About this topic
Summary Brentano defends a highly unusual account of judgment in Brentano 1874. On this account, all propositions are reducible to existential propositions, and accordingly all judgments are existential. In fact, it has been argued that for Brentano judgment is not really a relation to a proposition, but to a worldly individual thing. This has important implications for logic, and for Brentano's account of truth - both topics also covered in this leaf category. It is important to note that Brentano uses the term "judgment" very widely, to cover every mental state with a mind-to-world direction of fit, including perceptual states. However, his account of what makes a mental state a judgment is not in terms of anything like a direction of fit.
Key works Brentano's original account of judgment appears in Chapter 7 of Book II of Brentano 1874. It is developed further in essays and lecture notes collected posthumously in Brentano 1930/1966. Brentano's student Meinong engages with it thoroughly in Meinong 1910/1983. The logical implications Brentano derived from his account of judgment were noted in the Anglo-sphere early on - see Land 1876. These were developed in some detail in the 70s and 80s by Terrel, Chisholm, and Simons - see especially Terrell 1978 and Simons 1987. For a more general nonpropositional interpretation of Brentano's account of judgment, see Chisholm 1976 and Kriegel forthcoming.
Introductions Good introductions to Brentano on judgment are provided in Parsons 2004 and Brandl 2008. An extremely lucid if somewhat fast-paced discussion of Brentano's account of judgment and its role in Brentano's epistemology is provided in Chapter 4 of Chisholm 1986. A more slow-paced discussion is in Kriegel forthcoming. These are only English-language discussions; it should be noted that the literature on this in German and French is enormous.
Related categories

156 found
1 — 50 / 156
  1. La Conception de la Vérité du Jeune Brentano.Mauro Antonelli - 2006 - In Jocelyn Benoist (ed.), Propositions et états de choses. Vrin.
  2. Wharheit und Urteilsevidenz bei Franz Brentano.Rojszczack Artur - 1994 - Brentano Studien 5:187-218.
  3. Towards a New Brentanian Theory of Judgment.Giuliano Bacigalupo - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):245-264.
    _ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 2, pp 245 - 264 In the last few decades, the interest in Brentano’s philosophical psychology, especially in his theory of judgment, has been steadily growing. What, however, has remained relatively unexplored are the modifications that have been introduced over the years into this theory by Brentano himself and by his student Anton Marty. These amendments constitute the focus of the present paper. As will be argued, only by making such changes can the weaknesses of (...)
  4. Le « jugement motivé » et son intensité.Bernard Barsotti - 2005 - Archives de Philosophie 2005 (68):465-491.
    Dans sa Psychologie d’un point de vue empirique (côté 1874,1911,1914-1917), Brentano a jeté les bases d’une conception intentionnelle des actes de conscience. Mais où se situe, exactement, la contribution, plus ou moins contestée, de la Psychologie à la conception phénoménologique, husserlienne, de l’intentionnalité? En suivant l’évolution des analyses brentaniennes, on découvre que son apport se confirme moins du côté de la conscience noétique, selon la vision habituelle, que du côté de l’objet intentionnel, auquel Brentano donne un tout nouveau statut ontologique (...)
  5. The Doctrine Concerning the Judgment of Existence and the Critique of Some Arguments for the Existence of God in the Works of Franz Brentano (Reprinted from'Studi in Onore di A. Corsano', Pp 83-94, 1970). [REVIEW]A. Bausola - 2000 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 92 (2):282-294.
  6. Intenzionalità, verità ed evidenza secondo Franz Brentano.A. Bausola - 1967 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 59:275.
  7. Brentano Et la Théorie Réaliste de la Vérité.Jocelyn Benoist - 2004 - Phainomenon 8:9-29.
  8. Jugement et existence chez Kant. Comment des jugements d'existence sont-ils possibles?Jocelyn Benoist - 2003 - Quaestio 3 (1):207-228.
  9. The Question of Grammar in Logical Investigations, With Special Reference to Brentano, Marty, Bolzano and Later Developments in Logic.Jocelyn Benoist - 2003 - In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), Phenomenology World-Wide. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  10. Husserl entre Brentano et Bolzano: jugement et proposition.Jocelyn Benoist - 2000 - Manuscrito 23 (2):11-39.
    Il est bien connu que, dans la Ve Recherche Logique, Husserl critique la théorie brentanienne du jugement. Son problème est de définir le “porteur” de vérité auquel le jugement donne une valeur de vérité. Un tel projet le conduit très près du propositionalisme bolzanien. Alors la théorie phénoménologique du jugement apparaît comme une sorte de compromis entre la psychologie brentanienne de l’acte et un point de vue purement sémantique hérité de Bolzano. La question demeure de savoir si une telle conciliation (...)
  11. Qu'est-ce qu'un jugement?Jocelyn Benoist - 1998 - Études Phénoménologiques 14 (27-28):169-192.
  12. J. Srzednicki's "Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth". [REVIEW]Hugo Bergman - 1968 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (2):299.
  13. F. Brentano, The True and the Evident, and J. Srzedinicki, Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth. [REVIEW]Hugo Bergman - 1968 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (2):299-302.
  14. We Owe It to Sigwart! A New Look at the Content/Object Distinction in Early Phenomenological Theories of Judgment From Brentano to Twardowski.Arianna Betti - 2013 - In Mark Textor (ed.), Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. Palgrave. pp. 74.
  15. The Road From Vienna to Lvov: Twardowski's Theory of Judgement Between 1894 and 1897.Arianna Betti & Maria van der Schaar - 2004 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):1-20.
    In several manuscripts, written between 1894 and 1897, Twardowski developed a new theory of judgement with two types of judgement: existential and relational judgements. In Zur Lehre he tried to stay within a Brentanian framework, although he introduced the distinction between content and object in the theory of judgement. The introduction of this distinction forced Twardowski to revise further Brentano'stheory.His changes concerned judgements about relations and about non-present objects. The latter are considered special cases of relational judgements. The existential judgements (...)
  16. Brentano's Empiricism and the Refutation of a Priori Knowledge.Federico Boccaccini - unknown
  17. La Vérité Efficace: L’Origine du Concept de Vrai Chez Brentano Entre Evidenzphilosophie Et Pragmatisme.Federico Boccaccini - 2012 - In Ion Tanaescu (ed.), Franz Brentano's Psychology and Metaphysics. Zeta.
  18. Brentano on Truth.Johannes Brandl - forthcoming - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge.
    How to understand Brentano’s account of truth is a question of some controversy. A number of different views have been put forward as positions that Brentano held at some stage in his career. The received view has it that the early Brentano subscribed to a form of correspondence theory which he later rejected in favor of a definition of truth in terms of correct judging, where the correctness of a judgment is defined in terms of the notion of self-evidence (see (...)
  19. Was Brentano an Early Deflationist About Truth?Johannes Brandl - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):1-14.
    It is often assumed that deflationist accounts of truth are a product of philosophy of logic and language in the twentieth century. In this paper I show why this assumption is historically short-sighted. An early version of deflationism about truth can already be found in Brentano’s 1889 lecture “On the Concept of Truth.” That Brentano is a precursor of deflationism has gone largely unnoticed because of a different reception of his lecture: according to most scholars, Brentano proposes in it a (...)
  20. Brentano's Theory of Judgement.Johannes Brandl - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  21. Philosophie scientifique et philosophie des préjugés.Franz Brentano - 2013 - Philosophie 119 (4):5-32.
    Le texte traduit ici est tiré d’un recueil réunissant plusieurs écrits du philosophe allemand Franz Brentano (1838-1917) et publié en 1925 par son disciple Alfred Kastil sous le titre Essai sur la connaissance. La pièce maîtresse du recueil est un manuscrit de Brentano intitulé « À bas les préjugés ! », portant le sous-titre : « Une exhortation pour inciter l’époque actuelle à renoncer, dans l’esprit de Bacon et de Descartes, à tous les a priori aveugles » (1903). Nous avons (...)
  22. L'origine De La Connaissance Morale Suivi De La Doctrine Du Jugement Correct.Franz Brentano - 2003 - Gallimard.
  23. German Text and Translation of "Wahrheit Ist Eine Art von Ubereinstimmung".Franz Brentano - 1965 - In J. Srzendinski (ed.), Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth. Martinus Nijhoff. pp. 122-127.
  24. The German Text and Translation of "Uber der Sinn und die Wissenschaftliche Bedeutung des Satzes 'Veritas est Adequatio rei et intellectus'".Franz Brentano - 1965 - In J. Srzendinski (ed.), Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth. Martinus Nijhoff. pp. 128-131.
  25. The German Text and Translation of Kurzer Abriss Einer Allgemeinen Erkenntnistheorie, (Chapter IV) (EL. 96).Franz Brentano - 1965 - In J. Srzendinski (ed.), Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth. Martinus Nijhoff. pp. 132-136.
  26. Presentation and Judgment Form: Two Distinct Fundamental Classes.Franz Brentano - 1960 - In Roderick Chisholm (ed.), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. Ridgeview.
  27. Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil.Franz Brentano - 1956 - Francke.
  28. Psychologie du point de vue empirique.Franz Brentano - 1944 - Montaigne.
    Dans son ouvrage de 1874, repris et complété en 1911, puis augmenté à nouveau par une série d’appendices tardifs, dans l’édition procurée par Oscar Kraus, en 1924, Brentano n’est pas seulement celui qui ouvre le dossier très complet des questions psychologiques débattues dans l’après-Kant et jusqu’à la fin du XIXe siècle, dans l’espace intellectuel germanique, mais aussi et principalement anglophone; pas seulement celui qui, à la faveur de la redéfinition, à la fois très ancienne et novatrice, des phénomènes psychiques, caractérisés (...)
  29. The True and the Evident.Franz Brentano - 1930/1966 - Routledge.
    First published in English in1966, _The True and The Evident_ is a translation of Franz Brentano’s posthumous _Wahrheit und Evidenz_, edited by Oscsar Kraus. The book includes Brentano’s influential lecture "On the Concept of Truth", read before the Vienna Philosophical Society, a variety of essays, drawn from the immense wealth of Brentano’s unpublished material, and letters written by him to Marty, Kraus Hillebrand, and Husserl. Brentano rejects the familiar versions of the "correspondence theory of truth" and proposes to define the (...)
  30. Wahrheit und Evidenz.Franz Brentano - 1930 - Meiner.
    Brentanos Reflexionen über das Verhältnis von Wahrheit und Evidenz wurden erst 1930 herausgegeben. Ihre Kenntnis ist unentbehrlich für das Verständnis seines Verhältnisses zu den an ihn anknüpfenden Denkern, insbesondere zu Husserl.
  31. Versuch über die Erkenntnis.Franz Brentano - 1925 - Meiner.
  32. Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene.Franz Brentano - 1911 - Duncker Und Humblot.
  33. Miklosich Über Subjektlose Sätze. [REVIEW]Franz Brentano - 1883 - Wiener Zeitung 13:261.
  34. Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint.Franz Brentano - 1874 - Routledge.
  35. Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte.Franz Brentano - 1874 - Duncker Und Humblot.
    Im Zentrum der 1874 erschienenen bewußtseinspsychologischen Abhandlungen Brentanos steht die Beschreibung und Analyse des Psychischen. Damit bahnte sich jene Abwendung von der sensualistischen Tradition der philosophischen Bewußtseinslehre an, die in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls vollendet wurde.
  36. Immanence and Individuation: Brentano and the Scholastics on Knowledge of Singulars.Deborah Brown - 2000 - The Monist 83 (1):22-46.
  37. Quantification and Brentano's Logic.Terrell Dailey Burnham - 1978 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 5:45-66.
    Brentano's innovations in logical theory are considered in the context of his descriptive psychology, with its distinction between differences in quality and in object of mental phenomena. Objections are raised to interpretations that depend on a parallel between Urteil and assertion of a proposition. A more appropriate parallel is drawn between the assertion as subject to description in a metalanguage and the Urteil as secondary object in inner perception. This parallel is then applied so as to suggest a reinterpretation of (...)
  38. Die Kantkritik Brentanos.Eliam Campos - 1979 - Bouvier.
  39. Der Subjektivismus bei Franz Brentano in den Grenzen von Psychologie und Logik.Wolfgang Cernoch - 1998 - In Michael Benedikt, Endre Kiss & Reinhold Knoll (eds.), Verdrängter Humanismus — Verzögerte Aufklärung. Bd. 4, Anspruch und Echo: Sezession und Aufbrüche in den Kronländern zum Fin-de-Siécle. Philosophie in Österreich (1880-1920). Edituria Triade.
    Diese Arbeit zeichnet die Schwierigkeit nach, die Franz Brentano zwischen der Begruendung der Sittlichkeit aus moralischem Gefuehl und der Begruendung aus Vernunftgruenden zeitlebens gehabt hat: Die Eroerterung eines Gefuehls verwandelt dieses unweigerlich in ein Konzept der Kommunikation, das nicht nur rationaler, vielmehr noch oeffentlicher Diskussion zugaenglich wird. Beschraenkt man aber die Quelle des moralischen Gefuehls UND den Verstand auf ein individuelles Subjekt, geraet man mit der Untersuchung der Evidenz der sittlichen Erkenntnis in die naemlichen Aporien wie Franz Brentano.
  40. Marty and Brentano.Laurent Cesalli & Kevin Mulligan - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge.
    The Swiss philosopher Anton Marty (Schwyz, 1847 - Prague, 1914) belongs, with Carl Stumpf, to the first circle of Brentano’s pupils. Within Brentano’s school (and, to some extent, in the secondary literature), Marty has often been considered (in particular by Meinong) a kind of would-be epigone of his master (Fisette & Fréchette 2007: 61-2). There is no doubt that Brentano’s doctrine often provides Marty with his philosophical starting points. But Marty often arrives at original conclusions which are diametrically opposed to (...)
  41. Marty and Brentano.Laurent Cesalli & Kevin Mulligan - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 251-263.
  42. Intentionality and Speculation: The Logic of Judgment in Brentano and Hegel.Deborah Gayle Chaffin - 1982 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook
    This dissertation is a study of judgment as the first explicitly conceptual act in which being and thought are held apart. I argue that judgment, because it always involves the appropriation of an object by thought, i.e., because judgment always involves a separation between thought and being, is not the highest conceptual form for the expression of truth. The sundering that takes place in judgment must be overcome by the move to that original unity which underlies all true claims. Such (...)
  43. Brentano and Meinong Studies.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1982 - Rodopi.
  44. Brentano's Theory of Judgment.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1982 - In Brentano and Meinong Studies. Rodopi.
  45. Brentano's Nonpropositional Theory of Judgment.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1976 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1 (1):91-95.
  46. Truth, Concept Empiricism, and the Realism of Polish Phenomenology.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2008 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):23-34.
    The majority of Polish phenomenologists never found Husserl’s transcendental idealism attractive. In this paper I investigate the source of this rather surprising realist attitude. True enough the founder of Polish phenomenology was Roman Ingarden - one of the most severe critics of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, so it is initially tempting to reduce the whole issue to this sociological fact. However, I argue that there must be something more about Ingarden’s intellectual background that immunized him against Husserl’s transcendental argumentation, and that (...)
  47. Review: Franz Brentano, Psychologie du Point de vue Empirique. [REVIEW]Alonzo Church - 1947 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):56-57.
  48. Two Stages in Husserl's Critique of Brentano's Theory of Judgment.Richard Cobb-Stevens - 1998 - Études Phénoménologiques 14 (27-28):193-212.
  49. On Ontology.Roberta de Monticelli - 2003 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):171-186.
    This paper compares two basic approaches to “ontology”. One originated within the analytic tradition, and it encompasses two diverging streams, philosophy of language and (contemporary) philosophy of mind which lead to “reduced ontology” and “neo-Aristotelian ontology”, respectively. The other approach is “phenomenological ontology” (more precisely, the Husserlian, not the Heideggerian version).Ontology as a theory of reference (“reduced” ontology, or ontology dependent on semantics) is presented and justified on the basis of some classical thesis of traditional philosophy of language (from Frege (...)
  50. L'intentionnalité cognitive et ses modes : Reinach critique de Brentano.Arnaud Dewalque - 2016 - Philosophie 128 (1):20-33.
1 — 50 / 156