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  1. Modeling and Using Context.V. Akman (ed.) - 2001 - Springer.
    This book constitutes the reviewed proceedings of the Third International Conference on Modeling and Using Context, CONTEXT 2001, held in Dundee, UK in July 2001.The 30 full papers and 15 short papers presented were carefully reviewed, ...
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  2. A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision.Holger Andreas - 2011 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (2):205-232.
    The present paper aims at a synthesis of belief revision theory with the Sneed formalism known as the structuralist theory of science. This synthesis is brought about by a dynamisation of classical structuralism, with an abductive inference rule and base generated revisions in the style of Rott (2001). The formalism of prioritised default logic (PDL) serves as the medium of the synthesis. Why seek to integrate the Sneed formalism into belief revision theory? With the hybrid system of the present investigation, (...)
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  3. Grounded Consequence for Defeasible Logic.Antonelli Aldo - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a title on the foundations of defeasible logic, which explores the formal properties of everyday reasoning patterns whereby people jump to conclusions, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further information. Although technical in nature the book contains sections that outline basic issues by means of intuitive and simple examples. This book is primarily targeted at philosophers interested in the foundations of defeasible logic, logicians, and specialists in artificial intelligence and theoretical computer science.
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  4. Bayesian Epistemology and Epistemic Conditionals.Horacio Arló-Costa - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (11):555-593.
    The notion of probability occupies a central role in contemporary epistemology and cognitive science. Nevertheless, the classical notion of probability is hard to reconcile with the central notions postulated by the epistemological tradition.
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  5. Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change.Horacio Arlo-Costa & Arthur Paul Pedersen - unknown
    This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen's more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent social norms in the theory (...)
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  6. Keep Changing Your Beliefs, Aiming for the Truth.Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):255-270.
    We investigate the process of truth-seeking by iterated belief revision with higher-level doxastic information . We elaborate further on the main results in Baltag and Smets (Proceedings of TARK, 2009a , Proceedings of WOLLIC’09 LNAI 5514, 2009b ), applying them to the issue of convergence to truth . We study the conditions under which the belief revision induced by a series of truthful iterated upgrades eventually stabilizes on true beliefs. We give two different conditions ensuring that beliefs converge to “full” (...)
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  7. Probabilistic Dynamic Belief Revision.Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets - 2008 - Synthese 165 (2):179 - 202.
    We investigate the discrete (finite) case of the Popper–Renyi theory of conditional probability, introducing discrete conditional probabilistic models for knowledge and conditional belief, and comparing them with the more standard plausibility models. We also consider a related notion, that of safe belief, which is a weak (non-negatively introspective) type of “knowledge”. We develop a probabilistic version of this concept (“degree of safety”) and we analyze its role in games. We completely axiomatize the logic of conditional belief, knowledge and safe belief (...)
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  8. The Laws of Belief by Wolfgang Spohn.Richard Baron - 2013 - Philosophy Now 94:42-43.
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  9. The Logic of Belief Persistence.Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giacomo Bonanno - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):39-59.
    The principle of belief persistence, or conservativity principle, states that ’\Nhen changing beliefs in response to new evidence, you should continue to believe as many of the old beliefs as possible' (Harman, 1986, p. 46). In particular, this means that if an individual gets new information, she has to accommodate it in her new belief set (the set of propositions she believes), and, if the new information is not inconsistent with the old belief set, then (1) the individual has to (...)
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  10. Dynamic Update with Probabilities.Benthem Johan van, Gerbrandy Jelle & Kooi Barteld - 2009 - Studia Logica 93 (1):67 - 96.
    Current dynamic-epistemic logics model different types of information change in multi-agent scenarios. We generalize these logics to a probabilistic setting, obtaining a calculus for multi-agent update with three natural slots: prior probability on states, occurrence probabilities in the relevant process taking place, and observation probabilities of events. To match this update mechanism, we present a complete dynamic logic of information change with a probabilistic character. The completeness proof follows a compositional methodology that applies to a much larger class of dynamic-probabilistic (...)
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  11. Wolfgang Spohn and the Ranking Functions Theory.Stefano Bigliardi - 2010 - Rivista di Filosofia 101 (1):57-80.
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  12. A Simple Modal Logic for Belief Revision.Giacomo Bonanno - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):193-228.
    We propose a modal logic based on three operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes’ rule. Some theorems of this logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision are also discussed.
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  13. Quixotic Reasoning: A Rejoinder to K. W. Ranking.R. D. Bradley - 1963 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):362 – 372.
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  14. Revising Incomplete Attitudes.Richard Bradley - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):235 - 256.
    Bayesian models typically assume that agents are rational, logically omniscient and opinionated. The last of these has little descriptive or normative appeal, however, and limits our ability to describe how agents make up their minds (as opposed to changing them) or how they can suspend or withdraw their opinions. To address these limitations this paper represents the attitudinal states of non-opinionated agents by sets of (permissible) probability and desirability functions. Several basic ways in which such states of mind can be (...)
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  15. Static Justification in the Dynamics of Belief.John Cantwell - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):481-503.
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  16. The Irreducibility of Iterated to Single Revision.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-14.
    After a number of decades of research into the dynamics of rational belief, the belief revision theory community remains split on the appropriate handling of sequences of changes in view, the issue of so-called iterated revision. It has long been suggested that the matter is at least partly settled by facts pertaining to the results of various single revisions of one's initial state of belief. Recent work has pushed this thesis further, offering various strong principles that ultimately result in a (...)
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  17. Non-Prioritized Ranked Belief Change.Samir Chopra, Aditya Ghose & Thomas Meyer - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (4):417-443.
    Traditional accounts of belief change have been criticized for placing undue emphasis on the new belief provided as input. A recent proposal to address such issues is a framework for non-prioritized belief change based on default theories (Ghose and Goebel, 1998). A novel feature of this approach is the introduction of disbeliefs alongside beliefs which allows for a view of belief contraction as independently useful, instead of just being seen as an intermediate step in the process of belief revision. This (...)
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  18. Belief, Desire, and Revision.John Collins - 1988 - Mind 97 (387):333 - 342.
  19. Mystery, Explanation, and Credence.Matteo Colombo & Dominik Klein - unknown
    How should the information that a proposition p is a mystery impact your credence in p? To answer this question, we first provide a taxonomy of mysteries; then, we develop a test to distinguish two types of mysteries. When faced with mysteries of the first type, rational epistemic agents should lower their credence in p upon learning that p is a mystery. The same information should not impact agents’ credence in p, when they face mysteries of the second type. Our (...)
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  20. Conditionals: From Philosophy to Computer Science.G. Crocco, Luis Fariñas del Cerro & Andreas Herzig (eds.) - 1995 - Oxford University Press.
    This book looks at the ways in which conditionals, an integral part of philosophy and logic, can be of practical use in computer programming. It analyzes the different types of conditionals, including their applications and potential problems. Other topics include defeasible logics, the Ramsey test, and a unified view of consequence relation and belief revision. Its implications will be of interest to researchers in logic, philosophy, and computer science, particularly artificial intelligence.
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  21. Belief Merging with the Aim of Truthlikeness.Simon D'Alfonso - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    The merging/fusion of belief/data collections in propositional logic form is a topic that has received due attention within the domains of database and AI research. A distinction can be made between two types of scenarios to which the process of merging can be applied. In the first type, the collections represent preferences, such as the voting choices of a group of people, that need to be aggregated so as to give a consistent result that in some way best represents the (...)
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  22. True Believers : The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works.Daniel C. Dennett - 1981 - In A. F. Heath (ed.), Scientific Explanation: Papers Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford. Clarendon Press. pp. 150--167.
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  23. A Unified Characterization of Belief-Revision Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - manuscript
    This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upon learning some event, Jeffrey revision upon learning new probabilities of some events, Adams revision upon learning some new conditional probabilities, and 'dual-Jeffrey' revision upon learning a new conditional probability function. Despite their differences, these revision rules can be characterized in terms of the same two axioms: responsiveness, which requires that revised beliefs incorporate what has been learnt, and conservativeness, which requires that beliefs on which the learnt input (...)
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  24. Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2016 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...)
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  25. Changing Beliefs Rationally: Some Puzzles.Dorothy Edgington - 1992 - In Jes Ezquerro (ed.), Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 47--73.
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  26. Belief, Desire, and Revision, by John Collins. [REVIEW]A. Disentropic Ethic - 1988 - The Monist 71 (1).
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  27. Belief Revision: A Critique. [REVIEW]Nir Friedman & Joseph Y. Halpern - 1999 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (4):401-420.
    We examine carefully the rationale underlying the approaches to belief change taken in the literature, and highlight what we view as methodological problems. We argue that to study belief change carefully, we must be quite explicit about the ontology or scenario underlying the belief change process. This is something that has been missing in previous work, with its focus on postulates. Our analysis shows that we must pay particular attention to two issues that have often been taken for granted: the (...)
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  28. Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Informational Value Due to Loss of Belief.André Fuhrmann - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (11):587-591.
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  29. An Essay on Contraction.Andre Fuhrmann - 1996 - Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
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  30. On A Linear Representation For Quantitative Belief Revision.Akira Fusaoka & Satoshi Hiratsuka - 2003 - Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 18 (2):75-85.
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  31. Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, Vol 3.D. Gabbay & P. Smets (eds.) - 1998 - Kluwer Academic.
    HANDBOOK OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING AND UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS EDITORS: DOV M. ... and A. Hunter Volume 3: Belief Change Edited by D. Dubois and H. Prade HANDBOOK OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING AND ...
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  32. Harold Jeffreys' Probabilistic Epistemology: Between Logicism and Subjectivism.Maria Carla Galavotti - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):43-57.
    Harold Jeffreys' ideas on the interpretation of probability and epistemology are reviewed. It is argued that with regard to the interpretation of probability, Jeffreys embraces a version of logicism that shares some features of the subjectivism of Ramsey and de Finetti. Jeffreys also developed a probabilistic epistemology, characterized by a pragmatical and constructivist attitude towards notions such as ‘objectivity’, ‘reality’ and ‘causality’. 1 Introductory remarks 2 The interpretation of probability 3 Jeffreys' probabilistic epistemology.
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  33. Iterated Belief Revision and Conditional Logic.Laura Giordano, Valentina Gliozzi & Nicola Olivetti - 2002 - Studia Logica 70 (1):23-47.
    In this paper we propose a conditional logic called IBC to represent iterated belief revision systems. We propose a set of postulates for iterated revision which are a small variant of Darwiche and Pearl''s ones. The conditional logic IBC has a standard semantics in terms of selection function models and provides a natural representation of epistemic states. We establish a correspondence between iterated belief revision systems and IBC-models. Our representation theorem does not entail Gärdenfors'' Triviality Result.
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  34. Postulates for Revising BDI Structures.John Grant, Sarit Kraus, Donald Perlis & Michael Wooldridge - 2010 - Synthese 175 (S1):39-62.
    The process of rationally revising beliefs in the light of new information is a topic of great importance and long-standing interest in artificial intelligence. Moreover, significant progress has been made in understanding the philosophical, logical, and computational foundations of belief revision. However, very little research has been reported with respect to the revision of other mental states, most notably propositional attitudes such as desires and intentions. In this paper, we present a first attempt to formulate a general framework for understanding (...)
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  35. The Ranking Assumption.Robinson A. Grover - 1974 - Theory and Decision 4 (3-4):277-299.
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  36. A Brief Remark on Non-Prioritized Belief Change and the Monotony Postulate.Gordian Haas - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):319-322.
    The AGM success postulates for belief expansions and revisions have been widely criticized. This has resulted in the development of a number of non-prioritized belief change theories that violate these postulates. It is shown that we must also discard the monotony postulate for belief expansions if we abandon the success postulates. Non-prioritized belief change theories should instead fulfill a weaker postulate, which we call Conditional Monotony.
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  37. 6 The Standard Theory of Belief Revision: AGM.Gordian Haas - 2015 - In Minimal Verificationism: On the Limits of Knowledge. De Gruyter. pp. 113-134.
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  38. Ten Philosophical Problems in Belief Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - manuscript
    The paper introduces ten open problems in belief revision theory, related to the representation of the belief state, to different notions of degrees of belief, and to the nature of change operations. It is argued that these problems are all issues in philosopical logic, in the strong sense of requiring inputs from both logic and philosophy for their solution.
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  39. Reconstruction of Contraction Operators.Sven Ove Hansson - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):185-199.
    An operator of belief change is reconstructible as another such operator if and only if any outcome that can be obtained with the former can also be obtained with the latter. Two operators are mutually reconstructible if they generate exactly the same set of outcomes. The relations of reconstructibility among fifteen operators of contraction, including the common AGM contraction operators, are completely characterized. Furthermore, the additional such relations are characterized that arise if all belief sets are required to be finite-based (...)
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  40. Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):93-108.
    A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to “all beliefs” in coherentist phrases such as “all beliefs support each other” have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd conclusions, (...)
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  41. Review of Hans Rott, Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. [REVIEW]Sven Ove Hansson - 2004 - Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 77:145-147.
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  42. In Defense of Base Contraction.Sven Ove Hansson - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):239 - 245.
    In the most common approaches to belief dynamics, states of belief are represented by sets that are closed under logical consequence. In an alternative approach, they are represented by non-closed belief bases. This representation has attractive properties not shared by closed representations. Most importantly, it can account for repeated belief changes that have not yet been satisfactorily accounted for in the closed approach.
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  43. Belief Contraction Without Recovery.Sven Ove Hansson - 1991 - Studia Logica 50 (2):251 - 260.
    The postulate of recovery is commonly regarded to be the intuitively least compelling of the six basic Gärdenfors postulates for belief contraction. We replace recovery by the seemingly much weaker postulate of core-retainment, which ensures that if x is excluded from K when p is contracted, then x plays some role for the fact that K implies p. Surprisingly enough, core-retainment together with four of the other Gärdenfors postulates implies recovery for logically closed belief sets. Reasonable contraction operators without recovery (...)
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  44. Credibility Limited Revision.Sven Ove Hansson, Eduardo Leopoldo Fermé, John Cantwell & Marcelo Alejandro Falappa - 2001 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (4):1581-1596.
    Five types of constructions are introduced for non-prioritized belief revision, i.e., belief revision in which the input sentence is not always accepted. These constructions include generalizations of entrenchment-based and sphere-based revision. Axiomatic characterizations are provided, and close interconnections are shown to hold between the different constructions.
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  45. Epistemology as Methodology.Gilbert Harman - manuscript
    What is distinctive about my views in epistemology? One thing is that my concern with epistemology is a concern with methodology. Furthermore, I reject psychologism about logic and reject the idea that deductive rules like modus ponens are in any way rules of inference. I accept a kind of methodological conservatism and reject methodological theories that appeal to special foundations, analytic truth, or a priori justification. Although I believe that there are significant practical aspects of theoretical reasoning, I reject the (...)
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  46. Positive Versus Negative Undermining in Belief Revision.Gilbert Harman - 1984 - Noûs 18 (1):39-49.
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  47. Belief Expansion, Contextual Fit and the Reliability of Information Sources.Stephan Hartmann & L. Bovens - 2001 - In AkmanV (ed.), Modeling and Using Context,. Springer.
    We develop a probabilistic criterion for belief expansion that is sensitive to the degree of contextual fit of the new information to our belief set as well as to the reliability of our information source. We contrast our approach with the success postulate in AGM-style belief revision and show how the idealizations in our approach can be relaxed by invoking Bayesian-Network models.
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  48. Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
    Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the (...)
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  49. The Learning Power of Belief Revision.Kevin Kelly - unknown
    Belief revision theory aims to describe how one should change one’s beliefs when they are contradicted by newly input information. The guiding principle of belief revision theory is to change one’s prior beliefs as little as possible in order to maintain consistency with the new information. Learning theory focuses, instead, on learning power: the ability to arrive at true beliefs in a wide range of possible environments. The goal of this paper is to bridge the two approaches by providing a (...)
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  50. A Critique of Van Fraassen's Voluntaristic Epistemology.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1994 - Synthese 98 (2):325-348.
    Van Fraassen's epistemology is forged from two commitments, one to a type of Bayesianism and the other to what he terms voluntarism. Van Fraassen holds that if one is going to follow a rule in belief-revision, it must be a Bayesian rule, but that one does not need to follow a rule in order to be rational. It is argued that van Fraassen's arguments for rejecting non-Bayesian rules is unsound, and that his voluntarism is subject to a fatal dilemma arising (...)
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