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Summary Brentano introduces the notion of intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, and claims that it is the mark of the mental (in the sense that all and only mental phenomena are intentional); he offers important clarifications in the first appendix to this book published 37 years later in 1911. Scholars have debated whether Brentano changed his view on the nature of intentionality in the interval. It is natural to interpret the earlier passage as implying that intentionality is a relation between mental acts and immanent objects that exist only in the subject's mind; and to interpret the later passage as implying that intentionality is not a relation at all. More recently, however, these interpretations have been contested, with some suggesting that for Brentano intentional objects were always meant to be external and some claiming that Brentano foreshadows the accounts of intentionality as a three-place relation between an act, a content, and an object. More recently, there has also been an interest in whether Brentano's conception of intentionality foreshadowed work on so-called phenomenal intentionality. Other debates also concern the nature and plausibility of Brentano's claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental.
Key works Brentano introduces the notion of intentionality in Chapter 1 of Book II of Brentano 1874; his 1911 appendix on the notion is important (included in the same English edition). From Brentano, the notion propagated into all branches of the Brentano School, but most prominently through the phenomenological movement (see especially Husserl 1931). Other important contributions by Brentano's students include Twardowski 1977 and Meinong 1904. The notion is brought into analytic philosophy and regimented by Chisholm in Chisholm 1957, and later becomes central to philosophy of mind (see, e.g., Searle 1983). For an interpretation of Brentanian intentionality as a relation to immanent objects, see Brandl 2005; for an interpretation of it as not really a relation, see Chisholm 1988 (and, relatedly, Crane 2006). For a recent discussion of its connection to the notion of phenomenal intentionality, see Dewalque 2013. For discussion of Brentano's claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental, see Crane 1998 and Kriegel 2017.
Introductions A seminal presentation, and regimentation, of Brentano's notion of intentionality is offered in Chisholm 1957. Recent partially expository discussions are in Jacquette 2004 and Brandl 2005. A useful historical introduction to the propagation of the notion of intentionality through the Brentano School is offered in Kriegel 2013.
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  1. Intentionality: from Brentano to representationalism.Michelle Montague - forthcoming - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries. Routledge.
  2. Psychology first!Denis Seron - forthcoming - Studien Zur Österreichischen Philosophie.
    Brentano as well as many of his followers — with notable exceptions, especially Husserl — assigned to psychology a foundational role in the edifice of science, including philosophy. My suggestion in the present paper is that this view is a consequence of Brentano’s theory of intentionality. Brentano’s thesis of the intentionality of the mental, I argue, first and foremost expresses a strong epistemological position about what knowledge in general is: all knowledge, whether inner or outer, has its source in “inner (...)
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  3. Franz Brentano’s Conception of the Object and its Intentional Inexistence.Mauro Antonelli - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (1-2):79-112.
    In line with earlier works, this article argues for a “continuist” interpretation of Brentano’s conception of intentionality. It maintains that Brentano’s conception of intentionality rests on a complex set of notions, which are reduced to a minimal core or applied more fully depending on the complexity of the mental phenomenon under consideration and perspective from which it is analyzed. The article positions this conceptual structure in relation to theories of objects developed within the framework of late- and Neo-Scholastic philosophy where, (...)
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  4. Franz Brentano: Die intentionale Beziehung und die Bedeutung der Namen und Aussagen.Joelma Marques de Carvalho, Johannes L. Brandl & Carlo Ierna - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (1-2):8-53.
    In this article I provide an overview of the many different terms that Brentano sometimes uses as synonyms or as explanations for “intentional inexistence”. The many terms associated with intentional inexistence appear in many different contexts, and we can conclude that Brentano uses these terms primarily to describe a property that is accidental and dependent on the subject from which it arises and with which it passes away. Ontologically, both properties and substances exist, but the former requires a substance (the (...)
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  5. Das intentionale Objekt als Unding.Carlo Ierna - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (1-2):113-130.
    The so-called “intentional object” occupies a central position in the debates about intentionality in Brentano and the Brentano School. How does it relate to the correlate, the content, or the intended, possibly external, transcendent object? Does it perhaps even coincide with one of these? There was no clear consensus on this neither in Brentano’s time nor today. In order to develop a new perspective on the problem of the intentional object, I would like to introduce a deliberately radical interpretation and (...)
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  6. The epistemology of intentionality: notional constituents vs. direct grasp.Uriah Kriegel - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1386-1403.
    Franz Brentano is well known for highlighting the importance of intentionality, but he said curiously little about the nature of intentionality. According to Mark Textor, there is a deep reason for this: Brentano took intentionality to be a conceptual primitive the nature of which is revealed only in direct grasp. Although there is certainly textual support for this interpretation, it appears in tension with Brentano’s repeated attempts to analyze intentionality in terms of ‘notional constituents’ – aspects of intentionality which cannot (...)
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  7. Brentano's theory of intentionality.Michelle Montague - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):445-454.
    Chapters Five through Nine of Book Two of Brentano's 1874 Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint were republished in 1911 with a substantive Appendix of Brentano's remarks. In the Appendix Brentano makes a significant addition to his theory of intentionality. In particular, he introduces new modes within the mode of presentation itself. These new modes are needed to account for our thinking about anything in a relational structure (in recto and in obliquo modes) and for our thoughts about time (the temporal (...)
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  8. Brentano on Act, Content and Intentionality.Mark Textor - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (1-2):173-196.
    This article offers a reconstruction of Brentano’s notion of act content that identifies the content of a mental act with a combination of marks (Merkmale) or a single such mark. The author will first clarify the role act content plays in Brentano’s philosophy of psychology and then go on to locate the proposed notion of content in the historical context of Brentano’s work as well as in his writings at the time of Psychologie. The author will defend this notion against (...)
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  9. Deeper into Brentano’s mind: response to critics.Mark Textor - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1440-1462.
    Laura Gow, Uriah Kriegel, Hamid Taieb, and David Woodruff Smith raised help – and insightful points of criticism about my book Brentano’s Mind. In this paper, I will defend and expand on the main claims of the book. My responses are organized around four topics: Psychology without a Soul, Plural Intentionality (and Conceptual Parts), Intentionality and Intentionality Primitivism, Mark of Mental.
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  10. Judgement and Intentionality in Early Brentano.Maria van der Schaar - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (1-2):151-172.
    There are two notions of intentionality: the first contains the thesis that our acts of thinking, judging and loving have a content; the second that our mental acts are about something external to the act. Brentano uses the term ‘intentionality’ only in relation to the first notion; for him, intentionality does not function as a bridge between the mind and the external world. Is it possible for a phenomenologist like Brentano to give an account of the second notion of intentionality? (...)
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  11. Consciousness and Intentionality in Franz Brentano.Mauro Antonelli - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):301-322.
    The paper argues against the growing tendency to interpret Brentano’s conception of inner consciousness in self-representational terms. This trend has received support from the tendency to see Brentano as a forerunner of contemporary same-order theories of consciousness and from the view that Brentano models intransitive consciousness on transitive consciousness, such that a mental state is conscious insofar as it is aware of itself as an object. However, this reading fails to take into account the Brentanian concept of object, which is (...)
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  12. Brentano on Presenting Something as an Intentional Object.Denis Fisette - 2022 - In Fosca Mariani-Zini (ed.), The Meaning of Something: Rethinking the Logic and the Unity of Metaphysics. Springer. pp. 1-30.
    This paper is about the question: what is it for a mental state to mean (or present) something as an intentional object? This issue is addressed from a broad perspective, against the background of Brentano’s philosophical programme in Psychology from an empirical standpoint, and the controversy between the proponents of a non-canonical interpretation of Brentano’s theory of intentionality, and the so-called orthodox interpretation advocated namely by R. Chisholm. My investigation is divided into six parts. In the first section, I explain (...)
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  13. La Philosophie de Franz Brentano.Denis Fisette - 2022 - Paris: Vrin.
    This book is a short presentation of the life, thought and work of Franz Brentano. The first part of the book is a biography of Brentano, the second is a description of the ramifications of Brentano's philosophical program, and the third section offers a succinct description of his main works and of his Nachlaß. Résumé: Cet opuscule est une présentation sommaire de la vie, de la pensée et de l'œuvre de Franz Brentano. L'ouvrage est divisé en trois parties. La première (...)
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  14. La fabrique des pensées.Pierre Steiner - 2022 - Paris: Editions du Cerf.
    Un citron, La Joconde et le Père Noël. Aucun de ces trois objets ne se trouve dans notre esprit, pourtant, nous parvenons à les concevoir. Comment ? Mobilisant les ressources du pragmatisme et de la philosophie des techniques, Pierre Steiner développe l’idée que nos pensées ne visent pas le monde mais y sont inscrites. -/- Les principales traditions philosophiques ont en commun le présupposé que l’esprit serait comme un archer qui aurait le pouvoir, par la pensée, de « viser le (...)
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  15. Franz Brentano: mente, coscienza, realtà.Mauro Antonelli - 2021 - Roma: Carocci editore. Edited by Federico Boccaccini.
  16. Irrealia: F. Suárez’s Concept of Being in the Formulation of Intentionality from F. Brentano to J. Patočka and Beyond.Piotr J. Janik - 2021 - In Piotr J. Janik & Carla Canullo (eds.), Intentionnalité comme idée. Phenomenon, between efficacy and analogy. Kraków, Poland: pp. 31-45.
    The language of phenomenology includes terms such as intentionality, phenom- enon, insight, analysis, sense, not to mention the key term of Edmund Husserl’s manifesto, “the things themselves” to return to . But what does the “things them- selves” properly mean? How come the term is replaced by the “findings” over time? And what are the findings for? The investigation begins by looking at the tricky legacy of the modern turn, trying to clarify ties to past masters, including Francis- co Suárez (...)
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  17. Brentano on consciousness, intentionality, value, will, and emotion: Reply to symposiasts.Uriah Kriegel - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):486-493.
    It is a regrettable feature of this book symposium that it appears only after the book itself. If I could solicit from three outstanding philosophers detailed analyses of substantial portions of the book before publishing it, the book would have been far better. Below, I indicate some of the ways the book would have been better.
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  18. Intra‐mental or intra‐cranial? On Brentano's concept of immanent object.Ka-Wing Leung - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):1039-1059.
    The aim of this paper is to elucidate Franz Brentano's concept of immanent object through his own words and from his own perspective. The prevalent account of Brentano's revival of intentionality, his initial failure to distinguish between object and content, and his wrong‐headed immanentism, is largely derived from his students. Brentano's objection to it, although well known, is seldom heeded. In fact, plenty of guidelines have been provided by Brentano himself in his writings on how his concept of immanent object (...)
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  19. Brentano on Phenomenal and Transitive Consciousness, Unconscious Consciousness, and Phenomenal Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 31:458-467.
    In Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value, Uriah Kriegel argues that Brentano’s work forms a “live philosophical program” (p. 14, italics omitted) that contemporary philosophy has much to learn from and that is promising and largely correct. To this end, Kriegel argues that Brentano’s notion of consciousness is the contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness, that Brentano’s rejection of unconscious mentality is a grave mistake that can be fairly neatly excised from his overall view, and that Brentano’s notion of intentionality is (...)
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  20. The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐intentional Awareness.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):659-675.
    According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The (...)
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  21. Décrire: La psychologie de Franz Brentano.Massin Olivier & Mulligan Kevin - 2021 - Paris: Vrin.
    L'enseignement viennois de Brentano a faconne les philosophies exactes du XXe siecle, au travers de ses eleves Husserl, Meinong, Twardowski, Stumpf, Ehrenfels ou Marty. Si la theorie de l'intentionnalite, l'ontologie et la logique de Brentano ont fait l'objet de discussions approfondies, son anatomie d'une grande variete d'actes mentaux - choisir, hair, juger, percevoir, preferer, remarquer, savoir, sentir, souffrir, toucher, voir - demeure encore trop ignoree. Ce livre est consacre a cette analyse descriptive minutieuse et foisonnante. Outre son interet historique, celle-ci (...)
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  22. Brentano and the Medieval Distinction Between First and Second Intentions.Hamid Taieb - 2021 - Topoi 41 (1):143-158.
    Brentano’s account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This is justified by his claim that objects of thought have a specific mode of being—namely, “intentional inexistence” —and that mental acts have an “intentional relation” to these objects. These technical terms in Brentano do indeed recall the medieval notions of esse intentionale, which is a mode of being, and of intentio, which is a “tending towards” of mental acts. However, within the lexical family of intentio there (...)
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  23. F. Brentano y la concepción escolástica de ser intencional.David Torrijos Castrillejo - 2021 - Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 38 (2):293-306.
    Brentano claims to have taken his idea of intentionality from scholastic thought. However, in St. Thomas Aquinas, intentionality is not just the mark of knowledge, although some scholastics have interpreted it this way, even during Brentano’s lifetime. Moreover, to elaborate his idea of intentional presence, the German philosopher was not only inspired by him, but also by Francisco Suárez. In an unpublished manuscript from his legacy, Brentano understands Suarez’s objective concept as a representation of the thing in the psyche. Thus, (...)
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  24. Hamid Taieb, Relational Intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition. [REVIEW]Colin Guthrie King - 2020 - Ancient Philosophy Today 2 (2):183-189.
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  25. BRENTANO, FRANZ, Psicología desde el punto de vista empírico (traducción y presentación de Sergio Sánchez-Migallón), Ediciones Sígueme, Colección Hermeneia, Salamanca, 2020, 318 pp. [REVIEW]Miguel Martí-Sánchez - 2020 - Anuario Filosófico:581-583.
  26. Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, and Value and Brentano’s Mind.Michelle Montague - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):473-480.
  27. La relación intencional de Brentano a la luz del pensamiento de Suárez.David Torrijos-Castrillejo - 2020 - Anuario Filosófico 53:419-446.
    Brentano’s introduction of the concept of intentionality into contemporary philosophy was indebted to scholastic sources. Among these, Suárez has not been sufficiently addressed, even though his idea of transcendental relation is relied upon by Brentano to describe the intentional relation. In addition, in his examination of being as truth in Suárez, Brentano manifests his assumption of the principle of immanence. Finally, this article argues that, even in his reist period, Brentano continued to understand knowledge as a relation.
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  28. Brentano's mind. [REVIEW]Giuliano Bacigalupo - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (1):238-239.
  29. Brentano on Perception and Illusion.Guillaume Frechette - 2019 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception: Proceedings of the 40th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 119-134.
    Brentano’s philosophy of perception has often been understood as a special chapter of his theory of intentionality. If all and only mental phenomena are constitutively intentional, and if perceptual experience is mental by definition, then all perceptual experiences are intentional experiences. I refer to this conception as the “standard view” of Brentano’s account of perception. Different options are available to support the standard view: a sense-data theory of perception; an adverbialist account; representationalism. I argue that none of them are real (...)
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  30. Relational Intentionality. Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition, by Hamid Taieb. [REVIEW]Andrea Marchesi - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (5):1062-1066.
  31. Much Ado About Nothing: Toward a Structural Realist Theory of Intentionality.Majid Davoody Beni - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (3):293-308.
    Building upon Brentano’s Psychology from an empirical standpoint. Routledge, London, [1874] Brentano 1995) reintroduction of the concept of intentionality to the contemporary philosophy, Tim Crane has famously presented the intentionality as the mark of the mental. Accordingly, the problem of “intentional existence” has resurfaced in Crane’s revival of the Brentanoian theme. Here, I revise Crane’s construal of Brentano’s notion of intentional inexistence and reinterpret it in terms of a moderate version of relationalism. My relationalist theory of intentionality is inspired by (...)
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  32. Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value.Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Uriah Kriegel presents a rich exploration of the philosophy of the great nineteenth-century thinker Franz Brentano. He locates Brentano at the crossroads where the Anglo-American and continental European philosophical traditions diverged. At the centre of this account of Brentano's philosophy is the connection between mind and reality. Kriegel aims to develop Brentano's central ideas where they are overly programmatic or do not take into account philosophical developments that have taken place since Brentano's death a century ago; and to offer a (...)
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  33. Intentionality: from Brentano to representationalism.Michelle Montague - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge.
  34. Brentano's early philosophy of mind.Robin D. Rollinger - 2018 - In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Philosophy of mind in the nineteenth century. Routledge, Taylor & Francs Group.
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  35. Practical intentionality: from Brentano to the phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles.Alessandro Salice - 2018 - In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 604-622.
    The aim of this chapter is to mine, reconstruct, and evaluate the phenomenological notion of practical intentionality. It is claimed that the phenomenologists of the Munich and Göttingen Circles substantially modify the idea of practical intentionality originally developed by Franz Brentano. This development, it is further contended, anticipates the switch that occurred within contemporary theory of action from a belief-desire to a belief-desire-intention model of deliberation. While Brentanoâ s position can be interpreted as a variant of the BD model, early (...)
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  36. Relational Intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition.Hamid Taieb - 2018 - Cham: Springer.
    This book sheds new light on the history of the philosophically crucial notion of intentionality, which accounts for one of the most distinctive aspects of our mental life: the fact that our thoughts are about objects. Intentionality is often described as a certain kind of relation. Focusing on Franz Brentano, who introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy, and on the Aristotelian tradition, which was Brentano’s main source of inspiration, the book reveals a rich history of debate on precisely the relational (...)
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  37. Brentano on Intentionality.Tim Crane - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 41-48.
    Brentano’s account of what he called intentionale Inexistenz — what we now call intentionality — is without question one of the most important parts of his philosophy, and one of the most influential ideas in late 19th-century philosophy. Here I will explain how this idea figures in Brentano’s central text, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Brentano 1995a). I will then briefly explain how Brentano’s ideas about intentionality evolved after the first publication of this work in 1874, and how they were (...)
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  38. Brentano on Appearance and Reality.Seron Denis - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge.
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  39. Knowing Things in Themselves.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):332-358.
    A perennial epistemological question is whether things can be known just as they are in the absence of any awareness of them. This epistemological question is posterior to ontological considerations and more specific ones pertaining to mind. In light of such considerations, the author propounds a naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge of things in themselves, one that makes crucial use of the work of Brentano. After introducing the resources provided by Brentano’s study of mind, the author reveals the ontological (...)
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  40. The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2017 - London and New York: Routledge.
    Both through his own work and that of his students, Franz Clemens Brentano had an often underappreciated influence on the course of 20 th - and 21 st -century philosophy. _The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School_ offers full coverage of Brentano’s philosophy and his influence. It contains 38 brand-new essays from an international team of experts that offer a comprehensive view of Brentano’s central research areas—philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and value theory—as well as of the principal (...)
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  41. Brentano's Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - In Sandra Lapointe & Christopher Pincock (eds.), Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 197-228.
    Perhaps the philosophical thesis most commonly associated with Brentano is that intentionality is the mark of the mental. But in fact Brentano often and centrally uses also what he calls ‘inner perception’ to demarcate the mental. In this paper, I offer a new interpretation of Brentano’s conception of the interrelations between mentality, intentionality, and inner perception. According to this interpretation, Brentano took the concept of mind to be a natural-kind concept, with intentionality constituting the underlying nature of the mental and (...)
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  42. Meinong and Brentano.Johann Christian Marek - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 272-282.
  43. Brentano on Sensations and Sensory Qualities.Massin Olivier - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 87-96.
    This chapter has three sections. The first introduces Brentano’s view of sensations by presenting the intentional features of sensations irreducible to features of the sensory objects. The second presents Brentano’s view of sensory objects —which include sensory qualities— and the features of sensations that such objects allow to explain, such as their intensity. The third section presents Brentano’s approach to sensory pleasures and pains, which combines both appeal to specific modes of reference and to specific sensory qualities.
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  44. Intentionality and Reference: A Brentanian Distinction.Hamid Taieb - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):120-132.
    Brentano distinguishes between intentionality and reference. According to Brentano, all mental acts are intentionally directed toward something. Some mental acts also refer to something, which is the case when their object exists in reality. For Brentano, such acts, besides their intentionality, have a peculiar relation of similarity to their object. However, there is no mention of Brentano’s distinction between intentionality and reference in the literature. Drawing on some lesser known texts, this paper aims both at showing that Brentano makes such (...)
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  45. The Intentionality of Sensation and the Problem of Classification of Philosophical Sciences in Brentano’s empirical Psychology.Ion Tănăsescu - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (3):243-263.
    In the well-known intentionality quote of his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano characterises the mental phenomena through the following features: the intentional inexistence of an object, the relation to a content, and the direction toward an object. The text argues that this characterisation is not general because the direction toward an object does not apply to the mental phenomena of sensation. The second part of the paper analyses the consequences that ensue from here for the Brentanian classification of mental (...)
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  46. Brentano's Mind.Mark Textor - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Mark Textor presents a critical study of the work of Franz Brentano, one of the most important thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work has influenced analytic philosophers like Russell as well as phenomenologists like Husserl and Sartre, and continues to shape debates in the philosophy of mind. Brentano made intentionality a central topic in the philosophy of mind by proposing that 'directedness' is the distinctive feature of the mental. The first part of the book investigates Brentano's intentionalism as well (...)
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  47. Brentano's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality.Mark Textor - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):50-68.
    Brentano's Thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental is central to analytic philosophy of mind as well as phenomenology. The contemporary discussion assumes that it is a formulation of an analytic definition of the mental. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. According to Brentano, many philosophical concepts can only be elucidated by perceiving their instances because these concepts are abstracted from perception. The concept of the mental is one of these concepts. We need to understand Brentano's Thesis (...)
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  48. Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (2):1-15.
    The notion of intentionality is what Franz Brentano is best known for. But disagreements and misunderstandings still surround his account of its nature. In this paper, I argue that Brentano’s mature account of the nature of intentionality construes it, not as a two-place relation between a subject and an object, nor as a three-place relation between a subject’s act, its object, and a ‘content,’ but as an altogether non-relational, intrinsic property of subjects. I will argue that the view is more (...)
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  49. Act and Intentionality.Benjamin Sheredos - 2016 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    Understanding the “intentionality” of mental phenomena is widely regarded as a key problem in philosophy of mind. Franz Brentano (along with his students, especially Edmund Husserl) is widely credited with bringing intentionality to philosophers’ attention. In early treatment by the Brentano school, intentionality is at least nominally understood as executed, brought about, or achieved in mental acts. And in the early 20th century, historians of psychology regarded this “act conception” of intentionality as integral for understanding the phenomenon. Yet the secondary (...)
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  50. Brentano's Act Psychology Was not Aristotelian (or Else, not Empirical).Benjamin Sheredos - 2016 - Brentano Studien 14:157-189.
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