Berkeley: Value Theory

In the present article, I aim at showing a shift in Berkeley’s understanding of society in the late Siris. Although the work is primarily devoted to the curative qualities of tar-water and on the speculative level develops a new neoplatonic metaphysic of light, it should also be seen as a work in which Berkeley’s mature philosophy is expressed as a whole. Together with the fact that since the thirties Berkeley thought was more inclined towards practical, i.e. economic and social, issues, (...) this might be a premise for interpreting the Siris as a work in which a vision of society is presented. The parallelism of nature and society, of macrocosm and microcosm, and the claim that nature is not perfect, but is a dynamic, developing whole, makes it possible to treat society as an imperfect whole developed and perfected by human activity. If such a reading is correct it evidences the fact that in his Siris Berkeley abandoned the religious radicalism typical for his early works. (shrink)

Scholars disagree about the nature of the doctrinal apparatus that supports Berkeley’s case for passive obedience to the sovereign. Is he a rule-utilitarian, or natural law theorist, or ethical egoist, or some combination of some or all these elements? Here I argue that Berkeley is an act-utilitarian who thinks that one is more likely to act rightly by following certain sorts of rules. I also argue that Berkeley mischaracterizes and misevaluates Locke’s version of the social contract theory. Finally, I consider (...) the potentially practically self-defeating nature of Berkeley’s claim that there is no obligation to submit to the rule of “madmen” or “usurpers.”. (shrink)

This paper describes Berkeley’s ethics and analyses its metaphysical presuppositions. His ethical though is based on the theological idea of virtue that means obedience to God’s will and, hence, all ethically relevant concepts contain a reference to God. Berkeley also says that happiness in this vale of tears is God’s gift to us and a reward of virtue in heaven. Happiness is a sign and criterion of virtuous conduct. Obviously this kind of supernatural ethics can work only if its metaphysical (...) foundation is so obvious that all decent people can figure it out. This is to say that revealed religion must be replaced by natural religion. According to Berkeley, the existence of God, his goodness, the reality of heaven, and its supreme happiness can be proved philosophically and in terms of natural religion. The main part of the paper describes and evaluates Berkeley’s logic, especially analogical reasoning and his inferences from conclusions to premises, or effects to causes. Another major theme is the mutual independence of revealed and natural theology. Berkeley’s minor writings are in a major role here. Due to the unsystematic nature of its sources the conclusions of this paper are open-ended and speculative. (shrink)

A central problem of political philosophy is that of explaining how a state could have the moral authority to enforce laws, promulgate laws which citizens are thereby obliged to obey, give new duties to citizens and levy taxes. Many rival solutions to this problem of political authority have been offered by contemporary and recent philosophers but none has obtained wide acceptance. The current debate takes no cognisance of George Berkeley’s ‘Passive Obedience’, in which he defends the exceptionless duty of not (...) using force to resist the state and offers a rule-consequentialist account of morality which indicates an explanation of political authority as grounded in the social connectedness of human beings. I expound, criticise and develop Berkeley’s explanation to provide a promising solution to the problem of political authority. The solution impugns the political authority of all existing states as well as the duty of passive obedience. (shrink)

In June of 2012 scholars from Europe and North America met in Montreal to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the publication of George Berkeley's *Passive Obedience*. In this article Stephen Daniel summarizes the English presentations, and Sébastien Charles summarizes the French presentations, on how Berkeley invokes naturalistic themes in developing a moral theory while still allowing a role for God.

To discern the contours of a Berkeleian moral philosophy the article has been divided into four sections: the first introduces the moral importance of Berkeley’s new principle; in the second section the inter-dependence of morality and sociality is discussed; the third section identifies perennial moral problems and Berkeley’s success or failure in dealing with them; the fourth occupies itself with a notion of the common good that is socio-historical. Berkeley’s moral pragmatism is placed in relief in this way.

Cet article vise à présenter une dimension peu connue de la pensée de Berkeley à travers une étude minutieuse des polémiques entretenues par ce dernier tout au long de la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle. Ces polémiques, dont le contenu est généralement politique, moral ou économique, reposent sur trois thèses récurrentes et complémentaires, rarement pensées de concert: une philosophie cyclique de l’histoire; une distinction ontologique entre activité et passivité appliquée à d’autres domaines que celui de la métaphysique; une analogie entre (...) monde physique et monde moral qui fonctionne au niveau du rapport entre macrocosme et microcosme. La mise en valeur de ces trois thèses permet d’envisager la philosophie berkeleyenne sous un autre angle, notamment en donnant à son immatérialisme une saveur plus stratégique qu’on ne le fait habituellement. (shrink)

By focusing on the exchange between Descartes and Hobbes on how the self is related to its activities, Berkeley draws attention to how he and Hobbes explain the forensic constitution of human subjectivity and moral/political responsibility in terms of passive obedience and conscientious submission to the laws of the sovereign. Formulated as the language of nature or as pronouncements of the supreme political power, those laws identify moral obligations by locating political subjects within those networks of sensible signs. When thus (...) juxtaposed with Hobbes, Berkeley can be understood as endorsing a theologically inflected version of deontological ethics in which moral laws are linked directly to the constitution of the self. (shrink)

In the classical era, imagination garnered poor press: fooling the senses, perverting judgment, subverting reason, skewing social relations, and generally providing wrong ideas about the way things are; it was a faculty of which to beware. Occasionally it was recognized as not being entirely without value—Descartes, for example, insisted on its great usefulness as a figurational function in simplifying the work of the understanding in geometry. The traditional tendency in philosophy, though, was to denigrate imagination for its misleading nature and (...) negative effects and to dwell on its limits as a faculty bound to the body. Indeed, its first function is to represent to the mind things previously perceived by the senses as images in their likeness. But as imagination has neither the same vividness nor the same order as sensation, it is potentially misleading, since in fact images look only approximately the same as their models. Above all, however, imagination was reproached to be potentially misleading for its second function, the creation of images or entire fictions bearing no relation whatsoever to reality, which made it dangerously capable of nourishing all manner of superstition and fantasy. Within such a context, Berkeley’s conception of the imagination hardly seems original at first glance. But as I will propose, in its creative guidance of reason, imagination plays an important and distinctive role in Berkeley’s scientific, moral, and religious discussions. Rather than focusing solely on the representational character of imagination, then, I suggest that we attend also to the way in which Berkeley appeals to the imaginative aspects of reason itself. In this way, we can better appreciate the educational presuppositions of human freedom. (shrink)

Using Berkeley's life as a point of entry in the period, this dissertation approaches his thought from the vantage of contextual intellectual history, examining the relationship between ethical thought and the demands of commercial society during the early eighteenth century . Viewing this period through the prism of Berkeley's career, this dissertation is divided into three sections, chronologically tracing the development of Berkeley's social thought and outlining his place within the context of these contemporary debates. A primary goal of each (...) section is the explication of Berkeley's contributions to early eighteenth-century conceptions of sociability, morality, luxury, and history. In particular, it highlights growing concerns for ideas of sovereignty, sociability, and luxury upon individuals and society during a crucial moment of the commercial revolution, as well as interpretations of the relationship between these notions and Anglo-American views of historical development. Since many of the leading ethical, economic, religious, and political debates of this period were associated with the formation of "modern" commercial society, Berkeley's engagement with these points of contention provides an opportunity to closely examine these issues. This methodological strategy also has the benefit of exploring differences in the articulation of these disputes within different national situations: namely, in England, Ireland, and the American colonies. Finally, by stressing the non-philosophical aspects of Berkeley's thought, this dissertation adds new dimension to our understanding of his role in early eighteenth-century intellectual history, as an individual deeply engaged with social issues, not merely esoteric philosophical mattters. (shrink)

In Passive Obedience Berkeley argues that we must always observe the prohibitions decreed by our sovereign rulers. He defends this thesis both by providing critiques against opposing views and, more interestingly, by presenting a moral theory that supports it. The theory contains elements of divine - command, natural - law, moral - sense, rule - based, and outcome - oriented ethics. Ultimately, however, it seems to rest on a notion of spiritual reason — a specific God - given faculty that (...) all rational human beings have. Berkeley’s work on immaterialism, for which he is better known, could thus perhaps best be seen as an attempt to find a scientific justification for his moral doctrine. (shrink)

According to what one might call ‘indirect” forms of utilitarian thinking, the proper end of all human action is the greatest happiness of the greatest number of individuals, but due to the fallibility of moral agents this end cannot, and must not, be directly pursued. Instead, according to at least one version of the indirect theory, moral agents have a duty to act in conformity with a set of general rules which, in their turn, have been designed to promote the (...) greatest happiness of humankind. But acts which conform to such general rules can under exceptional circumstances occasion more suffering than happiness. This is clearly problematical to indirect utilitarians. If they follow the rules regardless of the evil consequences, it can be argued that they have abandoned the basic principles of utilitarianism. If, on the other hand, they refuse to follow the rules which normally promote the general good, their view can be seen to collapse into the direct form of the creed. (shrink)

Berkeley's sermons on passive obedience in the Irish context -- Science and sociability: Berkeley's "bond of society" -- Piety, perception, and the free-thinkers -- Luxury, moderation, and the south sea bubble -- Planting religion in the New World, 1722 - 1732 -- Improving Ireland: luxury, virtue, and economic development -- Bishop of Cloyne: protestantism, patriotism, and a national panacea.

(2003). Berkeley's theory of operative language in the Manuscript Introduction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 271-301. doi: 10.1080/09608780320001047877.

Did George Berkeley, as I argued long ago in Belfrage (1986), defend a theory of "emotive meaning" in his Manuscript Introduction (an early version of the introduction to the Principles)? This question has raised a broad spectrum of different issues, which I think it is important to keep apart, such as rhetorical, psychological, semantic, ethical, metaphysical, and theological aspects. In the present paper, I hope to clear the ground of ambiguities, which have led to serious misunderstandings on this interesting point (...) in Berkeley's unpublished philosophy. I open with a summary account of the historical context. (shrink)

Berkeley held that the moral duty of mankind was to obey God's laws; that--since God was a benevolent Creator--the object of His laws must be to promote the welfare and flourishing of mankind; and that, accordingly, humans could identify their moral duties by asking what system of laws for conduct would in fact tend to promote that object. This position--which is akin to that of 'rule' Utilitarianism--is neither unfamiliar nor manifestly untenable. He was surely mistaken, however, in his further supposition (...) that, if this theory were accepted, the resolution of all (or most) particular moral dilemmas would be simple and straightforward. (shrink)

ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDEES INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 33 PAUL J. OLSCAMP The Moral Philosophy of George Berkeley ..