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  1. Hume's Incredible Demonstrations.Graham Clay - 2022 - Hume Studies 47 (1):55-77.
    Commentators have rightly focused on the reasons why Hume maintains that the conclusions of skeptical arguments cannot be believed, as well as on the role these arguments play in Hume’s justification of his account of the mind. Nevertheless, Hume’s interpreters should take more seriously the question of whether Hume holds that these arguments are demonstrations. Only if the arguments are demonstrations do they have the requisite status to prove Hume’s point—and justify his confidence—about the nature of the mind’s belief-generating faculties. (...)
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  2. Berkeley and Locke.Patrick J. Connolly - 2021 - In Samuel Charles Rickless (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Berkeley. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter revisits three key disagreements between Locke and Berkeley. The disagreements relate to abstraction, the idea of substance, and the status of the primary/secondary quality distinction. The goal of the chapter is to show that these disagreements are rooted in a more fundamental disagreement over the nature of ideas. For Berkeley, ideas are tied very closely to perceptual content. Locke adopts a less restrictive account of the nature of ideas. On his view, ideas are responsible for both perceptual content (...)
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  3. Sensible Qualities and Secondary Qualities in the First Dialogue.Lisa Downing - 2018 - In Stefan Storrie (ed.), Berkeley's Three Dialogues: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 7-23.
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  4. Molyneux’s Question in Berkeley’s Theory of Vision.Juan R. Loaiza - 2017 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 32 (2):231-247.
    I propose a reading of Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision in which Molyneux-type questions are interpreted as thought experiments instead of arguments. First, I present the general argumentative strategy in the NTV, and provide grounds for the traditional reading. Second, I consider some roles of thought experiments, and classify Molyneux-type questions in the NTV as constructive conjectural thought experiments. Third, I argue that (i) there is no distinction between Weak and Strong Heterogeneity theses in the NTV; (ii) (...)
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  5. Berkeley on the Mind‐Dependence of Colors.Margaret D. Wilson - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (3-4):249-264.
  6. Berkeley and the Primary Qualities: Idealization vs. Abstraction.Richard Brook - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1289-1303.
    In the First of the Three Dialogues, Berkeley’s Hylas, responding to Philonous’s question whether extension and motion are separable from secondary qualities, says: What! Is it not an easy matter, to consider extension and motion by themselves,... Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them?
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  7. Qualities and Simple Ideas: Hume and his Debt to Berkeley.Alan Nelson & David Landy - 2011 - In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and secondary qualities: the historical and ongoing debate. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-238.
  8. Hume’s Causal Reconstruction of the Perceptual Relativity Argument in Treatise 1.4.4.Annemarie Butler - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):77-101.
    ABSTRACT: In Treatise 1.4.4, on behalf of modern philosophers, Hume described a causal argument that shows that our impressions of secondary qualities do not resemble qualities of objects themselves. However, in their respective arguments, Hume’s philosophical predecessors did not argue causally, but appealed to contrary qualities. I argue that Hume’s presentation was not simply a “gratuitous” stylistic difference, but an important correction of his predecessors in light of his own philosophical discoveries. -/- RÉSUMÉ : Dans le Traité 1.4.4, Hume a (...)
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  9. How Berkeley can maintain that snow is white.Margaret Atherton - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):101–113.
    Berkeley has made the bold claim on behalf of his theory that it is uniquely able to justify the claim that snow is white. But this claim, made most strikingly in the Third of his "Three Dialogues," has been held, most forcefully by Margaret Wilson, to conflict with Berkeley's argument in the First Dialogue that, because of various facts to do with perceptual variation, colors are merely apparent and hence, mind-dependent. This paper develops an alternative reading of the First Dialogue (...)
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  10. Ideas, Sentiments, and Qualities.Kenneth P. Winkler - 1992 - In Phillip D. Cummins (ed.), Minds, Ideas, and Objects: Essays on the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy. Ridgeview Publishing Company.