Blaise Pascal

Fanatics judge a lottery with a tiny probability of arbitrarily high value as better than the certainty of some modest value, and they are prone to getting swindled. You need only make the lie “big enough” to get one over on them. I put forward an elegant solution to the fanatic’s problem. When coming to a fully rational decision, agents may ignore outlandish possibilities.

L'originalité de l'interprétation pascalienne des trois concupiscences selon 1 Jn 2, 16 est double : d'une part, il ne s'agit plus des plaisirs des sens; Pascal abandonne la doctrine janséniste de la délectation, elle-même fondée sur une théorie de l'imitation; d'autre part, cette concupiscence n'est pas tant l'amour du pouvoir que l'amour de la richesse, en tant qu'elle particularise. Le renversement des trois concupiscences en « trois ordres de choses » ne se comprend que si l'on voit que toute la (...) méditation pascalienne est orientée vers sa fin, le quaternaire sapientiel fourni par 1 Cor 1, 30. Ainsi la lecture nécessairement théologique du § 933 interdit d'en faire un modèle partout exportable et de lui attribuer une fonction architectonique pour l'ensemble de l'Apologie. The originality of the Pascalian interpretation of the three kinds of concupiscence according to 1 John 2: 16 is twofold: on the one hand, what is aimed at no longer is the pleasures of the senses; Pascal gives up the Jansenist doctrine of delectation, which was itself founded on a theory of imitation; on the other hand, concupiscence thus redefined no longer is a yearning for power, and becomes a yearning for riches, insofar as it consists in intemizing. The reversal of these three kinds of concupiscence into the « three orders of things » can be understood only if one realises that the whole Pascalian meditation is directed towards its end, namely the sapiential quaternary provided in 1 Corinthians 1: 30. Thus, the necessarily theological reading of § 933 makes it impossible to see it as a universally pertinent model or to ascribe to it an architectonic role in the structure of the Apologia. (shrink)

Pascal’s Wager involves expected utilities. In this chapter, we examine the Wager in light of two main features of expected utility theory: utilities and probabilities. We discuss infinite and finite utilities, and zero, infinitesimal, extremely low, imprecise, and undefined probabilities. These have all come up in recent literature regarding Pascal’s Wager. We consider the problems each creates and suggest prospects for the Wager in light of these problems.

In this article, we re-examine Pascal’s Mugging, and argue that it is a deeper problem than the St. Petersburg paradox. We offer a way out that is consistent with classical decision theory. Specifically, we propose a “many muggers” response analogous to the “many gods” objection to Pascal’s Wager. When a very tiny probability of a great reward becomes a salient outcome of a choice, such as in the offer of the mugger, it can be discounted on the condition that there (...) are other symmetric, non-salient rewards that one may receive if one chooses otherwise. (shrink)

Fruit d'une mathématique mystique issue de Proclus et de Denys, la doctrine des trois ordres figure-t-elle une échelle de Jacob, un chemin d'ascèse ou la radicale discontinuité de réalités incommensurables? Toujours est-il qu'elle révèle un Pascal profondément étranger au dualisme cartésien et à distance sérieuse de la spiritualité bérullienne. Being the fruit of a mystical mathematics initiated by Proclus and Dionysius, does the doctrine of the three orders figure a Jacob's ladder, a way of askesis or the radical discontinuity between (...) incommensurable realities? In any case it reveals how deeply Pascal is foreign to the cartesian dualism and how distant he is from berullian spirituality. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Pascal's Wager as a decision problem where the uncertainty is massive, that is, as a decision under ignorance. I first present several reasons to support this interpretation. Then, I argue that wagering for God is the optimal act in a broad range of cases, according to two well-known criteria for decision-making: the Minimax Regret rule and the Hurwicz criterion. Given a Pascalian standard matrix, I also show that a tie between wagering for God and wagering (...) against God is only possible under very narrow conditions when applying the Hurwicz criterion. Finally, I discuss three objections to these two versions of the Wager. The most pressing challenge comes from the Many-Gods objection. I conclude that this objection is even more challenging whenever one faces a situation of massive uncertainty about God's existence. I argue that addressing it requires a more detailed examination of the benefits of adopting a religious life compared to those of choosing non-theism, or an additional criterion that can break the tie between these options. (shrink)

Quel ordre pour les trois ordres? On se propose de montrer ici que l'interprétation des fr. 933 et 308 Lafuma requiert un examen de ce qui, en chaque ordre, est principe organisateur. En élucidant deux formes de l'ordre dans les trois ordres, on est à même d'expliquer les variations de l'ordre entre les trois ordres. La première de ces formes voit en chaque ordre des objets intentionnels de la volonté, reconnaissables à une fin dominante; mais les trois ordres sont alors (...) de même rang. La considération, en chaque ordre, de la façon dont s'accomplit la fin, met en évidence l'exercice d'un jugement de perfection qui permet par contre de concevoir la raison d'être d'une hiérarchie entre les trois ordres, tout autant que la disproportion hyperbolique que Pascal établit entre eux. What order for the three orders? The aim in this paper is to point out that the exegesis of Laf 933 and 308 demands to scrutinize the ruling principle within each order. By emphasizing two types of order in the three orders, we are in position to give the rationale of the variations of order between the three orders. The first type pertains to intentional objects, commanded by the prevailing ends of the will. But then the three orders are on an equality. By considering in each order the way of performing the end, we manifest the use of a judgment of perfection allowing us to conceive a hierarchy as well as an hyperbolical disproportion between the three orders. (shrink)

Les implications théoriques de la doctrine des trois ordres se font également sentir sur le plan politique. Non au sens où cette doctrine relèverait prioritairement d'une lecture politique (ou politico-sociologique), mais à l'inverse au sens où les concepts politiques sont retravaillés et redéfinis par Pascal en fonction de la doctrine des trois ordres. Pascal ne se contente pas de définir le lieu du politique, il repense le statut et la fonction du politique. En son ultime signification, le politique, y compris (...) à travers la doctrine pascalienne des ordres incommensurables atteste la discordance postlapsaire entre la cité de l'homme et la cité de Dieu, entre le royaume de la concupiscence et le royaume de la charité, malgré la figuration du second par le premier. Ce point apparaît de manière plus manifeste encore lorsqu'on compare les positions de Pascal avec celles de Leibniz. L'étude des implications politiques des trois ordres nous conduit à examiner successivement : 1/ L'exemplification des déterminations de la notion d'ordre dans les textes et les fragments politiques et la réforme des concepts politiques. 2/ Les fonctions politiques de la doctrine des ordres : critique et légitimation. 3/ Ordres ou degrés : discordance ou conciliation entre la cité de l'homme et la cité de Dieu. The doctrine of the three orders has theoretical implications in the political field. This does not mean that the said doctrine should be primarily interpreted from a political (or political-sociological) point of view, but on the opposite, that Pascal re-elaborates and redefines political concepts in the light of the doctrine of the three orders. Pascal does not only define the location of the political: he produces a new theory of the status and function of the political. The ultimate meaning of the political interpreted in the light of Pascal's doctrine of the incommensurable orders attests the post-lapsarian discrepancy between the city of man and the city of God, between the kingdom of concupiscence and the kingdom of charity, though the latter is a figure of the former. The latter point is even more manifest when Pascal's positions are compared with those of Leibniz. As we study the political implications of the three orders, we shall successively consider: 1/ The examples of the determinations of the notion of order given in the political texts and fragments and the reform of political concepts. 2/ The political functions of the doctrine of the orders: criticism and legitimation. 3/ Orders or degrees? discrepancy or conciliation between the city of man and the city of God. (shrink)

This article examines the philosophical and theological nuances in the works of Étienne Pascal and Étienne Noël, focusing on their interpretations of Saint Augustine and Jean Duvergier de Hauranne. It explores the concept of antithesis (ἀντίθεσις) in both rhetorical and philosophical contexts, drawing upon Platonic and Aristotelian texts. The article highlights the use of antithesis in Augustine’s explanation of evil and its integration into the universal order, connecting this to 17th-century French thought, especially in relation to Blaise Pascal’s ideas on (...) rhetoric. A critical analysis of Étienne Pascal’s letter to Father Noël is presented, emphasizing his understanding of rhetorical figures, notably metaphor and antithesis, and their theological implications. The discussion extends to Saint-Cyran’s interpretation of Augustine, particularly concerning ecclesiastical guidance and priesthood preparation. The article concludes by underscoring the complex interplay between language, thought, and faith in these historical contexts. (shrink)

Among those enthused by Pascal’s pithy remark that “the heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing” are phenomenological value-theorists. What makes Pascal particularly attractive to these phenomenologists is the suggestion that the heart has reasons, and reasons of its own, which resonates with the quasi-cognitive function that they ascribe to feeling. Feelings apprehend values, which are genuine objects that display an essential order and a rank distinct from the objects of reason. In this paper, I introduce and evaluate (...) Pascal’s reception in phenomenological axiology. I begin by reviewing the philosophical position that for the phenomenological value-theorists corresponds to the Pascalian notion of the order of the heart (I). I then turn to Pascal and explore the notion of the order of the heart, especially in relation to the order of reason, in his thought (II). Finally, I evaluate the legitimacy of the attribution of the phenomenological position to Pascal, arguing that, while there is not a perfect correspondence, there is an affinity that warrants the phenomenologists’ allusions to Pascal (III). (shrink)

As a Catholic nun, to suggest Jacqueline Pascal as autonomous might at first glance seem contradictory. We show that her moral deference to the divine is not at all forfeiting her autonomy, but that aligning her own law with God's law is to align her own law with rationality itself, that is, the laws of nature. Her theoretical structure begins with a theory of virtue—viz., how and to whom we have an obligation to be moral. For her, acting in accordance (...) with cultural restrictions or following church orders against her own conscience would be living by the laws of another and so not acting autonomously. Pascal would not live by other's laws, regardless of whether her actions conform to the categories by which society expected her to act. The framework for her laws laid in Pascal's understanding of self-governance: if she wants to act virtuously then she must autonomously follow God's law by making it her own through the sentiments of her heart. Thus, she cannot live by the laws of men, but by the laws of her human nature and in alignment with a rightly ordered universe, that is, God's law, which we show parallels with a Stoic framework of autonomy. (shrink)

Blaise Pascal is a marquee name, yet little read outside France. Antoine Compagnon provides an ideal introduction to one of the great intellects, contextualizing Pascal in his own time and offering insightful readings of the Pensées and the Provincial Letters. Compagnon proves a welcoming guide to Pascal's challenging and rewarding thought.

Pascal places man at the heart of fundamental “contraries”: “Nature has put us so well in the middle that if we change one side of the scale, we also change the other (…). This makes me believe that there are springs in our head, which are so arranged that whoever touches one also touches the opposite”. The “middle” «which has fallen to us in share» can only be understood through the “divine milieu” and the role of a Mediator: this is (...) how the path of a consent “from ourselves to ourselves” is drawn for man. themselves», peace with God, the joy of salvation, the discovery of the truthfulness of the Gospel, the hope of a new life... It is nothing less than a consent to reality, to the end of a difficult crossing, often obscure and noisy open to a silence which is that of the tested, paradoxical Presence “of a God who hides himself”. (shrink)

Against the “universal consent of the people” and “the crowd of philosophers”, Pascal proves the existence of the void, thus re-establishing the truth where only the force and falsity of opinions had prevailed. Nature “has no repugnance for the void”, it “makes no effort to avoid it” but “admits it without difficulty or resistance”. Pascal defines the void as neither matter nor nothingness. Can this definition be found in Philosophy, in the Anthropology of the Pensées? We would like to show (...) the importance of the notion of the capacity of empty nature, which is decisive when it comes to describing the condition of man, troubled by a desire for truth and happiness that he cannot satisfy. Nature is thus, for him, what is “most contrary” to him, depriving him of what is rightfully his. The void has a cardinal function in Physics, but also in Philosophy. (shrink)

The Apaṇṇaka Sutta, one of the early recorded teachings of the Buddha, contains an argument for accepting the doctrines of karma and rebirth that Buddhist scholars claim anticipates Pascal’s wager. I call this argument the Buddha’s wager. Does it anticipate Pascal’s wager and is it a good bet? Contemporary scholars identify at least four versions of Pascal’s wager in his Pensées. This article demonstrates that the Buddha’s wager anticipates two versions of Pascal’s wager, but not its canonical form. Like Pascal’s (...) wager, the Buddha’s wager presents a decision problem between two opposing theses in an epistemic context that lacks evidence of their truth or falsity. Like Pascal, the Buddha also tries to solve this problem using dominance, superdominance or ‘superduperdominance’ reasoning. The Apaṇṇaka Sutta likely provides the earliest textual example of such reasoning. While the Buddha’s wager does not exhibit the expected utility reasoning of the best-known form of Pascal’s wager, the article suggests a reformulation that parallels Alan Hájek’s (2018) vector-value reformulation. Is it a good bet? This article argues that it is not if this means we are rationally required to accept its recommendation. This is because, while it avoids two of the major objections levelled against Pascal’s wager, it succumbs to one and has at least two problems of its own. (shrink)

In this work, I attempt to outline a critical history of Jansenism and its reception, especially in Pascal. In particular, in the first part, I will outline the interpretive lines that led to the formation of Jansenist thought and its main ideas, concerning the interpretation of predestination. In the second part, I will turn my attention to Jansenism as conceived in Port-Royal, with particular regard to Pascal’s interpretation and use of Jansen’s ideas, especially in relation to the complex dialectical relationship (...) that Pascal’s Jansenism entertains with the sciences. (shrink)

There was more to Blaise Pascal than his "wager," an argument about the existence of God. In this accessible study, philosopher Douglas Groothuis introduces readers to Pascal's life as well as the breadth of his intellectual pursuits, overviewing the key points of his Pensées and exploring his views on culture, politics, and more.

The aim of this paper is to describe and analyse the presence of Pascal’s thought in the work of the Spanish writer José Jiménez Lozano (1930-2020). In fact, it could be considered that this writer is almost a kind of Pascal come alive, especially in terms of understanding and experiencing Christianity, since, for both Pascal and Jiménez Lozano, the orientation of the human soul towards God is not only a part of the essence of man but also is his most (...) definitory anthropological constituent. (shrink)

The doctrine of the three orders which distinguishes and hierarchizes flesh, spirit and charity is obviously one of the major themes of Pascal’s thought. But it appears that Pascal meditates as much on the disorder – and dis-order – induced by sin and the corruption of our nature as on the hierarchy and the heterogeneity of these three kinds of reality. In the world he describes, in fact, not only is everything overturned – the lowest order, that of the flesh, (...) now dominating the other two – but also everything is confused – pleasure, for example, obtaining the credence that normally belongs to science, and the flesh invading the order of the spirit through custom and imagination. To maintain then, as several commentators do, that no interference between the orders is possible, so that tyranny can only exist in the state of desire, is in our view to adopt a more Stoic than Pascalian point of view. For to deny disorder is also, according to Pascal, to deny sin by projecting into the second nature the memory of the first. (shrink)

Pascal founds his interpretation of the Augustinian doctrine of the corruption of human nature on a philosophy of faith inherited from Montaigne: « we are Christians in just the same way as we are Périgordians or Germans » (Essais, II, 12) : this conception of « human faith » is analysed, in turn, by means of concepts drawn from Descartes (passion) and Gassendi (imagination). He thus leads us to a very modern conception of « human faith » – without grace (...) – as being the product of education and habit, a « sentiment » like so many others. (shrink)

In Pascal’s Pensées, at the very end of the so-called “wager” fragment, we find this intriguing remark intended to win once and for all the whole conviction of the “libertine” the apologist is addressing to : “I will tell you that you will win thereby in this life”. This article endeavours to reconsider this remark seriously, as it has been somewhat neglected by the canonical commentaries on the “wager”. We begin by determining the reasons that lead the apologist to this (...) final remark, then we attempt to define its meaning and scope in Pascal’s apologetic project. Next we seek to identify the “gain in this life” that is promised to the libertine who adopts a Christian lifestyle. This leads to study how Pascal analyses joy. To conclude we propose some more general thoughts about the strategies this fragment of Les Pensées suggests to today’s Christian apologetics. (shrink)

In Pascal's God and the Fragments of the World, Martin Nemoianu offers a new interpretation of the thought of Blaise Pascal, drawn from the Pensées and beyond. The book takes Pascal's central theme to be the distinction - Infini rien - between the transcendent God and the created world, which, without God, would be nothing. Nemoianu identifies the distinction in Pascal, articulates it, and works through the difficulties attending the distinction's disclosure. He then considers the implications of the distinction for (...) the nature of nature and the nature of the human being, culminating in the ideal of martyrdom. The book closes with treatment of a closely related theme: the relation between human freedom and divine grace, in the context of the vexed question of Pascal's Jansenism. (shrink)

Le Mystère de la mort de Notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ, by Jacqueline Pascal, constitutes a work of interest, in which not only the literary virtues of Blaise Pascal’s sister are reflected, but also a glimpse of her “phenomenological” capacity. After an approach to the biography of this 17th century author, an analysis of the work and its philosophical and theological scope, in connection with the writings of Blaise Pascal, is presented, as a reference to her genius and the impact of the (...) influence of Port-Royal’s thought. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show the crucial role of Blaise Pascal’s work for the development of Martin Heidegger’s early philosophical project – which lasted until the Turn [Kehre] of the 1930s. The scattered but decisive presence of quotes from the French thinker clearly shows how fundamental he was, both methodologically and content-wise, for Heidegger’s initial elaboration of the question of Being [Seinsfrage] and the Existential Analytic of Dasein [Daseinanalytik].

In his speech presenting Samuel Beckett with the Nobel Prize in Literature, Karl Ragnar Gierow claims that Beckett’s works “can be described as a negativism that cannot desist from descending to the depths.” This “negativism” is best portrayed in Beckett’s 1964 novel How It Is, which follows the character Pim in search of his torturer Pom. Pim’s world is gray and lifeless—along with countless other seekers, he crawls across the muddy terrain “from west to east towards an inexistent peace,” dragging (...) along a rucksack filled with scarce provisions and a can opener. But when Pim pauses to open a tin of sardines, he cannot help but marvel at the movement of his hands: “little swirl of fingers and palms little miracle thanks to which little miracle among so many thanks to which I live on lived on.” For Pim, this subtle gesture defies necessity, explanation, and comprehension, thus yielding evidence that anything can happen. This chapter traces the evolving role of the miracle in Beckett’s oeuvre by examining three moments: Beckett’s composition of Proust in 1930, How It Is in 1964, and Ghost Trio in 1975. By examining Beckett’s notes, manuscripts, and correspondence, this chapter reveals how each of these texts was shaped by Beckett’s fascination with accounts of the miraculous: Pascal’s Pensées on miracles, Arnold Geulincx’s metaphysics of “occasions,” and Heinrich von Kleist’s theory of “divine grace.” As the buried motif guiding his poetics of contingency, the miracle illuminates how Beckett’s works affirm the possibility of radical change even in the face of the darkest, most intractable necessitarianism. (shrink)

A long tradition of criticism, which has its roots in the Romantic era, admires Pascal as a dark, a tortured writer, an incomparable representative of human misery, of the anguish of existence, of the abysses that threaten us all. It is commonly understood that he is a magnificently sinister writer. This perspective, well established today in most minds, in the honest man as well as in the student or teacher, reduces Pascal’s work to a poor apologetic manoeuvre and transforms his (...) anthropology into a one-sided indictment, impressive by its very excesses, which we savour with a shudder. The present study aims: 1) to sketch a genealogy of this error of perspective, 2) to examine its dangers and measure its damage, to indicate why it is not acceptable, and 3) to propose some reflections on the place of the greatness of man in Pascalian anthropology. Three patterns of greatness can be identified in the Pensées: logical, paradoxical and phenomenological. (shrink)

Análisis de la interpretación de Blaise Pascal por parte de Miguel Unamuno, precisando lo que le unió al escritor francés en fondo y forma, y señalando asimismo lo que en realidad les separa. Después de resaltar el estilo compartido por los dos autores, se precisa el contenido de las referencias más importantes de Unamuno a Pascal en diferentes escritos. Todo ello muestra la interpretación de Pascal por parte de Unamuno como un espíritu «atormentado». Dicha interpretación se vio propiciada por el (...) estado de las ediciones de los Pensamientos de Pascal en vida de Unamuno, que no facilitaban distinguir el pensamiento propio de Pascal de su interlocutor, un escéptico al que quería incitar a buscar la fe en Dios. El artículo termina con una referencia a la presencia del argumento de la apuesta de Pascal en la novela San Manuel Bueno, mártir. (shrink)

Nicholas of Cusa and his daringly speculative theology seem odd matches for Blaise Pascal, the constant critic of the philosophies en vogue during his life. A commonality they share is their mutual concern for the apparent disproportion between the infinite God and the finite human. In this paper, I compare and analyse the shape this question takes in Cusanus's De ludo globi and Pascal's Pensées. Both men observe a sort of ‘ludic’ character inherent to the pursuit of bridging finite and (...) infinite. Cusanus's ‘ball game’ realises the universe and the human being's pursuit of salvation as a circular field in which the player seeks to reach the vanishing point of its centre. Pascal likewise portrays human life as a cosmic game that everyone must ‘play’ with their ethical decisions. Ultimately, they both come to register Christ as the agent and object of their games, the divine player who fashions finitude into infinity. I conclude by sketching a way to reconcile Pascal with natural theology based on his universal game. (shrink)

Réimpression inchangée de l'édition originale de 1882.

"Certitude" : le Mémorial -- "Quelle morale la raison devrait dicter sans la lumière de la foi" : l'entretien de M. Pascal avec M. de Sacy -- "La vérité hors de la charité" : du mystère de la pénitence -- "N'y a-t-il point une vérité substantielle?" : infini, rien -- "Qu'on ne prétende pas subtiliser" : les Écrits sur la grâce -- "La maxime de la médisance" : la XVIe Provinciale -- "Ce qui achève notre impuissance" : disproportion de l'homme (...) -- "De nouvelles lumières sur la religion" : la Vie de M. Pascal et De la vraie religion -- De vera religione -- Annexe : "Le chosisme" : Étienne Gilson et Pascal -- "Un portrait porte absence et présence" : De la vraie religion -- "Dans l'ennui" : du divertissement -- "Nous ne nous tenons jamais au temps présent" : du divertissement -- "En lui vous êtes remplis" : la Prière pour le bon usage des maIadies -- L'amitié "sans attachement" : la Vie de M. Pascal. (shrink)

Espinosa e Pascal, respectivamente no proêmio do Tratado da Emenda do Intelecto e no opúsculo Sobre a conversão do pecador, colocam em cena a explicação de um processo que implica a instituição de um novo modo de vida e que representa, para a alma ou para a mente humana, uma profunda renovação de valores. Nessa explicação, ambos os autores abordam temas como a consideração por um bem verdadeiro, a perturbação entre tal consideração e a estima pelo que até então era (...) objeto de deleite, a firme resolução e o desejo de buscar um bem verdadeiro e, por fim, a re fl exão sobre os meios para alcançá-lo. Entretanto, o solo no qual esse processo se desenvolve parece separ á-los, pois em Espinosa a resolução de buscar o bem verdadeiro é inerente ao esforço re fl exivo, ao passo que em Pascal a conversão do pecador não se realiza sem a intervenção da graça. A questão que então se coloca é a de compreender o fundamento da instituição de um novo modo de vida cujo processo, se não parece se originar simplesmente de uma decisão voluntária, não é contudo equivalente para tais autores. (shrink)

Este artículo explora la noción de "inquietud" en la fe cristiana según Blaise Pascal. El autor distingue tres tipos de inquietud en Pascal: la inquietud metafísica ante la muerte, la inquietud espiritual por el extravío del mundo en la diversión, y la inquietud de la salvación y el pecado para el creyente. Pascal describe una auténtica angustia ante la finitud (la muerte) y también ante el pecado (la separación de Dios). Pero más allá, hay en Pascal una inquietud propia del (...) cristiano, que "redobla" su responsabilidad al estar ligado a Dios. En "La conversión del pecador" (1653) aparece la inquietud "de" la fe, el temor ante la posibilidad de creer. Luego, en la experiencia del "Memorial" (1654), surge la inquietud "en" la fe, el miedo a perder a Dios una vez que se ha creído y amado. No basta con creer, sino con perseverar creyendo, en la incertidumbre. El "Memorial" no consagra sólo el recuerdo del pasado, sino la fidelidad a lo sucedido. La paz desaparece en la segunda versión, mostrando que la fe no es un estado permanente. La inquietud es constitutiva de la existencia creyente para Pascal. No se trata de alcanzar la certidumbre, sino de continuar creyendo cuando ya se ha creído. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relations among critique, destruction and negation, on the one hand, and creation, affirmation, love, and care on the other, in Nietzsche’s writings from Daybreak to Zarathustra. In doing this, it traces a movement in Nietzsche's thought that can be understood as an integration of critique in the process of affirmation, which consolidates in Nietzsche’s project of self-overcoming. In contrast to readings that use the metaphor of art and the creativity of the artist, this paper presents (...) pregnancy as a cipher to understand Nietzsche’s project as well as the dynamics that are involved. A key issue addressed throughout the entire paper concerns the way in which Zarathustra says that he loves those who want their own downfall (Untergang) and go “zu Grunde” (or perish). To fully grasp the meaning of these rather puzzling utterances, the paper analyzes Nietzsche's engagement with Pascal (as a very particular case of “going under”). (shrink)

Traditional theistic arguments conclude that God exists. Pragmatic theistic arguments, by contrast, conclude that you ought to believe in God. The two most famous pragmatic theistic arguments are put forth by Blaise Pascal (1662) and William James (1896). Pragmatic arguments for theism can be summarized as follows: believing in God has significant benefits, and these benefits aren’t available for the unbeliever. Thus, you should believe in, or ‘wager on’, God. This article distinguishes between various kinds of theistic wagers, including finite (...) vs. infinite wagers, premortem vs. postmortem wagers, and doxastic vs. acceptance wagers. Then, we’ll turn to the epistemic-pragmatic distinction, and discusses the nuances of James’ argument, and how views like epistemic permissivism and epistemic consequentialism provide unique “hybrid” wagers. Finally, we’ll cover outstanding objections and responses. (shrink)

The text fragments that make up Blaise Pascal's “Penséesˮ are traditionally published in different sequences, according to the difference in the conceptual positions of the editors. So, the problem of correlating different editions is very difficult. Translations of “Penséesˮ reflecting several numbering systems are currently available to Ukrainian readers. The author offers two comparative tables for these numberings. In Table 1, the numberings of Louis Lafuma, Jacques Chevalier and Michel Le Guerne are expressed through the numbering of Leon Brunschvicg, which (...) is currently the most common in Ukraine. In Table 2, Brunschvicg's numbering is correlated with the First Copy of the manuscript, the Port-Royal edition of 1670, as well as editions by Bossuet, Lafuma, Chevalier, Le Guerne, Tournier-Anzieu, and Dolgov. (shrink)

'Non seulement je lis, mais j'aime Pascal.' L'hommage réitéré que Nietzsche adresse au penseur français n'a guère retenu l'attention des commentateurs. Il semble que cette affection ait gêné, dérouté même. Comment, en effet, l' 'anti-chrétien', l'athée 'de rigueur' et 'd'instinct' aurait-il pu sincèrement aimer le pieux janséniste, qui portait le cilice, croyait aux miracles, et consacra les dernières années de sa vie à l'écriture d'une apologie du christianisme? Cette admiration n'a pas été prise au sérieux, parce que tout invitait à (...) y voir une fantaisie, une extravagance, une provocation même, chez ce penseur qui aime tant choquer. Nietzsche nous avertit cependant qu'il se joue bien davantage dans cet attachement, comme en 1885 lorsqu'il écrit : 'Il ne s'est rien passé depuis Pascal : face à lui, les philosophes allemands n'entrent pas en ligne de compte.' Afin d'élucider ce qui pourrait bien apparaître comme une énigme, cette étude entreprend d'examiner la place et le rôle accordés à Pascal dans la pensée de Nietzsche."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Philosophe, moraliste, inventeur de machines et de formes, mathématicien, physicien, théologien, polémiste... Blaise Pascal semble avoir eu mille visages. Mais de lui, finalement, que sait-on vraiment? En suivant l'écrivain pas à pas, de sa naissance à Clermont à sa mort à Paris, Pierre Lyraud nous dévoile les lignes de force d'une vie prématurément écourtée, mais passionnée par la recherche constante d'une vérité blessée par les troubles de son temps. C'est alors un nouveau visage de Pascal qui nous apparaît, celui d'un (...) penseur de la joie et de la grandeur de l'âme humaine; d'un honnête homme soucieux de vulgarisation; d'un ardent chrétien inquiet de l'avenir des autres; d'un plein vivant se rendant peu à peu compte que la vie véritable n'est pas celle du monde. Un parcours inédit dans l'œuvre de l'un des plus grands auteurs français"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Space and time are geometrical notions that Sophie Germain, a French mathematician, discusses on several occasions in her Pensées diverses, however not only in a geometrical way but also in terms of a philosophical and moral understanding: she speaks of a human’s lifespan, the space they occupy, their place in creation and the knowledge toward which they always aim. This mixture of mathematical and philosophical thinking brings out Germain’s dream: she wants to apply the language of numbers to moral and (...) political issues. As such this chapter aims to examine Germain’s mathematical understanding of space and time in order to discover her moral theory. Furthermore, in a purely hypothetical context (because one does not know which authors she has read), I compare Germain’s moral thinking to Pascal’s moral and mathematical thoughts in Pensées. We underline the possible inspiration by Pascal by highlighting the similarities between these authors concerning space and time, which both treat mathematically and philosophically. These authors agree that time and space can be measured, and thus provide constant and mathematically uniform elements. At the same time, time and space provide the framework for moral thinking. The latter is not “capable” of enjoying the present moment; he is on a quest for the future. For Germain, this results into knowledge, but for Pascal, this is a sign of an unhappy life in which people do not find rest and are constantly looking for a diversion. (shrink)