About this topic
Summary The concept of human biological enhancement has been used to describe the augmentation of human capacities based on some sort of biological manipulation. By and large, most philosophers work with one or the other of the following two definitions of human biological enhancement: (A) improving the well-being of persons, including the removal of disabilities defined as bio-social obstacles that reduce human well-being; (B) expanding or augmenting human capacities. These two definitions have different intentions and (arguably) different extensions since many people deny that expanding or augmenting human capacities (especially in the normal range) improves well-being and has much in common with removing disability. Some authors and authorities use "enhancement" and "therapy" as mutually excluding categories ("enhancement" being the biomedical improvement of normal or healthy human traits), others do not. Most of the arguments in this area have been initially developed within the debate on eugenics and human genetic enhancement, and some of them also belong to the broader emerging field of "neuroethics". (Hence the reader will notice a significant overlap between these phil-paper categories). Beside the genetic case, enhancement ranges from everyday cognitive stimulants (coffee), to doping in sport competitions, and off label drugs, such as methylphenidate (to prolong the attention span). Social network, education, and brain stimulation have also all been regarded as enhancements. More controversially, bioethicists have discussed "affective enhancement" (the use of oxytocin to improve relationships) and "moral enhancement", i.e. the use of all possible means (including pharmacological stimulants) to improve the moral quality of human choices. Part of the current debate elaborates the concerns of the ideology of "transhumanism" (with non strictly academic ramifications), advocating the use of biotechnology to radically transcend the present human condition.  
Key works The early literature on biological enhancement overlaps with that on eugenic selection (Savulescu 2001) and human genetic enhancement (Harris 1992Buchanan et al 2001Fukuyama 2002Habermas 2003). In the most recent literature, the ideas of moral enhancement (Douglas 2008), the relation between enhancement, Darwinian evolution, and moral status (Buchanan 2011, Douglas 2013), justice and human development (Buchanan 2008), the issue of enhancement in sport (Tamburrini & Tännsjö 2005, Miah ms) are developed further. The idea of enhancement is also used to advance the conceptual debate on disability, normal functioning, and well-being (Kahane & Savulescu 2012, Savulescu 2009, Kahane & Savulescu 2009). For a discussion of transhumanism and radical enhancement (creating abilities that do not belong to the biological repertoire of the species homo sapiens), see, respectively, Bostrom 2003, Miah 2008
Introductions Bostrom & Roache 2007 Buchanan 2009 Chadwick 2011 Miah unknown
Related categories

182 found
1 — 50 / 182
  1. added 2019-02-17
    A Symmetrical View of Disability and Enhancement.Stephen M. Campbell & David Wasserman - forthcoming - In Adam Cureton & David Wasserman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Disability and enhancement are often treated as opposing concepts. To become disabled in some respect is to move away from those who are enhanced in that same respect; to become enhanced is to move away from the corresponding state of disability. This chapter examines how best to understand the concepts of disability and enhancement in this symmetrical way. After considering various candidates, two types of accounts are identified as the most promising: welfarist accounts and typical-functioning accounts. The authors ultimately defend (...)
  2. added 2018-11-14
    The Composite Redesign of Humanity’s Nature: A Work in Process.Lantz Miller - 2018 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 39 (2):157-164.
    One of the most salient contemporary concerns in academic debates and pop culture alike is the extent to which new technologies may re-cast Homo sapiens. Species members may find themselves encased in a type of existence they deem to be wanting in comparison with their present form, even if the promised form was assured to be better. Plausibly, the concern is not merely fear of change or of the unknown, but rather it arises out of individuals’ general identification with what (...)
  3. added 2018-10-28
    Moral Enhancement, Self-Governance, and Resistance.Pei-Hua Huang - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):547-567.
    John Harris recently argues that the moral bioenhancement proposed by Persson and Savulescu can damage moral agency by depriving the recipients of their freedom to fall (freedom to make wrongful choices) and therefore should not be pursued. The link Harris makes between moral agency and the freedom to fall, however, implies that all forms of moral enhancement, including moral education, that aim to make the enhancement recipients less likely to “fall” are detrimental to moral agency. In this paper, I present (...)
  4. added 2018-10-19
    Playing with the “Playing God”.Hossein Dabbagh & E. Andreeva - 2017 - In V. Menuz, J. Roduit, D. Roiz, A. Erler & N. Stepanovan (eds.), Future-Human. Life. Geneva, Switzerland: neohumanitas. org. pp. 72-78.
    Some philosophers and theologians have argued against the idea of Human Enhancement, saying that human beings should not play God. A closer look, however, might reveal that the question of who is playing Whom is far from being so clear-cut. This chapter will address the idea of human enhancement from the standpoint of theistic theology, arguing that human enhancement and theistic theology may not be so very incompatible, after all.
  5. added 2018-10-16
    Enhancement & Desert.Thomas Douglas - forthcoming - Politics, Philosophy and Economics.
    It is sometimes claimed that those who succeed with the aid of enhancement technologies deserve the rewards associated with their success less, other things being equal, than those who succeed without the aid of such technologies. This claim captures some widely held intuitions, has been implicitly endorsed by participants in social-psychological research, and helps to undergird some otherwise puzzling philosophical objections to the use of enhancement technologies. I consider whether it can be provided with a rational basis. I examine three (...)
  6. added 2018-09-26
    Human Enhancement.Eric Juengst & Daniel Moseley - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    We examine a set of debates in Practical Ethics commonly labeled “the ethics of human enhancement.” Our essay focuses on (1) conceptual concerns about the limits of legitimate health care—the treatment vs. enhancement distinction, (2) moral considerations about fairness, authenticity, and human nature that are common in discussing the use of medical technologies in competitive institutions like sports and academia, and (3) broader issues that pertain to science policy and the distribution and regulation of medical technologies.
  7. added 2018-09-13
    The Principle of Totality and the Limits of Enhancement.Joshua Schulz - 2015 - Ethics and Medicine 31 (3):143-57.
    According to the Thomistic tradition, the Principle of Totality (TPoT) articulates a secondary principle of natural law which guides the exercise of human ownership or dominium over creation. In its general signification, TPoT is a principle of distributive justice determining the right ordering of wholes to their parts. In the medical field it is traditionally understood as entailing an absolute prohibition of bodily mutilation as irrational and immoral, and an imperfect obligation to use the parts of one’s body for the (...)
  8. added 2018-09-07
    Direct Vs. Indirect Moral Enhancement.G. Owen Schaefer - 2015 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 25 (3):261-289.
    Moral enhancement is an ostensibly laudable project. Who wouldn’t want people to become more moral? Still, the project’s approach is crucial. We can distinguish between two approaches for moral enhancement: direct and indirect. Direct moral enhancements aim at bringing about particular ideas, motives or behaviors. Indirect moral enhancements, by contrast, aim at making people more reliably produce the morally correct ideas, motives or behaviors without committing to the content of those ideas, motives and/or actions. I will argue, on Millian grounds, (...)
  9. added 2018-09-06
    Procedural Moral Enhancement.G. Owen Schaefer & Julian Savulescu - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-12.
    While philosophers are often concerned with the conditions for moral knowledge or justification, in practice something arguably less demanding is just as, if not more, important – reliably making correct moral judgments. Judges and juries should hand down fair sentences, government officials should decide on just laws, members of ethics committees should make sound recommendations, and so on. We want such agents, more often than not and as often as possible, to make the right decisions. The purpose of this paper (...)
  10. added 2018-07-24
    Etika lidského vylepšování a liberální eugenika.Tomas Hribek - 2014 - Filosoficky Casopis 62 (6):847-861.
    [The Ethics of Human Enhancement and Liberal Eugenics] The paper deals with the ethics of biotechnological enhancement of human qualities such as intelligence, health and lifespan. In contemporary bioethics three views have emerged concerning the moral permissibility of such a biotechnological enhancement of humans. While bioconservatives reject it as morally impermissible and dangerous, bioradicals welcome it as permissible and desirable. Between these two extremes we find bioliberals who admit some types of enhancement, under certain conditions. These debates are still overshadowed (...)
  11. added 2018-07-06
    Life-Extending Enhancements and the Narrative Approach to Personal Identity.Andrea Sauchelli - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (4):219-225.
    Various debates on the desirability and rationality of life-extending enhancements have been pursued under the presupposition that a generic psychological theory of personal identity is correct. I here discuss how the narrative approach to personal identity can contribute to these debates. In particular, I argue that two versions of the narrative approach offer good reasons to reject an argument against the rationality of life-extending enhancements.
  12. added 2018-06-08
    Life Enhancement Technologies: Significance of Social Category Membership.Christine Overall - 2009 - In Nick Bostrom & Julian Savulesu (eds.), Human Enhancement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 327-340.
  13. added 2018-06-01
    How Should One Live? An Introduction to Ethics and Moral Reasoning.Bradley Thames - 2018 - San Diego, CA, USA: Bridgepoint Education.
    This book provides an entry-level introduction to philosophical ethics, theories of moral reasoning, and selected issues in applied ethics. Chapter 1 describes the importance of philosophical approaches to ethical issues, the general dialectical form of moral reasoning, and the broad landscape of moral philosophy. Chapter 2 presents egoism and relativism as challenges to the presumed objectivity and unconditionality of morality. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 discuss utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics, respectively. Each chapter begins with a general overview of the (...)
  14. added 2018-05-09
    Thomas Aquinas: Teacher of Transhumanity?John Boyer & Geoffrey Meadows - 2015 - In John P. Hittinger & Daniel C. Wagner (eds.), Thomas Aquinas: Teacher of Humanity. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 176-187.
  15. added 2018-04-05
    Great Minds Think Different: Preserving Cognitive Diversity in an Age of Gene Editing.Jonny Anomaly, Julian Savulescu & Christopher Gyngell - forthcoming - Bioethics:0-0.
  16. added 2018-03-25
    Are You Morally Modified?: The Moral Effects of Widely Used Pharmaceuticals.Neil Levy, Thomas Douglas, Guy Kahane, Sylvia Terbeck, Philip J. Cowen, Miles Hewstone & Julian Savulescu - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (2):111-125.
    A number of concerns have been raised about the possible future use of pharmaceuticals designed to enhance cognitive, affective, and motivational processes, particularly where the aim is to produce morally better decisions or behavior. In this article, we draw attention to what is arguably a more worrying possibility: that pharmaceuticals currently in widespread therapeutic use are already having unintended effects on these processes, and thus on moral decision making and morally significant behavior. We review current evidence on the moral effects (...)
  17. added 2018-03-25
    Enhancement and Civic Virtue.William Jefferson, Thomas Douglas, Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu - 2014 - Social Theory and Practice 40 (3):499-527.
    Opponents of biomedical enhancement frequently adopt what Allen Buchanan has called the “Personal Goods Assumption.” On this assumption, the benefits of biomedical enhancement will accrue primarily to those individuals who undergo enhancements, not to wider society. Buchanan has argued that biomedical enhancements might in fact have substantial social benefits by increasing productivity. We outline another way in which enhancements might benefit wider society: by augmenting civic virtue and thus improving the functioning of our political communities. We thus directly confront critics (...)
  18. added 2018-03-25
    The Harms of Status Enhancement Could Be Compensated or Outweighed: A Response to Agar.T. Douglas - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):75-76.
    Nicholas Agar argues, that enhancement technologies could be used to create post-persons—beings of higher moral status than ordinary persons—and that it would be wrong to create such beings.1 I am sympathetic to the first claim. However, I wish to take issue with the second.Agar's second claim is grounded on the prediction that the creation of post-persons would, with at least moderate probability, harm those who remain mere persons. The harm that Agar has in mind here is a kind of meta-harm: (...)
  19. added 2018-03-23
    Moral Bioenhancement, Freedom and Reason.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):263-268.
    In this paper we reply to the most important objections to our advocacy of moral enhancement by biomedical means – moral bioenhancement – that John Harris advances in his new book How to be Good. These objections are to effect that such moral enhancement undercuts both moral reasoning and freedom. The latter objection is directed more specifically at what we have called the God Machine, a super-duper computer which predicts our decisions and prevents decisions to perpertrate morally atrocious acts. In (...)
  20. added 2018-03-23
    Enhancement in Sport, and Enhancement Outside Sport.Thomas Douglas - 2007 - Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 1 (1).
    Sport is one of the first areas in which enhancement has become commonplace. It is also one of the first areas in which the use of enhancement technologies has been heavily regulated. Some have thus seen sport as a testing ground for arguments about whether to permit enhancement. However, I argue that there are fairness-based objections to enhancement in sport that do not apply as strongly in some other areas of human activity. Thus, I claim that there will often be (...)
  21. added 2018-02-19
    Treating the Enhancement Debate: Irrelevant Distinctions in the Enhancement Medicine Debate.Joseph Roberts - 2014 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):1-12.
    This article argues against the relevance of the enhancement/treatment and biomedical/non-biomedical enhancement distinctions by analysing their validity in two ways: their clarity and whether they track our intuitions regarding what is permissible and impermissible. The treatment/enhancement distinction is found to be deficient in both respects. The biomedical/non-biomedical distinction, whilst clear, does not track our intuitions regarding what is permissible and impermissible. The article concludes that, in order to help the enhancement medicine debate, the distinctions should be abandoned due to the (...)
  22. added 2018-02-16
    How to Build a Better Human: An Ethical Blueprint.Gregory E. Pence - 2012 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    In How to Build a Better Human, prominent bioethicist Gregory E. Pence argues if, we are careful and ethical, we can use genetics, biotechnology, and medicine in safe ethical ways for human enhancement. He looks at the innovations and challenges that have occurred since the birth of bioethics almost 50 years ago and considers the ethical implications of the technological advances that are just around the corner.
  23. added 2018-02-16
    How to Live Forever: Science Fiction and Philosophy.Stephen R. L. Clark - 1995 - Routledge.
    Immortality is a subject which has long been explored and imagined by science fiction writers. In his intriguing new study, Stephen R.L.Clark argues that the genre of science fiction writing allows investigation of philosophical questions about immortality without the constraints of academic philosophy. He reveals how fantasy accounts of issues such as resurrection, disembodied survival, reincarnation and devices or drugs for preserving life can be used as an important resource for philosophical inquiry and examines how a society of immortals might (...)
  24. added 2018-02-03
    Moral Relevance in the Concepts and Language of Human Synthetic Moral Enhancement.Christian Carrozzo - 2015 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine 14 (2):06-12.
  25. added 2017-12-21
    Human Enhancement: A New Issue in Philosophical Agenda.Marco Azevedo - 2013 - Princípios. Revista de Filosofía 20 (33):265-303.
    Since before we can remember, humanity aims to overcome its biological limitations; such a goal has certainly played a key role in the advent of technique. However, despite the benefits that technique may bring, the people who make use of it will inevitably be under risk of harm. Even though human technical wisdom consists in attaining the best result without compromising anybody’s safety, misuses are always a possibility in the horizon. Nowadays, technology can be used for more than just improving (...)
  26. added 2017-10-13
    From Taquería to Medical School: Juan Carlos, Aristotle, Cognitive Enhancements, and a Good Life.Glenn " Trujillo & Boomer" - 2018 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 22 (1).
    This paper begins with a vignette of Juan Carlos, an immigrant to America who works to support his family, attends classes at a community college, and cares for his ill daughter. It argues that an Aristotelian virtue ethicist could condone a safe, legal, and virtuous use of cognitive enhancements in Juan Carlos’s case. The argument is that if an enhancement can lead him closer to eudaimonia (i.e., flourishing, or a good life), then it is morally permissible to use it. The (...)
  27. added 2017-09-07
    A Thomistic Account of Anti-Love Biotechnology.Brandon Boesch - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (11):30-31.
    Applies a generally Thomistic framework to Earp and colleagues' (2013) discussion of anti-love biotechnology. Discusses some of the constraints that should be placed on the use of such a technology from a Thomistic perspective.
  28. added 2017-09-04
    ‘Drugs That Make You Feel Bad’? Remorse-Based Mitigation and Neurointerventions.Jonathan Pugh & Hannah Maslen - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):499-522.
    In many jurisdictions, an offender’s remorse is considered to be a relevant factor to take into account in mitigation at sentencing. The growing philosophical interest in the use of neurointerventions in criminal justice raises an important question about such remorse-based mitigation: to what extent should technologically facilitated remorse be honoured such that it is permitted the same penal significance as standard instances of remorse? To motivate this question, we begin by sketching a tripartite account of remorse that distinguishes cognitive, affective (...)
  29. added 2017-09-04
    Cohen’s Conservatism and Human Enhancement.Jonathan Pugh, Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (4):331-354.
    In an intriguing essay, G. A. Cohen has defended a conservative bias in favour of existing value. In this paper, we consider whether Cohen’s conservatism raises a new challenge to the use of human enhancement technologies. We develop some of Cohen’s suggestive remarks into a new line of argument against human enhancement that, we believe, is in several ways superior to existing objections. However, we shall argue that on closer inspection, Cohen’s conservatism fails to offer grounds for a strong sweeping (...)
  30. added 2017-08-02
    Moral Bio-Enhancement, Freedom, Value and the Parity Principle.Jonathan Pugh - forthcoming - Topoi:1-14.
    A prominent objection to non-cognitive moral bio-enhancements is that they would compromise the recipient’s ‘freedom to fall’. I begin by discussing some ambiguities in this objection, before outlining an Aristotelian reading of it. I suggest that this reading may help to forestall Persson and Savulescu’s ‘God-Machine’ criticism; however, I suggest that the objection still faces the problem of explaining why the value of moral conformity is insufficient to outweigh the value of the freedom to fall itself. I also question whether (...)
  31. added 2017-08-02
    Bioconservatism, Partiality, and the Human-Nature Objection to Enhancement.Pugh Jonathan, Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu - 2016 - The Monist 99 (4):406-422.
    “Bioconservatives” in the human enhancement debate endorse the conservative claim that we should reject the use of biotechnologies that enhance natural human capacities. However, they often ground their objections to enhancement with contestable claims about human nature that are also in tension with other common tenets of conservatism. We argue that bioconservatives could raise a more plausible objection to enhancement by invoking a strain of conservative thought developed by G.A. Cohen. Although Cohen’s conservatism is not sufficient to fully revive the (...)
  32. added 2017-06-09
    Steve Clarke, Julian Savulescu, C. A. J. Coady, Alberto Giubilini, and Sagar Sanyal (Eds.), The Ethics of Human Enhancement: Understanding the Debate, Oxford University Press, 2016, 269pp. [REVIEW]Stephen M. Campbell & Sven Nyholm - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
    The Ethics of Human Enhancement: Understanding the Debate has two chief aims. These aims are to help readers understand the existing debate and to move the debate forward. The book consists of an introductory chapter by Alberto Giubilini and Sagar Sanyal (which lays out some prominent bioconservative objections to enhancement), eight essays grouped under the theme of "Understanding the Debate" (Section I), and eight devoted to "Advancing the Debate" (Section II). In this review, we offer brief summaries of each essay (...)
  33. added 2017-04-13
    Enhancement and the Conservative Bias.Ben Davies - 2017 - Philosophy and Technology 30 (3):339-356.
    Nicholas Agar argues that we should avoid certain ‘radical’ enhancement technologies. One reason for this is that they will alienate us from current sources of value by altering our evaluative outlooks. We should avoid this, even if enhancing will provide us with novel, objectively better sources of value. After noting the parallel between Agar’s views and G. A. Cohen’s work on the ‘conservative bias’, I explore Agar’s suggestion in relation to two kinds of radical enhancement: cognitive and anti-ageing. With regard (...)
  34. added 2016-12-29
    The Bioethics of Enhancement: Transhumanism, Disability, and Biopolitics.Melinda Hall - 2016 - Lexington Books.
    In a critical intervention into the bioethics debate over human enhancement, philosopher Melinda Hall tackles the claim that the expansion and development of human capacities is a moral obligation. Hall draws on French philosopher Michel Foucault to reveal and challenge the ways disability is central to the conversation. The Bioethics of Enhancement includes a close reading and analysis of the last century of enhancement thinking and contemporary transhumanist thinkers, the strongest promoters of the obligation to pursue enhancement technology. With specific (...)
  35. added 2016-12-12
    Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2012 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Unfit for the Future argues that the future of our species depends on radical enhancement of the moral aspects of our nature. Population growth and technological advances are threatening to undermine the conditions of worthwhile life on earth forever. We need to modify the biological bases of human motivation to deal with this challenge.
  36. added 2016-12-12
    Will Biomedical Enhancements Undermine Solidarity, Responsibility, Equality and Autonomy?Ori Lev - 2011 - Bioethics 25 (4):177-184.
    Prominent thinkers such as Jurgen Habermas and Michael Sandel are warning that biomedical enhancements will undermine fundamental political values. Yet whether biomedical enhancements will undermine such values depends on how biomedical enhancements will function, how they will be administered and to whom. Since only few enhancements are obtainable, it is difficult to tell whether these predictions are sound. Nevertheless, such warnings are extremely valuable. As a society we must, at the very least, be aware of developments that could have harmful (...)
  37. added 2016-12-08
    Borrowed Beauty? Understanding Identity in Asian Facial Cosmetic Surgery.Yves Saint James Aquino & Norbert Steinkamp - 2016 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 19 (3):431-441.
    This review aims to identify (1) sources of knowledge and (2) important themes of the ethical debate related to surgical alteration of facial features in East Asians. This article integrates narrative and systematic review methods. In March 2014, we searched databases including PubMed, Philosopher’s Index, Web of Science, Sociological Abstracts, and Communication Abstracts using key terms “cosmetic surgery,” “ethnic*,” “ethics,” “Asia*,” and “Western*.” The study included all types of papers written in English that discuss the debate on rhinoplasty and blepharoplasty (...)
  38. added 2016-12-08
    Enhancements and Justice: Problems in Determining the Requirements of Justice in a Genetically Transformed Society.Ronald Alan Lindsay - 2005 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 15 (1):3-38.
    : There is a concern that genetic engineering will exacerbate existing social divisions and inequalities, especially if only the wealthy can afford genetic enhancements. Accordingly, many argue that justice requires the imposition of constraints on genetic engineering. However, it would be unwise to decide at this time what limits should be imposed in the future. Decision makers currently lack both the theoretical tools and the factual foundation for making sound judgments about the requirements of justice in a genetically transformed society. (...)
  39. added 2016-12-05
    Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement.Nicholas Agar - 2008 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    In this provocative book, philosopher Nicholas Agar defends the idea that parents should be allowed to enhance their children’s characteristics. Gets away from fears of a Huxleyan ‘Brave New World’ or a return to the fascist eugenics of the past Written from a philosophically and scientifically informed point of view Considers real contemporary cases of parents choosing what kind of child to have Uses ‘moral images’ as a way to get readers with no background in philosophy to think about moral (...)
  40. added 2016-10-24
    Confining 'Disenhanced'Animals.John Hadley - 2012 - NanoEthics 6 (1):41-46.
    Abstract Drawing upon evolutionary theory and the work of Daniel Dennett and Nicholas Agar, I offer an argument for broadening discussion of the ethics of disenhancement beyond animal welfare concerns to a consideration of animal “biopreferences”. Short of rendering animals completely unconscious or decerebrate, it is reasonable to suggest that disenhanced animals will continue to have some preferences. To the extent that these preferences can be understood as what Agar refers to as “plausible naturalizations” for familiar moral concepts like beliefs (...)
  41. added 2016-09-22
    A More "Inclusive" Approach to Enhancement and Disability.David Wasserman & Stephen M. Campbell - 2017 - In Jessica Flanigan & Terry Price (eds.), The Ethics of Ability and Enhancement. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 25-38.
  42. added 2016-09-03
    Gregory E. Kaebnick and Thomas H. Murray, Eds., Synthetic Biology and Morality: Artificial Life and the Bounds of Nature. [REVIEW]Mahesh Ananth - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):241-248.
  43. added 2016-08-11
    Climate Change, Cooperation, and Moral Bioenhancement.Toby Handfield, Pei-hua Huang & Robert Mark Simpson - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (2):742-747.
    The human faculty of moral judgment is not well suited to address problems, like climate change, that are global in scope and remote in time. Advocates of ‘moral bioenhancement’ have proposed that we should investigate the use of medical technologies to make human beings more trusting and altruistic, and hence more willing to cooperate in efforts to mitigate the impacts of climate change. We survey recent accounts of the proximate and ultimate causes of human cooperation in order to assess the (...)
  44. added 2016-08-05
    The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    A common epistemological assumption in contemporary bioethics held b y both proponents and critics of non-traditional forms of cognitive enhancement is that cognitive enhancement aims at the facilitation of the accumulation of human knowledge. This paper does three central things. First, drawing from recent work in epistemology, a rival account of cognitive enhancement, framed in terms of the notion of cognitive achievement rather than knowledge, is proposed. Second, we outline and respond to an axiological objection to our proposal that draws (...)
  45. added 2016-07-02
    A Typology of Posthumanism: A Framework for Differentiating Analytic, Synthetic, Theoretical, and Practical Posthumanisms.Matthew E. Gladden - 2016 - In Sapient Circuits and Digitalized Flesh: The Organization as Locus of Technological Posthumanization. Defragmenter Media. pp. 31-91.
    The term ‘posthumanism’ has been employed to describe a diverse array of phenomena ranging from academic disciplines and artistic movements to political advocacy campaigns and the development of commercial technologies. Such phenomena differ widely in their subject matter, purpose, and methodology, raising the question of whether it is possible to fashion a coherent definition of posthumanism that encompasses all phenomena thus labelled. In this text, we seek to bring greater clarity to this discussion by formulating a novel conceptual framework for (...)
  46. added 2016-06-24
    EVOLUTIONARY RISK OF HIGH HUME TECHNOLOGIES. Article 3. EVOLUTIONARY SEMANTICS AND BIOETHICS.V. T. Cheshko, L. V. Ivanitskaya & V. I. Glazko - 2016 - Integrative Annthropology (1):21-27.
    The co-evolutionary concept of three-modal stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based on the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path of human evolution are defined by descriptive (evolutionary efficiency) and creative-teleological (evolutionary correctness) parameters simultaneously, that cannot be instrumental reduced to other ones. Resulting volume of both parameters define the vectors of biological, social, cultural and techno-rationalistic human evolution by two gear mechanism — genetic and cultural co-evolution and techno-humanitarian (...)
  47. added 2016-05-23
    Should We Use Commitment Contracts to Regulate Student Use of Cognitive Enhancing Drugs?John Danaher - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (7):568-578.
    Are universities justified in trying to regulate student use of cognitive enhancing drugs? In this article I argue that they can be, but that the most appropriate kind of regulatory intervention is likely to be voluntary in nature. To be precise, I argue that universities could justifiably adopt a commitment contract system of regulation wherein students are encouraged to voluntarily commit to not using cognitive enhancing drugs. If they are found to breach that commitment, they should be penalized by, for (...)
  48. added 2016-05-19
    Authenticity, Autonomy, and Enhancement.Pei-hua Huang - 2015 - Dilemata 19.
    This paper aims to provide a clarification of the long debate on whether enhancement will or will not diminish authenticity. It focuses particularly on accounts provided by Carl Elliott and David DeGrazia. Three clarifications will be presented here. First, most discussants only criticise Elliott’s identity argument and neglect that his conservative position in the use of enhancement can be understood as a concern over social coercion. Second, Elliott’s and DeGrazia’s views can, not only co-exist, but even converge together as an (...)
  49. added 2016-05-03
    Moral Bioenhancement is Dangerous.N. Agar - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (4):343-345.
  50. added 2016-05-03
    Moral Bioenhancement and the Utilitarian Catastrophe.Nicholas Agar - 2015 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24 (1):37-47.
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