Blaise Pascal

Nicholas of Cusa and his daringly speculative theology seem odd matches for Blaise Pascal, the constant critic of the philosophies en vogue during his life. A commonality they share is their mutual concern for the apparent disproportion between the infinite God and the finite human. In this paper, I compare and analyse the shape this question takes in Cusanus's De ludo globi and Pascal's Pensées. Both men observe a sort of ‘ludic’ character inherent to the pursuit of bridging finite and (...) infinite. Cusanus's ‘ball game’ realises the universe and the human being's pursuit of salvation as a circular field in which the player seeks to reach the vanishing point of its centre. Pascal likewise portrays human life as a cosmic game that everyone must ‘play’ with their ethical decisions. Ultimately, they both come to register Christ as the agent and object of their games, the divine player who fashions finitude into infinity. I conclude by sketching a way to reconcile Pascal with natural theology based on his universal game. (shrink)

L'originalité de l'interprétation pascalienne des trois concupiscences selon 1 Jn 2, 16 est double : d'une part, il ne s'agit plus des plaisirs des sens; Pascal abandonne la doctrine janséniste de la délectation, elle-même fondée sur une théorie de l'imitation; d'autre part, cette concupiscence n'est pas tant l'amour du pouvoir que l'amour de la richesse, en tant qu'elle particularise. Le renversement des trois concupiscences en « trois ordres de choses » ne se comprend que si l'on voit que toute la (...) méditation pascalienne est orientée vers sa fin, le quaternaire sapientiel fourni par 1 Cor 1, 30. Ainsi la lecture nécessairement théologique du § 933 interdit d'en faire un modèle partout exportable et de lui attribuer une fonction architectonique pour l'ensemble de l'Apologie. The originality of the Pascalian interpretation of the three kinds of concupiscence according to 1 John 2: 16 is twofold: on the one hand, what is aimed at no longer is the pleasures of the senses; Pascal gives up the Jansenist doctrine of delectation, which was itself founded on a theory of imitation; on the other hand, concupiscence thus redefined no longer is a yearning for power, and becomes a yearning for riches, insofar as it consists in intemizing. The reversal of these three kinds of concupiscence into the « three orders of things » can be understood only if one realises that the whole Pascalian meditation is directed towards its end, namely the sapiential quaternary provided in 1 Corinthians 1: 30. Thus, the necessarily theological reading of § 933 makes it impossible to see it as a universally pertinent model or to ascribe to it an architectonic role in the structure of the Apologia. (shrink)

As a Catholic nun, to suggest Jacqueline Pascal as autonomous might at first glance seem contradictory. We show that her moral deference to the divine is not at all forfeiting her autonomy, but that aligning her own law with God's law is to align her own law with rationality itself, that is, the laws of nature. Her theoretical structure begins with a theory of virtue—viz., how and to whom we have an obligation to be moral. For her, acting in accordance (...) with cultural restrictions or following church orders against her own conscience would be living by the laws of another and so not acting autonomously. Pascal would not live by other's laws, regardless of whether her actions conform to the categories by which society expected her to act. The framework for her laws laid in Pascal's understanding of self-governance: if she wants to act virtuously then she must autonomously follow God's law by making it her own through the sentiments of her heart. Thus, she cannot live by the laws of men, but by the laws of her human nature and in alignment with a rightly ordered universe, that is, God's law, which we show parallels with a Stoic framework of autonomy. (shrink)

The Apaṇṇaka Sutta, one of the early recorded teachings of the Buddha, contains an argument for accepting the doctrines of karma and rebirth that Buddhist scholars claim anticipates Pascal’s wager. I call this argument the Buddha’s wager. Does it anticipate Pascal’s wager and is it a good bet? Contemporary scholars identify at least four versions of Pascal’s wager in his Pensées. This article demonstrates that the Buddha’s wager anticipates two versions of Pascal’s wager, but not its canonical form. Like Pascal’s (...) wager, the Buddha’s wager presents a decision problem between two opposing theses in an epistemic context that lacks evidence of their truth or falsity. Like Pascal, the Buddha also tries to solve this problem using dominance, superdominance or ‘superduperdominance’ reasoning. The Apaṇṇaka Sutta likely provides the earliest textual example of such reasoning. While the Buddha’s wager does not exhibit the expected utility reasoning of the best-known form of Pascal’s wager, the article suggests a reformulation that parallels Alan Hájek’s (2018) vector-value reformulation. Is it a good bet? This article argues that it is not if this means we are rationally required to accept its recommendation. This is because, while it avoids two of the major objections levelled against Pascal’s wager, it succumbs to one and has two problems of its own. (shrink)

Traditional theistic arguments conclude that God exists. Pragmatic theistic arguments, by contrast, conclude that you ought to believe in God. The two most famous pragmatic theistic arguments are put forth by Blaise Pascal (1662) and William James (1896). Pragmatic arguments for theism can be summarized as follows: believing in God has significant benefits, and these benefits aren’t available for the unbeliever. Thus, you should believe in, or ‘wager on’, God. This article distinguishes between various kinds of theistic wagers, including finite (...) vs. infinite wagers, premortem vs. postmortem wagers, and doxastic vs. acceptance wagers. Then, we’ll turn to the epistemic-pragmatic distinction, and discusses the nuances of James’ argument, and how views like epistemic permissivism and epistemic consequentialism provide unique “hybrid” wagers. Finally, we’ll cover outstanding objections and responses. (shrink)

Fruit d'une mathématique mystique issue de Proclus et de Denys, la doctrine des trois ordres figure-t-elle une échelle de Jacob, un chemin d'ascèse ou la radicale discontinuité de réalités incommensurables? Toujours est-il qu'elle révèle un Pascal profondément étranger au dualisme cartésien et à distance sérieuse de la spiritualité bérullienne. Being the fruit of a mystical mathematics initiated by Proclus and Dionysius, does the doctrine of the three orders figure a Jacob's ladder, a way of askesis or the radical discontinuity between (...) incommensurable realities? In any case it reveals how deeply Pascal is foreign to the cartesian dualism and how distant he is from berullian spirituality. (shrink)

Unlike other classical arguments for the existence of God, Pascal’s Wager provides a pragmatic rationale for theistic belief. Its most popular version says that it is rationally mandatory to choose a way of life that seeks to cultivate belief in God because this is the option of maximum expected utility. Despite its initial attractiveness, this long-standing argument has been subject to various criticisms by many philosophers. What is less discussed, however, is the rationality of this choice in situations where the (...) decision-makers are confronted with greater uncertainty. In this paper, I examine the imprecise version of Pascal’s Wager: those scenarios where an agent’s credence that God exists is imprecise or vague rather than precise. After introducing some technical background on imprecise probabilities, I apply five different principles for decision-making to two cases of state uncertainty. In the final part of the paper, I argue that it is not rationally permitted to include zero as the lower probability of God’s existence. Although the conditions for what makes an act uniquely optimal vary significantly across those principles, I also show how the option of wagering for God can defeat any mixed strategy under two distinct interpretations of salvation. (shrink)

Quel ordre pour les trois ordres? On se propose de montrer ici que l'interprétation des fr. 933 et 308 Lafuma requiert un examen de ce qui, en chaque ordre, est principe organisateur. En élucidant deux formes de l'ordre dans les trois ordres, on est à même d'expliquer les variations de l'ordre entre les trois ordres. La première de ces formes voit en chaque ordre des objets intentionnels de la volonté, reconnaissables à une fin dominante; mais les trois ordres sont alors (...) de même rang. La considération, en chaque ordre, de la façon dont s'accomplit la fin, met en évidence l'exercice d'un jugement de perfection qui permet par contre de concevoir la raison d'être d'une hiérarchie entre les trois ordres, tout autant que la disproportion hyperbolique que Pascal établit entre eux. What order for the three orders? The aim in this paper is to point out that the exegesis of Laf 933 and 308 demands to scrutinize the ruling principle within each order. By emphasizing two types of order in the three orders, we are in position to give the rationale of the variations of order between the three orders. The first type pertains to intentional objects, commanded by the prevailing ends of the will. But then the three orders are on an equality. By considering in each order the way of performing the end, we manifest the use of a judgment of perfection allowing us to conceive a hierarchy as well as an hyperbolical disproportion between the three orders. (shrink)

Les implications théoriques de la doctrine des trois ordres se font également sentir sur le plan politique. Non au sens où cette doctrine relèverait prioritairement d'une lecture politique (ou politico-sociologique), mais à l'inverse au sens où les concepts politiques sont retravaillés et redéfinis par Pascal en fonction de la doctrine des trois ordres. Pascal ne se contente pas de définir le lieu du politique, il repense le statut et la fonction du politique. En son ultime signification, le politique, y compris (...) à travers la doctrine pascalienne des ordres incommensurables atteste la discordance postlapsaire entre la cité de l'homme et la cité de Dieu, entre le royaume de la concupiscence et le royaume de la charité, malgré la figuration du second par le premier. Ce point apparaît de manière plus manifeste encore lorsqu'on compare les positions de Pascal avec celles de Leibniz. L'étude des implications politiques des trois ordres nous conduit à examiner successivement : 1/ L'exemplification des déterminations de la notion d'ordre dans les textes et les fragments politiques et la réforme des concepts politiques. 2/ Les fonctions politiques de la doctrine des ordres : critique et légitimation. 3/ Ordres ou degrés : discordance ou conciliation entre la cité de l'homme et la cité de Dieu. The doctrine of the three orders has theoretical implications in the political field. This does not mean that the said doctrine should be primarily interpreted from a political (or political-sociological) point of view, but on the opposite, that Pascal re-elaborates and redefines political concepts in the light of the doctrine of the three orders. Pascal does not only define the location of the political: he produces a new theory of the status and function of the political. The ultimate meaning of the political interpreted in the light of Pascal's doctrine of the incommensurable orders attests the post-lapsarian discrepancy between the city of man and the city of God, between the kingdom of concupiscence and the kingdom of charity, though the latter is a figure of the former. The latter point is even more manifest when Pascal's positions are compared with those of Leibniz. As we study the political implications of the three orders, we shall successively consider: 1/ The examples of the determinations of the notion of order given in the political texts and fragments and the reform of political concepts. 2/ The political functions of the doctrine of the orders: criticism and legitimation. 3/ Orders or degrees? discrepancy or conciliation between the city of man and the city of God. (shrink)

The Pensées is a difficult book. When originally published in 1670, eight years after Pascal’s death, it was simply a collection of “thoughts” or pensées found among his papers after his death. Modern editors have based their editions on two seventeenth-century copies that group many of the fragments into thematic groups that purport to reflect Pascal’s own organization. Even so, the Pensées is still a collection of fragments. The reader, particularly the first-time reader, needs a guide.It was well known among (...) his friends that Pascal was working on an apology for Christianity. In Pascal: Reasoning and Belief, Michael Moriarty is attempting both to recover Pascal’s plan for this apology and to offer a philosophical... (shrink)

Nevertheless' comprises essays on Machiavelli and on Pascal. The ambivalent connection between the two parts is embodied by the comma in the subtitle: Machiavelli, Pascal. Is this comma a conjunction or a disjunction? In fact, both. Ginzburg approaches Machiavelli's work from the perspective of casuistry, or case-based ethical reasoning. For as Machiavelli indicated through his repeated use of the adverb nondimanco, there is an exception to every rule. Such a perspective may seem to echo the traditional image of Machiavelli as (...) a cynical, "machiavellian" thinker. But a close analysis of Machiavelli the reader, as well as of the ways in which some of Machiavelli's most perceptive readers read his work, throws a different light on Machiavelli the writer. The same hermeneutic strategy inspires the essays on the Provinciales, Pascal's ferocious attack against Jesuitical casuistry. Casuistry vs anti-casuistry; Machiavelli's secular attitude towards religion vs Pascal's deep religiosity. We are confronted, apparently, with two completely different worlds. But Pascal read Machiavelli, and reflected deeply upon his work. A belated, contemporary echo of this reading can unveil the complex relationship between Machiavelli and Pascal - their divergences as well as their unexpected convergences. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 4, Page 691-702, July 2022.

In the Infini-Rien fragment of his Pensées, Blaise Pascal develops an argument for the rationality of faith in God, which posthumously became known as Pascal’s Wager and at the same time represents a cornerstone of modern probability theory. While this betting argument has been the subject of much philosophical investigation, the contribution of this paper lies in the following: On the one hand, the bet is reconstructed in its basic features as well as its structure with the help of modern (...) decision and probability theory tools. Thus, it is shown that Pascal’s betting argument, in distinction to Hacking 1972 for instance, has the form of an a fortiori argument. On the other hand, as far as objections to Pascal’s argument are concerned, it is true that the premises have often been called into doubt, more or less convincingly. On the other hand, this article is dedicated to the question, often emphatically – especially in Hacking 1972 – and perhaps carelessly affirmed in Pascal research, whether Pascal’s premises imply his conclusion at all. (shrink)

One version of Pascal’s Wager says we should commit to, or cultivate belief in, whatever religion we think is most likely to bring us eternal joy. I pose a reductio for this version of the Wager. After exploring some ways the Pascalian might respond, the verdict is that it provides some reason to suspect that somewhere, somehow, the Wager goes wrong.

One version of moral error theory maintains that the central problem with morality is an ontological commitment to irreducible normativity. This paper argues that this version of error theory ultimately depends on an appeal to Ockham’s Razor, and that Ockham’s Razor should not be applied to irreducible normativity. This is because the appeal to Ockham’s Razor always contains an intractable element of epistemic circularity; and if this circularity is not vicious, we can construct a sound argument for the existence of (...) irreducibly normative truths that contains a similar kind of epistemic circularity. This argument is a version of Pascal’s Wager which I call “Parfit’s Wager,” because it is based on a passage from Derek Parfit’s On What Matters. It states that, if we believe that there are some irreducibly normative truths, we are more likely to be believing what we ought to believe compared to not believing that there are such truths, and that this indicates that we ought rationally to believe that there are such truths, justifying the ontological commitment to irreducible normativity in the process. (shrink)

The article places Game of Thrones within a tradition of pessimism, reaching back to Blaise Pascal and coloured by Nabokov’s vision of birth as a separation between two voids. This lineage provides a philosophical thread to analyse the motivations and actions of the protagonists of Game of Thrones, in particular their relation to child-killing. The void looms large in the world of Game of Thrones as the unchartered space beyond the wall. It is the awareness of the reality of this (...) void and the horrors it harbours which is shown to propel those who have it, to go to the greatest lengths to preserve the life of a child. (shrink)

Der Philosoph und Mathematiker Pascal gehört zu jenen Denkern, die Tocqueville am tiefsten beeinflusst haben, und zwar nicht nur inhaltlich, sondern auch stilistisch. Sein Freund Louis de Kergorlay teilt ihm in einem Brief aus dem Jahr 1834 mit, dass er sich Montesquieu, Rousseau und Pascal als »Meister« und als stilistische Vorbilder nehmen sollte und weist ihn darauf hin, dass er deren Stil schon sporadisch annimmt. Zwei Jahre später schreibt ihm Tocqueville, Pascal, Montesquieu und Rousseau seien die drei Menschen, mit denen (...) er täglich ein wenig lebe. (shrink)

De Maistre à Jacques Vier, en passant par l'abbé Bremond, Mgr Calvet, l'abbé Baudin et le cardinal Journet, par Massis, Bourget, Maritain, Goyau, Maurras et bien d'autres, l'auteur a enquêté. Et il faut l'admettre, le Pascal des paroissiens correspond rarement au Pascal historique: "... il y a chez Pascal une critique sociale et politique [...] qu'il serait à peine exagéré de dire qu'aucun des théoriciens du XVIIIe siècle ne l'a seulement rejointe," écrit Goldschmidt. Son génie a contribué à introduire dans (...) la pensée des catholiques les éléments de la modernité politique qui étaient la condition préalable de sa destruction, résultat inespéré du jansénisme, dont nous sommes si imprégnés que nous le voyons plus. Alors, que reste-t-il de Pascal?"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This brief but comprehensive introduction to French author Blaise Pascal provides an overview of his life and works and examines the major themes in his writings.

Katherine Dormandy aims both to classify possible modes of relating faith to epistemic norms in terms of three broad viewpoints: evidentialism, epistemological partialism, and anti-epistemological partialism. I advance two related claims: first, her categorization flattens the epistemological terrain by treating epistemic norms that operate at different levels as if they operated on the same level and thereby distorts the views she categorizes under Anti-Epistemological Partiality; and second, when rightly described, the noetic conflict involved in this view can be understood as (...) waged between epistemic norms of different types and function. To advance this claim, I examine Pascal’s conception of faith. For Pascal, we require first principles to establish an interpretive framework for understanding the universe and interpreting evidence, but outside of statements whose negations are self-contradictory, we cannot distinguish between “natural” principles and fantasies; faith is then understood as a relation to the Divine that allows the believer to receive, through grace, more accurate first principles. Faith therefore has a special cognitive status: (a) it has the right to influence how we interpret the world, including our epistemic norms and how to accommodate apparently disconfirming evidence, and (b) it is resilient to being reinterpreted in ways that would hinder it from fulfilling this function of stabilizing our epistemic situation—in the manner, for example, that such functioning would be hindered by negative beliefs concerning whether God exists, is good, and is faithful. The Pascalian believer is therefore involved in a much more subtle type of struggle than one between evidence and belief. Her conflict is waged between evidence and the interpretive framework through which she understands the world, including that evidence. I use the example of Job as a paradigm of how such a believer responds to apparently disconfirming evidence, treating doubt as grounds for frankly asking, or even demanding, God to answer one’s doubts, for the sake of his justice and love. (shrink)

Initiation de l'amitié -- En lisant en écrivant -- Le dérèglement originel de l'amour de soi humain -- Au démêlé avec Pascal -- Montaigne législateur? -- "Mointaigne a tort" -- "La justice est sujette à dispute" -- L'injustice du moi -- Pascal et Hobbes -- Le règlement de la dispute -- Une vraisemblance de justice.

O objetivo deste artigo é comparar a maneira como Pascal trata das relações entre ceticismo e dogmatismo em duas de suas principais obras, os Pensamentos e Conversa com o Senhor de Sacy, as quais, embora não conflitantes, trazem uma relevante mudança de pontos de vista. A Conversa aborda o debate ceticismo/dogmatismo diretamente pelo ângulo moral, de modo que os riscos morais para os leitores serão o critério fundamental de avaliação das duas filosofias. É igualmente do ponto de vista moral que (...) Epiteto e Montaigne, representantes do dogmatismo e do ceticismo, serão considerados inconciliáveis, visto que a aniquilação recíproca de vícios e virtudes impossibilita a constituição de uma moral perfeita. Nos Pensamentos, o ponto de vista assumido é o da teoria do conhecimento, ainda que se termine o embate no mesmo impasse moral da Conversa. A diferença mais importante, porém, é que os Pensamentos trazem o embate para o interior da natureza humana. Ambas as obras concordam em apontar ao apontar a religião cristã como fonte de explicação para os paradoxos da condição humana. (shrink)

The main objective of this article is to demonstrate that the thought of the French philosopher Blaise Pascal was never unaware of the main metaphysical discussions of the 17th century. The discussion thatwill be explored here is related to the question of infinity, explored with emphasis by the authors of that period. With this objective in mind, we will try to build an argument on the question of infinity in the metaphysics of two 17th century philosophers: Blaise Pascal and Baruch (...) Espinosa. We will try to show that Pascal’s philosophical reflection, on the one hand, resembles that of Spinoza when he assumes that God must be conceived as absolutely infinite, beyond any specific kind of infinity, whether mathematical orspatial, but he distances himself from the Dutch philosopher when he assumes that it is impossible for man to understand the infinite in absolute terms through rationality. (shrink)

In Pascal’s famous wager, he claims that the seeking non-believer can induce genuine religious belief in herself by joining a religious community and taking part in its rituals. This form of belief regulation is epistemologically puzzling: can we form beliefs in this way, and could such beliefs be rationally held? In the first half of the paper, we explain how the regimen could allow the seeking non-believer to regulate her religious beliefs by intervening on her evidence and epistemic standards. In (...) the second half of the paper, we argue that regulated religious beliefs can be rationally held. (shrink)

"Le roseau pensant, les deux infinis, le pari ou le nez de Cléopâtre : les Pensées renferment tant de formules et d'images inoubliables. Pascal fut un virtuose de la langue française, mais d'abord un mathématicien et un physicien incomparable, et encore un philosophe et un théologien hors pair. Plusieurs de ses sentences sont inscrites dans le cerveau de tout Français : "Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m'effraie" ; Qui veut faire l'ange fait la bête" ; "Le coeur a (...) ses raisons, que la raison ne connaît point". Au moins depuis Chateaubriand, nous négligeons que les Pensées offrent les rudiments d'une Apologie de la religion chrétienne", et Pascal représente pour nous l'homme moderne partagé entre la science et la foi, soumis au tragique du Dieu caché et à l'angoisse de la condition humaine. On devrait mettre dans le journal, moi je ne sais pas, les... Pensées de Pascal", disait le Swann de Proust. C'est un peu ce que nous avons tenté de faire dans cet Été avec Pascal."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Thema dieses Buchs ist die Religion von fünf Philosophen aus unterschiedlichen Kulturen und Epochen: Konfuzius, Sokrates, Epiktet, Montaigne und Pascal. Anhand der sehr unterschiedlichen Textgrundlagen werden nicht nur ihre Gedanken über ihre Religion dargestellt, sondern auch ihre philosophischen Lehren. Im Blickpunkt steht auch, wie sich das, was diese fünf über Religion sagen, von ihrer religiösen Praxis unterscheidet. Ein Ergebnis des Vergleichs ist die Erkenntnis, dass alle echte Religion, die Gott als Höchstes hat, in fünf voneinander untrennbaren Haltungen besteht, die ausdrücken, (...) was dieses Höchste für sie ist: in der Überzeugung, einen göttlichen Auftrag zu haben und diesen Auftrag erfüllen, d.h. dadurch Gott dienen zu sollen, in der Dankbarkeit gegenüber Gott, in der Güte oder tätigen Liebe gegenüber seinen Mitmenschen, im Vertrauen in den Schutz oder in die Hilfe Gottes und in der Ehrlichkeit und Wahrhaftigkeit sich selbst und seinen Mitmenschen gegenüber. (shrink)

Pascal is the most widely read French philosopher in Russia. This work looks at Pascalian studies in contemporary Russia, detailing the themes and images associated with Pascal in Russian philosophy and poetry. It also focuses on Leo Tolstoy, who read Pascal.

This book is a study of Blaise Pascal's defence of Christian belief in the Pensees. Michael Moriarty aims to expound--and in places to criticize--what he argues is a coherent and original apologetic strategy. Setting out the basic philosophical and theological presuppositions of Pascal's project, the present volume draws the distinction between convictions attained by reason and those inspired by God-given faith. It also presents Pascal's view of the contradictions within human nature, between the 'wretchedness' and the 'greatness'. His mind-body dualism (...) and his mechanistic conception of non-human animals are discussed. Pascal invokes the biblical story of the Fall and the doctrine of original sin as the only credible explanation of these contradictions. His analysis of human occupations as powered by the twin desire to escape from painful thoughts and to gratify one's vanity is subjected to critical examination, as is his conception of the self and self-love. Pascal argues that just as Christianity propounds the only explanation for the human condition, so it offers the only kind of happiness that would satisfy our deepest longings. He thus reasons that we have an interest in investigating its truth-claims as rooted in the Bible and in history. The closing chapters of this book discuss Pascal's view of Christian morality and the famous 'wager' argument for opting in favour of Christian belief. (shrink)