with their previous beliefs. An influential theory of belief change proposed by Alchourron, G¨ardenfors and Makinson (AGM) [1] describes postulates which a rational belief revision and contraction operations should satisfy. The AGM postulates have been perceived (...)
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  34. How to Expect a Surprising Exam.Brian Kim & Anubav Vasudevan - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3101-3133.
    In this paper, we provide a Bayesian analysis of the well-known surprise exam paradox. Central to our analysis is a probabilistic account of what it means for the student to accept the teacher's announcement that he will receive a surprise exam. According to this account, the student can be said to have accepted the teacher's announcement provided he adopts a subjective probability distribution relative to which he expects to receive the exam on a day on which he expects not to (...)
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  35. Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation.Krista Lawlor - 2014 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):1-27.
    (2014). Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation. Inquiry: Vol. 57, The Nature of Belief, pp. 1-27. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2014.858414.
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  36. Epistemology, Context, and Formalism.Franck Lihoreau & Manuel Rebuschi (eds.) - 2014 - Springer Verlag.
    Acknowledgements Five out of the 13 contributions to this volume originate from papers which were presented at the international workshop on “Epistemology, Context, Formalism” held at the MSH-Lorraine in Nancy, France, on November the ...
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  37. The Ramsey Test and the Indexicality of Conditionals: A Proposed Resolution of Gärdenfors' Paradox.Sten Lindström - 1996 - In André Fuhrmann & Hans Rott (eds.), Logic, Action and Information. de Gruyter.
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  38. The Powers That Bind : Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Obligation.Eric Mandelbaum & Neil Levy - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson (ed.), The Ethics of Belief. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 12-33.
    In this chapter, we argue for three theses: (1) we lack the power to form beliefs at will (i.e., directly); at very least, we lack the power to form at will beliefs of the kind that proponents of doxastic voluntarism have in mind; but (2) we possess a propensity to form beliefs for non-epistemic reasons; and (3) these propensities—once we come to know we have them—entail that we have obligations similar to those we would have were doxastic voluntarism true. Specifically, (...)
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  39. Believing Without Reason.Eric Mandelbaum & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 22:42-52.
  40. Probability Kinematics and Probability Dynamics.Lydia Mcgrew - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:89-105.
    Richard Jeffrey developed the formula for probability kinematics with the intent that it would show that strong foundations are epistemologically unnecessary. But the reasons that support strong foundationalism are considerations of dynamics rather than kinematics. The strong foundationalist is concerned with the origin of epistemic force; showing how epistemic force is propagated therefore cannot undermine his position. The weakness of personalism is evident in the difficulty the personalist has in giving a principled answer to the question of when the conditions (...)
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  41. Three Philosophical Lessons for the Analysis of Criminal and Military Intelligence.Christopher Mole - 2012 - Intelligence and National Security 27 (4):441-58.
    It has recently been suggested that philosophy – in particular epistemology – has a contribution to make to the analysis of criminal and military intelligence. The present article pursues this suggestion, taking three phenomena that have recently been studied by philosophers, and showing that they have important implications for the gathering and sharing of intelligence, and for the use of intelligence in the determining of military strategy. The phenomena discussed are: (1) Simpson's Paradox, (2) the distinction between resiliency and reliability (...)
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  42. Construction and Revision of Spatial Mental Models Under High Task Demand.Jelica Nejasmic, Leandra Bucher, Paul D. Thorn & Markus Knauff - 2014 - In Paul Bello, Marcello Guarini, Marjorie McShane & Brian Scassellati (eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 1066-72.
    Individuals often revise their beliefs when confronted with contradicting evidence. Belief revision in the spatial domain can be regarded as variation of initially constructed spatial mental models. Construction and revision usually follow distinct cognitive principles. The present study examines whether principles of revisions which follow constructions under high task demands differ from principles applied after less demanding constructions. We manipulated the task demands for model constructions by means of the continuity with which a spatial model was constructed. We administered tasks (...)
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  43. Reasoning with Comparative Moral Judgements: An Argument for Moral Bayesianism.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2017 - In Rafal Urbaniak & Gillman Payette (eds.), Applications of Formal Philosophy - The Road Less Travelled. Cham: Springer. pp. 113-136.
    The paper discusses the notion of reasoning with comparative moral judgements (i.e judgements of the form “act a is morally superior to act b”) from the point of view of several meta-ethical positions. Using a simple formal result, it is argued that only a version of moral cognitivism that is committed to the claim that moral beliefs come in degrees can give a normatively plausible account of such reasoning. Some implications of accepting such a version of moral cognitivism are discussed.
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  44. Una aproximación pragmatista al testimonio como evidencia.Andrés Páez - 2013 - In Carmen Vásquez (ed.), Estándares de prueba y prueba científica. Ensayos de epistemología jurídica. Marcial Pons. pp. 215-238.
    El testimonio es nuestra mayor fuente de creencias. La gran mayoría de nuestras creencias han sido adquiridas a partir de las palabras de otros y no a través de la observación directa del mundo. Una de las peculiaridades de la mayor parte de las creencias testimoniales es que son aceptadas sin ninguna deliberación consciente. Mientras el testimonio sea consistente con nuestras creencias y la fuente sea confiable, la reacción más corriente es la aceptación automática de la información (Thagard 2004, 2005). (...)
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  45. Frontloading, Supposition, and Contraction.Bryan Pickel - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):559-578.
    In Constructing the World, Chalmers observes that our knowledge exceeds the core evidence provided by our senses and introspection. Thus, on the basis of core evidence, one also can know (S) that water covers the majority of the Earth. This knowledge, Chalmers suggests, requires a great deal of apriori knowledge. Chalmers argues that even if one suspends belief in one’s core evidence, one can nevertheless reason from a description of this evidence to an ordinary claim such as S. Chalmers concludes (...)
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  46. A Reply to the Synchronist.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):859-871.
    On the face of it, in ordinary practices of rational assessment, we criticize agents both for the combinations of attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention, that they possess at particular times, and for the ways that they behave cognitively over time, by forming, reconsidering, and updating those attitudes. Accordingly, philosophers have proposed norms of rationality that are synchronic—concerned fundamentally with our individual time-slices, and diachronic—concerned with our temporally extended behaviour. However, a recent movement in epistemology has cast doubt on the (...)
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  47. Replies to the Papers in the Issue "Recanati on Mental Files".François Recanati - 2015 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):408-437.
  48. Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the Concept of Belief.Hans Rott - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2695-2720.
    Pragmatists have argued that doxastic or epistemic norms do not apply to beliefs, but to changes of beliefs; thus not to the holding or not-holding, but to the acquisition or removal of beliefs. Doxastic voluntarism generally claims that humans acquire beliefs in a deliberate and controlled way. This paper introduces Negative Doxastic Voluntarism according to which there is a fundamental asymmetry in belief change: humans tend to acquire beliefs more or less automatically and unreflectively, but they tend to withdraw beliefs (...)
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  49. Three Floors for the Theory of Theory Change.Hans Rott - 2014 - In Vít Punčochář Michal Dančák (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2013. College Publications. pp. 187-205.
    The theory of theory change due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson ("AGM") has been widely known as being characterized by two sets of postulates, one being very weak and the other being very strong. Commenting on the three classic constructions of partial meet contraction, safe contraction and entrenchment-based construction, I argue that three intermediate levels can be distinguished that play decisive roles within the AGM theory.
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  50. Unvergleichbarkeit und unabhängige Bedeutung.Hans Rott - 2014 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 68 (2):237-241.
    This paper gives critical comments on Wolfgang Spohn's Laws of Belief (2012). I argue, first, that it is important to account for incomparabilities in the plausibilities of possible worlds or propositions, and second, that the meaning of input parameters specifying the degree to which a proposition is to be accepted should be independent of the agent's belief state.
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