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Summary Brentano introduces the notion of intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, and claims that it is the mark of the mental (in the sense that all and only mental phenomena are intentional); he offers important clarifications in the first appendix to this book published 37 years later in 1911. Scholars have debated whether Brentano changed his view on the nature of intentionality in the interval. It is natural to interpret the earlier passage as implying that intentionality is a relation between mental acts and immanent objects that exist only in the subject's mind; and to interpret the later passage as implying that intentionality is not a relation at all. More recently, however, these interpretations have been contested, with some suggesting that for Brentano intentional objects were always meant to be external and some claiming that Brentano foreshadows the accounts of intentionality as a three-place relation between an act, a content, and an object. More recently, there has also been an interest in whether Brentano's conception of intentionality foreshadowed work on so-called phenomenal intentionality. Other debates also concern the nature and plausibility of Brentano's claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental.
Key works Brentano introduces the notion of intentionality in Chapter 1 of Book II of Brentano 1874; his 1911 appendix on the notion is important (included in the same English edition). From Brentano, the notion propagated into all branches of the Brentano School, but most prominently through the phenomenological movement (see especially Husserl 2012). Other important contributions by Brentano's students include Twardowski 1977 and Meinong 1960. The notion is brought into analytic philosophy and regimented by Chisholm in Chisholm 1957, and later becomes central to philosophy of mind (see, e.g., Searle 1983). For an interpretation of Brentanian intentionality as a relation to immanent objects, see Brandl 2005; for an interpretation of it as not really a relation, see Chisholm 1989 (and, relatedly, Crane 2006). For a recent discussion of its connection to the notion of phenomenal intentionality, see Dewalque 2013. For discussion of Brentano's claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental, see Crane 1998 and Kriegel 2017.
Introductions A seminal presentation, and regimentation, of Brentano's notion of intentionality is offered in Chisholm 1957. Recent partially expository discussions are in Jacquette 2004 and Brandl 2005. A useful historical introduction to the propagation of the notion of intentionality through the Brentano School is offered in Kriegel 2013.
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  1. Brentano on Presenting Something as an Intentional Object.Fisette Denis - forthcoming - In Mariani Zini Fosca (ed.), The Meaning of Something: Rethinking the Logic and the Unity of Metaphysics. Berlin:
    This paper is about the question: what is it for a mental state to mean (or present) something as an intentional object? This issue is addressed from a broad perspective, against the background of Brentano’s philosophical programme in Psychology from an empirical standpoint, and the controversy between the proponents of a non-canonical interpretation of Brentano’s theory of intentionality, and the so-called orthodox interpretation advocated namely by R. Chisholm. My investigation is divided into six parts. In the first section, I explain (...)
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  2. The Epistemology of Intentionality: Notional Constituents Vs. Direct Grasp.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Franz Brentano is well known for highlighting the importance of intentionality, but he said curiously little about the nature of intentionality. According to Mark Textor, there is a deep reason for this: Brentano took intentionality to be a conceptual primitive the nature of which is revealed only in direct grasp. Although there is certainly textual support for this interpretation, it appears in tension with Brentano’s repeated attempts to analyze intentionality in terms of ‘notional constituents’ – aspects of intentionality which cannot (...)
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  3. Brentano on Consciousness, Intentionality, Value, Will, and Emotion: Reply to Symposiasts.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    It is a regrettable feature of this book symposium that it appears only after the book itself. If I could solicit from three outstanding philosophers detailed analyses of substantial portions of the book before publishing it, the book would have been far better. Below, I indicate some of the ways the book would have been better.
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  4. Brentano on Phenomenal and Transitive Consciousness, Unconscious Consciousness, and Phenomenal Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    In Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value, Uriah Kriegel argues that Brentano’s work forms a “live philosophical program” (p. 14, italics omitted) that contemporary philosophy has much to learn from and that is promising and largely correct. To this end, Kriegel argues that Brentano’s notion of consciousness is the contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness, that Brentano’s rejection of unconscious mentality is a grave mistake that can be fairly neatly excised from his overall view, and that Brentano’s notion of intentionality is (...)
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  5. The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non-Intentional Awareness.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The (...)
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  6. Psychology First!Denis Seron - forthcoming - Studien Zur Österreichischen Philosophie.
    Brentano as well as many of his followers — with notable exceptions, especially Husserl — assigned to psychology a foundational role in the edifice of science, including philosophy. My suggestion in the present paper is that this view is a consequence of Brentano’s theory of intentionality. Brentano’s thesis of the intentionality of the mental, I argue, first and foremost expresses a strong epistemological position about what knowledge in general is: all knowledge, whether inner or outer, has its source in “inner (...)
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  7. Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, and Value and Brentano’s Mind.Michelle Montague - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):473-480.
  8. Brentano's Mind. [REVIEW]Giuliano Bacigalupo - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (1):238-239.
  9. Brentano on Perception and Illusion.Guillaume Frechette - 2019 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 119-134.
    Brentano’s philosophy of perception has often been understood as a special chapter of his theory of intentionality. If all and only mental phenomena are constitutively intentional, and if perceptual experience is mental by definition, then all perceptual experiences are intentional experiences. I refer to this conception as the “standard view” of Brentano’s account of perception. Different options are available to support the standard view: a sense-data theory of perception; an adverbialist account; representationalism. I argue that none of them are real (...)
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  10. Relational Intentionality. Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition, by Hamid Taieb. [REVIEW]Andrea Marchesi - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (5):1062-1066.
  11. Brentano's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality.Mark Textor - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):50-68.
    Brentano's Thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental is central to analytic philosophy of mind as well as phenomenology. The contemporary discussion assumes that it is a formulation of an analytic definition of the mental. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. According to Brentano, many philosophical concepts can only be elucidated by perceiving their instances because these concepts are abstracted from perception. The concept of the mental is one of these concepts. We need to understand Brentano's Thesis (...)
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  12. Much Ado About Nothing: Toward a Structural Realist Theory of Intentionality.Majid Beni - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (3):293-308.
    Building upon Brentano’s Psychology from an empirical standpoint. Routledge, London, [1874] Brentano 1995) reintroduction of the concept of intentionality to the contemporary philosophy, Tim Crane has famously presented the intentionality as the mark of the mental. Accordingly, the problem of “intentional existence” has resurfaced in Crane’s revival of the Brentanoian theme. Here, I revise Crane’s construal of Brentano’s notion of intentional inexistence and reinterpret it in terms of a moderate version of relationalism. My relationalist theory of intentionality is inspired by (...)
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  13. Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value.Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Uriah Kriegel presents a rich exploration of the philosophy of the great nineteenth-century thinker Franz Brentano. He locates Brentano at the crossroads where the Anglo-American and continental European philosophical traditions diverged. At the centre of this account of Brentano's philosophy is the connection between mind and reality. Kriegel aims to develop Brentano's central ideas where they are overly programmatic or do not take into account philosophical developments that have taken place since Brentano's death a century ago; and to offer a (...)
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  14. Practical Intentionality: From Brentano to the Phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles.Alessandro Salice - 2018 - In Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 604-622.
    The aim of this chapter is to mine, reconstruct, and evaluate the phenomenological notion of practical intentionality. It is claimed that the phenomenologists of the Munich and Göttingen Circles substantially modify the idea of practical intentionality originally developed by Franz Brentano. This development, it is further contended, anticipates the switch that occurred within contemporary theory of action from a belief-desire to a belief-desire-intention model of deliberation. While Brentanoâ s position can be interpreted as a variant of the BD model, early (...)
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  15. Relational Intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition.Hamid Taieb - 2018 - Cham: Springer.
    This book sheds new light on the history of the philosophically crucial notion of intentionality, which accounts for one of the most distinctive aspects of our mental life: the fact that our thoughts are about objects. Intentionality is often described as a certain kind of relation. Focusing on Franz Brentano, who introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy, and on the Aristotelian tradition, which was Brentano’s main source of inspiration, the book reveals a rich history of debate on precisely the relational (...)
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  16. Brentano on Intentionality.Tim Crane - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 41-48.
    Brentano’s account of what he called intentionale Inexistenz — what we now call intentionality — is without question one of the most important parts of his philosophy, and one of the most influential ideas in late 19th-century philosophy. Here I will explain how this idea figures in Brentano’s central text, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Brentano 1995a). I will then briefly explain how Brentano’s ideas about intentionality evolved after the first publication of this work in 1874, and how they were (...)
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  17. Brentano on Appearance and Reality.Seron Denis - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge.
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  18. Knowing Things in Themselves.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):332-358.
    A perennial epistemological question is whether things can be known just as they are in the absence of any awareness of them. This epistemological question is posterior to ontological considerations and more specific ones pertaining to mind. In light of such considerations, the author propounds a naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge of things in themselves, one that makes crucial use of the work of Brentano. After introducing the resources provided by Brentano’s study of mind, the author reveals the ontological (...)
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  19. The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2017 - London and New York: Routledge.
    Both through his own work and that of his students, Franz Clemens Brentano had an often underappreciated influence on the course of 20 th - and 21 st -century philosophy. _The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School_ offers full coverage of Brentano’s philosophy and his influence. It contains 38 brand-new essays from an international team of experts that offer a comprehensive view of Brentano’s central research areas—philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and value theory—as well as of the principal (...)
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  20. Brentano's Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - In Sandra Lapointe & Christopher Pincock (eds.), Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 197-228.
    Perhaps the philosophical thesis most commonly associated with Brentano is that intentionality is the mark of the mental. But in fact Brentano often and centrally uses also what he calls ‘inner perception’ to demarcate the mental. In this paper, I offer a new interpretation of Brentano’s conception of the interrelations between mentality, intentionality, and inner perception. According to this interpretation, Brentano took the concept of mind to be a natural-kind concept, with intentionality constituting the underlying nature of the mental and (...)
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  21. Meinong and Brentano.Johann Christian Marek - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 272-282.
  22. Brentano on Sensations and Sensory Qualities.Massin Olivier - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 87-96.
    This chapter has three sections. The first introduces Brentano’s view of sensations by presenting the intentional features of sensations irreducible to features of the sensory objects. The second presents Brentano’s view of sensory objects —which include sensory qualities— and the features of sensations that such objects allow to explain, such as their intensity. The third section presents Brentano’s approach to sensory pleasures and pains, which combines both appeal to specific modes of reference and to specific sensory qualities.
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  23. Intentionality and Reference: A Brentanian Distinction.Hamid Taieb - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):120-132.
    Brentano distinguishes between intentionality and reference. According to Brentano, all mental acts are intentionally directed toward something. Some mental acts also refer to something, which is the case when their object exists in reality. For Brentano, such acts, besides their intentionality, have a peculiar relation of similarity to their object. However, there is no mention of Brentano’s distinction between intentionality and reference in the literature. Drawing on some lesser known texts, this paper aims both at showing that Brentano makes such (...)
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  24. The Intentionality of Sensation and the Problem of Classification of Philosophical Sciences in Brentano’s Empirical Psychology.Ion Tănăsescu - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (3):243-263.
    In the well-known intentionality quote of his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano characterises the mental phenomena through the following features: the intentional inexistence of an object, the relation to a content, and the direction toward an object. The text argues that this characterisation is not general because the direction toward an object does not apply to the mental phenomena of sensation. The second part of the paper analyses the consequences that ensue from here for the Brentanian classification of mental (...)
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  25. Brentano's Mind.Mark Textor - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Mark Textor presents a critical study of the work of Franz Brentano, one of the most important thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work has influenced analytic philosophers like Russell as well as phenomenologists like Husserl and Sartre, and continues to shape debates in the philosophy of mind. Brentano made intentionality a central topic in the philosophy of mind by proposing that 'directedness' is the distinctive feature of the mental. The first part of the book investigates Brentano's intentionalism as well (...)
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  26. Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (2):1-15.
    The notion of intentionality is what Franz Brentano is best known for. But disagreements and misunderstandings still surround his account of its nature. In this paper, I argue that Brentano’s mature account of the nature of intentionality construes it, not as a two-place relation between a subject and an object, nor as a three-place relation between a subject’s act, its object, and a ‘content,’ but as an altogether non-relational, intrinsic property of subjects. I will argue that the view is more (...)
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  27. Act and Intentionality.Benjamin Sheredos - 2016 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    Understanding the “intentionality” of mental phenomena is widely regarded as a key problem in philosophy of mind. Franz Brentano (along with his students, especially Edmund Husserl) is widely credited with bringing intentionality to philosophers’ attention. In early treatment by the Brentano school, intentionality is at least nominally understood as executed, brought about, or achieved in mental acts. And in the early 20th century, historians of psychology regarded this “act conception” of intentionality as integral for understanding the phenomenon. Yet the secondary (...)
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  28. Brentano's Act Psychology Was Not Aristotelian (or Else, Not Empirical).Benjamin Sheredos - 2016 - Brentano Studien 14:157-189.
  29. Brentano or Husserl? Intentionality, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness in Contemporary Phenomenology of Mind.Federico Boccaccini - 2015 - Archivio Di Filosofia (3):189-202.
  30. The Paradox of Objectless Presentations in Early Phenomenology: A Brief History of the Intentional Object From Bolzano to Husserl With Concise Analyses of the Positions of Brentano, Frege, Twardowski and Meinong.George Heffernan - 2015 - Studia Phaenomenologica 15:67-91.
    This paper explores the close connection in early phenomenology between the problem of objectless presentations and the concept of intentional objects. It clarifies how this basic concept of Husserl’s early phenomenology emerged within the horizons of Bolzano’s logical objectivism, Brentano’s descriptive psychology, Frege’s mathematical logicism, Twardowski’s psychological representationalism, and Meinong’s object theory. It shows how in collaboration with these thinkers Husserl argued that a theory of intentionality is incomplete without a concept of the intentional object. It provides a brief history (...)
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  31. Improper Intentions of Ambiguous Objects: Sketching a New Approach to Brentano’s Intentionality.Carlo Ierna - 2015 - Brentano Studien:55–80.
    In this article I will begin by discussing recent criticism, by Mauro Antonelli and Werner Sauer, of the ontological interpretation of Franz Brentano’s concept of intentionality, as formulated by i.a. Roderick Chisholm. I will then outline some apparent inconsistencies of the positions advocated by Antonelli and Sauer with Brentano’s formulations of his theory in several works and lectures. This new evaluation of (unpublished) sources will then lead to a sketch of a new approach to Brentano’s theory of intentionality. Specifically, it (...)
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  32. A Problem of the Intentional Relation of Presentation in Brentano’s Empirical Psychology.Tanasescu Ion - 2015 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 77 (2):251-271.
    In this paper, I argue that Brentano’s analysis of the mental act of presentation faces a major difficulty. Specifically, Brentano provides a description of the intentional relation of presentation that neglects an important difference between sensory presentation and nominal presentation. I also maintain that there are four kinds of intentional relations in Brentano’s empirical psychology: 1) intentional relation as a genus, 2) the relation of bare intentional containing of sensory presentation, 3) the relation of signification proper to nominal presentation, and (...)
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  33. Origins of Gegenstandstheorie: Immanent and Transcendent Intended Objects in Brentano, Twardowski, and Meinong.Dale Jacquette - 2015 - In Alexius Meinong, the Shepherd of Non-Being. Springer Verlag.
  34. Relations and Intentionality in Brentano’s Last Texts.Hamid Taieb - 2015 - Brentano-Studien 13:183-210.
    This paper will present an analysis of the relational aspect of Brentano’s last theory of intentionality. My main thesis is that Brentano, at the end of his life, considered relations (relatives) without existent terms to be genuine relations (relatives). Thus, intentionality is a non-reducible real relation (the thinking subject is a non-reducible real relative) regardless of whether or not the object exists. I will use unpublished texts from the Brentanian Nachlass to support my argument.
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  35. The Bounds of Object: The Brentano-Meinong Dispute, A Priori Knowledge, and the Power of Perception.C. Zielinska Anna & Boccaccini Federico - 2015 - In Denis Seron, Sebastien Richard & Bruno Leclercq (eds.), Objects and Pseudo-Objects: Ontological Deserts and Jungles From Brentano to Carnap. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 17-50.
  36. Kotarbiński’s Strong Minimalist Ontology.Anna C. Zielinska - 2015 - In Denis Seron, Sebastien Richard & Bruno Leclercq (eds.), Objects and Pseudo-Objects Ontological Deserts and Jungles from Brentano to Carnap. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 17-50.
    Ontological reism remains a defensible metaphysical position, and Kotarbiński’s unwillingness to propose a more robust defence of his views has some identifiable historical causes, i.e. his post-war engagement in practical philosophy (both praxeology and ethics), more relevant in the context of a war-ravaged country. There is however one more reason why it remains difficult to justify the ontological part of the doctrine. Kotarbiński assumes indeed that “the fundamental justification of concretism is both naively intuitive and ordinarily inductive” (Kotarbiński 1958, 402). (...)
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  37. Intentionnalité in obliquo.Arnaud Dewalque - 2014 - Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 10 (6):40-84.
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  38. The Origins of the Phenomenology of Pain: Brentano, Stumpf and Husserl.Saulius Geniusas - 2014 - Continental Philosophy Review 47 (1):1-17.
    The following investigation aims to determine the historical origins of the phenomenology of pain. According to my central thesis, these origins can be traced back to an enthralling discussion between Husserl and two of his most important teachers, Brentano and Stumpf. According to my reconstruction of this discussion, while Brentano defended the view that all feelings, including pain, are intentional experiences, and while Stumpf argued that pain is a non-intentional feeling-sensation, Husserl of the Logical Investigations provides compelling resources to resolve (...)
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  39. Two Views on Intentionality, Immortality, and the Self in Brentano’s Philosophy of Mind.Sonia Kamińska - 2014 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):25-42.
    This paper is devoted to Franz Brentano’s conception of intentionality, and aims to reveal some of its lesser known aspects, like the implications of his studies for our understanding of Aristotle’s psychology. I try to show two “currents” in Brentano’s thought: beside what is widely known as Franz Brentano’s philosophy of mind, I also present the Aristotelian side of his thinking. Each of these currents, which I call A and B, makes different assumptions about the ontological status of the soul (...)
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  40. Intencionalumas – Įminimo Raktas Ar Esminė Problema?Andrei Lauruhin - 2014 - Problemos 66 (1).
    This investigation sets for itself the task of a critical reconsideration of the concept of intentionality in the descriptive psychology of Brentano and in the phenomenology of Husserl. The author focuses his attention on two problems: that of the ontological basis under an idea of “intentionale Inexistenz” of Brentano and that of the constitution of an individual thing in phenomenology of Husserl. The analysis discloses methodical and metaphysical assumptions of intentional analyses of Brentano and of Husserl.
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  41. Titchener Versus Brentzano : Quelques Objections Fortes Contre l'Intentionalité En Psychologie.Denis Seron - 2014 - In C.-E. Niveleau (ed.), Vers une philosophie scientifique. Le programme de Brentano. Demopolis.
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  42. Why Should Inexistent Objects Be a Problem?Jocelyn Benoist - 2013 - In Alessandro Salice (ed.), Intentionality: Historical and Systematic Perspectives'. Philosophia Verlag.
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  43. We Owe It to Sigwart! A New Look at the Content/Object Distinction in Early Phenomenological Theories of Judgment From Brentano to Twardowski.Arianna Betti - 2013 - In Mark Textor (ed.), Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. Palgrave. pp. 74.
  44. Brentano and Aristotle on the Ontology of Intentionality.A. Chrudzimski - 2013 - In Fisette Denis & Fréchette Guillaume (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi.
    It is often claimed that Brentano’s rediscovery of intentionality has been strongly influenced by Aristotle. Brentano himself stressed repeatedly his affinity to Aristotle and this self-interpretation was by no means restricted to the theory of intentionality. In fact, Brentano seemed to believe that almost all of what he had discovered during his most influential years (1874–1895) has its more or less remote roots in the philosophy of Aristotle. Yet if we carefully compare the picture of intentionality that is to be (...)
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  45. Varieties of Intentional Objects.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2013 - Semiotica 2013 (194):189–206.
    In this paper I propose a certain classification of entities which are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label ‘intentional objects’. Franz Brentano’s immanent objects, Alexius Meinong’s entities ‘beyond being and non-being’, or Roman Ingarden’s purely intentional objects can serve as examples of such entities. What they all have in common is that they have been introduced in order to extensionalise the so called ‘intentional contexts’ (‘intentional’ with ‘t’). But not all entities which function this way deserve the (...)
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  46. Brentano and the Parts of the Mental: A Mereological Approach to Phenomenal Intentionality.Arnaud Dewalque - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):447-464.
    In this paper, I explore one particular dimension of Brentano’s legacy, namely, his theory of mental analysis. This theory has received much less attention in recent literature than the intentionality thesis or the theory of inner perception. However, I argue that it provides us with substantive resources in order to conceptualize the unity of intentionality and phenomenality. My proposal is to think of the connection between intentionality and phenomenality as a certain combination of part/whole relations rather than as a supervenience (...)
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  47. Themes From Brentano.Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.) - 2013 - Editions Rodopi.
    Franz Brentano’s impact on the philosophy of his time and on 20th-century philosophy is considerable. The “sharp dialectician” (Freud) and “genial master” (Husserl) influenced philosophers of various allegiances, being acknowledged not only as the “grandfather of phenomenology” (Ryle) but also as an analytic philosopher “in the best sense of this term” (Chisholm). The fourteen new essays gathered together in this volume give an insight in three core issues of Brentano’s philosophy: consciousness (sect.1), intentionality (sect. 2) and ontology and metaphysics (sect. (...)
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  48. Brentano's Thesis (Revisited).Guillaume Frechette - 2013 - In D. Fisette & G. Frechette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi. pp. 91-119.
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  49. Kant, Brentano and Stumpf on Psychology and Anti-Psychologism.Guillaume Fréchette - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 727-736.
  50. Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present: Introductory.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):437-444.
    This is an introduction to a special issue on the history of phenomenal intentionality.
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