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  1. Why Leibniz Should Have Agreed with Berkeley about Abstract Ideas.Stephen Puryear - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (6):1054-1071.
    Leibniz claims that Berkeley “wrongly or at least pointlessly rejects abstract ideas”. What he fails to realize, however, is that some of his own core views commit him to essentially the same stance. His belief that this is the best (and thus most harmonious) possible world, which itself stems from his Principle of Sufficient Reason, leads him to infer that mind and body must perfectly represent or ‘express’ one another. In the case of abstract thoughts he admits that this can (...)
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  2. The Role of Visual Language in Berkeley’s Account of Generality.Katherine Dunlop - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):525-559.
  3. Berkeley et les idées générales mathématiques.Claire Schwartz - 2010 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 1 (1):31-44.
    Les Principes de la connaissance humaine sont l'occasion pour Berkeley de nier l'existence des idées générales abstraites. Il admet cependant l'existence d'idées générales, plus exactement d'idées déterminées à signification générale. C'est ainsi qu'il peut rendre compte de la généralité de certaines démonstrations. L'exemple choisi est celui de l'idée de triangle dans le cadre d'une démonstration géométrique. Mais peut-on également rendre compte de cette manière des démonstrations et des idées algébriques et notamment celle de quantité? In the Principles of human knowledge, (...)
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  4. Berkeley on the Conceivability of Qualities and Material Objects.Harold I. Brown - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 7:161-168.
    Berkeley’s “selective attention” account of how we establish general conclusions without abstract ideas—particularly in light of his denial of abstract ideas and rejection of the legitimacy of several subjects of scientific and philosophic study on the grounds that they presuppose abstract ideas—yields a puzzle: Why can’t we begin with ideas and use the method of selective attention to establish conclusions about qualities and material objects independently of their being perceived, even though we do not have ideas of these entities? I (...)
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