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  1. added 2019-01-03
    The Dutch Book Arguments.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    (This is for the series Elements of Decision Theory published by Cambridge University Press and edited by Martin Peterson) -/- Our beliefs come in degrees. I believe some things more strongly than I believe others. I believe very strongly that global temperatures will continue to rise during the coming century; I believe slightly less strongly that the European Union will still exist in 2029; and I believe much less strongly that Cardiff is east of Edinburgh. My credence in something is (...)
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  2. added 2018-11-15
    Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.
    The foundations of probability are viewed through the lens of the subjectivist interpretation. This article surveys conditional probability, arguments for probabilism, probability dynamics, and the evidential and subjective interpretations of probability.
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  3. added 2018-07-18
    On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which purports to determine the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Recently, a new objection to Ramsey's Thesis has emerged (Hedden 2013, Wronski & Godziszewski 2017, Wronski 2018)--I call this the Expected Utility Objection. According to this objection, it is Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) that determines the prices an agent is required to pay for a bet, and this often disagrees with Ramsey's Thesis. I (...)
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  4. added 2018-07-16
    Probabilism, Representation Theorems, and Whether Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):379-399.
    Decision-theoretic representation theorems have been developed and appealed to in the service of two important philosophical projects: in attempts to characterise credences in terms of preferences, and in arguments for probabilism. Theorems developed within the formal framework that Savage developed have played an especially prominent role here. I argue that the use of these ‘Savagean’ theorems create significant difficulties for both projects, but particularly the latter. The origin of the problem directly relates to the question of whether we can have (...)
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  5. added 2018-05-18
    Probability as a Guide in Life.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 2001 - The Monist 84 (2):135-152.
    Bishop Butler, [Butler, 1736], said that probability was the very guide of life. But what interpretations of probability can serve this function? It isn’t hard to see that empirical views won’t do, and many recent writers-for example John Earman, who has said that Bayesianism is “the only game in town”-have been persuaded by various dutch book arguments that only subjective probability will perform the function required. We will defend the thesis that probability construed in this way offers very little guidance, (...)
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  6. added 2018-04-23
    Beauty, Odds, and Credence.Masahiro Yamada - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    This paper considers fair betting odds for certain bets that might be placed in the situation discussed in the so-called Sleeping Beauty Problem. This paper examines what Thirders, Halfers, and Double Halfers must say about the odds as determined by various decision theoretic approaches and argues that Thirders and Halfers have difficulties formulating plausible and coherent positions concerning the relevant betting odds. Double Halfers do not face this problem and that is an important consideration in favor of Double Halfers.
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  7. added 2018-02-17
    Bets on Hats: On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):281-300.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a puzzle in social epistemology. It describes a situation in which a group of rational agents with common priors and common goals seems vulnerable to a Dutch book if they are exposed to different information and make decisions independently. Situations in which this happens involve violations of what might be called the Group-Reflection Principle. As it turns out, the Dutch book is flawed. It is based on the betting interpretation of the subjective probabilities, but (...)
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  8. added 2017-10-21
    The Sure-Thing Principle and P2.Yang Liu - 2017 - Economics Letters 159:221-223.
    This paper offers a fine analysis of different versions of the well known sure-thing principle. We show that Savage's formal formulation of the principle, i.e., his second postulate (P2), is strictly stronger than what is intended originally.
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  9. added 2017-03-13
    Ramsey Without Ethical Neutrality: A New Representation Theorem.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):1-51.
    Frank Ramsey's ‘Truth and Probability’ sketches a proposal for the empirical measurement of credences, along with a corresponding set of axioms for a representation theorem intended to characterize the preference conditions under which this measurement process is applicable. There are several features of Ramsey's formal system which make it attractive and worth developing. However, in specifying his measurement process and his axioms, Ramsey introduces the notion of an ethically neutral proposition, the assumed existence of which plays a key role throughout (...)
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  10. added 2017-02-13
    Bruno de Finetti.A. Short Confirmation of My Standpoint - 1979 - In Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel. pp. 161.
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  11. added 2017-02-12
    Another Characterization of the Owen Value Without the Additivity Axiom.André Casajus - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (4):523-536.
    We provide another characterization of the Owen value for TU games with a coalition structure without the additivity axiom.
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  12. added 2017-02-12
    Interpretation of De Finetti Coherence Criterion in Łukasiewicz Logic.Daniele Mundici - 2009 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 161 (2):235-245.
    De Finetti gave a natural definition of “coherent probability assessment” β:E→[0,1] of a set E={X1,…,Xm} of “events” occurring in an arbitrary set of “possible worlds”. In the particular case of yes–no events, , Kolmogorov axioms can be derived from his criterion. While De Finetti’s approach to probability was logic-free, we construct a theory Θ in infinite-valued Łukasiewicz propositional logic, and show: a possible world of is a valuation satisfying Θ, β is coherent iff it is a convex combination of valuations (...)
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  13. added 2017-02-11
    Tests of the Discontinuity Hypothesis of the Effects of Independent Outcome Values Upon Bets. Anonymous - 1968 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 76 (3p1):444.
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  14. added 2017-02-10
    A Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    In this paper, I present an argument for a rational norm involving a kind of credal attitude called a quantificational credence – the kind of attitude we can report by saying that Lucy thinks that each record in Schroeder’s collection is 5% likely to be scratched. I prove a result called a Dutch Book Theorem, which constitutes conditional support for the norm. Though Dutch Book Theorems exist for norms on ordinary and conditional credences, there is controversy about the epistemic significance (...)
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  15. added 2017-02-10
    De Finetti's Earliest Works on the Foundations of Probability.Jan Plato - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):263-282.
    Bruno de Finetti's earliest works on the foundations of probability are reviewed. These include the notion of exchangeability and the theory of random processes with independent increments. The latter theory relates to de Finetti's ideas for a probabilistic science more generally. Different aspects of his work are united by his foundational programme for a theory of subjective probabilities.
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  16. added 2017-02-08
    Subjective Probability and Expected Utility Without Additivity.David Schmeidler - 1989 - Econometrica 57:571-589.
  17. added 2017-02-06
    B. De Finetti, Philosophical Lectures on Probability[REVIEW]Jon Williamson - 2010 - Philosophia Mathematica 18 (1):130-135.
  18. added 2017-02-03
    Studies in Subjective Probability.Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.) - 1964 - Krieger.
  19. added 2017-02-01
    Subjective Probability and Acceptance.Mark Norris Lance - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):147 - 179.
  20. added 2017-02-01
    Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Probability: Bruno de Finetti's Subjectivism. [REVIEW]Maria Carla Galavotti - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):239--261.
    Known as an upholder of subjectivism, Bruno de finetti (1906-1985) put forward a totally original philosophy of probability. This can be qualified as a combination of empiricism and pragmatism within an entirely coherent antirealistic perspective. The paper aims at clarifying the central features of such a philosophical position, Which is not only incompatible with any perspective based on an objective notion, But cannot be assimilated to other subjective views of probability either.
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  21. added 2017-01-29
    Coherence in the Aggregate: A Betting Method for Belief Functions on Many-Valued Events.Tommaso Flaminio, Lluis Godo & Hykel Hosni - unknown
    Betting methods, of which de Finetti's Dutch Book is by far the most well-known, are uncertainty modelling devices which accomplish a twofold aim. Whilst providing an interpretation of the relevant measure of uncertainty, they also provide a formal definition of coherence. The main purpose of this paper is to put forward a betting method for belief functions on MV-algebras of many-valued events which allows us to isolate the corresponding coherence criterion, which we term coherence in the aggregate. Our framework generalises (...)
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  22. added 2017-01-29
    Betting on Famine: Why the World Still Goes Hungry [Book Review].Howard Hodgens - 2014 - Australian Humanist, The 115:22.
    Hodgens, Howard Review of: Betting on famine: Why the world still goes hungry, by Jean Ziegler, The New Press $34.99.
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  23. added 2017-01-29
    Theaetetus Invents Dutch Books.Arthur Falk - 1984 - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 9.
  24. added 2017-01-29
    Betting and Gambling.Moore Richard Neligan - 1909
  25. added 2017-01-29
    Why Are Betting and Gambling Wrong?Arthur Thomas Barnett - 1897
  26. added 2017-01-29
    Gambling and Betting, an Address. [2 Issues].Samuel Reynolds Hole - 1888
  27. added 2017-01-29
    The Odds Against Betting. Odds - 1870
  28. added 2017-01-28
    Never Judge a Dutch Book by its Cover.Peter G. Found - 2001 - Dissertation, Bowling Green State University
    The purpose of this dissertation was to expose the Dutch Book Argument as a thoroughly flawed justification for applying the probability calculus to subjective degrees of belief. ;Through close and careful scrutiny of the internal logical and conceptual structure of the argument, it was concluded that the DBA relies on a number of questionable assumptions and misguided interpretations, to the point of virtually begging the question. In particular, it was shown that the key concept of fairness was distorted and misapplied. (...)
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  29. added 2017-01-27
    Betting Interpretation and the Problem of Interference.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Lina Eriksson - 2014 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 17:103-115.
    It has long been common to identify an agent’s degrees of belief with her betting rates. Here is this betting interpretation in a nutshell: A bet on a proposition A with price C and a non-zero stake S is said to be fair for an agent iff the latter is willing to take each side of the bet, to buy the bet as to sell it. Assuming that such a bet on A exists and that the C/S ratio is constant (...)
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  30. added 2017-01-27
    Owntree's Betting and Gambling. [REVIEW]H. G. Lord - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy 2 (18):499.
  31. added 2017-01-26
    Fronting in Dutch.Jan G. Kooij - 1978 - In Frank Jansen (ed.), Studies on Fronting. Peter de Ridder Press.
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  32. added 2017-01-26
    Dutch Philosophy.Ferdinand Sassen - 1967 - In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. pp. 8--440.
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  33. added 2017-01-25
    A Betting Market: Description and a Theoretical Explanation of Bets in Pelota Matches. [REVIEW]Loreto Llorente & Josemari Aizpurua - 2008 - Theory and Decision 64 (2-3):421-446.
    In Pelota matches, bets are made between viewers through a middleman who receives 16% of the finally paid amount. In this paper, a description of the way bets are made and an explanation of the existence of those markets are presented. Taking betting markets as a simplified analogy for financial markets we have searched for the explanation in a world where both sides of the market are not different in believes and preferences. We find that for a bet to exist (...)
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  34. added 2017-01-25
    Bibliopolis: A Platform for the Dutch History of the Book.Marieke van Delft & Marco de Niet - 2004 - Logos 15 (1):25-29.
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  35. added 2017-01-25
    Betting on Belief.Will Barrett - 2001 - Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 3 (1):40.
  36. added 2017-01-24
    A Dutch Book for Group Decision-Making?Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - In Benedikt Löwe, Eric Pacuit & Jan-Willem Romeijn (eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences Vi: Probabilistic Reasoning and Reasoning With Probabilities. Studies in Logic. London UK: College Publication. pp. 91-101.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and (...)
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  37. added 2017-01-24
    "Boekbalie" — a Unique Dutch Website.Adriaan Langendonk - 2006 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 17 (4):198-200.
  38. added 2017-01-24
    Bibliopolis: A Platform for the Dutch History of the Book.Marieke van Delft & Marco de Niet - 2004 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 15 (1):25-29.
  39. added 2017-01-23
    The Supertask Argument Against Countable Additivity.Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):619-628.
    This paper proves that certain supertasks constitute counterexamples to countable additivity even in the frame of an objective (not subjective, à la de Finetti) conception of probability. The argument requires taking conditional probability as a primitive notion.
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  40. added 2017-01-23
    Why Countable Additivity?Kenny Easwaran - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):53-61.
    It is sometimes alleged that arguments that probability functions should be countably additive show too much, and that they motivate uncountable additivity as well. I show this is false by giving two naturally motivated arguments for countable additivity that do not motivate uncountable additivity.
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  41. added 2017-01-23
    The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretation of Degrees of Belief.Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):809-830.
    The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition A does not (...)
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  42. added 2017-01-23
    A Note on the Decidability of de Finetti's Coherence.Francesco Corielli - 1995 - Theory and Decision 38 (1):121-129.
  43. added 2017-01-23
    Coherent Bets Under Partially Resolving Uncertainty and Belief Functions.Jean-Yves Jaffray - 1989 - Theory and Decision 26 (2):99-105.
  44. added 2017-01-22
    Cerrando Apuestas = Betting on the Horses.Jannette Brossard Duharte - 2010 - In Steven C. Daiber & Yamilys Brito Jorge (eds.), Poder. Red Trillum Press.
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  45. added 2017-01-21
    Book Review:Betting on Theories Patrick Maher. [REVIEW]Henry Kyburg Jr - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):343-.
  46. added 2017-01-21
    Book Review:Betting on Theories Patrick Maher. [REVIEW] Kyburg Jr - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):343-.
  47. added 2017-01-21
    The Notion of Subjective Probability in the Work of Ramsey and de Finetti.Maria Carla Galavotti - 1991 - Theoria 57 (3):239-259.
  48. added 2017-01-21
    Probability Logic and $\Scr{F}$.A. I. Dale - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (2):254-.
    In order that a degree-of-belief function be coherent it is necessary and sufficient that it satisfy the axioms of probability theory. This theorem relies heavily for its proof on the two-valued sentential calculus, which emerges as a limiting case of a continuous scale of truth-values. In this "continuum of certainty" a theorem analogous to that instanced above is proved.
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  49. added 2017-01-20
    Conditionalization and Belief De Se.Darren Bradley - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):247-250.
    Colin Howson (1995 ) offers a counter-example to the rule of conditionalization. I will argue that the counter-example doesn't hit its target. The problem is that Howson mis-describes the total evidence the agent has. In particular, Howson overlooks how the restriction that the agent learn 'E and nothing else' interacts with the de se evidence 'I have learnt E'.
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  50. added 2017-01-19
    Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability.J. Williamson - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.
    While there are several arguments on either side, it is far from clear as to whether or not countable additivity is an acceptable axiom of subjective probability. I focus here on de Finetti's central argument against countable additivity and provide a new Dutch book proof of the principle, To argue that if we accept the Dutch book foundations of subjective probability, countable additivity is an unavoidable constraint.
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1 — 50 / 157