Belief

Edited by Rima Basu (Claremont McKenna College)
Related

Contents
2219 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 2219
Material to categorize
  1. Temporalism and Eternalism Reconsidered: Perceptual Experience, Memory, and Knowledge.Tamer Nawar - 2024 - Synthese 203 (6):1-20.
    Traditional debates between semantic temporalists and eternalists appeal to the efficacy of temporal operators and the intuitive (in)validity of instances of temporal reasoning. In this paper, I argue that such debates are inconclusive at best and that under-explored arguments concerning perceptual experience, memory, and knowledge offer more productive means of advancing debates between temporalists and eternalists and rendering salient several significant potential costs and benefits of these views.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Perceptual justification and objectual attitudes.Valentina Martinis - 2024 - Synthese 203 (165):1-24.
    Some philosophers claim that perception immediately and prima facie justifies belief in virtue of its phenomenal character (Huemer, Skepticism and the veil of perception. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2001; Pryor, There is immediate justification. In: Steup M, Sosa E (eds) Contemporary debates in epistemology. Blackwell, London (2014), pp. 181–202, 2005). To explain this special justificatory power, some appeal to perception’s presentational character: the idea that perceptual experience presents its objects as existing here-and-now (Chudnoff, Intuition. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013; Berghofer, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Are There Counterexamples to the Consistency Principle?Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):852-869.
    Must rational thinkers have consistent sets of beliefs? I shall argue that it can be rational for a thinker to believe a set of propositions known to be inconsistent. If this is right, an important test for a theory of rational belief is that it allows for the right kinds of inconsistency. One problem we face in trying to resolve disagreements about putative rational requirements is that parties to the disagreement might be working with different conceptions of the relevant attitudes. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.
    Philosophy is witnessing an “Agential Turn,” characterised by the thought that explaining certain distinctive features of human mentality requires conceiving of many mental phenomena as acts, and of subjects as their agents. We raise a challenge for three central explanatory appeals to mental agency––agentialism about doxastic responsibility, agentialism about doxastic self‐knowledge, and an agentialist explanation of the delusion of thought insertion: agentialists either commit themselves to implausibly strong claims about the kind of agency involved in the relevant phenomena, or make (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. What should I believe?George Trumbull Ladd - 1915 - New York [etc.]: Longmans, Green, and co..
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Is the wandering mind a planning mind?Frederik T. Junker & Thor Grünbaum - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Recent studies on mind‐wandering reveal its potential role in goal exploration and planning future actions. How to understand these explorative functions and their impact on planning remains unclear. Given certain conceptions of intentions and beliefs, the explorative functions of mind‐wandering could lead to regular reconsideration of one's intentions. However, this would be in tension with the stability of intentions central to rational planning agency. We analyze the potential issue of excessive reconsideration caused by mind‐wandering. Our response resolves this tension, presenting (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Talking About: A Response to Bowker, Keiser, Michaelson.Elmar Unnsteinsson - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    I respond to comments from Mark Bowker, Jessica Keiser, and Eliot Michaelson on my book, Talking About. The response clarifies my stance on the nature of reference, conflicting intentions, and the sense in which language may have proper functions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Idle Questions.Jens Kipper, Alexander W. Kocurek & Zeynep Soysal - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy.
    In light of the problem of logical omniscience, some scholars have argued that belief is question-sensitive: agents don't simply believe propositions but rather believe answers to questions. Hoek (2022) has recently developed a version of this approach on which a belief state is a "web" of questions and answers. Here, we present several challenges to Hoek's question-sensitive account of belief. First, Hoek's account is prone to very similar logical omniscience problems as those he claims to address. Second, the link between (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.
    This book takes purism about knowledge as the default position and defends it from the challenges of pragmatic encroachment. The book is divided into two parts, a negative and a positive one. The negative part critically examines existing purist strategies in response to pragmatic encroachment. The positive part provides a new theory of how practical factors can systematically influence our confidence and explores some implications of such influence.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Resolving to Believe: Kierkegaard’s Direct Doxastic Voluntarism.Z. Quanbeck - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    According to a traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, he endorses a strong form of direct doxastic voluntarism on which we can, by brute force of will, make a “leap of faith” to believe propositions that we ourselves take to be improbable and absurd. Yet most leading Kierkegaard scholars now wholly reject this reading, instead interpreting Kierkegaard as holding that the will can affect what we believe only indirectly. This paper argues that Kierkegaard does in fact endorse a restricted, sophisticated, and plausible (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal Imagining.Alon Chasid - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy:1-33.
    This paper argues against the view, proposed in Langland-Hassan (2020), that attitudinal imaginings are reducible to basic folk-psychological attitudes such as judgments, beliefs, desires, decisions, or combinations thereof. The proposed reduction fails because attitudinal imaginings, though similar to basic attitudes in certain respects, function differently than basic attitudes. I demonstrate this by exploring two types of cases: spontaneous imaginings, and imaginings that arise in response to fiction, showing that in these cases, imaginings cannot be identified with basic attitudes. I conclude (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Abstract rationality: the ‘logical’ structure of attitudes.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):12-41.
    We present an abstract model of rationality that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. Rationality requires coherence between your attitudes, such as your beliefs, values, and intentions. We define three 'logical' conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness, and closedness. They parallel the familiar logical conditions on beliefs, but contrast with standard rationality conditions like preference transitivity. We establish a formal correspondence between our logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. Addressing John Broome's programme 'rationality through reasoning', we formally characterize how you can (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13. Adopting trust as an ex post approach to privacy.Haleh Asgarinia - 2024 - AI and Ethics 3 (4).
    This research explores how a person with whom information has been shared and, importantly, an artificial intelligence (AI) system used to deduce information from the shared data contribute to making the disclosure context private. The study posits that private contexts are constituted by the interactions of individuals in the social context of intersubjectivity based on trust. Hence, to make the context private, the person who is the trustee (i.e., with whom information has been shared) must fulfil trust norms. According to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Imaginative Beliefs.Joshua Myers - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    I argue for the existence of imaginative beliefs: mental states that are imaginative in format and doxastic in attitude. I advance two arguments for this thesis. First, there are imaginings that play the functional roles of belief. Second, there are imaginings that play the epistemic roles of belief. These arguments supply both descriptive and normative grounds for positing imaginative beliefs. I also argue that this view fares better than alternatives that posit distinct imaginative and doxastic states to account for the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. Rational Hypothesis: Inquiry Direction Without Evidence.Michele Palmira - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
    There are scenarios in which letting one’s own views on the question whether p direct one’s inquiry into that question brings about individual and collective epistemic benefits. However, these scenarios are also such that one’s evidence doesn’t support believing one’s own views. So, how to vindicate the epistemic benefits of directing one’s inquiry in such an asymmetric way, without asking one to hold a seemingly irrational doxastic attitude? To answer this question, the paper understands asymmetric inquiry direction in terms of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Pennywise Parsimony: Langland-Hassan on Imagination.Neil Van Leeuwen - forthcoming - Analysis.
    This essay discusses Peter Langland-Hassan's approach to "explaining imagination" as it plays out in his recent book of that title. Langland-Hassan offers a theory of “attitude imagining” that avoids positing what he calls a “sui generis cognitive attitude.” This theory attempts to explain things like pretend play, hypothetical reasoning, and cognition of fiction; to explain them using only (what he calls) more “basic” mental states like beliefs and desires; and thus to explain them without positing a distinct cognitive attitude of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Provisional Attitudes.Michele Palmira - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
  18. Delusion and Double Bookkeeping.José Eduardo Porcher - forthcoming - In Ema Sullivan Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge.
    This chapter connects the phenomenon of double bookkeeping to two critical debates in the philosophy of delusion: one from the analytic tradition and one from the phenomenological tradition. First, I will show how the failure of action guidance on the part of some delusions suggests an argument to the standard view that delusions are beliefs (doxasticism about delusion) and how its proponents have countered it by ascribing behavioral inertia to avolition, emotional disturbances, or a failure of the surrounding environment in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Hoffen-Dürfen : Kants kritische Begründung des moralischen Glaubens.Günter Zöller - 2013 - In Robert Theis, Dietmar Hermann Heidemann & Raoul Weicker (eds.), Glaube und Vernunft in der Philosophie der Neuzeit. Festschrift für Robert Theis/Foi et raison dans la philosophie moderne. Recueil en hommage à Robert Theis (Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie 85). Hildesheim: George Olms Verlag.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. Kants Kryptoanthropologie.Raoul Weicker - 2013 - In Robert Theis, Dietmar Hermann Heidemann & Raoul Weicker (eds.), Glaube und Vernunft in der Philosophie der Neuzeit. Festschrift für Robert Theis/Foi et raison dans la philosophie moderne. Recueil en hommage à Robert Theis (Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie 85). Hildesheim: George Olms Verlag.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Justified True Belief: The Remarkable History of Mainstream Epistemology.Sander Verhaegh - forthcoming - Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    This paper reconstructs the origins of Gettier-style epistemology, highlighting the philosophical and methodological debates that led to its development in the 1960s. Though present-day epistemologists assume that the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge began with Gettier’s 1963 argument against the JTB-definition, I show that this research program can be traced back to British discussions about knowledge and analysis in the 1940s and 1950s. I discuss work of, among others, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, A. J. Ayer, Norman (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Barbarism, religion and the rule of law: a topic of the Boston, Melbourne, Oxford, Vancouver Conversazioni on Culture and Society.Geoffrey Blainey, George Pell & Stephen G. Breyer (eds.) - 2021 - Boston: Melbourne, Oxford, Vancouver Conversazioni on Culture and Society.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Baḥth fī al-lā yaqīn: qirāʼah falsafīyah fī al-īmān wa-al-ilḥād.Muʻādh Banī ʻĀmir - 2021 - Baghdād: Maktabat Dār Alkā.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Afterword.Rose Wellman - 2023 - In Urmila Mohan (ed.), The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Pause, pivot and (un)mask in early pandemic U.S.Urmila Mohan - 2023 - In The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Grieving as a practice of resistance : Bishnoi entanglements with the Indian nuclear state.Sonali Huria - 2023 - In Urmila Mohan (ed.), The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. What's solid about solidarity? Shields and efficacious intimacy in the 2020 protests in Portland, OR.Steve Marotta - 2023 - In Urmila Mohan (ed.), The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Intimate with the enemy : nuclear presence, vernacular art and post-Chornobyl transformations.Elena Romashko - 2023 - In Urmila Mohan (ed.), The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Protective cloaks, enveloping baby carriers : embodiment and ritual practice in Angkola Batak Ulos textiles.Susan Rodgers - 2023 - In Urmila Mohan (ed.), The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Kokoro-dzukai as a practice of the heart in Japanese Islam and design.Lira Anindita Utami - 2023 - In Urmila Mohan (ed.), The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Rituals and riverine flows : negotiating change in Majuli Island, Assam.Simashree Bora - 2023 - In Urmila Mohan (ed.), The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Objects as bodies in Michael Landy's Shelf life.Lindsay Crisp - 2023 - In Urmila Mohan (ed.), The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Tisser du lien" : textile art as a tautological performance and embodiment of an expression.Claire Le Pape - 2023 - In Urmila Mohan (ed.), The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Praying through the hands : making objects and devotees in Umbanda.Patrícia Rodrigues de Souza - 2023 - In Urmila Mohan (ed.), The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Introduction: Efficacious intimacies of worldmaking.Urmila Mohan - 2023 - In The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Inexpressible reading : the efficacious non-discursivity of drinking the Qur'an.Hanna Nieber - 2023 - In Urmila Mohan (ed.), The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Foreword.Jean-Pierre Warnier - 2023 - In Urmila Mohan (ed.), The efficacy of intimacy and belief in worldmaking practices. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. A planning theory of belief.Sara Aronowitz - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):5-17.
    What does it mean to hold a belief? Some of our ways of speaking in English suggest that to hold a belief is to have something in your mind: beliefs are things we acquire, defend, recover, and so on (Abelson, 1986). That is, believing is a matter of being in a state of having a thing. In this paper, I will argue for an alternative: believing is something we do. This is not a new suggestion. For instance, Matthew Boyle (2011) (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39. Symbolic belief in social cognition.Evan Westra - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):388-408.
    Keeping track of what others believe is a central part of human social cognition. However, the social relevance of those beliefs can vary a great deal. Some belief attributions mostly tell us about what a person is likely to do next. Other belief attributions tell us more about a person's social identity. In this paper, I argue that we cope with this challenge by employing two distinct concepts of belief in our everyday social interactions. The epistemic concept of belief is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. Introduction to the genetic treatment of the faith-consciousness in the individual.William Wilberforce Costin - 1909 - Baltimore,: Williams & Wilkins.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Cook Wilson on judgement.Simon Wimmer - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (1):126-149.
    John Cook Wilson is increasingly recognised as an important predecessor of ordinary language philosophy. He emphasizes the authority of ordinary language in philosophical theorizing. At the same time, however, he circumscribes the limits of that authority and identifies cases in which it threatens to mislead us. My aim is to consider in detail one case where, according to Cook Wilson, ordinary language has misled philosophical theorizing. Judgement was one of the core notions of the logic, epistemology, and philosophy of mind (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. A defence of philosophic doubt.Arthur James Balfour - 1920 - London,: Hodder & Stoughton.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Akratic Beliefs and Seemings.Chenwei Nie - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    How does it come about that a person akratically believes that P, while at the same time believing that the available evidence speaks against that P? Among the current accounts, Scanlon offers an intuitive suggestion that one’s seeming experience that P may play an important role in the aetiology of their akratic belief that P. However, it turns out to be quite challenging to articulate what the role of seeming experience is. This paper will offer a novel development of Scanlon’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. On Believing and Being Convinced.Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming - Cambridge University Press.
    Our doxastic states are our belief-like states, and these include outright doxastic states and degreed doxastic states. The former include believing that p, having the opinion that p, thinking that p, being sure that p, being certain that p, and doubting that p. The latter include degrees of confidence, credences, and perhaps some phenomenal states. But we also have conviction (being convinced simpliciter that p) and degrees of conviction (being more or less convinced that p). This volume shows: how and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. A Practice-based Account of The Truth Norm of Belief.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    It is a platitude that belief is subject to a standard of correctness: a belief is correct if and only if it is true. But not all standards of correctness are authoritative or binding. Some standards of correctness may be arbitrary, unjustified or outrightly wrong. Given this, one challenge to proponents of the truth norm of belief, is to answer what Korsgaard (1996) calls ‘the normative question’. Is the truth norm of belief authoritative or binding regarding what one ought to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  46. The Philosophy of Dumbness: A Philosophical Romance about Rationality.Tommaso Ostillio - manuscript
    In this work, I investigate the implications of reversing the common assumption of rationality on behalf of human agents typically underlying philosophical research. Instead, I assume that human agents can become rational only if they learn to edge against their dumbness. Specifically, I show that intelligence cannot be considered the opposite of dumbness. To this end, I embrace the difference among System 1, System 2, and System 1.5. On these grounds, I argue that System 2 can be considered the system (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Prefaces, Knowledge, and Questions.Frank Hong - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.
    The Preface Paradox is often discussed for its implications for rational belief. Much less discussed is a variant of the Preface Paradox for knowledge. In this paper, I argue that the most plausible closure-friendly resolution to the Preface Paradox for Knowledge is to say that in any given context, we do not know much. I call this view “Socraticism”. I argue that Socraticism is the most plausible view on two accounts—(1) this view is compatible with the claim that most of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. On the roles of false belief and recalcitrant fear in anorexia nervosa.Somogy Varga & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2023 - Mind and Language (5):1296-1313.
    The DSM‐5 highlights two essential psychological features of anorexia nervosa (AN): recalcitrant fear of gaining weight and body image disturbance. Prominent accounts grant false beliefs about body weight and shape a central role in the explanation of AN behavior. In this article, we propose a stronger emphasis on recalcitrant fear. We show that such fear can explain AN behavior without the intermediary of a false belief, and thus without the associated explanatory burdens and conceptual difficulties. We illustrate how shifting the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.
    Abstract In slogan form, the thesis of this paper is that beliefs are self-verifying fictions: We make them up, but in so doing, they come to exist, and so the fiction of belief is in fact true. This picture of belief emerges from a combination of three independently motivated views: (1) a phenomenal intentionalist picture of intentionality, on which phenomenal consciousness is the basis of intentionality; (2) what I will call a “self-ascriptivist” picture of derived representation, on which non-fundamental representational (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.
    This is an opinionated guide to the literature on epistemic dilemmas. It discusses seven kinds of situations where epistemic dilemmas appear to arise; dilemmic, dilemmish, and non-dilemmic takes on them; and objections to dilemmic views along with dilemmist’s replies to them.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 2219