Berkeley and Other Philosophers

Francis Hutcheson's theory of perception, as put forth in his Synopsis of Metaphysics, bears a striking similarity to that of John Locke. In particular, Hutcheson and Locke both have at the centre of their theories the notion of ideas as representational entities acting as the direct objects of all of our perceptions. On first consideration, one might find this similarity wholly unremarkable, given the popularity of Locke's Essay. But the Essay was published in 1689 and the Synopsis in 1742, and (...) during these years Berkeley had published a substantive attack on Locke's representative realism and the sceptical conclusions he saw it implying. Further, Hume had argued in 1739 that in accepting a Lockean account of perception, we (at least when thinking as philosophers in our studies) are left without any sure knowledge of external objects, even their existence. Despite this, Hutcheson apparently feels no obligation to address either Berkeley's idealism or Hume's scepticism in the Synopsis. The question addressed in this article is, Why did he not see any force to such arguments, and thus why did he feel no onus to attempt to offer an explicit refutation of Berkeley and Hume? (shrink)

Ever since its first publication critics of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason have been struck by certain strong formal resemblances between transcendental idealism and Berkeley's immaterialism. Both philosophers hold that the sensible world is mind-dependent, and that from this very mind-dependence we can draw a refutation of scepticism of the senses.

Ever since its first publication critics of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason have been struck by certain strong formal resemblances between transcendental idealism and Berkeley's immaterialism. Both philosophers hold that the sensible world is mind-dependent, and that from this very mind-dependence we can draw a refutation of scepticism of the senses.

I try to show that Berkeley's theory of ideas is not a variant of Locke's. We can find such an interpretation of Berkeley in Thomas Reid. So, we could call this interpretation a 'traditional interpretation'. This traditional interpretation has an influence still now, for example, Tomida interprets Berkeley in this line (Tomida2002). We will see that this traditional interpretation gives a serious problem to Berkeley (section 1). And I am going to present an argument against this traditional interpretation (section 2).

: La contribution de Berkeley à l'histoire de la métaphysique n'a que rarement été étudiée par ses commentateurs français ou anglo-saxons. La présente étude se propose de revenir sur la définition berkeleyenne de la métaphysique, sur la place qu'elle occupe dans l'économie de sa pensée, et tente ainsi d'éclairer la contribution de Berkeley à l'histoire de la notion de métaphysique à l'époque moderne. Nous montrons que la critique berkeleyenne de la métaphysique n'empêche pas Berkeley de maintenir sa pertinence théorique, si (...) l'on rapporte sa conception de la métaphysique à la transformation qui affecte celle-ci après Descartes, et qui en fait la science des principes de la connaissance humaine. Cette étude entend donc réévaluer la place de la métaphysique dans l'oeuvre de Berkeley, et, simultanément, de mesurer l'apport de Berkeley à l'histoire de la métaphysique. (shrink)

Jonathan Bennett engages with the thought of six great thinkers of the early modern period: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume. While not neglecting the historical setting of each, his chief focus is on the words they wrote. What problem is being tackled? How exactly is the solution meant to work? Does it succeed? If not, why not? What can we learn from its success or its failure? These questions reflect Bennett's dedication to engaging with philosophy as philosophy, not as (...) museum exhibit, and they require a close and demanding attention to textual details; these being two features that characterize all Bennett's work on early modern philosophy. For newcomers to the early modern scene, this clearly written work is an excellent introduction to it. Those already in the know can learn how to argue with the great philosophers of the past, treating them as colleagues, antagonists, students, teachers. -/- Volume 2: In this volume Jonathan Bennett examines the views of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume on thought and sensation, meaning, language, classification, innate ideas and knowledge, our knowledge of necessary truths (bringing in Descartes and Leibniz as well), the basis for our belief that we live in a world of material things, causation, the fundamental difference between colours and shapes, the passage of time and our ability to live through it. While finding much to criticize, Bennett shows that we can learn much about these and other topics under the guidance and inspiration of the energy, courage, and insight of these three great British philosophers. (shrink)

The material reprinted in this two-volume set, first published in 1989, covers the first eighty-five years in responses to George Berkeley’s writings. David Berman identifies several key waves of eighteenth-century criticism surrounding Berkeley’s philosophies, ranging from hostile and discounted, to valued and defended. The first volume includes an account of the life of Berkeley by J. Murray and key responses from 1711 to 1748, whilst the second volume covers the years between 1745 and 1796. This fascinating reissue illustrates the breadth (...) and diversity of the early reaction to Berkeley’s philosophies, and will help students and academics form a clear image of both Berkeley’s work and his reputation through the eyes of his contemporaries. (shrink)

The material reprinted in this two-volume set, first published in 1989, covers the first eighty-five years in responses to George Berkeley’s writings. David Berman identifies several key waves of eighteenth-century criticism surrounding Berkeley’s philosophies, ranging from hostile and discounted, to valued and defended. The first volume includes an account of the life of Berkeley by J. Murray and key responses from 1711 to 1748, whilst the second volume covers the years between 1745 and 1796. This fascinating reissue illustrates the breadth (...) and diversity of the early reaction to Berkeley’s philosophies, and will help students and academics form a clear image of both Berkeley’s work and his reputation through the eyes of his contemporaries. (shrink)

The material reprinted in this two-volume set, first published in 1989, covers the first eighty-five years in responses to George Berkeley’s writings. David Berman identifies several key waves of eighteenth-century criticism surrounding Berkeley’s philosophies, ranging from hostile and discounted, to valued and defended. The first volume includes an account of the life of Berkeley by J. Murray and key responses from 1711 to 1748, whilst the second volume covers the years between 1745 and 1796. This fascinating reissue illustrates the breadth (...) and diversity of the early reaction to Berkeley’s philosophies, and will help students and academics form a clear image of both Berkeley’s work and his reputation through the eyes of his contemporaries. (shrink)

George Berkeley -- On missing the wrong target -- Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment in Irish philosophy -- The culmination and causation of Irish philosophy -- Francis Hutcheson on Berkeley and the Molyneux problem -- The impact of Irish philosophy on the American Enlightenment -- Irish ideology and philosophy -- An early essay concerning Berkeley's immaterialism -- Mrs. Berkeley's annotations in An account of the life of Berkeley (1776) -- Some new Bermuda Berkeleiana -- The good bishop : new letters -- Beckett (...) and Berkeley. (shrink)

My purpose is to compare Berkeley’s and Gentile’s idealism, interpreting Berkeley’s Treatise, §§22–23, and Gentile’s reading of this passage. The Italian philosopher finds in Berkeley’s master argument the original source of the true idealistic way of thinking, but he believes that Berkeley has not been sufficiently consistent in deducing all the consequences from his new principle. This criticism is the ground of Gentile’s actual idealism. Comparing the two positions is very instructive both to elucidate the general issue of idealism and (...) to understand Berkeley’s philosophy. (shrink)

This dissertation concerns an important dispute between George Berkeley and David Hume. The dispute involves Berkeley's defense of his conception of the self as a spirit, a purely active being which perceives ideas; and Hume's elimination of that conception via his own, according to which the self is merely a heap, a causally connected system of perceptions. At bottom, this difference in the way that the self is conceptualized is informed by a fundamental difference in philosophical starting-point. Berkeley seeks to (...) extricate philosophers from skepticism and perplexity; and he desires to restore them to virtue by demonstrating the natural immortality of the soul. Hume, by contrast, wants to construct a science of the mind; and he hopes to encourage modesty in philosophical opinion by promoting a skepticism about bold metaphysical doctrines such as the immortality of the soul. ;Since Berkeley's account has frequently been dismissed as inconsequential, while Hume's account has been accorded philosophical honor, a large part of this project consists in demonstrating the worth of the former. In chapter I, I defend Berkeley's conception of spirit against a traditional objection that it is really just a conflicted Humean account. I argue that a demonstration of the immortality of the soul is central to Berkeley's agenda, flowing from his deep distinction between spirit and idea. In chapter II, I argue that Berkeley effectively abandons the Aristotelian/scholastic distinction between substance and accident, thereby leading him to draw this distinction between spirit and idea. In chapter III, I show how this ontological transformation leads Berkeley to deny that spirit can be perceived, and thereby provides him with a response to skepticism about the soul. In chapter IV, I argue that Hume theoretically eliminates Berkeleian spirit by reconceptualizing the self as a heap of perceptions, motivated by his project of constructing a science of the mind. (shrink)

Existe já uma grande quantidade de literatura dedicada à presença na filosofia inicial de Berkeley de alguns assuntos tipicamente platônicos (arquétipos, o problema da mente de Deus, a relaçáo entre ideias e coisas, etc.). Baseados em alguns desses escritos, nas próprias palavras de Berkeley, assim como no exame de alguns elementos da tradiçáo platônica num amplo sentido, sugiro que, longe de serem apenas tópicos isolados, livremente espalhados nos primeiros escritos de Berkeley, eles formam uma perfeita rede de aspectos, atitudes e (...) modos de pensar platônicos, e que, por mais alusivos ou ambíguos que esses elementos platônicos possam parecer, eles constituem um todo coerente e complexo, desempenhando um papel importante na formaçáo da própria essência do pensamento de Berkeley. Em outras palavras, sugiro que, dadas algumas das ideias apresentadas em suas primeiras obras, foi de certo modo inevitável para George Berkeley, em virtude da lógica interna do desenvolvimento de seu pensamento, chegar a uma obra táo abertamente platônica e especulativa como Siris (1744). (shrink)

That the legacy of Berkeley's philosophy has been a largely sceptical one is perhaps rather surprising. For he himself took it as one of his objectives to undermine scepticism. He roundly denied that there were ‘any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down’ . Yet Hume was to write of Berkeley that ‘most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism, Bayle not excepted’. And it has become something of a (...) commonplace to say that Berkeley's philosophy is sceptical in direction, if not in intention. He is represented as a half-hearted sceptic, applying radical empiricist principles in his treatment of matter but baulking at their implications when he came to consider spirits. Hume is credited with being the more thoroughgoing of the two. Berkeley had denied the substantiality of extended things. Hume felt obliged, by parity of reasoning, to deny the substantiality of the self. On his account of the mind there is ‘properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different’ . It is commonly supposed that Berkeley, in maintaining the quite contrary view that we know ourselves to be simple, undivided beings , showed a lack of rigour or consistency. (shrink)

For the last 30 years I have been writing a trilogy on Locke’s, Berkeley’s, and Hume’s philosophies of money. With the publication of Clipped Coins. Abused Words and Civil Government; John Locke’s Philosophy of Money and Exciting the Industry of Mankind; George Berkeley’s Philosophy of Money and with the last volume on Hume in preparation, the trilogy is now almost completed.

Berkeley's "new theory of vision" and, In particular, His sensationalist solution to the problem of judging distance and magnitude were discussed by many eighteenth-Century authors who faced a variety of problem situations. More specifically, Berkeley's theory fed into the debate over whether the phenomena of vision were susceptible to mathematical analysis or were experientially determined. In this paper a variety of responses to berkeley are examined, Concluding with thomas reid's attempt to distinguish physical optics (which can be analyzed geometrically) from (...) the psychology of vision (in which experience plays a major role). (shrink)

A influência do ceticismo nos século XVI e XVII é por demais evidente para ser posta em questão. De Montaigne a Bayle, parece que o cético foi o promotor tanto de uma refutação radical dos princípios metafísicos escolásticos e depois cartesianos quanto de uma crítica feroz às autoridades religiosas e políticas. Ora, esse papel parece ter se amenizado no Século das Luzes, ou melhor, se deslocado - somente as dimensões críticas do social continuaram pertinentes. Pretende-se mostrar aqui o pressuposto de (...) uma tal leitura que leva em conta apenas o aspecto visível da crítica cética e mostrar que o ceticismo, sob uma forma particular (o solipsismo), foi uma das grandes questões da epistemologia das Luzes e que ele é indissociável, para ser compreendido em toda a sua dimensão polêmica, da recepção européia do imaterialismo berkeleyano. O objetivo de nossa intervenção se faz compreender então claramente: explicar primeiramente como uma tal concepção epistemológica pôde nascer em terra cartesiana e quais foram os seus líderes desse solipsismo das Luzes, a supor que os tenha havido, para mostrar, em seguida, porque ela pôde se tornar uma questão metafísica maior no século XVIII, antes de definir, para concluir, os interesses a que ela serviu ou desserviu. Berkeley in the land of the Enlightenment: skepticism and solipsism in the XVIIIth centuryThe influence of skepticism on the XVIth and XVIIth century is far too evident to be questioned. From Montaigne to Bayle, the skeptic seems to have been the furtherer both of a radical refutation of the metaphysical principles of scholasticism and, later, of Cartesianism, and of a fierce critique of the political and religious authority. Well, this role seems to be diminished, or displaced, in the Enlightenment: only the critical dimensions on the social aspect continue to be pertinent. We would like to show that the parti pris of such a consideration only takes into account the visible aspect of the skeptical critique, and that the skepticism, under a very particular form ( the solipsism), was one of the greatest assets of the Enlightenment epistemology and that, in order to apprehend it thoroughly in its polemical dimension, it is inseparable of the European reception of the Berkeley‚s immaterialism. The aim of our intervention is easily understood: it is to explain, firstly, how such a epistemological conception could have been born in the land of Descartes and who were the leaders of this solipsism in the Enlightenment, supposing that there were such people, and, secondly, why it could become a major metaphysical asset in the XVIIIth century, before defining, as a conclusion, the interests it has done service or disservice. (shrink)

Ao defender, nos Princípios matemáticos de filosofia natural, a existência de uma força de gravitação universal, Newton desencadeou uma onda de dúvidas e objeções filosóficas. Suas próprias declarações sobre a natureza da gravitação não são facilmente interpretáveis como formando um conjunto consistente de opiniões. Por um lado, logo após fornecer as três definições de "quantidades de forças centrípetas" (Defs. 6-8), Newton observa que está tratando tais forças "matematicamente", sem se pronunciar sobre sua realidade física. Mas, por outro lado, no Escólio (...) Geral inserido no final da segunda edição do livro, Newton diz que foi capaz de "explicar" vários fenômenos de movimento por meio da força de gravidade - que ele mostrou ser um tipo de força centrípeta -, embora não tivesse ainda conseguido explicar a causa dessa força. Uma interpretação plausível dessas últimas afirmações é que Newton acreditava que pôde inferir, a partir dos fenômenos, a existência da força de gravidade, enquanto agente causal real de certos movimentos, mas que ainda não havia tido sucesso em descobrir a causa dessa causa. O objetivo principal do presente artigo não é aprofundar a análise histórica das declarações de Newton, mas examinar como essa questão se insere no debate mais geral sobre o estatuto epistemológico das hipóteses científicas que transcendem a experiência imediata. Segundo a posição defendida, entre muitos outros, por John Locke, tais hipóteses devem ser interpretadas como tentativas legítimas de descrever aspectos inobserváveis da realidade. Em contraste com isso, no caso específico das hipóteses sobre forças - de gravitação ou quaisquer outras -, George Berkeley argumentou vigorosamente a favor de sua interpretação como meros artifícios teóricos úteis às "demonstrações matemáticas" na ciência da mecânica. Ao longo da análise das vantagens e desvantagens filosóficas dessas posições opostas, indica-se aqui que, embora a interpretação realista pareça fazer mais justiça ao desenvolvimento real da física após os Princípios matemáticos, a interpretação instrumentalista de Berkeley tem o mérito filosófico inegável de representar uma adesão mais firme ao empirismo, que é, de um modo ou de outro, valorizado por ambas as partes envolvidas na disputa sobre a natureza da gravitação. Newton's defence, in the Principia, of the existence of a universal force of gravity immediately gave rise to a wave of philosophical doubts and objections. His own remarks on the nature of gravitation are not easily amenable of a consistent, uniform interpretation. This paper begins by reviewing briefly these remarks. Its primary objective is, however, to examine how this important scientific issue contributed to demarcate two main epistemological positions on the status of scientific hypotheses transcending immediate experience. In Newton's time, two exponents of these positions were, respectively, Locke and Berkeley. Intriguingly, Newton fuelled both the Berkeleyan, instrumentalist interpretation, and the Lockean, realist interpretation. On the one hand, immediately after offering the definitions of "quantities of centripetal forces" (Definitions 6-8), he warned that he was treating these forces "mathematically", without pronouncing on its physical status. This remark lends support to Berkeley's anti-realist interpretation of forces, as Berkeley himself was keen to point out. But in the General Scholium, at the end of the book, Newton declared that he could "explain" certain important phenomena of motion by the force of gravity, although he had not yet been able to explain the cause of this force, adding, famously, that he would "feign no hypotheses" about this issue. A natural, realist interpretation of this statement is that Newton believed that he could infer, from the phenomena, the existence of gravity, as a real, causal physical agent, but that he had not yet succeeded in discovering the cause of this cause. In discussing the shortcomings and advantages of these opposing views, we indicate that although the realist interpretation appears to do more justice to the actual development of physics after the Principia, Berkeley's interpretation has the philosophical merit of representing a firmer adherence to empiricism, a position valued, in one way or another, by all parties involved in the dispute on the nature of gravitation. (shrink)