Belief

Edited by Rima Basu (Claremont McKenna College)
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  1. The Point of Political Belief.Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder - forthcoming - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology.
    An intuitive and widely accepted view is that (a) beliefs aim at truth, (b) many citizens have stable and meaningful political beliefs, and (c) citizens choose to support political candidates or parties on the basis of their political beliefs. We argue that all three claims are false. First, we argue that political beliefs often differ from ordinary world-modelling beliefs because they do not aim at truth. Second, we draw on empirical evidence from political science and psychology to argue that most (...)
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  2. Exploring by Believing.Sara Aronowitz - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
    Sometimes, we face choices between actions most likely to lead to valuable outcomes, and actions which put us in a better position to learn. These choices exemplify what is called the exploration/exploitation trade-off. In computer science and psychology, this trade-off has fruitfully been applied to modulating the way agents or systems make choices over time. In this paper, I argue that the trade-off also extends to belief. We can be torn between two ways of believing, one of which is expected (...)
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  3. Wittgenstein on Understanding Religious Beliefs: Some Remarks Against Incommensurability and Scepticism.Yuliya Fadeeva - 2020 - Wittgenstein-Studien 11 (1):53-78.
  4. Beyond Belief: Logic in Multiple Attitudes.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - manuscript
    Choice-theoretic and philosophical accounts of rationality and reasoning address a multi-attitude psychology, including beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. By contrast, logicians traditionally focus on beliefs only. Yet there is 'logic' in multiple attitudes. We propose a generalization of the three standard logical requirements on beliefs -- consistency, completeness, and deductive closedness -- towards multiple attitudes. How do these three logical requirements relate to rational requirements, e.g., of transitive preferences or non-akratic intentions? We establish a systematic correspondence: each logical requirement (consistency, completeness, (...)
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  5. William James and Allama Iqbal on Empirical Faith.Mark J. Boone - 2020 - Heythrop Journal 61 (5):775-787.
    American Pragmatist philosopher William James and subcontinent Islamic philosopher Allama Iqbal both believe that religious experiences are an important class of those experiences with which empiricism is concerned. They both explain and defend religious belief on empirical grounds and argue that the ultimate empirical justification of a religious belief must come by looking at its fruits. This is no accident, for James influenced Iqbal on this very point. -/- However, they diverge in some matters. James defends the right to diverse (...)
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  6. Delusions as Herero-Dynamic Property Clusters.Shelby Clipp - 2020 - ScholarWorks.
    The standard position in psychiatry maintains that delusions are beliefs. However, the features of delusions often diverge from those typically associated with belief. This discrepancy has given rise to what I refer to as the doxastic status debate, which concerns whether delusions are best characterized as “beliefs.” Despite efforts, there has been little progress in settling this debate. I argue that the debate has been stymied because it’s largely a verbal dispute (Chalmers, 2011). I then attempt to advance the debate (...)
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  7. A Will to Believe: Shakespeare and Religion. By David Scott Kastan. Pp. 155, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, $39.95. [REVIEW]Andrea Campana - 2020 - Heythrop Journal 61 (3):544-545.
  8. Delusions and Theories of Belief.Michael H. Connors & Peter W. Halligan - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 81:102935.
  9. Becoming a Christian: Combining Prior Belief, Evidence, and Will. [REVIEW]Lydia McGrew - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (2):599-603.
  10. Religious Belief as Acquired Second Nature.Hans Van Eyghen - 2020 - Zygon 55 (1):185-206.
    Multiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR) argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR theories argue for the (...)
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  11. The Prospects for Debunking Non-Theistic Belief.Thaddeus Robinson - forthcoming - Sophia:1-7.
    According to The Debunking Argument, evidence from the cognitive science of religion suggests that it is epistemically inappropriate to persist in believing in the theistic God. In this paper, I focus on a reply to this argument according to which the evidence from cognitive science says nothing about the epistemic propriety of belief in the theistic God, since God may have chosen to create human beliefs in God by means of precisely the systems identified by cognitive scientists. I argue that (...)
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  12. Transparent Delusion.Vladimir Krstić - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):183-201.
    In this paper, I examine a kind of delusion in which the patients judge that their occurrent thoughts are false and try to abandon them precisely because they are false, but fail to do so. I call this delusion transparent, since it is transparent to the sufferer that their thought is false. In explaining this phenomenon, I defend a particular two-factor theory of delusion that takes the proper integration of relevant reasoning processes as vital for thought-evaluation. On this proposal, which (...)
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  13. Reflections on Knowledge and Belief.Simon Wimmer - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
    This thesis defends egalitarianism about knowledge and belief, on which neither is understood in terms of the other, from what I call the abductive argument. This argument is meant to favour views opposed to egalitarianism: doxasticism, on which knowledge is understood in terms of belief, and epistemicism, on which belief is understood in terms of knowledge. The abductive argument turns on the idea that doxasticism and epistemicism, by contrast with egalitarianism, explain certain data about knowledge and belief. I argue, however, (...)
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  14. Presupposing, Believing, Having Faith.Carlos Miguel Gómez Rincón - forthcoming - Sophia:1-19.
    This paper traces the borders between presupposing, believing, and having faith. These three attitudes are often equated and confused in the contemporary image of the historically and culturally situated character of rationality. This confusion is problematic because, on the one hand, it prevents us from fully appreciating the way in which this image of rationality points towards a dissolving of the opposition between faith and reason; on the other hand, it leads to forms of fideism. After bringing this differentiation into (...)
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  15. Presupposing, Believing, Having Faith.Carlos Miguel Gómez Rincón - forthcoming - Sophia:1-19.
    This paper traces the borders between presupposing, believing, and having faith. These three attitudes are often equated and confused in the contemporary image of the historically and culturally situated character of rationality. This confusion is problematic because, on the one hand, it prevents us from fully appreciating the way in which this image of rationality points towards a dissolving of the opposition between faith and reason; on the other hand, it leads to forms of fideism. After bringing this differentiation into (...)
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  16. Unstable Knowledge, Unstable Belief.Hans Rott - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (4):395-407.
    An idea going back to Plato’s Meno is that knowledge is stable. Recently, a seemingly stronger and more exciting thesis has been advanced, namely that rational belief is stable. I sketch two stability theories of knowledge and rational belief, and present an example intended to show that knowledge need not be stable and rational belief need not be stable either. The second claim does not follow from the first, even if we take knowledge to be a special kind of rational (...)
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  17. Minimal Rationality and the Web of Questions.Daniel Hoek - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk & Andy Egan (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.
    This paper proposes a new account of bounded or minimal doxastic rationality (in the sense of Cherniak 1986), based on the notion that beliefs are answers to questions (à la Yalcin 2018). The core idea is that minimally rational beliefs are linked through thematic connections, rather than entailment relations. Consequently, such beliefs are not deductively closed, but they are closed under parthood (where a part is an entailment that answers a smaller question). And instead of avoiding all inconsistency, minimally rational (...)
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  18. What is Special About De Se Attitudes?Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - forthcoming - In The Routledge Handbook on Linguistic Reference.
    De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.
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  19. Presupposing, Believing, Having Faith.Carlos Miguel Gómez Rincón - forthcoming - Sophia:1-19.
    This paper traces the borders between presupposing, believing, and having faith. These three attitudes are often equated and confused in the contemporary image of the historically and culturally situated character of rationality. This confusion is problematic because, on the one hand, it prevents us from fully appreciating the way in which this image of rationality points towards a dissolving of the opposition between faith and reason; on the other hand, it leads to forms of fideism. After bringing this differentiation into (...)
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  20. Ethics at the Edges of Law: Christian Moralists and American Legal Thought. By Cathleen Kaveny. Pp. Xxi, 299, New York, Oxford University Press, 2018, $35.00/£22.99. Litigating Religions: An Essay on Human Rights, Courts, and Beliefs. By Christopher McCrudden. Pp. Xv, 196, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, $65.00. [REVIEW]John R. Williams - 2019 - Heythrop Journal 60 (6):961-963.
  21. Weighing Aims in Doxastic Deliberation.C. J. Atkinson - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper, I defend teleological theories of belief against the exclusivity objection. I argue that despite the exclusive influence of truth in doxastic deliberation, multiple epistemic aims interact when we consider what to believe. This is apparent when we focus on the processes involved in specific instances (or concrete cases) of doxastic deliberation, such that the propositions under consideration are specified. First, I out- line a general schema for weighing aims. Second, I discuss recent attempts to defend the teleological (...)
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  22. No Hope in the Dark: Problems for Four-Dimensionalism.Jonathan J. Loose - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (3):31-47.
    Whether or not it is coherent to place hope in a future life beyond the grave has become a central question in the larger debate about whether a materialist view of human persons can accommodate Christian belief. Hud Hudson defends a four-dimensional account of resurrection in order to avoid persistent difficulties experienced by three-dimensionalist animalism. I present two difficulties unique to Hudson’s view. The first problem of counterpart hope is a manifestation of a general weakness of four-dimensional views to accommodate (...)
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  23. Review of Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology, Edited by Matthew Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz: Oxford University Press, 2018, ISBN: 9780198798705, 368pp. [REVIEW]Hans Van Eyghen - 2019 - Sophia 58 (3):539-541.
  24. The Emotional Impact of Evil: Philosophical Reflections on Existential Problems.Nicholas Colgrove - 2019 - Open Theology 5 (1):125-135.
    In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoyevsky illustrates that encounters with evil do not solely impact agents’ beliefs about God (or God’s existence). Evil impacts people on an emotional level as well. Authors like Hasker and van Inwagen sometimes identify the emotional impact of evil with the “existential” problem of evil. For better or worse, the existential version of the problem is often set aside in contemporary philosophical discussions. In this essay, I rely on Robert Roberts’ account of emotions as “concern-based construals” (...)
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  25. Knowledge-First Believing the Unknowable.Simon Wimmer - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    I develop a challenge for a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief that turns, primarily, on unknowable propositions. I consider and reject several responses to my challenge and sketch a new knowledge-first account of belief that avoids it.
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  26. What Does Emotion Teach Us About Self-Deception? Affective Neuroscience in Support of Non-Intentionalism.Federico Lauria & Delphine Preissmann - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (2):70-94.
    Intuitively, affect plays an indispensable role in self-deception’s dynamic. Call this view “affectivism.” Investigating affectivism matters, as affectivists argue that this conception favours the non-intentionalist approach to self-deception and offers a unified account of straight and twisted self-deception. However, this line of argument has not been scrutinized in detail, and there are reasons to doubt it. Does affectivism fulfill its promises of non-intentionalism and unity? We argue that it does, as long as affect’s role in self-deception lies in affective filters—that (...)
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  27. Faith.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2014 - In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy , 3rd edition. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    A brief article on faith as a psychological attitude.
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  28. Les attitudes russelliennes.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Cahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 54:149-168.
    Russell prétend qu’un examen des croyances est indispensable pour définir nos raisonnements quotidiens et comprendre ce que les philosophes entendent par la notion de vérité. Cela étant, l’auteur considère qu’une étude de ces croyances n’a aucun rapport avec la logique, laquelle concerne uniquement le vrai et le faux. En d’autres termes, Russell associe croyance et psychologie tout en réservant le domaine de la logique au thème de la proposition, vraie ou fausse par définition. Une certaine théorie de la vérité sous-tend (...)
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  29. Functionalist Interrelations Amongst Human Psychological States Inter Se, Ditto for Martians.Nicholas Shea - forthcoming - In Joulia Smortchkova, Tobias Schlicht & Krzysztof Dolega (eds.), What Are Mental Representations? Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    One job for theories of mental representation is to distinguish between different kinds of mental representation: beliefs, desires, intentions, perceptual states, etc. What makes a mental state a belief that p rather than a desire that p or a visual representation that p? Functionalism is a leading approach for doing so: for individuating mental states. Functionalism is designed to allow that psychological states can be multiply realized. Mark Sprevak has argued that, for a functionalist account of psychological states to apply (...)
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  30. Unstructured Content.Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk & Andy Egan (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
  31. Knowledge and Belief in the Letter of Paul the Persian.Said Hayati - 2016 - In Dietmar W. Winkler (ed.), Syrische Studien. LIT Verlag. pp. 63-73.
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  32. From Probabilities to Categorical Beliefs: Going Beyond Toy Models.Igor Douven & Hans Rott - 2018 - Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (6):1099-1124.
    According to the Lockean thesis, a proposition is believed just in case it is highly probable. While this thesis enjoys strong intuitive support, it is known to conflict with seemingly plausible logical constraints on our beliefs. One way out of this conflict is to make probability 1 a requirement for belief, but most have rejected this option for entailing what they see as an untenable skepticism. Recently, two new solutions to the conflict have been proposed that are alleged to be (...)
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  33. Marcus on Belief and Belief in the Impossible.Mark Richard - 2013 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 28 (3):407-420.
    I review but don’t endorse Marcus’ arguments that impossible beliefs are impossible. I defend her claim that belief’s objects are, in some important sense, not the bearers of truth and falsity, discuss her disposition- alism about belief, and argue it’s a good fit with the idea that belief’s objects are Russellian states of affairs.
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  34. Unvergleichbarkeit und unabhängige Bedeutung.Hans Rott - 2014 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 68 (2):237–241.
    This is a short discussion review of Wolfgang Spohn, The Laws of Belief, Oxford UP 2012. I argue, first, that it is important to account for incomparabilities in the plausibilities of possible worlds or propositions, and second, that the meaning of input parameters specifying the degree to which a proposition is to be accepted should be independent of the agent's belief state.
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  35. Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs.Hans Rott - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):167-197.
    There are two prominent ways of formally modelling human belief. One is in terms of plain beliefs, i.e., sets of propositions. The second one is in terms of degrees of beliefs, which are commonly taken to be representable by subjective probability functions. In relating these two ways of modelling human belief, the most natural idea is a thesis frequently attributed to John Locke: a proposition is or ought to be believed just in case its subjective probability exceeds a contextually fixed (...)
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  36. Thoughts, Oughts and the Conceptual Primacy of Belief.Alexander Miller - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):234-238.
  37. An Essay on Belief and Acceptance.Louis P. Pojman - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):496-498.
  38. Sometimes a Great Notion: A Critical Notice of Mark Crimmins' Talk About Beliefs.Kent Bach - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):431-441.
    Anyone weary of endless philosophical debate on belief reports will find welcome relief in this book. Talking not just about belief talk but about belief itself, it offers much that is new, interesting, and subtle. The central thesis, though interestingly and subtly developed, is not exactly new. It is a version of the “hidden indexical theory” (HIT) of..
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  39. “On an Argument for the Relational View of Belief”.Eric Stiffler - 1981 - Dialectica 35 (3):351-355.
    The view that belief is a dyadic relation between a believer and some other object, e.g., a proposition, appears to receive support from the fact that we can infer ‘There is something that Jones believes' from ordinary belief ascriptions such as ‘Jones believes that the tallest man is wise’. On consideration, however, it turns out that even a crude nonrelational view of belief can accommodate this inference. In order to permit the inference the nonrelationalist must read‘ There is something that (...)
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  40. VII &Ast;—‘BELIEF IS UP TO US’.Jonathan Barnes - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Paperback) 106 (2):187-204.
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  41. Provocation on Belief: Part 3.Steve Fuller - 1987 - Social Epistemology 1 (1):102-105.
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  42. Provocation on Belief: Part 1.David Gorman - 1987 - Social Epistemology 1 (1):97-99.
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  43. Provocation on Belief: Part 6.Hugh Wilder - 1987 - Social Epistemology 1 (2):195-201.
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  44. Scott-Kakures on Believing at Will.Dana Radcliffe - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):145-151.
    Many philosophers hold that it is conceptually impossible to form a belief simply by willing it. Noting the failure of previous attempts to locate the presumed incoherence, Dion Scott-Kakures offers a version of the general line that voluntary believing is conceptually impossible becuse it could not qualify as a basic intentional actions. This discussion analyzes his central argument, explaining how it turns on the assumption that a prospective voluntary believer must regard the desired belief as not justified, given her other (...)
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  45. The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Steglich-Petersen: Discussions.Kathrin Glüer & åsa Wikforss - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):757-761.
    We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.
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  46. The Deflation of Belief States.Robert J. Stainton - 1997 - Critica 29 (85):95-119.
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  47. Pragmatic Believing and its Explanation.Ward E. Jones - 2004 - Critica 36 (108):3-36.
    Most explanations of beliefs are epistemically or pragmatically rationalizing. The distinction between these two types involves the explainer's differing expectations of how the believer will behave in the face of counter-evidence. This feature suggests that rationalizing explanations portray beliefs as either a consequence of the believer's following a norm, or part of a sub-intentional goal-oriented system. Which properly characterizes pragmatic believing? If there were pragmatic norms for believing, I argue, they would not be consciously followable. Yet an unallowable norm is (...)
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  48. Between Belief and Unbelief. [REVIEW]A. D. H. - 1976 - Review of Metaphysics 29 (3):557-558.
    A leading psychologist at the Menninger Foundation analyzes the current cultural situation where deep unbelief alienates itself from classical belief. He recognizes that unbelief is not just a simple negation of belief but is itself pluralistic, and the varieties of unbelief have now become the attitudes of masses of modern men. The author makes extensive use of recent philosophical reflection. He is also well aware of how social policy may tend to replace what had once been religious goals and institutions, (...)
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  49. The Varieties of Belief. [REVIEW]A. C. C. - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (2):390-390.
    Helm criticizes contemporary—largely analytic—work in philosophy of religion which closes off dispute or objection by a simple appeal to "the grammar of religious language" or to "what the believer would say." "The argument of this book is that such approaches involve an important error in philosophical method, for they rest on the mistaken assumption that the ‘religious believer’ has an unmistakable identity, and that ‘religious language’ is a distinct, homogeneous form of language". The issue is methodological because it focuses on (...)
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  50. Legitimation of Belief. [REVIEW]O. B. T. - 1976 - Review of Metaphysics 29 (4):734-735.
    In the past 300 years philosophy has been preoccupied with the problem of knowledge. Since Descartes, traditional, prescientific culture has eroded under the sceptical attack and has been replaced by a new culture characterized by an unprecedented growth in scientific knowledge and its powerful models of explanation. Gellner seeks to understand "the differences between its two shores, the nature of the reasons and causes which explain or justify our firm location on one side of it." His concern is with relativism, (...)
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