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  1. On Rational Betting Systems.Ernest W. Adams - 1964 - Archiv für Mathematische Logik Und Grundlagenforschung 6:7-29.
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  2. De Finetti's No-Dutch-Book Criterion for Gödel Logic.Stefano Aguzzoli, Brunella Gerla & Vincenzo Marra - 2008 - Studia Logica 90 (1):25 - 41.
    We extend de Finetti’s No-Dutch-Book Criterion to Gödel infinite-valued propositional logic.
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  3. The Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice.Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
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  4. Inferring Beliefs as Subjectively Imprecise Probabilities.Steffen Andersen, John Fountain, Glenn W. Harrison, Arne Risa Hole & E. Elisabet Rutström - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (1):161-184.
    We propose a method for estimating subjective beliefs, viewed as a subjective probability distribution. The key insight is to characterize beliefs as a parameter to be estimated from observed choices in a well-defined experimental task and to estimate that parameter as a random coefficient. The experimental task consists of a series of standard lottery choices in which the subject is assumed to use conventional risk attitudes to select one lottery or the other and then a series of betting choices in (...)
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  5. Tests of the Discontinuity Hypothesis of the Effects of Independent Outcome Values Upon Bets. Anonymous - 1968 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 76 (3p1):444.
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  6. Stakes and Beliefs.Brad Armendt - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):71 - 87.
    The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically exclude the idea and treat belief as stake-invariant (...)
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  7. Frank Plumpton Ramsey.Brad Armendt - 2005 - In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge. pp. 671-681.
    On the work of Frank Ramsey, emphasizing topics most relevant to philosophy of science.
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  8. Dutch Books, Additivity, and Utility Theory.Brad Armendt - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):1-20.
    One guide to an argument's significance is the number and variety of refutations it attracts. By this measure, the Dutch book argument has considerable importance.2 Of course this measure alone is not a sure guide to locating arguments deserving of our attention—if a decisive refutation has really been given, we are better off pursuing other topics. But the presence of many and varied counterarguments at least suggests that either the refutations are controversial, or that their target admits of more than (...)
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  9. Dutch Strategies for Diachronic Rules: When Believers See the Sure Loss Coming.Brad Armendt - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:217 - 229.
    Two criticisms of Dutch strategy arguments are discussed: One says that the arguments fail because agents who know the arguments can use that knowledge to avoid Dutch strategy vulnerability, even though they violate the norm in question. The second consists of cases alleged to be counterexamples to the norms that Dutch strategy arguments defend. The principle of Reflection and its Dutch strategy argument are discussed, but most attention is given to the rule of Conditionalization and to Jeffrey's rule for fallible (...)
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  10. Is There a Dutch Book Argument for Probability Kinematics?Brad Armendt - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (4):583-588.
    Dutch Book arguments have been presented for static belief systems and for belief change by conditionalization. An argument is given here that a rule for belief change which under certain conditions violates probability kinematics will leave the agent open to a Dutch Book.
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  11. Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding.Frank Arntzenius, Adam Elga & John Hawthorne - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):251 - 283.
    We pose and resolve several vexing decision theoretic puzzles. Some are variants of existing puzzles, such as 'Trumped' (Arntzenius and McCarthy 1997), 'Rouble trouble' (Arntzenius and Barrett 1999), 'The airtight Dutch book' (McGee 1999), and 'The two envelopes puzzle' (Broome 1995). Others are new. A unified resolution of the puzzles shows that Dutch book arguments have no force in infinite cases. It thereby provides evidence that reasonable utility functions may be unbounded and that reasonable credence functions need not be countably (...)
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  12. Confirmation and the Dutch Book Argument.Patricia Baillie - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (4):393-397.
  13. Why Are Betting and Gambling Wrong?Arthur Thomas Barnett - 1897
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  14. Betting on Belief.Will Barrett - 2001 - Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 3 (1):40.
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  15. Countable Additivity and the de Finetti Lottery.Paul Bartha - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):301-321.
    De Finetti would claim that we can make sense of a draw in which each positive integer has equal probability of winning. This requires a uniform probability distribution over the natural numbers, violating countable additivity. Countable additivity thus appears not to be a fundamental constraint on subjective probability. It does, however, seem mandated by Dutch Book arguments similar to those that support the other axioms of the probability calculus as compulsory for subjective interpretations. These two lines of reasoning can be (...)
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  16. Four Brides for Twelve Brothers - How to Dutch Book a Group of Fully Rational Players.Luc Bovens - unknown
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  17. A Dutch Book for Group Decision-Making?Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - unknown
  18. When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments.D. Bradley & H. Leitgeb - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):119-127.
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  19. Conditionalization and Belief De Se.Darren Bradley - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):247-250.
    Colin Howson (1995 ) offers a counter-example to the rule of conditionalization. I will argue that the counter-example doesn't hit its target. The problem is that Howson mis-describes the total evidence the agent has. In particular, Howson overlooks how the restriction that the agent learn 'E and nothing else' interacts with the de se evidence 'I have learnt E'.
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  20. When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments.Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb - 2006 - Analysis 66 (290):119–127.
    If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...)
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  21. Dutch Book Arguments and Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2012 - In Dennis Dieks, Stephan Hartmann, Michael Stoeltzner & Marcel Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structures. Springer.
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  22. The Pragmatic Stance.John Cantwell - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):319-336.
    The view that decision methods can only be justified by appeal to pragmatic considerations is defended. Pragmatic considerations are viewed as providing the underlying subject matter (“semantics”) of decision theories. It is argued that other approaches (e.g. justifying principles by appeal to obviousness, common usage, etc.) fail to provide grounds for a normative decision theory.It is argued that preferences that can lead to pragmatically adverse outcomes in a relevantly similar possible decision situation are pragmatically unsound, even if the decision situation (...)
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  23. Another Characterization of the Owen Value Without the Additivity Axiom.André Casajus - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (4):523-536.
    We provide another characterization of the Owen value for TU games with a coalition structure without the additivity axiom.
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  24. Statistical Thought: A Perspective and History.Chatterjee Shoutir Kishore - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    In this unique monograph, based on years of extensive work, Chatterjee presents the historical evolution of statistical thought from the perspective of various approaches to statistical induction. Developments in statistical concepts and theories are discussed alongside philosophical ideas on the ways we learn from experience.
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  25. Epistemic Self-Respect.David Christensen - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):319-337.
  26. Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief.David Christensen - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon.
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  27. Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism.David Christensen - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.
    Both Representation Theorem Arguments and Dutch Book Arguments support taking probabilistic coherence as an epistemic norm. Both depend on connecting beliefs to preferences, which are not clearly within the epistemic domain. Moreover, these connections are standardly grounded in questionable definitional/metaphysical claims. The paper argues that these definitional/metaphysical claims are insupportable. It offers a way of reconceiving Representation Theorem arguments which avoids the untenable premises. It then develops a parallel approach to Dutch Book Arguments, and compares the results. In each case (...)
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  28. Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers.David Christensen - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):450-479.
    The most immediately appealing model for formal constraints on degrees of belief is provided by probability theory, which tells us, for instance, that the probability of P can never be greater than that of (P v Q). But while this model has much intuitive appeal, many have been concerned to provide arguments showing that ideally rational degrees of belief would conform to the calculus of probabilities. The arguments most frequently used to make this claim plausible are the so-called "Dutch Book" (...)
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  29. Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency For Partial Believers.David Christensen - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):450-479.
  30. Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.
  31. A Note on the Decidability of de Finetti's Coherence.Francesco Corielli - 1995 - Theory and Decision 38 (1):121-129.
  32. Probability Logic and F.A. I. Dale - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (2):254 - 265.
    In order that a degree-of-belief function be coherent it is necessary and sufficient that it satisfy the axioms of probability theory. This theorem relies heavily for its proof on the two-valued sentential calculus, which emerges as a limiting case of a continuous scale of truth-values. In this "continuum of certainty" a theorem analogous to that instanced above is proved.
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  33. Probability Logic and $\Scr{F}$.A. I. Dale - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (2):254-.
    In order that a degree-of-belief function be coherent it is necessary and sufficient that it satisfy the axioms of probability theory. This theorem relies heavily for its proof on the two-valued sentential calculus, which emerges as a limiting case of a continuous scale of truth-values. In this "continuum of certainty" a theorem analogous to that instanced above is proved.
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  34. In Defence of the Dutch Book Argument.Barbara Davidson & Robert Pargetter - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):405 - 423.
  35. The Role of 'Dutch Books' and of 'Proper Scoring Rules'.de Finetti Bruno - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (1):55-56.
  36. Theory of Probability.Bruno de Finetti - 1970 - New York: John Wiley.
  37. La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives.Bruno de Finetti - 1937 - Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré 17:1-68.
  38. Bibliopolis: A Platform for the Dutch History of the Book.Marieke van Delft & Marco de Niet - 2004 - Logos: Journal of the World Book Community 15 (1):25-29.
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  39. On Generalizing Kolmogorov.Richard Dietz - 2010 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (3):323-335.
    In his "From classical to constructive probability," Weatherson offers a generalization of Kolmogorov's axioms of classical probability that is neutral regarding the logic for the object-language. Weatherson's generalized notion of probability can hardly be regarded as adequate, as the example of supervaluationist logic shows. At least, if we model credences as betting rates, the Dutch-Book argument strategy does not support Weatherson's notion of supervaluationist probability, but various alternatives. Depending on whether supervaluationist bets are specified as (a) conditional bets (Cantwell), (b) (...)
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  40. Conditional Probability and Dutch Books.Frank Doring - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):391 - 409.
    There is no set Δ of probability axioms that meets the following three desiderata: (1) Δ is vindicated by a Dutch book theorem; (2) Δ does not imply regularity (and thus allows, among other things, updating by conditionalization); (3) Δ constrains the conditional probability q(·,z) even when the unconditional probability p(z) (=q(z,T)) equals 0. This has significant consequences for Bayesian epistemology, some of which are discussed.
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  41. Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent.Igor Douven - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (Supplement):S424-S435.
    Van Fraassen (1989) argues that Inference to the Best Explanation is incoherent in the sense that adopting it as a rule for belief change will make one susceptible to a dynamic Dutch book. The present paper argues against this. A strategy is described that allows us to infer to the best explanation free of charge.
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  42. Diachronic Dutch Books and Sleeping Beauty.Kai Draper & Joel Pust - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):281 - 287.
    Hitchcock advances a diachronic Dutch Book argument (DDB) for a 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. Bradley and Leitgeb argue that Hitchcock’s DDB argument fails. We demonstrate the following: (a) Bradley and Leitgeb’s criticism of Hitchcock is unconvincing; (b) nonetheless, there are serious reasons to worry about the success of Hitchcock’s argument; (c) however, it is possible to construct a new DDB for 1/3 about which such worries cannot be raised.
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  43. Cerrando Apuestas = Betting on the Horses.Jannette Brossard Duharte - 2010 - In Steven C. Daiber & Yamilys Brito Jorge (eds.), Poder. Red Trillum Press.
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  44. Subjective Probability and the Problem of Countable Additivity.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 1.
    The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Bruno de Finetti's view that the axiom of countable additivity of the probability calculus cannot be justified in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability. After presenting the core of the subjective theory of probability and the main de Finetti's argument against the axiom of countable additivity (the so called de Finetti's infinite lottery) I argue against de Finetti's view. In particular, I claim that de Finetti does not prove the (...)
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  45. Subiektywne prawdopodobieństwo i problem przeliczalnej addytywności.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 1.
    The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Bruno de Finetti's view that the axiom of countable additivity of the probability calculus cannot be justified in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability. After presenting the core of the subjective theory of probability and the main de Finetti's argument against the axiom of countable additivity (the so called de Finetti's infinite lottery) I argue against de Finetti's view. In particular, I claim that de Finetti does not prove the (...)
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  46. Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.
    Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones—they are both represented by credence 0, which violates a principle known as “regularity.” Following Skyrms 1980 and Lewis 1980, they recommend that we should instead use a much richer set of numbers, called the “hyperreals.” This essay argues that this popular (...)
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  47. Why Countable Additivity?Kenny Easwaran - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):53-61.
    It is sometimes alleged that arguments that probability functions should be countably additive show too much, and that they motivate uncountable additivity as well. I show this is false by giving two naturally motivated arguments for countable additivity that do not motivate uncountable additivity.
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  48. Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10 (05).
    Many have claimed that unspecific evidence sometimes demands unsharp, indeterminate, imprecise, vague, or interval-valued probabilities. Against this, a variant of the diachronic Dutch Book argument shows that perfectly rational agents always have perfectly sharp probabilities.
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  49. Ramsey Without Ethical Neutrality: A New Representation Theorem.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):1-51.
    Frank Ramsey's ‘Truth and Probability’ sketches a proposal for the empirical measurement of credences, along with a corresponding set of axioms for a representation theorem intended to characterize the preference conditions under which this measurement process is applicable. There are several features of Ramsey's formal system which make it attractive and worth developing. However, in specifying his measurement process and his axioms, Ramsey introduces the notion of an ethically neutral proposition, the assumed existence of which plays a key role throughout (...)
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  50. The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretation of Degrees of Belief.Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):809-830.
    The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition A does not (...)
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