Berkeley: General Works

Mostly what Bennett learns from these six philosophers is not their positive doctrines. Rather, his learning takes the form of reconstruction and analysis of what he deems to be otherwise incorrect views. A good example is found in his treatment of Berkeley’s attack on the conceptual defects of materialism. On Bennett’s analysis Berkeley’s case rests on a flawed theory of representation, but Bennett sticks with Berkeley nonetheless. We see the same kind of learning in his excellent chapter 29 on the (...) reasons behind Berkeley’s mistaken reading of Locke, as well as in his discussion of the nature of and reasons for phenomenalism in Berkeley’s work. Incidently, many scholars will take exception to Bennett’s argument that Berkeley’s assurances that idealism squares with commonsense materialism are merely rhetorical. Throughout his study Bennett readily and generously acknowledges debts for insights he has received from other interpreters of these six great philosophers, insights which often cause him to revise or recant some of his own earlier views. For instance, a big climbdown is found in his assessment that the doctrine of tropes, which he once dismissed as nonsense but now accepts, does not bear negatively upon the notion of bodies as modes in Spinoza’s monist philosophy. Again, Bennett revises his earlier views on Locke’s two-faced attitude toward substance, as something both indispensible and “intellectually disgraceful,” and shows it to be a case of “genius in a bind.”. (shrink)

This book is neither a biography nor an in-depth interpretation of Berkeley's philosophical system. There are numerous details about Berkeley's life, social relationships, and intellectual contributions, but Berman neither explores these matters in comprehensive depth nor claims to do so. What, then, does he do? Berman's answer is: "Advancing chronologically, I have focussed on Berkeley as homo religiosus". He uses biographical details to portray Berkeley as a Christian thinker who acted on his commitment both in and out of his study. (...) Berman also locates Berkeley's writings in their specific intellectual and social contexts while tracing a career that spanned over forty years and encompassed a wide range of interests and disciplines, from theology to economics. Attention is paid, for example, to Berkeley's Guardian essays and to Siris, which is characterized as his most popular book during his lifetime. Philosophers now concentrate almost exclusively on the Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, regarding their author only as a technical thinker offering immaterialism as a solution to free-standing philosophical problems. It is therefore salutary to be informed about the wide range of Berkeley's writings and regard them as diverse expressions of Christian idealism, a religiously inspired outlook about God, nature, and humanity which issued in, but transcends, immaterialism, the technical philosophical position. (shrink)

Emerson said that idealism sees the world in God: not as “painfully accumulated, atom after atom, act after act, in a aged creeping Past,” but as “a vast picture” painted by God “on the instant eternity.” Emerson’s portrait fits A.C. Grayling’s Berkeley, who sees the world in an infinite spirit whose power is unfailing and ubiquitous. Berkeley’s arguments, Grayling suggests, move at three levels, and at the metaphysical level, God’s activity accounts for what occurs at the level of sensory experience (...) and at “the level of ordinary thought and talk about everyday experience and its objects”. Level 3 explanations invoking matter, violate Berkeley’s “austere constraints” on “sensefulness”. Grayling himself accepts these constraints. This permits him to conclude that although Berkeley cannot establish the God his level 3 accout requires, his claim that the esse of sensible things is percipi is “substantially defensible”. (shrink)

Both John Foster and Howard Robinson hold that idealism, construed as a position about perception and the material world, is far more defensible than most philosophers think. The former, indeed, wrote The Case for Idealism. This may be enough to explain their project to celebrate Berkeley’s tercentenary, since he surely is the decisive figure in the development of the kind of idealism they take seriously. In their “Introduction,” the editors attempt to link together the twelve essays which follow, but do (...) so only by finding a place for the themes and arguments of some of them in an overview, a nicely structured one, of their own making. The reality, not surprisingly, is that like most anthologies devoted to a single topic or philosopher, the papers are fundamentally unrelated. The contributors mind their own business and do not address each others’ arguments and contentions. This is no criticism; for it to be otherwise would require a level of organization and ongoing interaction among the contributors that is all but impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, one would rather avoid the unsettling experience of finding different and even incompatible assumptions being proffered by different authors as the central principle of Berkeley’s immaterialism, especially since each author offers a candidate without attempting to discredit its rivals textually. Despite this unavoidable flaw, it is a useful anthology. (shrink)

Both these developments would have surprised Berkeley. He would have found it paradoxical that the vulgar should have rejected his vulgar immaterialism as paradoxical, since he of course believed himself to be on their side in the matter, and characterised his own philosophy as a.

According to Berkeley, then, the unconscious process of inference of the scientist goes as follows. He notices that, when he does not have his house within visual range, he cannot see it just by wishing to; and that, when he does have it within visual range and his eyes open, he cannot prevent himself from seeing it just by wishing not to. He therefore infers that he is not the efficient cause of these sensations. But, since he holds that they (...) must have some efficient cause, he concludes that this is a congeries of "material substances," which are numerically distinct and partly dissimilar from the sensations, and which exist even when unperceived, or "externally to the mind." As a psychological theory, this seems to be at any rate plausible. (shrink)

In disproof of the materialist principle, that common things exist unperceived, and in defence of the New Principle, Philonous here objects that it is inconceivable that a common thing should do so. Hylas replies that, on the contrary, we can and do think of, e.g., a tree standing alone as opposed to a tree being perceived by an observer. But Philonous counter-objects to this reply that it contains a contradiction, since it asserts that we can think of something which is (...) not thought of. (shrink)

Review of G.A. Johnston, The development of Berkeley’s philosophy. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1923.

Richard Glauser mène dans cet ouvrage une enquête serrée sur le contexte philosophique dans lequel est née la philosophie de George Berkeley, cherchant contre quels sceptiques lutte précisément le jeune philosophe irlandais, en particulier dans les Principes de la connaissance humaine et les Trois Dialogues entre Hylas et Philonous qui leur font suite. La question se pose à la curiosité de l'historien des idées d'autant plus vivement que Berkeley est un philosophe avant tout argumentatif, qui préfère toujours exposer et démontrer (...) logiquement ses thèses, envisager les objections et les réfuter, ou encore en proposer une analyse serrée sous forme de dialogue. S'agissant des personnes, Berkeley se contente le plus souvent, de formules allusives ; il dit peu envers qui a il des dettes, et qui il attaque. (shrink)

In the latest volume in the Arguments of the Philosophers series, George Pitcher discusses selected topics in Berkeley’s philosophy. With the exception of a biographical sketch and a closing chapter on Berkeley’s ethical views, the book is devoted exclusively to an examination of issues in the Essay towards A New Theory of Vision and the Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. Although the jacket blurb implies that Pitcher will show the development of Berkeley’s views as (...) a reaction to Locke, and Pitcher himself states that "Locke is the Philosopher for Berkeley", the main concern of the book is neither Berkeley’s place in the history of philosophy, nor his relationship to Locke, but a critical examination of Berkeley’s principles and positions. Pitcher’s typical technique is to extract a principle or position from Berkeley’s writings and carefully to seek to determine its meaning and to discover how, if at all, it can be defended. In particular cases, this leads him beyond the works already mentioned to, for example, a consideration of Berkeley’s early notebooks, the Philosophical Commentaries, and the genesis of Berkeley’s views. (shrink)

This volume showcases the best current work now being written on a wide range of issues in early modern philosophy, when some of the most influential current philosophical problems were first identified by figures like Locke, Berkeley, Kant, Spinoza, and Descartes. Collectively the articles exemplify the wide range of methodological perspectives currently being employed by top figures in the field. Indeed the selling point of the volume is the very high level of the fourteen contributors, each of whom has a (...) highly distinguished international reputation. (shrink)

Tradução para o português do capítulo 5 do livro "Berkeley" (Oxford University Press, 1982), Cap. 5, p. 47-57. Republicado em The British Empiricists: Locke, Berkeley, Hume (Oxford University Press, 1992).

This volume in the “Past Masters” series is a short introduction to Berkeley’s philosophy. Urmson begins with an account of the “corpuscularian philosophy,” which is followed by a discussion of Berkeley’s attack on matter. Urmson takes Locke’s philosophy to be corpuscularian. The foundation of his interpretation is that Berkeley is attacking Newton and Locke. Berkeley is, moreover, said to be an “extreme empiricist”. He also reads Berkeley as an implicit proponent of grounding language on ostensively defined terms. So it comes (...) as no surprise that Urmson provides us with a phenomenalist interpretation of Berkeley, and of course phenomenalism is a philosophical position whose flaws have long been clear to Urmson. (shrink)

A collection of lectures given in commemoration of the bicentennial of Berkeley's death, this work bears testimony to a renewed interest in his philosophy. The basic tenets of Berkelian idealism are defended as possessing contemporary validity and tenability, and Berkeley is shown to have anticipated much of present day philosophy. -- W. S. L.