Berkeley and Other Philosophers

George Berkeley's apparently strange view – that nothing exists without a mind except for minds themselves – is notorious. Also well known, and equally perplexing at a superficial level, is his insistence that his doctrine is no more than what is consistent with common sense. It was every bit as crucial for Berkeley that it be demonstrated that the colors are really in the tulip, as that there is nothing that is neither a mind nor something perceived by a mind. (...) In what follows, I shall attempt to re-examine Berkeley's argument in terms of what it appears to have meant to him. I am especially interested in the connection between Berkeley's thought concerning the relation between perception and metaphysics and that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, with whom, perhaps surprisingly, Berkeley shared a great many intuitions and concerns. Thus part of my objective is to compare and contrast the work of two thinkers who had many common interests, and whose thought frequently led them down similar paths. I shall be especially interested in apparent points of departure, both those that turn out to reflect real divergences and those which reflect confusions of one kind or another. My main objective, however, is not mere textual analysis. Like both Berkeley and Merleau-Ponty, my main hope is to make progress in clarifying how things are. As odd as some of Berkeley's pronouncements may sound to contemporary ears – concerning especially the metaphysical consequences of what he regarded as perceptual facts – I shall argue that, in substance, he was often not far wrong at all – at least as measured by important strands of more contemporary work on the subject. More particularly, I shall contend that for going a long way down an extraordinarily fruitful path which has been subsequently explored more fully by (especially) Martin Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Nelson Goodman and Hilary Putnam, Berkeley deserves considerably more credit than he is usually accorded as a progenitor of contemporary approaches to metaphysical issues. (shrink)

Locke believes in the existence of the corporeal substance arguing that qualities and attributes cannot be self-subsistent and, therefore, need such a substance to hang on. Nonetheless, Berkeley stresses that qualities even the so-called 'primary qualities.' are all the same species which depend on the mind of the perceiver. The external existence, Berkeley maintains, is no more than a collection of qualities that are imagained by the perceiver. Locke says that the origin of our perception is an external substance but (...) in view of Berkeley there is a universal soul that emanates such perception and that soul cannot be but God. There is no cause-and-effect relation in Berkeley's philosophy because the sensible world in his opinion is a collection of passive perceptions which annul the existence of any cause. Berkeley states that what is referred to as causality is indication instead. (shrink)

According to Kant, there is some doctrine, which he sometimes calls 'empirical realism,' such that it was doubted by Descartes, denied by Berkeley, and endorsed by Kant himself. It may be doubted whether there really is such a doctrine or, if there is, whether it takes the form Kant seems to say it does. For instance, if empirical realism is taken as the assertion that familiar objects like tables and chairs exist, then this doctrine was neither seriously doubted by Descartes, (...) nor denied by Berkeley. If empirical realism is the view that such objects are mind-independent, then it was clearly denied by Berkeley, but was neither seriously doubted by Descartes, nor straightforwardly endorsed by Kant. Kant's assertion thus presents us with a puzzle: what might empirical realism be? The primary aim of this paper will be to reconstruct Kant's own narrative of the historical relationship between Descartes, Berkeley, and himself, in order to identify the doctrine Kant calls 'empirical realism.' I argue that the empirical realism which Descartes doubted, Berkeley denied, and Kant endorsed is the doctrine that the concept of extended substance has legitimate application. (shrink)

Esse est percipi---this famous phrase of 18th century British philosopher, George Berkeley, is known to be an Idealist challenge against our common sense that there are mind-independent things. In contrast with the familiarity Berkeley’s theory, the existence of similar theory in Indian Buddhism in the 8th century is widely unknown. The Indian version of this theory can be expressed in Sanskrit, sattopalambhavāda, i.e., the theory claiming that “to be is to perceive/to be perceived.” The first and probably last philosopher who (...) clearly advocated this theory in Indian Buddhism is Prajñākaragputa, one of the great commentators of his predecessor, Dharmakīrti’s magnum opus, Pramāṇavārttika. In explaining Dharmakīrti’s ideas of the Buddha’s religious authority, theory of perception and logic, Prajñākaragupta incorporated his original ideas into his commentarial work, Pramāṇavarttikālaṅkāra. His sattopalambhavāda is one remarkable result of his innovated theorems of Buddhist epistemology and ontology. The aim of this paper is to clarify the significance of Prajñākaragupta’s idea of sattopalambhavāda from two viewpoints: Frist, I will examine its philosophical-historical development from Dharmakīrti’s ontology and make its innovative value clear. Second, I will also briefly compare its idea with Berkeley’s esse est percipi, especially focusing on their similarities in defending their religious authorities. (shrink)

Many passages in Kant’s texts suggest that he is a phenomenalist about appearances, i.e., that appearances are only part of our mental content and do not exist outside our mind. In recent years, however, phenomenalist readings of Kant’s idealism have been of ill repute. Without wanting to make a positive case for phenomenalism, this paper attempts to rebut three particularly popular objections to any phenomenalist reading. In slogan form, they are 1) «There is only prima facie evidence», 2) «Kant is (...) an empirical realist», and 3) «Kant is not Berkeley». In response, I argue, first, that any strategy to explain the textual evidence for phenomenalism away fails. Second, I hold that Kant’s «empirical realism» is consistent with phenomenalism, as empirical realism does not mean that appearances exist outside our mind. Third, I will give a novel interpretation of Kant’s rejection of Berkeley’s idealism: Kant does not criticize him because he thinks Berkeley is a phenomenalist, but because his transcen dental realism renders all outer things, appearances and things in themselves alike, impossible. (shrink)

En su Tratado sobre los principios del conocimiento humano, George Berkeley ofrece una serie de argumentos cuyo objetivo es criticar la tesis materialista. Mi propósito en este artículo es reconstruir y analizar en detalle estos argumentos. Dado que la crítica de Berkeley al materialismo es, fundamentalmente, una crítica al materialismo representacionalista de John Locke, empezaré este artículo explicando cuáles son las ideas básicas de la propuesta de Locke.

In 1827, Lady Mary Shepherd published Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, which offers both an argument for the existence of a world of external bodies existing outside our minds and a criticism of Berkeley's argument for idealism in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. In this paper, I evaluate Margaret Atherton's criticisms of Shepherd's case against Berkeley, and provide reasons for thinking that, although Shepherd's particular criticisms of Berkeley do not succeed, she correctly identifies an (...) important problem to which Berkeley's reasoning is subject. (shrink)

Embodiment is a fact of human existence which philosophers should not ignore. They may differ to a great extent in what they have to say about our bodies, but they have to take into account that for each of us our body has a special status, it is not merely one amongst the physical objects, but a physical object to which we have a unique relation. While Descartes approached the issue of embodiment through consideration of sensation and imagination, it is (...) more directly reached by consideration of action and agency: whenever we act upon the world, we act by moving our bodies. So if we can understand what an immaterialist such as Berkeley thinks about agency, we will have gone a fair way to understanding what he thinks about embodiment. §1 discusses a recent flurry of articles on the subject of Berkeley’s account of action. I choose to present Berkeley as a causal-volitional theorist not because I think it is the uniquely correct interpretation of the texts, but because I find it more philosophically interesting as a version of immaterialism. In particular, it raises the possibility of a substantive account of human embodiment which is completely unavailable to the occasionalist. §2 articulates an apparent philosophical problem for Berkeley qua causal-volitional theorist and show that Locke was aware of a related problem and had a solution of which Berkeley would have known. §3 distinguishes two interpretations of Berkeley’s famous denial of blind agency – as the assertion of a weak representational condition or a strong epistemic one – and provide evidence that there was a well-established debate about blind powers in the seventeenth century which took the metaphor of blindness as indicating an epistemic rather than merely representational failing. What remains to do in §4 is to consider whether Berkeley, with his own peculiar commitments, could in fact accept this account of agency. (shrink)

Phenomenalist interpretations of Kant are out of fashion. The most common complaint from anti-phenomenalist critics is that a phenomenalist reading of Kant would collapse Kantian idealism into Berkeleyan idealism. This would be unacceptable because Berkeleyan idealism is incompatible with core elements of Kant’s empirical realism. In this paper, I argue that not all phenomenalist readings threaten empirical realism. First, I distinguish several variants of phenomenalism, and then show that Berkeley’s idealism is characterized by his commitment to most of them. I (...) then make the case that two forms of phenomenalism are consistent with Kant’s empirical realism. The comparison between Kant and Berkeley runs throughout the paper, with special emphasis on the significance of their theories of intentionality. (shrink)

This paper presents structural similarities and historical connections between Prior’s rejection of the Barcan formula and his critique of Berkeley’s master argument for idealism in his 1955 paper “Berkeley in Logical Form”. Making use of Mackie’s paper “Self-Refutation—A Formal Analysis”, it concludes with some suggestions concerning what is at stake in the debate between Prior and Berkeley and in structurally similar debates such as whether to accept the Barcan formula.

Modern science is not linguistically original in hypothesizing the existence of dark matter. For Plotinus, the matter that underlies all perceptible objects, is essentially obscure and describable only in the negative terms of what it lacks by way of inherent properties. In formulating this theory of absolute matter, Plotinus took himself to be interpreting both Plato and Aristotle, with the result that his own position emerges as a highly original and equivocal synthesis of this tradition. Plotinus did not claim that (...) matter is nothing, but the puzzling status he attributes to it can be aptly compared to Berkeley's doctrine that material substance is a self-contradictory notion. (shrink)

In 1739 Hume bequeathed a bold view of the self to the philosophical community that would prove highly influential, but equally controversial. His bundle theory of the self elicited substantial opposition soon after its appearance in the Treatise of Human Nature. Yet Hume makes it clear to his readers that his views on the self rest on respectable foundations: namely, the views of the highly regarded Irish philosopher, George Berkeley. As the author of the Treatise sees it, his account of (...) the self draws on Berkeley’s conception of language, especially his views on singular terms. But Hume, as impressed as he is with Berkeley’s account of language, deems it necessary to defend this view against possible criticism. In the process Hume modifies Berkeley’s views. My paper is a critical investigation of Hume’s defense of Berkeley on language and an attempt to highlight the extent to which Hume departs from the views of his Irish colleague. -/- . (shrink)

The material reprinted in this two-volume set, first published in 1989, covers the first eighty-five years in responses to George Berkeley’s writings. David Berman identifies several key waves of eighteenth-century criticism surrounding Berkeley’s philosophies, ranging from hostile and discounted, to valued and defended. The first volume includes an account of the life of Berkeley by J. Murray and key responses from 1711 to 1748, whilst the second volume covers the years between 1745 and 1796. This fascinating reissue illustrates the breadth (...) and diversity of the early reaction to Berkeley’s philosophies, and will help students and academics form a clear image of both Berkeley’s work and his reputation through the eyes of his contemporaries. (shrink)

The material reprinted in this two-volume set, first published in 1989, covers the first eighty-five years in responses to George Berkeley’s writings. David Berman identifies several key waves of eighteenth-century criticism surrounding Berkeley’s philosophies, ranging from hostile and discounted, to valued and defended. The first volume includes an account of the life of Berkeley by J. Murray and key responses from 1711 to 1748, whilst the second volume covers the years between 1745 and 1796. This fascinating reissue illustrates the breadth (...) and diversity of the early reaction to Berkeley’s philosophies, and will help students and academics form a clear image of both Berkeley’s work and his reputation through the eyes of his contemporaries. (shrink)

The material reprinted in this two-volume set, first published in 1989, covers the first eighty-five years in responses to George Berkeley’s writings. David Berman identifies several key waves of eighteenth-century criticism surrounding Berkeley’s philosophies, ranging from hostile and discounted, to valued and defended. The first volume includes an account of the life of Berkeley by J. Murray and key responses from 1711 to 1748, whilst the second volume covers the years between 1745 and 1796. This fascinating reissue illustrates the breadth (...) and diversity of the early reaction to Berkeley’s philosophies, and will help students and academics form a clear image of both Berkeley’s work and his reputation through the eyes of his contemporaries. (shrink)

Ao defender, nos Princípios matemáticos de filosofia natural, a existência de uma força de gravitação universal, Newton desencadeou uma onda de dúvidas e objeções filosóficas. Suas próprias declarações sobre a natureza da gravitação não são facilmente interpretáveis como formando um conjunto consistente de opiniões. Por um lado, logo após fornecer as três definições de "quantidades de forças centrípetas" (Defs. 6-8), Newton observa que está tratando tais forças "matematicamente", sem se pronunciar sobre sua realidade física. Mas, por outro lado, no Escólio (...) Geral inserido no final da segunda edição do livro, Newton diz que foi capaz de "explicar" vários fenômenos de movimento por meio da força de gravidade - que ele mostrou ser um tipo de força centrípeta -, embora não tivesse ainda conseguido explicar a causa dessa força. Uma interpretação plausível dessas últimas afirmações é que Newton acreditava que pôde inferir, a partir dos fenômenos, a existência da força de gravidade, enquanto agente causal real de certos movimentos, mas que ainda não havia tido sucesso em descobrir a causa dessa causa. O objetivo principal do presente artigo não é aprofundar a análise histórica das declarações de Newton, mas examinar como essa questão se insere no debate mais geral sobre o estatuto epistemológico das hipóteses científicas que transcendem a experiência imediata. Segundo a posição defendida, entre muitos outros, por John Locke, tais hipóteses devem ser interpretadas como tentativas legítimas de descrever aspectos inobserváveis da realidade. Em contraste com isso, no caso específico das hipóteses sobre forças - de gravitação ou quaisquer outras -, George Berkeley argumentou vigorosamente a favor de sua interpretação como meros artifícios teóricos úteis às "demonstrações matemáticas" na ciência da mecânica. Ao longo da análise das vantagens e desvantagens filosóficas dessas posições opostas, indica-se aqui que, embora a interpretação realista pareça fazer mais justiça ao desenvolvimento real da física após os Princípios matemáticos, a interpretação instrumentalista de Berkeley tem o mérito filosófico inegável de representar uma adesão mais firme ao empirismo, que é, de um modo ou de outro, valorizado por ambas as partes envolvidas na disputa sobre a natureza da gravitação. Newton's defence, in the Principia, of the existence of a universal force of gravity immediately gave rise to a wave of philosophical doubts and objections. His own remarks on the nature of gravitation are not easily amenable of a consistent, uniform interpretation. This paper begins by reviewing briefly these remarks. Its primary objective is, however, to examine how this important scientific issue contributed to demarcate two main epistemological positions on the status of scientific hypotheses transcending immediate experience. In Newton's time, two exponents of these positions were, respectively, Locke and Berkeley. Intriguingly, Newton fuelled both the Berkeleyan, instrumentalist interpretation, and the Lockean, realist interpretation. On the one hand, immediately after offering the definitions of "quantities of centripetal forces" (Definitions 6-8), he warned that he was treating these forces "mathematically", without pronouncing on its physical status. This remark lends support to Berkeley's anti-realist interpretation of forces, as Berkeley himself was keen to point out. But in the General Scholium, at the end of the book, Newton declared that he could "explain" certain important phenomena of motion by the force of gravity, although he had not yet been able to explain the cause of this force, adding, famously, that he would "feign no hypotheses" about this issue. A natural, realist interpretation of this statement is that Newton believed that he could infer, from the phenomena, the existence of gravity, as a real, causal physical agent, but that he had not yet succeeded in discovering the cause of this cause. In discussing the shortcomings and advantages of these opposing views, we indicate that although the realist interpretation appears to do more justice to the actual development of physics after the Principia, Berkeley's interpretation has the philosophical merit of representing a firmer adherence to empiricism, a position valued, in one way or another, by all parties involved in the dispute on the nature of gravitation. (shrink)

This essay examines the strategies that Berkeley and Dharmakīrti utilize to deny that idealism entails solipsism. Beginning from similar arguments for the non-existence of matter, the two philosophers employ markedly different strategies for establishing the existence of other minds. This difference stems from their responses to the problem of intersubjective agreement. While Berkeley’s reliance on his Cartesian inheritance does allow him to account for intersubjective agreement without descending into solipsism, it nevertheless prevents him from establishing the existence of other finite (...) minds. I argue that Dharmakīrti, in accounting for intersubjective agreement causally, is able to avoid Berkeley’s shortcoming. I conclude by considering a challenge to Dharmakīrti’s use of inference that Ratnakīrti, a Buddhist successor of Dharmakīrti, advances in his “Disproof of the Existence of Other Minds” and briefly exploring a possible response that someone who wants to advocate an idealist position could give. (shrink)

The prevailing view about the history of early modern philosophy, which the author dubs “the early modern tale” and wants to convince us is really a fairy tale, has it that the focus on ideas as a solution to various epistemological puzzles, first introduced by Descartes, created difficulties for the traditional ontological scheme of substance and mode. The early modern tale depicts the development of “the way of ideas” as abandoning ontology at least by the time of Berkeley. This, in (...) turn, fostered an antimetaphysical bias as modern philosophy developed further, elevating epistemology to its current primary status in the field. Marc Hight challenges this account by showing how, though the conception of ideas changed over time, the ontological status of ideas remained a central part of the discussion about ideas and influenced how even later thinkers like Locke, Berkeley, and Hume thought about them. By his reading of important texts in early modern philosophy, Hight aims not only to provide a more accurate history of philosophy for this period but also to resuscitate the value of metaphysics for philosophical analysis today.��. (shrink)

MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE IN THE ALEPH AND THE WRITING OF THE GOD BY JORGE LUIS BORGES In my paper I undertake an analysis of chosen short stories of Jorge Luis Borges in which the problem of mysticism occupies an important place. I claim that Borges, whose works are known for covering philosophical issues of most fundamental importance, is a writer who describes the impossibility of reaching a mystical experience in the modern world. As far as philosophical background of Borges is concerned (...) there exists a well-spread opinion that Borges, who readily confessed his admiration for Berkeley and Hume, was an idealist himself. My point is that even though the Berkeleyan epistemology influenced Borges, there is a fundamental difference between those thinkers which consists of the fact that in the philosophy of Berkeley there is a place for God. As a result it can be claimed that the world as an object of God's experience has a stable existence. There is no place for such a privileged being neither in the ontology nor epistemology proposed by Borges. The world as described by him can be called a fiction because there is no privileged subject whose experience would not be accidental and private. For that reason the description of mystical experience is always a failure when it refers to modern times. I demonstrate it at length by the analysis of the short story entitled The Aleph, while taking into consideration other texts as well. (shrink)

Berkeley’s ‘esse is percipi’ has been criticized for implying epistemological solipsism, the main argument being that different minds cannot harbor numerically one and the same idea. Similarly, C. J. Boström, the dominating Swedish philosopher in the nineteenth century, was early scorned because his principle of esse est percipi allegedly contradicts the simultaneous claim that two spirits can perceive the same thing under qualitatively different appearances. Whereas the criticism against Berkeley is here regarded as valid, it is argued that Boström successfully (...) defended himself by employing a dual concept of meaning, resembling Frege’s Sinn and Bedeutung some thirty years later, and by postulating an ontology that permits human minds to share in the divine ideas that constitute reality. (shrink)

Francis Hutcheson's theory of perception, as put forth in his Synopsis of Metaphysics, bears a striking similarity to that of John Locke. In particular, Hutcheson and Locke both have at the centre of their theories the notion of ideas as representational entities acting as the direct objects of all of our perceptions. On first consideration, one might find this similarity wholly unremarkable, given the popularity of Locke's Essay. But the Essay was published in 1689 and the Synopsis in 1742, and (...) during these years Berkeley had published a substantive attack on Locke's representative realism and the sceptical conclusions he saw it implying. Further, Hume had argued in 1739 that in accepting a Lockean account of perception, we (at least when thinking as philosophers in our studies) are left without any sure knowledge of external objects, even their existence. Despite this, Hutcheson apparently feels no obligation to address either Berkeley's idealism or Hume's scepticism in the Synopsis. The question addressed in this article is, Why did he not see any force to such arguments, and thus why did he feel no onus to attempt to offer an explicit refutation of Berkeley and Hume? (shrink)

This paper examines John Scottus Eriugena's account of material bodies. Some scholars have argued that Eriugena's account prefigures Berkeleyan idealism. The interpretation offered in the paper rejects the Berkeleyan interpretation on the grounds that Eriugena, unlike Berkeley, did not propose a thoroughly immaterialist view of reality.

Berkeley subscribed to the principle of heterogeneity, that what we see is qualitatively and numerically different from what we touch. He says of this principle that it is “the main part and pillar of [his] theory.” The argument I present here is that the theory to which Berkeley refers is not just his theory of vision, but what that theory was the preparation for, which is nothing less than his idealism. The argument turns on the passivity of perception, which is (...) what is at stake in the principle of heterogeneity. The author targeted by Berkeley's theory is Descartes, who explicitly denies heterogeneity. (shrink)

In this paper, I survey the way Wittgenstein reacts to radical philosophical doubt in his On Certainty.He deems skeptical doubt in some important cases idle, pointless or otherwise negligible. I point out that several passages of On Certainty make it difficult to judge whether Wittgenstein intends to address a skeptic or a metaphysical idealist. Drawing attention to the anti-skeptical nature of Berkeley’s idealism, I go on to argue that the question is far from trivial: rather, it affects the way we (...) should evaluate Wittgenstein’s arguments in On Certainty in general. I finally attempt to explain why Wittgenstein remained ambiguous about the target of his arguments, and discuss the possibility of making room for the idealism/skepticism distinction in On Certainty’s framework. (shrink)

For the last 30 years I have been writing a trilogy on Locke’s, Berkeley’s, and Hume’s philosophies of money. With the publication of Clipped Coins. Abused Words and Civil Government; John Locke’s Philosophy of Money and Exciting the Industry of Mankind; George Berkeley’s Philosophy of Money and with the last volume on Hume in preparation, the trilogy is now almost completed.

There is a widespread assumption that Berkeley and Spinoza have little in common, even though early Jesuit critics in France often linked them. Later commentators have also recognized their similarities. My essay focuses on how Berkeley 's comments on the Arnauld-Malebranche debate regarding objective and formal reality and his treatment of god's creation of finite minds within the order of nature relate his theory of knowledge to his doctrine in a way similar to that of Spinoza. On estime souvent que (...) Berkeley et Spinoza ont peu en commun, même si les premières critiques jésuites en France les ont souvent liés. D'autres commentateurs ont également reconnu leurs similitudes. Mon essai se concentre sur la manière dont 1 / les remarques de Berkeley sur la discussion entre Arnauld et Malebranche concernant la réalité objective et formelle et 2 / son traitement de la création par Dieu des esprits finis dans l'ordre de la nature mettent en relation sa théorie de la connaissance et sa doctrine de la liberté dans une manière semblable à celle de Spinoza. (shrink)

L'article expose et discute l'interprétation de l'immatérialisme de Berkeley par James Frederick Ferrier. Dans deux articles denses (1842, 1847), contre l'historiographie reidienne dominante, celui-ci rejette la thèse selon laquelle Berkeley souscrit à la méthode des idées et par là aux principes élémentaires du représentationnalisme. Loin de défendre l'idéalisme subjectif, Berkeley adhère à une forme de réalisme direct. Dans les Institutes of Metaphysic (1854), Ferrier va plus loin et se sert du « maître argument » de Berkeley pour risquer ses propres (...) thèses métaphysiques. The paper sets out and discusses James Frederick Ferrier's interpretation of Berkeley's immaterialism. In two dense papers (1842, 1847), against the prevailing Reidean historiography, Ferrier rejects the claim that Berkeley subscribes to the way of ideas and thus to the basis tenets of representationalism. Far from defending subjective idealism, Berkeley holds some form of direct realism. In his Institutes of Metaphysic (1854), Ferrier goes further and draws on Berkeley's master argument to venture his own metaphysical views. (shrink)

L’article expose et discute l’interprétation de l’immatérialisme de Berkeley par James Frederick Ferrier. Dans deux articles denses , contre l’historiographie reidienne dominante, celui-ci rejette la thèse selon laquelle Berkeley souscrit à la méthode des idées et par là aux principes élémentaires du représentationnalisme. Loin de défendre l’idéalisme subjectif, Berkeley adhère à une forme de réalisme direct. Dans les Institutes of Metaphysic , Ferrier va plus loin et se sert du « maître argument » de Berkeley pour risquer ses propres thèses (...) métaphysiques.The paper sets out and discusses James Frederick Ferrier’s interpretation of Berkeley’s immaterialism. In two dense papers , against the prevailing Reidean historiography, Ferrier rejects the claim that Berkeley subscribes to the way of ideas and thus to the basis tenets of representationalism. Far from defending subjective idealism, Berkeley holds some form of direct realism. In his Institutes of Metaphysic , Ferrier goes further and draws on Berkeley’s master argument to venture his own metaphysical views. (shrink)

This essay deals with a quite unexplored topic : Berkeley's sources from Renaissance. In fact, while the relationships between Berkeley and the most well-known modern philosophers (as Descartes, Malebranche, Locke and Hume) have been widely analysed, the importance of Berkeley's classical learning and erudition for the development of his own philosophical thought has usually been overlooked. After some general considerations, I focus on two topics : ether and tar-water in Siris. Cet essai traite un sujet très peu exploré : les (...) sources de Berkeley dans la Renaissance. Alors que les relations entre Berkeley et les plus célèbres philosophes modernes (comme Descartes, Malebranche, Locke et Hume) ont été amplement analysées, l'importance de la culture classique et de l'érudition de Berkeley pour le développement de sa propre philosophie a été généralement méjugé. Après quelques considérations générales, je me concentre sur deux questions : l'éther et l'eau de goudron dans la Siris. (shrink)

Existe já uma grande quantidade de literatura dedicada à presença na filosofia inicial de Berkeley de alguns assuntos tipicamente platônicos (arquétipos, o problema da mente de Deus, a relaçáo entre ideias e coisas, etc.). Baseados em alguns desses escritos, nas próprias palavras de Berkeley, assim como no exame de alguns elementos da tradiçáo platônica num amplo sentido, sugiro que, longe de serem apenas tópicos isolados, livremente espalhados nos primeiros escritos de Berkeley, eles formam uma perfeita rede de aspectos, atitudes e (...) modos de pensar platônicos, e que, por mais alusivos ou ambíguos que esses elementos platônicos possam parecer, eles constituem um todo coerente e complexo, desempenhando um papel importante na formaçáo da própria essência do pensamento de Berkeley. Em outras palavras, sugiro que, dadas algumas das ideias apresentadas em suas primeiras obras, foi de certo modo inevitável para George Berkeley, em virtude da lógica interna do desenvolvimento de seu pensamento, chegar a uma obra táo abertamente platônica e especulativa como Siris (1744). (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In a seminal article on the origin of philosophical idealism in the western philosophical tradition, Myles Burnyeat argued that idealism could not have come about prior to Descartes. According to Burnyeat, Descartes introduced a radical version of external world scepticism which made it possible for subsequent philosophers to argue that reality is composed exclusively of immaterial minds and their contents. I argue that the success of Burnyeatidealisms definitions of the term does not rule out the possibility of Pre-Cartesian idealism.