Berkeley, Misc

Berkeley’s social and political writings play an important role in his philosophy although, surprisingly, has been little studied by scholars. This lack of scholarly attention is a deficiency because such writings are not only interesting, but even more essential for understanding Berkeley’s philosophy as a whole, since point toward the same goal that his epistemological and metaphysical writings serves, namely, consolidate his apologetic and humanist project. This paper focuses on that forgotten part of Berkeley’s philosophy and aims to explore a (...) little researched topic but recurrent in his social and political writings, namely, that of the Civil Authority and the Secular State. (shrink)

En este trabajo realizo un examen crítico del reciente libro de Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo sobre la crítica de Aristóteles a la teoría platónica de las Ideas. El libro de Di Camillo es un trabajo muy serio cuya lectura recomiendo ampliamente. Sin embargo, considero que cuatro de las principales tesis que la autora defiende tienen varias dificultades y mi objetivo aquí es presentar argumentos detallados en contra de ellas: la interpretación de la distinción entre argumentos más y menos rigurosos del (...) tratado Sobre las Ideas; la tesis de que la separación es el blanco esencial de las críticas aristotélicas a las Ideas; la interpretación de las opciones que Platón tiene para responder al argumento del tercer hombre, y la tesis de que la separación de las Ideas debe entenderse como homonimia. In this paper I examine Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo's recent book on Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's theory of Ideas. Di Camillo's book is a very serious work that I highly recommend. Nevertheless, I consider that four of the main theses that the author defends face several difficulties and my aim here is to offer detailed arguments against them: the interpretation of the distinction between more and less accurate arguments of the treatise On Ideas; the thesis that separation is the essential target of Aristotle's criticisms against Plato's Ideas; the interpretation of the options available to Plato to reply to the third man argument; and the thesis that the separation of Ideas should be understood as homonymy. (shrink)

Review of Flage's book "Berkeley".

In this essay, the author analyses Berkeley’s conformity and inference argument against Locke’s theory of percep tion. Both arguments are not as decisive as traditionally has been perceived and fail to engage in Locke’s actual position. The main reason for this is that Berkeley does not see that Locke’s position is compatible with the non-inferential nature of perceptual knowledge.

In the early 1730s George Berkeley began to explore the conceptual field between ideas and spirits that he previously claimed to be empty. In this field he found a rich set of concepts including “notions,” “principles,” “beliefs,” “opinions,” and even “prejudices.” Elsewhere I have referred to this phase in Berkeley’s thought as his “second conceptual revolution.”2 I believe that it was motivated by his increasing need to develop a language to discuss the social, moral and theological concerns vital to him (...) and his circle. This second conceptual revolution made possible two of his most important contributions to 18th century thought: The Analyst and The Querist . Even though they were written almost simultaneously, these texts are rarely discussed together, since the former is categorized as a critique of the foundations of the calculus, while the latter is taken a tract advocating the development of a specie-less economy in Ireland. Using new textual and contextual evidence, however, I will show with that these two texts have a common basis in Berkeley’s second conceptual revolution, in that the rejection of intrinsic values and the revaluation of notions, principles, and prejudices are crucial to the critique of both Newtonian mathematics in The Analystand Newtonian monetary theory and policy in The Querist. Specifically, I will argue that Berkeley’s famous demonstration of the absurdities of Newton’s method of fluxions devalued geometric reasoning and gave a new pride of place to algebraic reasoning. On the basis of this revaluation in mathematics, Berkeley more confidently undermined the concept of intrinsic monetary value and suggested the development of a monetary system based on “tickets, tokens and counters” . The issues posed by the transition from a specie-based to a specie-less currency were clearly some of the most important and controversial in the Age of Enlightenment. Berkeley’s contributions to understanding the significance and feasibility of such atransition and its benefits for Ireland certainly add support the claim that he was “the most engaging and useful man in Ireland in the eighteenth century.”. (shrink)

A reavaliação das contribuições de Berkeley à história do pensamento econômico tem-se concentrado em três questões: sua discordância com as idéias mercantilistas, as precoces contribuições à teoria do desenvolvimento e as posições de vanguarda em economia monetária. Neste último campo, Berkeley é tanto visto como o sucessor de Locke quanto como um pioneiro defensor de um padrão monetário não metálico. O artigo revisa as principais idéias econômicas de Berkeley e busca efetuar um balanço de suas contribuições aos diversos campos da (...) economia, em particular à economia monetária. Por meio de comparações com Locke e Hume, dá-se ênfase ao papel do moralista e ao peso dos argumentos morais na visão econômica de Berkeley. (shrink)

Well chosen selections from the works of idealists from Berkeley to Blanshard. Four critical articles--including Moore's "refutation of Idealism"--give the other side of the story. Ewing contributes a balanced and illuminating introduction.--A. C. P.

Sir Thomas Berkeley has scarcely more than a liminal status among literary scholars and historians, even those who study fourteenth-century England. We may rather dimly remember him as an aristocratic spear carrier in Shakespeare's Richard II, a reflection of real activities known to historians. Or we may recall that he sponsored an extraordinarily prolific and important translator, the Cornishman John Trevisa.

Idealism, which gradually dominated nineteenth century philosophy through its insistence upon the superiority of spiritual values above material forces and its sophisticated objections against the immediate instinct of common-sense realism in knowledge, is moribund to-day and difficult to render intelligible to to-day’s down-to-earth student. Yet its problems still constitute a capital part of epistemology, in whose courses it is often presented in a summary and harsh light. Histories of philosophy are not large enough normally to follow systematically one line of (...) development of thought without distraction and tend naturally, like textbooks of epistemology, to aim at topical discussion. Hence a systematic presentation of texts illustrating the movement of Idealist thought from Bishop Berkeley to the contemporary Professor Brand Blanshard is a very practical aid to the epistemological novice, ordering the confusion of his scattered ideas and clarifying a set of influential principles, which have still an important, if indirect influence upon professional philosophizing. Dr. Ewing states its relation to the current English scene thus. (shrink)

No Tratado, Hume procura investigar as causas da crença nos objetos exteriores, admitindo ser impossível provar se os mesmos existem ou náo. Sua análise consistirá na investigaçáo da origem da inteligibilidade das noções de continuidade e distinçáo dos objetos sensíveis, em última instância, a crença do senso comum na continuidade e distinçáo das próprias percepções. Este texto pretende mostrar como essa discussáo humeana é um diálogo direto com a filosofia berkeleyana, a defesa humeana da crença na matéria implicando inicialmente uma (...) certa aceitaçáo da filosofia de Berkeley, para, na seqüência, representar uma dissensáo direta com o seu princípio fundamental: ser é ser percebido . Tais colocações têm, entre outras, a finalidade de argumentar que Berkeley exerce um papel central na filosofia humeana, nesse caso como seu interlocutor direto, e que a compreensáo desse papel é parte obrigatória de um melhor esclarecimento do problema da objetividade em Hume. (shrink)

This has been a great century for logic and the foundations of mathematics. Ewald's excellent sourcebook is a welcome addition to the literature on the exciting developments of this and the past two centuries. The richness of the material on which Ewald is drawing is shown by the fact that he has assembled a broad and representative selection without once duplicating anything to be found in the famous sourcebooks of van Heijenoort and Benacerraf/Putnam.

Many passages in Kant’s texts suggest that he is a phenomenalist about appearances, i.e., that appearances are only part of our mental content and do not exist outside our mind. In recent years, however, phenomenalist readings of Kant’s idealism have been of ill repute. Without wanting to make a positive case for phenomenalism, this paper attempts to rebut three particularly popular objections to any phenomenalist reading. In slogan form, they are 1) «There is only prima facie evidence», 2) «Kant is (...) an empirical realist», and 3) «Kant is not Berkeley». In response, I argue, first, that any strategy to explain the textual evidence for phenomenalism away fails. Second, I hold that Kant’s «empirical realism» is consistent with phenomenalism, as empirical realism does not mean that appearances exist outside our mind. Third, I will give a novel interpretation of Kant’s rejection of Berkeley’s idealism: Kant does not criticize him because he thinks Berkeley is a phenomenalist, but because his transcen dental realism renders all outer things, appearances and things in themselves alike, impossible. (shrink)

Esse est percipi---this famous phrase of 18th century British philosopher, George Berkeley, is known to be an Idealist challenge against our common sense that there are mind-independent things. In contrast with the familiarity Berkeley’s theory, the existence of similar theory in Indian Buddhism in the 8th century is widely unknown. The Indian version of this theory can be expressed in Sanskrit, sattopalambhavāda, i.e., the theory claiming that “to be is to perceive/to be perceived.” The first and probably last philosopher who (...) clearly advocated this theory in Indian Buddhism is Prajñākaragputa, one of the great commentators of his predecessor, Dharmakīrti’s magnum opus, Pramāṇavārttika. In explaining Dharmakīrti’s ideas of the Buddha’s religious authority, theory of perception and logic, Prajñākaragupta incorporated his original ideas into his commentarial work, Pramāṇavarttikālaṅkāra. His sattopalambhavāda is one remarkable result of his innovated theorems of Buddhist epistemology and ontology. The aim of this paper is to clarify the significance of Prajñākaragupta’s idea of sattopalambhavāda from two viewpoints: Frist, I will examine its philosophical-historical development from Dharmakīrti’s ontology and make its innovative value clear. Second, I will also briefly compare its idea with Berkeley’s esse est percipi, especially focusing on their similarities in defending their religious authorities. (shrink)

According to Kant, there is some doctrine, which he sometimes calls 'empirical realism,' such that it was doubted by Descartes, denied by Berkeley, and endorsed by Kant himself. It may be doubted whether there really is such a doctrine or, if there is, whether it takes the form Kant seems to say it does. For instance, if empirical realism is taken as the assertion that familiar objects like tables and chairs exist, then this doctrine was neither seriously doubted by Descartes, (...) nor denied by Berkeley. If empirical realism is the view that such objects are mind-independent, then it was clearly denied by Berkeley, but was neither seriously doubted by Descartes, nor straightforwardly endorsed by Kant. Kant's assertion thus presents us with a puzzle: what might empirical realism be? The primary aim of this paper will be to reconstruct Kant's own narrative of the historical relationship between Descartes, Berkeley, and himself, in order to identify the doctrine Kant calls 'empirical realism.' I argue that the empirical realism which Descartes doubted, Berkeley denied, and Kant endorsed is the doctrine that the concept of extended substance has legitimate application. (shrink)

En su Tratado sobre los principios del conocimiento humano, George Berkeley ofrece una serie de argumentos cuyo objetivo es criticar la tesis materialista. Mi propósito en este artículo es reconstruir y analizar en detalle estos argumentos. Dado que la crítica de Berkeley al materialismo es, fundamentalmente, una crítica al materialismo representacionalista de John Locke, empezaré este artículo explicando cuáles son las ideas básicas de la propuesta de Locke.