Bertrand Russell

I present an answer to the title question which relates Russell’s writings to a remark by C.D. Broad. Russell shared the same concerns as Broad about the new postgraduate students at the University of Cambridge but instead of voicing them, his writings left a problem.

According to what has long been the dominant school of thought in analytic meta-ontology––defended not only by W. V. O. Quine, but also by Bertrand Russell, Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen, and many others––the meaning of ‘there is’ is identical to the meaning of ‘there exists.’ The most (in)famous aberration from this view is advanced by Alexius Meinong, whose ontological picture has endured extensive criticism (and borderline abuse) from several subscribers to the majority view. Meinong denies the identity of being (...) and existence. That is, he denies that ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ are semantically equivalent, and espouses a theory according to which there are things that do not exist. Here I defend a revised version of this view, which I call “Noncontradictory Neo-Meinongianism.” Focusing primarily on van Inwagen’s arguments in “Meta-Ontology” (1998), I argue that Noncontradictory Neo-Meinongianism is, on commonsensical grounds, preferable to the meta-ontological theories of van Inwagen and Meinong. (shrink)

The goal of this note is to bring into wider attention the often neglected important work by Bertrand Russell on the foundations of physics published in the late 1920s. In particular, we emphasize how the book The Analysis of Matter can be considered the earliest systematic attempt to unify the modern quantum theory, just emerging by that time, with general relativity. More importantly, it is argued that the idea of what I call Russell space, introduced in Part III of that (...) book, is more fundamental than quantum theory, general relativity, and quantum gravity since the topological ordinal space proposed by Russell would naturally incorporate into its very fabric the emergent nature of spacetime by deploying event assemblages, and not spacetime or particles, as the fundamental building blocks of the world. (shrink)

Russell’s role in the controversy about the paradoxes of material implication is usually presented as a tale of how even the greatest minds can fall prey to basic conceptual confusions. Quine accused him of making a silly mistake in Principia Mathematica. He interpreted “if- then” as a version of “implies” and called it material implication. Quine’s accusation is that this decision involved a use-mention fallacy because the antecedent and consequent of “if-then” are used instead of being mentioned as the premise (...) and the conclusion of an implication relation. It was his opinion that the criticisms and alternatives to the material implication presented by C. I. Lewis and others would never be made in the first place if Russell simply called the Philonian construction “material conditional” instead of “material implication”. Quine’s interpretation of the topic became hugely influential if not universally accepted. This paper will present the following criticisms against this interpretation: (1) the notion of material implication does not involve a use-mention fallacy, since the components of “if-then” are mentioned and not used; (2) Quine’s belief that the components of “if-then” are used was motivated by a conditional-assertion view of conditionals that is widely controversial and faces numerous difficulties; (3) if anything, it was Quine who could be accused of fallacious reasoning: he ignored that in the assertion of a conditional is the whole proposition that is asserted and not its constituents; (4) the Philonian construction remains counter-intuitive even if it is called “material conditional”; (5) the Philonian construction is more plausible when it is interpreted as a material implication. (shrink)

Traditional descriptivism and Kripkean causalism are standardly interpreted as rival theories on a single topic. I argue that there is no such shared topic, i.e. that there is no question that they can be interpreted as giving rival answers to. The only way to make sense of the commitment to epistemic transparency that characterizes traditional descriptivism is to interpret Russell and Frege as proposing rival accounts of how to characterize a subject’s beliefs about what names refer to. My argument relies (...) on a development of the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. (shrink)

of (from British Columbia Philosophy Graduate Conference) This paper attempts to argue for an interpretation of Peter Strawson�s account of moral responsibility that successfully eliminates the threat of determinism. The goal is to capture the spirit of Strawson�s view and elucidate that spirit. I do this by emphasizing an aspect of Strawson�s account that others, like Paul Russell, may find insignificant, and then I demonstrate how this aspect is meant to quash the threat of determinism. Specifically, I claim that Strawson (...) wishes us to recognize that certain interpersonal relationships are explanatorily prior to the capacities necessary for morally responsible agency, and this explanatory relationship implies that (at least in our world) the capacities necessary for morally responsible agency could not include freedom from determinism. (shrink)

This paper presents a history of Bertrand Russell's evolving views on the nature of truth. It begins with his brief defense of a primitivist view of truth, followed by his critical accounts of both the coherence and pragmatic theories of truth. Then the paper discusses Russell's shift to the correspondence theory, and the variations of it he defended throughout his career.

This chapter clarifies that it was the works Giuseppe Peano and his school that first led Russell to embrace symbolic logic as a tool for understanding the foundations of mathematics, not those of Frege, who undertook a similar project starting earlier on. It also discusses Russell’s reaction to Peano’s logic and its influence on his own. However, the chapter also seeks to clarify how and in what ways Frege was influential on Russell’s views regarding such topics as classes, functions, meaning (...) and denotation, etc., and summarizes the correspondence between Frege and Russell and the light it sheds on the philosophical logic of both. (shrink)

Russell famously posited a type of knowledge distinct from and irreducible to propositional knowledge, which he called knowledge by acquaintance. In recent years, several epistemologists have reignited interest in knowledge by acquaintance, pointing out an array of theoretical jobs it is serviceable in performing. Nonetheless knowledge by acquaintance continues to be met with resistance and disregard. I surmise that this has partly to do with the specific conception of knowledge by acquaintance propounded by Russell and many of his followers – (...) what I will call here the “classical conception” of knowledge by acquaintance. At the heart of this conception are two theses, which I will label relationalism and infallibilism and try to articulate more fully in what follows. The main aim of this paper, however, is to construct an alternative notion of knowledge by acquaintance – fallibilist and non-relationalist – and argue that this alternative conception is just as fit to perform the theoretical jobs identified by proponents of knowledge by acquaintance. The hope is to thereby rescue knowledge by acquaintance from its relationalist and infallibilist associations, the better to foster its wider acceptance. (shrink)

In 1921, John Wisdom (1904–1993) became a member of Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge, where he read philosophy and attended lectures by G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad, and J. E. McTaggart. He received his BA in 1924, after which he worked for five years at the National Institute of Industrial Psychology. From 1929 to 1934, Wisdom was a Lecturer in the department of logic and metaphysics at the University of St Andrews and a colleague of G. F. Stout. After the publication (...) of his book Interpretation and Analysis (1931) and five articles on “Logical Constructions” in Mind (1931–3), Wisdom became a Lecturer in Moral Sciences in Cambridge and a Fellow of Trinity College. This gave him the opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Since nothing by Wittgenstein but Tractatus appeared in print for decades, Wisdom’s publications of these years were—mistakenly—read as portents of the new ideas of Wittgenstein himself. The publication of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in 1953 brought with it, among other things, the fall of Wisdom’s popularity. (shrink)

Ernst Mach’s and Bertrand Russell’s philosophical outlooks contributed to shaping the philosophy of science of the 20th century. Mach is a philosophical interpreter of science, a positivist, and a historian, considering the general principles of science as condensed economic descriptions of observed facts. Russell held a view of the nature and relation of philosophy to science and to logic that can be described as essentially consistent. In this article, the aim is to explore how both Mach and Russell defended the (...) classical version of “Neutral Monism”. Since it was developed as a reaction to the mechanical philosophy of nature, Neural Monism also emerged along with scientific psychology in the late 19th century. The attempt in this article is to examine their versions of neutral monism and emphasize their differences and convergences. (shrink)

In Chapter III of Principia Mathematica and several later writings, Russell gave a proof to show that definite descriptions are “incomplete symbols” that have “no meaning in isolation”. Despite the importance Russell seems to attach to the proof, many commentators have regarded it as obviously fallacious. Perkins has offered an interpretation that aims to rehabilitate the proof, but does not, I suggest, vindicate the conclusion about meaning in isolation in a sufficiently robust sense. This paper aims to close that gap (...) by offering an alternative interpretation according to which the proof relies on Russellian ideas about propositional structure. It concludes by revisiting the frequently debated question of whether Russell could have accepted a generalized-quantifier treatment of definite descriptions on which they denote second-order properties. (shrink)

The Russell's paradox concerns the foundations of naive set theory. This short short paper is about how it can be interpreted in other contexts and has significance in the world of commands. Understanding the paper assumes that the reader is broadly familiar with the foundations of set theory and its history. The text contains many formulas and therefore the reader should be comfortable in the world of logical formulas. My example is somewhat similar to the barber paradox. There, too, we (...) are puzzled by the feasibility of a task. In the case of the barber paradox there is a solution: the barber is a woman, in my example there is no such escape. (shrink)

This chapter considers some of the philosophical writings of Alice Ambrose (1906–2001) and Margaret MacDonald (1903–1956), particularly in relation to their responses to Russell’s work. It argues that both need to be recovered and reconsidered as significant philosophers in their own right, who have important contributions to make to the familiar problems posed by ordinary language in relation to philosophy. Ambrose worked mainly in mathematics and symbolic logic and her earliest publications drew a critical response from Russell himself. Responding in (...) turn to the work of Russell, among others, she went on to bring clarity to the various ways in which ordinary language featured in contemporary philosophical discussion, and identified the centrality of ‘linguistic innovation’ to much philosophical practice. MacDonald found much to agree with in Russell’s work on analysis, but she, too, was troubled by his dismissive attitude to ordinary language. She argued that many philosophical problems can be solved by understanding how language is ordinarily used, and published her case before more celebrated ‘ordinary language philosophers’, most notably J. L. Austin. She also set out ideas and terminology which were later to be associated with Austin’s speech act theory in her contributions to ethics and aesthetics. Both Ambrose and MacDonald contributed to and extended the application of the study of ordinary language in analytic philosophy in ways which deserve to be recovered and to be subjected to further philosophical scrutiny. (shrink)

Reviewers of Bertrand Russell’s Marriage and Morals (MM) came to no consensus on the purpose of the work. Some saw it as advocating love in marriage, others as destroying marriage and still others as an attempt to justify promiscuity (Kayden, Tract on Sex and Marriage: Review of Marriage and Morals by Bertrand Russell. The Sewanee Review 38(1), 104–108, 1930; Pan, Review of Marriage and Morals by Bertrand Russell. The China Critic 3(8), 186–187, 1930). Their confusion is understandable given the tensions (...) in the book. This chapter proposes that these were partly the result of an unsuccessful attempt to combine two incompatible value systems: aristocratic values and the new morality which Bertrand Russell and his wife at the time, Dora, promoted. The book also reveals a couple in crisis—whose ideals had proved impossible to realize in their life together. (shrink)

In this chapter I critically examine the hitherto neglected influence that Dorothy Wrinch had on her teacher, friend, and informal thesis adviser, Bertrand Russell, and the puzzling fact that Russell never cited Wrinch’s mathematical papers on Principia Mathematica. Wrinch never reshaped Russell’s general outlook; indeed, Wrinch adopted as her own many of Russell’s 1911–1919 views about logic, philosophy, science, and their relationships that are characteristic of logic-centered twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Still, the influence was not just in one direction, from teacher (...) to student, but also ran the other way. And while Wrinch’s own life and ideas have enjoyed far more attention in recent literature, most historians of philosophy have, for too long, largely overlooked how Wrinch influenced Russell. Here I critically discuss how Wrinch influenced Russell and tell a more well-rounded story of mutual influence and collaboration. (shrink)

This book examines Bertrand Russell’s complicated relationships to the women around him, and to feminism more generally. The essays in this volume offer scholarly reassessments of these relationships and their import for the history of feminism and of analytic philosophy. Russell is a founder of analytic philosophy. He has also been called a feminist due to his public, decades-long advocacy for women’s rights and equality of the sexes. But his private behavior towards wives and sexual partners, and his apparently dismissive (...) (occasionally public) responses to some women philosophers, raises the question of what sort of feminist (or chauvinist) Russell actually was. Focusing on women in Russell’s circle of acquaintance, including feminist activists and his philosophical interlocutors, this book casts new light on a timeless thinker’s feminism and the women who played critical roles in the making of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The question of Russell’s engagement with feminist ideas of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is helpfully illuminated, I argue, by comparison to some of his feminist contemporaries—namely, Victoria Claflin Woodhull (1838–1927) and Emma Goldman (1869–1940). Like Woodhull and Goldman, Russell argues for women’s right to vote, a new sexual ethic, and a significant revision to marriage. These are paradigmatic feminist projects, and so would seem to suggest that Russell, particularly within Marriage and Morals, has significant philosophical overlap with (...) some of the feminist philosophers of his time. His similarities with feminist thinkers and activists Woodhull and Goldman on the classical feminist concerns of sex, suffrage, and marriage suggest that Russell’s views may yet find a place in the history of feminism, even if he does not. (shrink)

Russell’s use of incomplete symbols constituted progress in philosophy. They allowed Russell to make true negative existential claims, like ‘the present King of France does not exist’, and to analyse away logical constructs like tables. Russell’s view rested on the availability of complete symbols, logically proper names, which single out objects which we know by acquaintance, which we are committed to, and to whose existence discourse about apparent complexes can be reduced. Susan Stebbing enthusiastically embraced incomplete symbols for use in (...) negative existentials and in her innovative theory of metaphysical analysis. Yet she also raised trenchant objections to Russell’s assumption that complete symbols are purely referring expressions, equivalent to mere demonstration or pointing. Stebbing thought it could not be assumed that analysis terminates in objects of acquaintance. In this chapter I lay out Stebbing’s arguments and argue that they bear a striking similarity to those made by Stebbing’s former college’s Mistress, Constance Jones, whose influence on Russell is now largely forgotten but worth recovering. Jones defended a sense-reference (signification-denotation) distinction before Frege. Russell’s objections to that distinction in ‘On Denoting’ appear to borrow from Jones’s presentation of it. In Russell and Jones’s 1911 exchange at the Aristotelian Society, Jones’s arguments that names have signification and are more than mere noises or shapes, and that unless both signification and denotation are taken into account, all identity statements reduce to the trivial ‘a=a’ form, foreshadow Stebbing’s later arguments against complete symbols. (shrink)

This chapter explores the metaphysical views about higher-order logic held by two individuals responsible for introducing it to philosophy: Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970). Frege understood a function at first as the remainder of the content of a proposition when one component was taken out or seen as replaceable by others, and later as a mapping between objects. His logic employed second-order quantifiers ranging over such functions, and he saw a deep division in nature between objects and functions. (...) Russell understood propositional functions as what is obtained when constituents of propositions are replaced by variables, but eventually denied that they were entities in their own right. Both encountered contradictions when supposing there to exist as many objects as functions, and both adopted views about the meaningfulness of higher-order discourse that were difficult to state from within their own strictures. (shrink)

This chapter will argue that due to a lack of genuine consent, some of Russell’s practices in his romantic/sexual relationships are morally objectionable according to his own normative theory (utilitarianism) and these practices are intellectually objectionable according to his post-1913 meta-ethics (expressivism) and his understanding of rationality. On utilitarian grounds, Russell’s actions would maximize pleasure and minimize pain for all the parties affected by the relationship if the authenticity of his partners’ consent were maintained either by a more or less (...) equal social and political standing of the partners or, failing that, by the powerful partner’s exercise of the virtue of restraint; neither of these conditions was satisfied in Russell’s relationships with Vivien Eliot or Helen Dudley. On expressivist grounds, the expressions of desires upon which Russell’s romantic/sexual practices were based, such as the disregard for the humanity of women, conflict with his calls for world peace based on a concern for the well-being of humanity. (shrink)

Susan Stebbing held that Russell’s Doctrine of External Relations was incorrect. Interestingly, she also held that Bradley’s Doctrine of Internal Relations was problematic. In this paper, I’ll explain why she held this position, and develop what I will call the Doctrine of I/E relations, which will explain her middle ground. I start with a brief explanation of Russell’s Logical Atomism and his commitment to the Doctrine of External Relations. Then, to explain the Doctrine of I/E Relations, I take a brief (...) detour through Stebbing’s theory of directional analysis. This will allow us to conclude by presenting the new Doctrine. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell’s epistemology had the interesting structural feature that it made propositional knowledge (“S knows that p”) asymmetrically dependent upon what Russell called knowledge by acquaintance. On this view, a subject lacking any knowledge by acquaintance would be unable to know that p for any p. This is something that virtually nobody has defended since Russell, and in this paper I initiate a sympathetic reconsideration.

Wilfrid Sellars’ “myth of the given” had a momentous influence on 20th-century epistemology, putting under pressure the internalist foundationalism so prominent in early analytic philosophy. In this paper, I argue that the core themes in Sellars’ argument are anticipated in the work of the London philosopher and psychologist Beatrice Edgell (1871-1948). Indeed, in some respects Edgell’s argument against the myth of the given is even more compelling than Sellars’. The paper logically reconstructs and historically contextualizes Edgell’s line of argument, as (...) emerging out of a critique of Russell’s epistemology, with the goal of showing that the “myth of the given” effectively predated Sellars by four decades. (shrink)

American philosophical realism developed in two forms: “new” and “critical” realism. While the new realists sought to ‘emancipate’ ontology from epistemology and defended a direct theory of perception, the critical realists promoted a representationalist account of perception and thus argued for an epistemological dualism. Bertrand Russell’s early philosophical writings figured prominently in both of these American realist camps. However, while the new realists quite enthusiastically embraced the Russellian analytic style of reasoning (and Russell himself appreciated the American new realists as (...) anti-idealist allies), the critical realists were significantly more reserved toward Russell’s point of view. In the present paper, I identify the reasons for this difference in reception. In particular, I will show that the critical realists’ reservations pertained primarily to a more traditionalist—‘continental’—account of philosophy, whereas the neo-realists proved instrumental in setting the stage for later full-blown analytic philosophy in the United States. (shrink)

We classify two of Bertrand Russell's theories of events within the point-free ontology. The first of such approaches was presented informally by Russell in ‘The World of Physics and the World of Sense’ (Lecture IV in Our Knowledge of the External World of 1914). Based on this theory, Russell sketched ways to construct instants as collections of events. This paper formalizes Russell's approach from 1914. We will also show that in such a reconstructed theory, we obtain all axioms of Russell's (...) second theory from 1936 and all axioms of Thomason's theory of events from 1989. Russell's work certainly influenced the works of Stanisław Leśniewski, his student Alfred Tarski, and Czesław Lejewski – prominent members of the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS). We see our work in the tradition of the research of Leśniewski and Tarski. Building on the technical tools developed in this environment and in the spirit of the traditional research of the LWS, we engage here, in particular, with two classic works by Russell on fundamental ontology. (shrink)

In order to explain that sentences containing empty definite descriptions are nevertheless true or false, Russell famously analyzes sentences of the form ‘The F is G’ as ‘There is exactly one F and it is G’. Against this it has been objected that Russell’s analysis provides the wrong truth-conditions when it comes to non-doxastic attitude ascriptions. For example, according to Heim, Kripke, and Elbourne (HKE), there are circumstances in which (1) is true and (2) is false. Hans wants the ghost (...) in his attic to be quiet tonight.Hans wants there to be exactly one ghost in his attic and for it to be quiet tonight. After all, the argument goes, unlike (2), (1) can be true without Hans wanting there to be exactly one ghost in his attic. Kaplan and Neale famously reply that the HKE objection presupposes that non-doxastic attitudes are closed under entailment, which they are not. For Rostworowski, on the other hand, the problematic principle used by the HKE objection is a substitutivity principle for non-doxastic attitude ascriptions. This is further supported by the fact that, as Elbourne points out, Russell’s analysis already leads to a problem similar to the HKE objection together with substitutivity alone. By questioning substitutivity for non-doxastic attitude ascriptions, Rostworowski tries to block both the HKE objection and Elbourne’s variant of the HKE objection. In this paper, I will argue that Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions leads to a variant of the HKE objection even in the context of doxastic attitude ascriptions. Since, as we will see, doxastic attitude ascriptions do not seem to suffer from the substitutivity problems discussed by Rostworowski in the context of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions, this will further exacerbate the problem for Russell’s analysis. I will then discuss the possibility to reject substitutivity for doxastic attitude ascriptions using a contextualist analysis of attitude ascriptions. However, we will see that, independent of whether we accept substitutivity for doxastic attitude ascriptions, a complete solution of the doxastic problem has to reject Russell’s analysis of the truth-conditions of sentences of the form ‘The F is G’. Concluding, I will show that, unlike Russell’s analysis, the Frege–Strawson analysis of definite descriptions, according to which a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ presupposes that there is exactly one F, rather than asserting it, provides an explanation of the HKE objection, Elbourne’s variant of the HKE objection, and the doxastic problem presented in this paper. This will speak not only in favor of a Fregean analysis of definite descriptions, but also of a Fregean conception of propositions. (shrink)

In his 1912 book _The Problems of Philosophy_, Bertrand Russell advocates an indirect realism with regard to physical objects. Only two years later, in his book _Our Knowledge of the External World_ and the paper “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics”, he changes his method in philosophy. Instead of inferring the existence of physical objects, he now sets out to construct them out of sense-data. As I will argue in this article, the main argument from _The Problems of Philosophy_ can (...) be rationally reconstructed as an inference to the best explanation which infers to unobservable objects. The main motivation for the new approach in _Our Knowledge of the External World_, on the other hand, is to establish a more direct variant of realism, in particular because Russell became skeptical with regard to inferences to unobservable objects. As I will argue, the resulting theory of the physical world loses so much in simplicity that it becomes an unattractive alternative to his earlier position, and Russell’s reason for rejecting simplicity as a criterion of theory choice turns out to be inconsequential. (shrink)

Responding to Russell is a constant throughout Wittgenstein's philosophizing. This Element focuses on Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's theories of judgment in the summer of 1913. Wittgenstein's response to these criticisms is of first-rate importance for his early philosophical development, setting the path to the conceptions of proposition and of logic in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. This Element also touches on further aspects of Wittgenstein's responses to Russell: the rejection of Russell's and Frege's logicisms in the Tractatus, the critique of Russell's causal-behavioristic philosophy (...) of mind in Wittgenstein's 'middle' period, the Russellian origins of notions of privacy dialectically treated in Philosophical Investigations, and the discussion of 'surveyability' of mathematical proof in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, which is, again, a response to Russellian logicism. (shrink)

In this article I examine the dispute between F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell concerning the reality of relations. I show that Bradley’s objections to Russell’s view, that there are such things as relations which serve to effect the unity of complex items, were rooted in a methodological approach which Russell did not share. On Bradley’s view, one must be able to offer reductive analyses of the items one postulates in order that commitment to those items be justified. I argue (...) that Russell expressly rejected this methodological principle of Bradley’s, and instead adopted the view that one may justifiably postulate entities if doing so aids in the illumination of mathematical truths. I show that the postulation of relations does, on Russell’s view, serve to provide that illumination. Russell held that the truths of mathematics constitute fixed data, and that philosophical positions may be judged as successful according to the extent that they possess explanatory power with respect to this data. I argue that Bradley’s and Russell’s exchanges in print, as well as in private correspondence, reflect Russell’s awareness of a fundamental difference in methodological approach. I conclude that Russell elected not to answer Bradley’s objections on their own terms, but rather rejected the methodological assumptions from which those objections emerged. (shrink)

In this article I describe the contributions made by Samuel Alexander to the issue of relations which so vexed Bertrand Russell and F. H. Bradley in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I provide a novel understanding of Alexander’s position concerning relations and describe the way in which he viewed his position as superior to those of Bradley and Russell. I offer, therefore, a more complete picture of a philosophical debate central to the relevant period, through the introduction of (...) a third character whose views have been largely omitted from available narratives. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell’s relationship with his third wife, Patricia Russell (nee Spence), remains largely unexplored, primarily due to the long-standing embargo on correspondence between Russell and Patricia contained in McMaster University’s Russell Archives that has only recently been lifted. This chapter focuses on letters written by Patricia from the time she became involved with Russell after being hired as the governess for Russell’s children in 1930 to the return of Russell and Patricia to England in 1944 following their six-year exile in (...) the United States. This correspondence with Russell and a significant range of critical actors provides fresh insight into the dynamics of Patricia’s relationship with Russell and her prominent role in impacting his affairs. She clearly played a central role in Russell’s private sphere during this period. Furthermore, her role as a collaborator with Russell on projects such as The Amberley Papers and other political and philosophical research initiatives attests to her own intellectual capabilities. Finally, Patricia proved to be a stalwart defender of Russell during some of the most turbulent periods of his life, most notably in the whirlwind of controversy that engulfed Russell following the revocation of his appointment to the College of the City of New York in 1940. This study that centers Patricia Russell in the events of Russell’s life in this period provides Russell scholars with the opportunity to challenge and refine existing narratives of a particularly significant and understudied period in Russell’s career and personal experiences. Based on her own detailed primary source legacy, it also allows Patricia to emerge as a figure in British intellectual and cultural history worthy of independent attention in her own right. (shrink)

In this paper I describe the place of naive realism in Russell’s changing accounts of perception. I argue ‎for the following conclusions: (1) The early period, 1898-1910: I am inclined to think that the naïve ‎realism that Russell embraced so enthusiastically early on may not have been intended as a naïve ‎realism about perception, but as a metaphysical or semantical thesis. (2) The Problems of Philosophy ‎‎(1912): Russell abandons naïve realism (if, in fact, he ever held it) and presents a (...) sense-datum version ‎of representative realism. (3) “On Matter” (1912): here we see Russell’s best attempt to defend ‎something very close to the standard doctrine of naïve realism. The objects of perception—the ‎‎“everyday material objects such as caterpillars and Cadillacs”—have, of course, undergone severe ‎reconstruction. But the resulting picture does capture the spirit of the doctrine. (4) The period from ‎‎1914 to 1927: though Russell’s thinking about perception underwent some significant changes during ‎this period—the sense datum theory is replaced by neutral monism—I try to show that the ‎distinction between the matter of physics and the thing of common sense is a constant feature of ‎Russell’s changing views. And I suggest that our perceptual relation the thing of common ‎sense (as logically reconstructed by Russell) can usefully be viewed as a limited sort of naïve realism. ‎‎(5) The period after 1927: the thing of common sense no longer features in Russell’s account of our ‎perceptual access to the world. The things we perceive are percepts, located in our private spaces. The ‎only material objects of which these percepts are parts are our brains. All other material objects are ‎beyond our perceptual reach and are accessible only via inference. This is the end of anything ‎resembling the traditional view of naïve realism in Russell’s account of perception. ‎. (shrink)

The ‘new realist’ G E Moore is hardly known as a metaphysician of time, yet I argue his 1910–11 lectures, later published as Some Main Problems of Philosophy, offer the first substantial English-language defence of presentism and the A-theory. This paper contextualises Moore’s positions, stressing his intellectual connections with J M E McTaggart and Bertrand Russell; explores his Common Sense metaphysics of time; and argues that his time realism owes a great debt to ‘old realist’ Henry Sidgwick.