About this topic
Summary This category is about whether or not computers, robots, and software agents can literally be said to think.  Humans think, chimps think, dogs think, cats and birds think. But do computers?  Is your computer thinking now?  Perhaps only specially programmed computers think?  Or perhaps only computers with special hardware can think -- hardware that resembles the neurons of the brain, for example. If computers can be made to think, then does that mean that humans are a kind of robot and their brains a kind of computer -- a neurocomputer, say?  One of the deeper issues here is that the term "thinking" is ambiguous in at least two ways: It can include being conscious of one's environment (surroundings), one's personal feelings and thoughts, etc., or it can mean cogitate, learn, plan, and solve problems, where these latter terms pick out mental events that may or may not be conscious.   
Key works The idea that machines could think occurred to the very first computer builders and programmers.  See, e.g., Alan Turing's great paper Turing 1950.  The term "artificial intelligence" (AI) goes back to a summer conference in held 1956 at Dartmouth College in New Hampshire.  Many AI pioneers took it for granted that within a decade or two computers would be as intelligent as humans.  A central paper from this time is McCarthy & Hayes 1969.  Another crucial paper is Putnam's Putnam 1960.  But the optimism proved to be unjustified.  The decades came and went without machines achieving human-level intelligence.  Soon several philosophers and other researchers argued that computers would never think and that human brains and minds were completely different from computers.  The most important paper in this push-back was John Searle's famous paper: Searle 1980, where he argues that machines cannot think at all because they lack the proper semantical connection to the world.  Summaries and replies to Searle's paper accompany it in the same journal issue (Searle 1980).  Also, a summary of Searle's anti-AI argument and many replies to it can be found in Dietrich 1994.  Another form of attack on AI came from Lucas 1961, who argued that Godel's famous Incompleteness Theorems showed that machines could not think.  This theme was reinvigorated by Roger Penrose in his well-known book Penrose 1989.  Yet another form of attack on AI came from Fodor 1987.  All of these attacks on AI spawned a large literature trying to refute them, agreeing with them, or amending them. To this day, it is not known whether or not machines (computers) can think, nor if humans are machines.  Nevertheless, the effort to build intelligent machines continues, and this is probably the best way to answer the question.
Introductions See Searle 1980 and the associated replies for a good introduction to the issues surrounding Searle's attack on AI. For some good history of AI, which raises many important issues, see Pamela McCorduck's McCorduck 2004 and Daniel Crevier's AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence (1993).  
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1993 found
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1 — 50 / 1993
Material to categorize
  1. Computers and Education.Donald L. Alderman & Ernest J. Anastasio - 1974 - Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 5 (2):3-5.
  2. Discourse on Artificiality: A Unifying Framework For the Artificial Sciences.S. M. Ali & R. M. Zimmer - 1994 - Idealistic Studies 24 (3):201-226.
    This paper presents a unifying framework for the study of artificial life, intelIigence and reality. By providing this framework we can give a clear and concise introduction to the fundamental arguments of all three artificial sciences and facilitate the translation of arguments from any one domain to the other two. The framework is based on a variant of functionalism that does not exclude the role of the observer.
  3. Cattell Group Intelligence Tests. [REVIEW]John Anderson - 1930 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):235.
  4. Intelligence Tests of Yale Freshmen.John E. Anderson - 1920 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17 (17):469-469.
  5. Programmed Development.Gerard P. Baerends - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):635-636.
  6. Simulative Reasoning, Common-Sense Psychology and Artificial Intelligence.John A. Barnden - 1995 - In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Blackwell. pp. 247--273.
  7. Computers and Life Styles.Yves Battagion - 1994 - World Futures 41 (1):17-20.
  8. Computers for Everyone.Fiorella Battaglia - 2016 - Metascience 25 (2):279-280.
  9. Review of B. Rotman, Ad Infinitum - The Ghost In Turing's Machine: Taking God Out of Mathematics and Putting the Body Back In: An Essay in Corporeal Semiotics[REVIEW]J. L. Bell - 1995 - Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):218-221.
  10. Human Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence. When Are Computers Dumb in Simulating Human Reasoning?Irena Bellert - 1998 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 62:95-102.
  11. Computers and Medical Discoveries.F. M. Berger & Harry P. Kroitor - 1967 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 11 (1):63-70.
  12. Machine Readable Corpora.S. Bernardini - 2006 - In Keith Brown (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier. pp. 358--375.
  13. Ourselves and Computers Difference in Minds and Machines.Aart Bijl - 1995
  14. Intelligence Tests of Blind Subjects with the Modified Bridges Point Scale.W. E. Black - 1928 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):64 – 66.
  15. Intelligence Tests of Blind Subjects with the Modified Bridges Point Scale.W. E. Black - 1928 - Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 6 (1):64-66.
  16. Enumeration of Recursive Sets By Turing Machine.E. K. Blum - 1965 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 11 (3):197-201.
  17. Philosophie Contre Intelligence Artificielle.Jacques Bolo - 1996
    This essay replies to some representative authors, canonic indeed, of the opposition to artificial intelligence (AI) : Hubert L. DREYFUS, with his study, systematic enough in its time, What Computers can't do. His phenomenological critic meets a numerous audience, even among computer scientists. Joseph WEIZENBAUM, research worker in artificial intelligence himself, gone over to the opposition with his book Computer Power and Human Reason. His objections are classically moral and anti-techno-scientific. The philosopher John R. SEARLE, whose book Mind, Brain and (...)
  18. Machines and Intelligence: A Critique of Arguments Against the Possibility of Artificial Intelligence. Stuart Goldkind.Jay David Bolter - 1987 - Isis 78 (4):597-597.
  19. When Machines Outsmart Humans.Nick Bostrom - manuscript
    Artificial intelligence is a possibility that should not be ignored in any serious thinking about the future, and it raises many profound issues for ethics and public policy that philosophers ought to start thinking about. This article outlines the case for thinking that human-level machine intelligence might well appear within the next half century. It then explains four immediate consequences of such a development, and argues that machine intelligence would have a revolutionary impact on a wide range of the social, (...)
  20. Truth Machine: The Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting.Robyn Braun - 2010 - Annals of Science 67 (1):145-147.
  21. Intelligence Tests of Immigrant Groups.C. C. Brigham - 1930 - Psychological Review 37 (2):158-165.
  22. Report: Computers and the Medievalist.Vern L. Bullough, Serge Lusignan & Thomas H. Ohlgren - 1974 - Speculum 49 (2):392-402.
  23. Royal Society/British Academy" Artificial Intelligence and The Mind: New Breakthroughs or Dead Ends?A. Bundy & R. M. Needham - 1994 - Mind 103.
  24. Trouble with Medical Computers.Ian E. Bush - 1979 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 22 (4):600-620.
  25. Is Frankenstein's Creature a Machine or Artificially Created Human Life? Intentionality Between Searle and Turing.Marco Buzzoni - 2013 - Epistemologia 36 (1):37-53.
  26. Artificial Intelligence and Wittgenstein.Gerard Casey - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 32:156-175.
    The association of Wittgenstein’s name with the notion of artificial intelligence is bound to cause some surprise both to Wittgensteinians and to people interested in artificial intelligence. After all, Wittgenstein died in 1951 and the term artificial intelligence didn’t come into use until 1956 so that it seems unlikely that one could have anything to do with the other. However, establishing a connection between Wittgenstein and artificial intelligence is not as insuperable a problem as it might appear at first glance. (...)
  27. The Cambridge Quintet a Work of Scientific Speculation.J. L. Casti - 1998
  28. The Multiple Faces of Social Intelligence Design.Humberto Cavallin, Renate Fruchter & Toyoaki Nishida - 2010 - AI and Society 25 (2):141-143.
  29. The Comprehensibility Theorem and the Foundations of Artificial Intelligence.Arthur Charlesworth - 2014 - Minds and Machines 24 (4):439-476.
    Problem-solving software that is not-necessarily infallible is central to AI. Such software whose correctness and incorrectness properties are deducible by agents is an issue at the foundations of AI. The Comprehensibility Theorem, which appeared in a journal for specialists in formal mathematical logic, might provide a limitation concerning this issue and might be applicable to any agents, regardless of whether the agents are artificial or natural. The present article, aimed at researchers interested in the foundations of AI, addresses many questions (...)
  30. Editorial for Minds and Machines Special Issue on Philosophy of Colour.M. Chirimuuta - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):123-132.
  31. Review of KM Ford, C. Glymour & PJ Hayes (Eds) Android Epistemology. [REVIEW]W. Christensen - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10:130-132.
  32. Why Today’s Computers Don’T Learn the Way People Do.William J. Clancey - unknown
    Speaking is conceiving, not translating what has already been represented inside the brain in a hidden way.
  33. Computers and Philosophers.Gary Clark - 1985 - Philosophy Today 29 (4):332-338.
  34. Computers as Universal Mimics.Timothy Clark - 1985 - Philosophy Today 29 (4):302-318.
  35. GUNDERSON, K. "Mentality and Machines". [REVIEW]J. L. Cohen - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23:292.
  36. Modeling a Paranoid Mind.Kenneth Mark Colby - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):515.
  37. Man a Machine.Cornelius J. Connolly - 1929 - New Scholasticism 3 (3):331-332.
  38. How the World Computes.S. Barry Cooper (ed.) - 2012
  39. Stan Franklin, Artificial Minds.D. Crevier - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6:261-266.
  40. Lula, la Machine À Communiquer.Juremir Machado da Silva - 2009 - Hermès: La Revue Cognition, communication, politique 53 (1):193.
  41. Donald Gillies, Artificial Intelligence and Scientific Method.L. Darden - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (2):301-304.
  42. Intelligence and the Philosophy of Mind.Jean De Groot - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:91-99.
  43. Selections From Machine Man.Julien Offray de La Mettrie - 2004 - In Stuart M. Shieber (ed.), The Turing Test: Verbal Behavior as the Hallmark of Intelligence. MIT Press.
  44. Man a Machine.Julien Offray De La Mettrie - 1914 - Philosophical Review 23 (3):359-360.
  45. Animal Intelligence and Concept-Formation.John N. Deely - 1971 - The Thomist 35 (1):43-93.
  46. The Relationship of Group Context and Intelligence to the Overjustification Effect.Linda L. DeLoach, Kirk M. Griffith & Richard C. LaBarba - 1983 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 21 (4):291-293.
  47. Animal Intelligence: A Construct Neither Defined nor Measured.Donald A. Dewsbury - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):661.
  48. Epistemological Observations About Mind-Machine Equivalence.Farzad Didehvar & Mohammad Saleh Zareepour - manuscript
    One of the highly contraversial discussions in philosophy of mind is equivalence of human being mind and machines. Here we show that no one could prove that, in certain he is a machine.
  49. Mind and Computer.Vincent J. Digricoli - 1986 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):442-451.
  50. Kant and Turing-on the Archaeology of Thought on the Machine.Bj Dotzler - 1989 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 96 (1):115-131.
1 — 50 / 1993