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Summary Brentano introduces the notion of intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, and claims that it is the mark of the mental (in the sense that all and only mental phenomena are intentional); he offers important clarifications in the first appendix to this book published 37 years later in 1911. Scholars have debated whether Brentano changed his view on the nature of intentionality in the interval. It is natural to interpret the earlier passage as implying that intentionality is a relation between mental acts and immanent objects that exist only in the subject's mind; and to interpret the later passage as implying that intentionality is not a relation at all. More recently, however, these interpretations have been contested, with some suggesting that for Brentano intentional objects were always meant to be external and some claiming that Brentano foreshadows the accounts of intentionality as a three-place relation between an act, a content, and an object. More recently, there has also been an interest in whether Brentano's conception of intentionality foreshadowed work on so-called phenomenal intentionality. Other debates also concern the nature and plausibility of Brentano's claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental.
Key works Brentano introduces the notion of intentionality in Chapter 1 of Book II of Brentano 1874; his 1911 appendix on the notion is important (included in the same English edition). From Brentano, the notion propagated into all branches of the Brentano School, but most prominently through the phenomenological movement (see especially Husserl 2012). Other important contributions by Brentano's students include Twardowski 1977 and Meinong 1960. The notion is brought into analytic philosophy and regimented by Chisholm in Chisholm 1957, and later becomes central to philosophy of mind (see, e.g., Searle 1983). For an interpretation of Brentanian intentionality as a relation to immanent objects, see Brandl 2005; for an interpretation of it as not really a relation, see Chisholm 1989 (and, relatedly, Crane 2006). For a recent discussion of its connection to the notion of phenomenal intentionality, see Dewalque 2013. For discussion of Brentano's claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental, see Crane 1998 and Kriegel forthcoming.
Introductions A seminal presentation, and regimentation, of Brentano's notion of intentionality is offered in Chisholm 1957. Recent partially expository discussions are in Jacquette 2004 and Brandl 2005. A useful historical introduction to the propagation of the notion of intentionality through the Brentano School is offered in Kriegel 2013.
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  1. Intentionality in Brentano.Frederick J. Adelmann - 1964 - Modern Schoolman 41 (4):375-383.
  2. What Is Intentionality and Who Has Intentions in a Structuralist Model of Knowledge, Action and Thought.Hans Aebli - 1984 - Dialectica 38 (2‐3):231-242.
    The philosophical core of a psychological theory of cognitive processes is developped and commented, focussing on the problem of intentionality, this term being taken in the normal and in the phenomenological sense. Actions, perceived processes, their states and results, operations and concepts are seen as related insofar as they all establish relations between elements, are generated by construction and can be objectivated. These acts and/or the objectives that control them, are intentional insofar as their structure is activated. Such activation is (...)
  3. D. MÜNCH "Intention Und Zeichen. Untersuchungen Zu Franz Brentano Und Zu Edmund Husserls Frühwerk". [REVIEW]L. Albertazzi - 1995 - History and Philosophy of Logic 16 (2):272.
  4. Immanent Realism: An Introduction to Brentano.Liliana Albertazzi - 2006 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This book guides the readers through Brentano's life and works, investigating into the inherent complexity of both his view of mental life and the related methodology.
  5. Retrieving Intentionality: A Legacy From the Brentano School.Liliana Albertazzi - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 89:291.
  6. Introduzione a Brentano.Liliana Albertazzi - 1999 - Laterza.
  7. Dieter Münch, Intention Und Zeichen. Untersuchungen Zu Franz Brentano Und Zu Edmund Husserls Frühwerk, Frankfurt A. Main, Suhrkamp, 1993. [REVIEW]Liliana Albertazzi - 1995 - Axiomathes 6 (1):123-135.
  8. La doctrina de la intencionalidad en Franz Brentano.Aquilina Satue Alvarez - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 18 (4):480-480.
  9. Thoughts Concerning Anton Marty's Early Conception of Intentionality. Was He Thinking What Brentano Was Thinking?M. Antonelli - 2012 - Quaestio 12:233-241.
    The paper focuses on a specific point addressed in the previous article of L. Cesalli and H. Taieb The road to “ideelle Verähnlichung”, namely, the correctness of Marty’s interpretation of the early (pre-reistic) Brentanian conception of intentionality. Moving from the distinction between immanent (or intentional) object and intentional correlate, as developed by Brentano in his lectures on Descriptive Psychology, and referring to Aristotelian theory of relativa, which Brentano always remained faithful to, I show that Marty interpreted Brentano’s early conception of (...)
  10. Univocità dell'essere e intenzionalità del conoscere: Saggio critico sulla genesi e sulle fonti del pensiero di Franz Brentano.M. Antonelli - 1990 - Giornale Critico Della Filosofia Italiana 10 (1):101-123.
  11. Univocity of Being and Intentionality of Knowledge-Critical-Essay on the Genesis and Sources of the Thought of Brentano, Franz.M. Antonelli - 1990 - Giornale Critico Della Filosofia Italiana 10 (1):101-123.
  12. Franz Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis.Mauro Antonelli - 2012 - In A. Salice (ed.), Intentionality: Historical and Systematic Perspectives. Philosophia Verlag.
  13. Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty. Wege Und Abwege Eines Brentano-Schulers.Mauro Antonelli - 2011 - In A. Marty (ed.), Deskriptive Psychologie. Konigshausen & Neumann.
  14. Franz Brentano et l'"inexistence intentionnelle".Mauro Antonelli - 2009 - Philosophiques 36 (2):467-487.
    La thèse de l’« inexistence intentionnelle » formulée par Brentano a été traditionnellement interprétée comme une théorie de la « relation intentionnelle », autrement dit de la relation entre l’acte mental et son « objet immanent » ou « intentionnel », c’est-à-dire interne à la conscience. Se fondant sur la lecture du fameux passage sur l’intentionnalité de la Psychologie du point de vue empirique , le présent article démontre que l’interprétation ontologique de la théorie de l’intentionnalité du premier Brentano est (...)
  15. Seiendes, Bewußtsein, Intentionalit Im Frühwerk von Franz Brentano.Mauro Antonelli - 2001 - K. Alber.
  16. Franz Brentano und die Wiederentdeckung der Intentionalität.Mauro Antonelli - 2000 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 58:93-117.
    Ausgehend von Franz Brentanos berühmter Intentionalitätspassage aus der Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt wird dargelegt, daß die vorherrschende ontologische Deutung seines sogenannten frühen Intentionalitätsgedankens unhaltbar ist. Unter Berücksichtigung von Brentanos Quellen, vor allem Aristoteles' Wahmehmungslehre und Theorie der Relativa, wird die Auffassung des sogenannten intentionalen bzw. immanenten Objektes als bewußtseinsimmanenter Entität abgelehnt und die Kontinuität hervorgehoben, die zwischen Brentanos früher und späterer, sogenannter reistischer Intentionalitätsauffassung besteht.
  17. Intentional Objects and Kantian Appearances.Richard E. Aquila - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (2):9-37.
  18. Intentionality: A Study Of Mental Acts.Richard E. Aquila - 1976 - Penn St University Press.
    This book is a critical and analytical survey of the major attempts, in modern philosophy, to deal with the phenomenon of intentionality—those of Descartes, Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Frege, Russell, Bergmann, Chisholm, and Sellars. By coordinating the semantical approaches to the phenomenon, Dr. Aquila undertakes to provide a basis for dialogue among philosophers of different persuasions. "Intentionality" has become, since Franz Brentano revived its original medieval use, the standard term describing the mind's apparently paradoxical capacity to relate itself to objects existing (...)
  19. Brentano, Descartes, and Hume on Awareness.Richard E. Aquila - 1974 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (2):223-239.
    BRENTANO'S CLAIMS ABOUT INTENTIONALITY DO NOT BEAR SOLELY\nON A CONCERN WITH THE POSITIVE NATURE OF MENTAL STATES.\nTHEY ALSO HAVE NO BEARING ON THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL/MATERIAL\nIDENTITY. PART OF THEIR POINT IS JUST TO OPPOSE A CERTAIN\nVIEW ABOUT THE PROPER OBJECTS OF AWARENESS, NAMELY THAT\nINSOFAR AS WE ARE AWARE OF OBJECTS THEY HAVE AN EXISTENCE\n"IN THE MIND." BOTH HUME AND DESCARTES HELD SUCH A VIEW. AN\nEXAMINATION OF THE NOTIONS OF "IDEA" AND "OBJECTIVE\nREALITY" SHOWS THE INACCURACY OF REGARDING DESCARTES AS A\n"REPRESENTATIVE REALIST." (...)
  20. The Status of Intentional Objects.Richard E. Aquila - 1971 - New Scholasticism 45 (3):427-456.
  21. Austrian Phenomenology: Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object. [REVIEW]Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray - 2011 - Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale 15 (2):209-212.
  22. Intensionality and Intentionality.Stephen F. Barker - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
    This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis (that all and only mental phenomena are intentional) will not be (...)
  23. Intensionality and Intentionality.Stephen F. Barker - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
    This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis will not be strictly true. However, intentional descriptions will always be (...)
  24. Le « jugement motivé » et son intensité.Bernard Barsotti - 2005 - Archives de Philosophie 2005 (68):465-491.
    Dans sa Psychologie d’un point de vue empirique (côté 1874,1911,1914-1917), Brentano a jeté les bases d’une conception intentionnelle des actes de conscience. Mais où se situe, exactement, la contribution, plus ou moins contestée, de la Psychologie à la conception phénoménologique, husserlienne, de l’intentionnalité? En suivant l’évolution des analyses brentaniennes, on découvre que son apport se confirme moins du côté de la conscience noétique, selon la vision habituelle, que du côté de l’objet intentionnel, auquel Brentano donne un tout nouveau statut ontologique (...)
  25. De Leibniz à Brentano: naissance et fin du rêve d'une chimie des représentations.Bernard Barsotti - 2003 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 85 (2):131-151.
  26. Brentano's Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and Phenomenological Readings.Philip J. Bartok - 2005 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (4):437-460.
    : Philosophers in the analytic and phenomenological traditions have interpreted Brentano's intentionality thesis, and his empirical psychology more generally, in significantly different ways. Disregarding Brentano's distinctive psychological method, analytic philosophers have typically read him as a philosopher of mind, and his intentionality thesis as a contribution to the Cartesian project of clarifying the distinction between the mental and the physical. Phenomenologists, while more attentive to his method, tended to read Brentano as merely Òon the wayÓ to a truly phenomenological approach. (...)
  27. Act, Object, and Content.Wilhelm Baumgartner - 1996 - In Liliana Albertazzi, Massimo Libardi & Roberto Poli (eds.), The School of Franz Brentano. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  28. Intenzionalità, verità ed evidenza secondo Franz Brentano.A. Bausola - 1967 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 59:275.
  29. Review: Natuhiko Yosida, On Brentano's Thesis and Psychologism. [REVIEW]Charles A. Baylis - 1967 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (3):405-406.
  30. Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality.George Bealer - 1996 - In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
    After a brief history of Brentano's thesis of intentionality, it is argued that intentionality presents a serious problem for materialism. First, it is shown that, if no general materialist analysis (or reduction) of intentionality is possible, then intentional phenomena would have in common at least one nonphysical property, namely, their intentionality. A general analysis of intentionality is then suggested. Finally, it is argued that any satisfactory general analysis of intentionality must share with this analysis a feature which entails the existence (...)
  31. Why Should Inexistent Objects Be a Problem?Jocelyn Benoist - 2013 - In Alessandro Salice (ed.), Intentionality: Historical and Systematic Perspectives'. Philosophia Verlag.
  32. Two (or Three) Conceptions of Intentionality.Jocelyn Benoist - 2007 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (1):79-103.
    Except for some eliminativists, the notion of intentionality is considered to be oneof the common goods of 20th century philosophy of mind. However, this rather general label may hide deeper differences. In his 'Husserl Memorial Lecture' Jocelyn Benoist investigates the different possible conceptions of intentionality and the problem of its nature. To examine this question he concurs with Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell by positing an alternative between two conceptions of intentionality, taken either as a relation or not. From this (...)
  33. Sprachkritik ou sémantique : sur le schisme de l'école brentanienne.Jocelyn Benoist - 2003 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 64 (1):35.
    The author studies the last period of Brentano’s thought and its characteristic refusal of semantic entities. During this « reist » period, Brentano fought against the idea of something like the « content » of a judgement. Confronting this conception, according to which nothing is but what is real, with the one of the « semantic objectivism », exemplified by Bolzano and Husserl, the author underlines the split which divides the so-called Austrian philosophical tradition.
  34. We Owe It to Sigwart! A New Look at the Content/Object Distinction in Early Phenomenological Theories of Judgment From Brentano to Twardowski.Arianna Betti - 2013 - In Mark Textor (ed.), Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. Palgrave. pp. 74.
  35. Intentionality, Brentano and Bain's Psychology.Boccaccini Federico - unknown
  36. Brentano or Husserl? Intentionality, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness in Contemporary Phenomenology of Mind.Federico Boccaccini - 2016 - Archivio Di Filosofia (3):189-202.
  37. Intentionnalité et intentionalisme: la référence mentale chez Brentano.Federico Boccaccini - 2010 - Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 6 (8).
  38. Intentionality.Johannes Brandl - 1996 - In Liliana Albertazzi, Massimo Libardi & Roberto Poli (eds.), The School of Franz Brentano. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  39. The Immanence Theory of Intentionality.Johannes L. Brandl - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 167.
  40. The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena (Excerpt).Franz Brentano - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa.
  41. Von der Natur der Vorstellung.Franz Brentano - 1987 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 21 (53/54):25-31.
  42. Sechs Briefe an A. Meinong.Franz Brentano - 1965 - In R. Kindinger (ed.), Philosophenbriefe: Aus der wissenschaftlichen Korrespondenz von A. Meinong. Akademische Druck u. Verlagsanstalt.
  43. Psychologie du point de vue empirique.Franz Brentano - 1944 - Montaigne.
    Dans son ouvrage de 1874, repris et complété en 1911, puis augmenté à nouveau par une série d’appendices tardifs, dans l’édition procurée par Oscar Kraus, en 1924, Brentano n’est pas seulement celui qui ouvre le dossier très complet des questions psychologiques débattues dans l’après-Kant et jusqu’à la fin du XIXe siècle, dans l’espace intellectuel germanique, mais aussi et principalement anglophone; pas seulement celui qui, à la faveur de la redéfinition, à la fois très ancienne et novatrice, des phénomènes psychiques, caractérisés (...)
  44. Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene.Franz Brentano - 1911 - Duncker Und Humblot.
  45. Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint.Franz Brentano - 1874 - Routledge.
  46. Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte.Franz Brentano - 1874 - Duncker Und Humblot.
    Im Zentrum der 1874 erschienenen bewußtseinspsychologischen Abhandlungen Brentanos steht die Beschreibung und Analyse des Psychischen. Damit bahnte sich jene Abwendung von der sensualistischen Tradition der philosophischen Bewußtseinslehre an, die in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls vollendet wurde.
  47. Conscience et intentionnalité d'après saint Thomas et Brentano.S. Breton - 1955 - Archives de Philosophie 19:63.
  48. Brentano's Argument for Reismus.Terrell Dailey Burnham - 1966 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20:446-459.
  49. Franz Brentano: Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. [REVIEW]W. Caldwell & Oskar Kraus - 1926 - Philosophical Review 35 (2):189.
  50. Intencionalidad sin conciencia: Brentano, Searle y las ciencias cognitivas.Oscar Lucas González Castán - 1992 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 7 (2):99-118.
    In this paper, I shall argue that both cognitivism and liberal contractualism defend a pre-moral conception of human desire that has its origin in the Hobbesian and Humean tradition that both theories share. Moreover, the computational and syntactic themes in cognitive science support the notion, which Gauthier evidently shares, that the human mind – or, in Gauthier’s case, the mind of “economic man” – is a purely formal mechanism, characterized by logical and mathematical operations. I shall conclude that a single (...)
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