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1 — 50 / 164
  1. added 2020-05-03
    Bayesian Updating When What You Take Yourself to Learn Might Be False.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    Michael Rescorla (2020) has recently pointed out that the standard arguments for Bayesian Conditionalization assume that whenever you take yourself to learn something with certainty, it's true. Most people would reject this assumption. In response, Rescorla offers an improved Dutch Book argument for Bayesian Conditionalization that does not make this assumption. My purpose in this paper is two-fold. First, I want to illuminate Rescorla's new argument by giving a very general Dutch Book argument that applies to many cases of updating (...)
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  2. added 2020-02-05
    Dutch-Books and Money Pumps.E. F. McClennen & P. Found - forthcoming - Theory and Decision.
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  3. added 2020-02-05
    Van Fraassen's Dutch Book Argument Against Explanationism.Dorit Ganson & Billy Holiday - 2007 - In J. K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. S. Silverstein (eds.), Causation and Explanation. MIT Press. pp. 4--171.
  4. added 2019-10-28
    The Problem of State-Dependent Utility: A Reappraisal.Jean Baccelli - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz024.
    State-dependent utility is a problem for the behavioural branch of decision theory under uncertainty. It questions the very possibility that beliefs be revealed by choice data. According to the current literature, all models of beliefs are equally exposed to the problem. Moreover, the problem is solvable only when the decision-maker can influence the resolution of uncertainty. This article gives grounds to reject these two views. The various models of beliefs can be shown to be unequally exposed to the problem of (...)
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  5. added 2019-10-28
    Moral Hazard, the Savage Framework, and State-Dependent Utility.Jean Baccelli - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    In this paper, I investigate the betting behavior of a decision-maker who can influence the likelihood of the events upon which she is betting. In decision theory, this is best known as a situation of moral hazard. Focusing on a particularly simple case, I sketch the first systematic analysis of moral hazard in the canonical Savage framework. From the results of this analysis, I draw two philosophical conclusions. First, from an observational and a descriptive point of view, there need to (...)
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  6. added 2019-09-21
    Do Bets Reveal Beliefs?Jean Baccelli - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3393-3419.
    This paper examines the preference-based approach to the identification of beliefs. It focuses on the main problem to which this approach is exposed, namely that of state-dependent utility. First, the problem is illustrated in full detail. Four types of state-dependent utility issues are distinguished. Second, a comprehensive strategy for identifying beliefs under state-dependent utility is presented and discussed. For the problem to be solved following this strategy, however, preferences need to extend beyond choices. We claim that this a necessary feature (...)
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  7. added 2019-08-17
    Nonrational Belief Paradoxes as Byzantine Failures.Ryan Miller - manuscript
    David Christensen and others argue that Dutch Strategies are more like peer disagreements than Dutch Books, and should not count against agents’ conformity to ideal rationality. I review these arguments, then show that Dutch Books, Dutch Strategies, and peer disagreements are only possible in the case of what computer scientists call Byzantine Failures—uncorrected Byzantine Faults which update arbitrary values. Yet such Byzantine Failures make agents equally vulnerable to all three kinds of epistemic inconsistencies, so there is no principled basis for (...)
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  8. added 2019-07-22
    Measuring Belief and Risk Attitude.Sven Neth - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:252–272.
    Ramsey (1926) sketches a proposal for measuring the subjective probabilities of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is an expected utility maximizer. I show how to extend the spirit of Ramsey's method to a strictly wider class of agents: risk-weighted expected utility maximizers (Buchak 2013). In particular, I show how we can measure the risk attitudes of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer. Further, we can leverage (...)
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  9. added 2019-07-05
    Betting Against the Zen Monk: On Preferences and Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
    According to the preference-centric approach to understanding partial belief, the connection between partial beliefs and preferences is key to understanding what partial beliefs are and how they’re measured. As Ramsey put it, the ‘degree of a belief is a causal property of it, which we can express vaguely as the extent to which we are prepared to act on it’ The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, Routledge, Oxon, pp 156–198, 1931). But this idea is not as popular as (...)
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    Deductive Reasoning Under Uncertainty: A Water Tank Analogy.Guy Politzer - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):479-506.
    This paper describes a cubic water tank equipped with a movable partition receiving various amounts of liquid used to represent joint probability distributions. This device is applied to the investigation of deductive inferences under uncertainty. The analogy is exploited to determine by qualitative reasoning the limits in probability of the conclusion of twenty basic deductive arguments (such as Modus Ponens, And-introduction, Contraposition, etc.) often used as benchmark problems by the various theoretical approaches to reasoning under uncertainty. The probability bounds imposed (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Arguments for–or Against–Probabilism&Quest;: Articles.Alan H.ájek - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.
    Four important arguments for probabilism—the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments—have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned. Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences to be probabilities. I contend that each argument is invalid as formulated. In each case there is a mirror-image theorem and (...)
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  12. added 2019-01-03
    The Dutch Book Arguments.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    (This is for the series Elements of Decision Theory published by Cambridge University Press and edited by Martin Peterson) -/- Our beliefs come in degrees. I believe some things more strongly than I believe others. I believe very strongly that global temperatures will continue to rise during the coming century; I believe slightly less strongly that the European Union will still exist in 2029; and I believe much less strongly that Cardiff is east of Edinburgh. My credence in something is (...)
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  13. added 2018-11-15
    Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.
    The foundations of probability are viewed through the lens of the subjectivist interpretation. This article surveys conditional probability, arguments for probabilism, probability dynamics, and the evidential and subjective interpretations of probability.
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  14. added 2018-07-18
    On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Noûs 1.
    The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which purports to determine the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Recently, a new objection to Ramsey's Thesis has emerged (Hedden 2013, Wronski & Godziszewski 2017, Wronski 2018)--I call this the Expected Utility Objection. According to this objection, it is Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) that determines the prices an agent is required to pay for a bet, and this often disagrees with Ramsey's Thesis. I (...)
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  15. added 2018-07-16
    Probabilism, Representation Theorems, and Whether Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):379-399.
    Decision-theoretic representation theorems have been developed and appealed to in the service of two important philosophical projects: in attempts to characterise credences in terms of preferences, and in arguments for probabilism. Theorems developed within the formal framework that Savage developed have played an especially prominent role here. I argue that the use of these ‘Savagean’ theorems create significant difficulties for both projects, but particularly the latter. The origin of the problem directly relates to the question of whether we can have (...)
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  16. added 2018-05-18
    Probability as a Guide in Life.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 2001 - The Monist 84 (2):135-152.
    Bishop Butler, [Butler, 1736], said that probability was the very guide of life. But what interpretations of probability can serve this function? It isn’t hard to see that empirical views won’t do, and many recent writers-for example John Earman, who has said that Bayesianism is “the only game in town”-have been persuaded by various dutch book arguments that only subjective probability will perform the function required. We will defend the thesis that probability construed in this way offers very little guidance, (...)
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  17. added 2018-04-23
    Beauty, Odds, and Credence.Masahiro Yamada - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1247-1261.
    This paper considers fair betting odds for certain bets that might be placed in the situation discussed in the so-called Sleeping Beauty Problem. This paper examines what Thirders, Halfers, and Double Halfers must say about the odds as determined by various decision theoretic approaches and argues that Thirders and Halfers have difficulties formulating plausible and coherent positions concerning the relevant betting odds. Double Halfers do not face this problem and that is an important consideration in favor of Double Halfers.
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  18. added 2018-02-17
    Bets on Hats: On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):281-300.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a puzzle in social epistemology. It describes a situation in which a group of rational agents with common priors and common goals seems vulnerable to a Dutch book if they are exposed to different information and make decisions independently. Situations in which this happens involve violations of what might be called the Group-Reflection Principle. As it turns out, the Dutch book is flawed. It is based on the betting interpretation of the subjective probabilities, but (...)
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  19. added 2017-03-13
    Ramsey Without Ethical Neutrality: A New Representation Theorem.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):1-51.
    Frank Ramsey's ‘Truth and Probability’ sketches a proposal for the empirical measurement of credences, along with a corresponding set of axioms for a representation theorem intended to characterize the preference conditions under which this measurement process is applicable. There are several features of Ramsey's formal system which make it attractive and worth developing. However, in specifying his measurement process and his axioms, Ramsey introduces the notion of an ethically neutral proposition, the assumed existence of which plays a key role throughout (...)
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  20. added 2017-02-13
    Bruno de Finetti.A. Short Confirmation of My Standpoint - 1979 - In Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel. pp. 161.
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  21. added 2017-02-12
    Another Characterization of the Owen Value Without the Additivity Axiom.André Casajus - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (4):523-536.
    We provide another characterization of the Owen value for TU games with a coalition structure without the additivity axiom.
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  22. added 2017-02-12
    Interpretation of De Finetti Coherence Criterion in Łukasiewicz Logic.Daniele Mundici - 2009 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 161 (2):235-245.
    De Finetti gave a natural definition of “coherent probability assessment” β:E→[0,1] of a set E={X1,…,Xm} of “events” occurring in an arbitrary set of “possible worlds”. In the particular case of yes–no events, , Kolmogorov axioms can be derived from his criterion. While De Finetti’s approach to probability was logic-free, we construct a theory Θ in infinite-valued Łukasiewicz propositional logic, and show: a possible world of is a valuation satisfying Θ, β is coherent iff it is a convex combination of valuations (...)
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  23. added 2017-02-11
    Tests of the Discontinuity Hypothesis of the Effects of Independent Outcome Values Upon Bets. Anonymous - 1968 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 76 (3p1):444.
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  24. added 2017-02-10
    A Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    In this paper, I present an argument for a rational norm involving a kind of credal attitude called a quantificational credence – the kind of attitude we can report by saying that Lucy thinks that each record in Schroeder’s collection is 5% likely to be scratched. I prove a result called a Dutch Book Theorem, which constitutes conditional support for the norm. Though Dutch Book Theorems exist for norms on ordinary and conditional credences, there is controversy about the epistemic significance (...)
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  25. added 2017-02-10
    De Finetti's Earliest Works on the Foundations of Probability.Jan Plato - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):263-282.
    Bruno de Finetti's earliest works on the foundations of probability are reviewed. These include the notion of exchangeability and the theory of random processes with independent increments. The latter theory relates to de Finetti's ideas for a probabilistic science more generally. Different aspects of his work are united by his foundational programme for a theory of subjective probabilities.
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  26. added 2017-02-08
    Subjective Probability and Expected Utility Without Additivity.David Schmeidler - 1989 - Econometrica 57:571-589.
  27. added 2017-02-06
    B. De Finetti, Philosophical Lectures on Probability[REVIEW]Jon Williamson - 2010 - Philosophia Mathematica 18 (1):130-135.
  28. added 2017-02-03
    Studies in Subjective Probability.Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.) - 1964 - Krieger.
  29. added 2017-02-01
    Subjective Probability and Acceptance.Mark Norris Lance - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):147 - 179.
  30. added 2017-02-01
    Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Probability: Bruno de Finetti's Subjectivism. [REVIEW]Maria Carla Galavotti - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):239--261.
    Known as an upholder of subjectivism, Bruno de finetti (1906-1985) put forward a totally original philosophy of probability. This can be qualified as a combination of empiricism and pragmatism within an entirely coherent antirealistic perspective. The paper aims at clarifying the central features of such a philosophical position, Which is not only incompatible with any perspective based on an objective notion, But cannot be assimilated to other subjective views of probability either.
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  31. added 2017-01-29
    Coherence in the Aggregate: A Betting Method for Belief Functions on Many-Valued Events.Tommaso Flaminio, Lluis Godo & Hykel Hosni - unknown
    Betting methods, of which de Finetti's Dutch Book is by far the most well-known, are uncertainty modelling devices which accomplish a twofold aim. Whilst providing an interpretation of the relevant measure of uncertainty, they also provide a formal definition of coherence. The main purpose of this paper is to put forward a betting method for belief functions on MV-algebras of many-valued events which allows us to isolate the corresponding coherence criterion, which we term coherence in the aggregate. Our framework generalises (...)
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  32. added 2017-01-29
    Betting on Famine: Why the World Still Goes Hungry [Book Review].Howard Hodgens - 2014 - Australian Humanist, The 115:22.
    Hodgens, Howard Review of: Betting on famine: Why the world still goes hungry, by Jean Ziegler, The New Press $34.99.
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  33. added 2017-01-29
    Theaetetus Invents Dutch Books.Arthur Falk - 1984 - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 9.
  34. added 2017-01-29
    Betting and Gambling.Moore Richard Neligan - 1909
  35. added 2017-01-29
    Why Are Betting and Gambling Wrong?Arthur Thomas Barnett - 1897
  36. added 2017-01-29
    Gambling and Betting, an Address. [2 Issues].Samuel Reynolds Hole - 1888
  37. added 2017-01-29
    The Odds Against Betting. Odds - 1870
  38. added 2017-01-28
    Never Judge a Dutch Book by its Cover.Peter G. Found - 2001 - Dissertation, Bowling Green State University
    The purpose of this dissertation was to expose the Dutch Book Argument as a thoroughly flawed justification for applying the probability calculus to subjective degrees of belief. ;Through close and careful scrutiny of the internal logical and conceptual structure of the argument, it was concluded that the DBA relies on a number of questionable assumptions and misguided interpretations, to the point of virtually begging the question. In particular, it was shown that the key concept of fairness was distorted and misapplied. (...)
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  39. added 2017-01-27
    Betting Interpretation and the Problem of Interference.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Lina Eriksson - 2014 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 17:103-115.
    It has long been common to identify an agent’s degrees of belief with her betting rates. Here is this betting interpretation in a nutshell: A bet on a proposition A with price C and a non-zero stake S is said to be fair for an agent iff the latter is willing to take each side of the bet, to buy the bet as to sell it. Assuming that such a bet on A exists and that the C/S ratio is constant (...)
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  40. added 2017-01-27
    Owntree's Betting and Gambling. [REVIEW]H. G. Lord - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy 2 (18):499.
  41. added 2017-01-26
    Fronting in Dutch.Jan G. Kooij - 1978 - In Frank Jansen (ed.), Studies on Fronting. Peter de Ridder Press.
  42. added 2017-01-26
    Dutch Philosophy.Ferdinand Sassen - 1967 - In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. pp. 8--440.
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  43. added 2017-01-25
    A Betting Market: Description and a Theoretical Explanation of Bets in Pelota Matches. [REVIEW]Loreto Llorente & Josemari Aizpurua - 2008 - Theory and Decision 64 (2-3):421-446.
    In Pelota matches, bets are made between viewers through a middleman who receives 16% of the finally paid amount. In this paper, a description of the way bets are made and an explanation of the existence of those markets are presented. Taking betting markets as a simplified analogy for financial markets we have searched for the explanation in a world where both sides of the market are not different in believes and preferences. We find that for a bet to exist (...)
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  44. added 2017-01-25
    Bibliopolis: A Platform for the Dutch History of the Book.Marieke van Delft & Marco de Niet - 2004 - Logos 15 (1):25-29.
  45. added 2017-01-25
    Betting on Belief.Will Barrett - 2001 - Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 3 (1):40.
  46. added 2017-01-24
    A Dutch Book for Group Decision-Making?Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - In Benedikt Löwe, Eric Pacuit & Jan-Willem Romeijn (eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences Vi: Probabilistic Reasoning and Reasoning With Probabilities. Studies in Logic. London UK: College Publication. pp. 91-101.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and (...)
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  47. added 2017-01-24
    "Boekbalie" — a Unique Dutch Website.Adriaan Langendonk - 2006 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 17 (4):198-200.
  48. added 2017-01-24
    Bibliopolis: A Platform for the Dutch History of the Book.Marieke van Delft & Marco de Niet - 2004 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 15 (1):25-29.
  49. added 2017-01-23
    The Supertask Argument Against Countable Additivity.Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):619-628.
    This paper proves that certain supertasks constitute counterexamples to countable additivity even in the frame of an objective (not subjective, à la de Finetti) conception of probability. The argument requires taking conditional probability as a primitive notion.
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  50. added 2017-01-23
    The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretation of Degrees of Belief.Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):809-830.
    The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition A does not (...)
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